The channel leading to the old harbour, the only one at this time supposed capable of receiving the ships, being found shoal, narrow, and intricate, Buonaparte, on the 3rd of July, ordered Vice-admiral Brueys to anchor the men-of-war in the road or bay of Aboukir, about 20 miles to the east-north-east of Alexandria. But, if the admiral found his position not a defensive one against an enemy's fleet, he was to direct his course for Corfu; leaving behind him the Causse and Dubois, with the guns for arming them complete, the frigates Diane, Junon, Alceste, and Artémise, the whole of the light flotilla, of which commodore Perrée had been appointed the commander, and all the frigates armed en flûte, with their guns and stores. Admiral Brueys, accordingly, with his ships of the line and full-armed frigates, proceeded to the bay of Aboukir, and there cast anchor. In the mean time an active and intelligent French officer, Captain Jean-Baptiste Barré, was ordered to survey the old harbour of Alexandria, and report upon its capacity and facility of entrance. On the 15th Captain Barré made a report, in which he showed that, out of the three channels, there was one which, when a rock or two were blown up, would have 25 feet (French) water; but Admiral Brueys, considering the risk too great to attempt entering the port with his line-of-battle ships, the smallest of which drew 22 feet, preferred remaining at Aboukir— where we will leave him awhile in the enjoyment of his apparent security, and revert to the proceedings of one who soon put that security to the test.

Notwithstanding the inconvenient situations of the wateringplaces in the port of Syracuse, the indefatigable exertions of the officers and men of the British fleet procured, by the fifth day, an ample supply; to which was added, owing solely to the influence of Lady Hamilton, the British ambassador's wife, with the court of "neutral" Naples, a sufficient quantity of fresh beef and vegetables. Thus victualled and refreshed, the ships of the fleet, on the 24th and 25th, again put to sea. All the accounts received while at Syracuse agreed in representing that the French fleet had not been seen, either in the Archipelago or the Adriatic, and yet that it had not gone down the Mediterranean: hence no other conclusion remained, than that it still lay to the eastward, and that Egypt after all was, or had been, its destination. To be certain it was so, the rear-admiral bent his course for the Morea; and on the 28th, being off Cape Gallo, despatched the Culloden to Coron. The Turkish governor behaved very graciously to Captain Troubridge, per

mitting him to take out as a prize a French wine-vessel at anchor in the port; and he dismissed him with a yet more valuable present, in the communication, that the French fleet had been seen about four weeks since on the coast of Candia, steering south-east. South-east, then, was steered by the British; and a fresh breeze astern, with a heavy following sea, drove them rapidly towards the goal of their hopes.

On the 1st of August, at 10 A.M., the towers or minarets of Alexandria, the Pharos, and Pompey's pillar, made their welcome appearance; and soon the two ports, which when last seen had been unpeopled and solitary, displayed to the view a wood of masts: as an unerring sign, too, of who were now the occupants of the city, the French flag waved upon its walls. The two British look-out ships, the Alexander and Swiftsure, as they drew nearer, caused a general disappointment to their friends in the offing, by the signal their duty obliged them to make, that the enemy's fleet did not form part of the vessels at anchor; that there appeared to be but eight ships of war, of various sizes (the Causse, Dubois, and six ex-Venetian frigates), and that the remainder were transports and merchantmen. The disappointment to the fleet was, however, of short duration; as the Zealous, a little before 1 P.M., just as the Pharos tower bore from her south-south-west, distant four or five leagues, signalled, that 17 ships of war, 13 or 14 of them formed in line of battle, lay at anchor in a bay upon her larboard bow. Instantly the British fleet hauled up, steering to the eastward under topgallantsails, with a fine breeze from north by west to

north-north-west.

Let us pause here while we endeavour to explain how it happened that, in a sea so comparatively small as the Mediterranean, two hostile filcets, one of which was so strenuously seeking the other, that other, too, from its immense numbers, spread over so wide a surface, did not come in mutual contact. On the 24th of May, when the reinforcement for Rear-admiral Nelson quitted Earl St. Vincent off Cadiz, the French fleet was running down the eastern coast of Corsica; and on the 8th of June, when Rear-admiral Nelson made sail from off Toulon, with a fleet which had only been formed the night before, Vice-admiral Brueys was standing across from Sicily to Malta. It has already been stated, that the French fleet (part of it the day before) quitted the last-named island on the morning of the 19th. Singularly enough, on the night of the 22nd, the two fleets crossed each other's track unperceived. That this should VOL. II.

N

have happened, in a case in which one of the fleets numbered, as that of the French then did, nearly 400 sail, must appear strange; but the surprise will diminish, when it is known that the spot of intersection was about midway between Cape Mesurata and the mouth of the Adriatic, the widest part of the Mediterranean; that the British fleet sailed in close order, and had no frigates to spread as look-outs; and that a constant haze pervaded the atmosphere. Subsequently to the 22nd the French steered east, to make the Goza di Candia; while the British stood southeast, or straight along the African coast. Hence the latter reached its port of destination just two days before the former; and the British fleet, as it quitted the shore on its departure, was actually seen from the Pharos tower on the morning of the same day, the 30th, towards the evening of which the French fleet made its appearance off the coast of Egypt.

We have already mentioned that the French fleet anchored in the bay of Aboukir. That fleet consisted of the

Previously to our entering into the details of the famous battle that ensued, it will be useful to give a slight description of the spot in which it was fought. The bay of Aboukir commences, as already mentioned, about 20 miles to the east-north-east of Alexandria, and extends from the castle of Aboukir, in a semicircular direction, to the westernmost or Rosetta mouth of the Nile, distant from the castle about six miles. Aboukir bay has no depth for line-of-battle ships nearer than three miles from the shore, a sand-bank, on which there is not anywhere more than four fathoms, running out to that distance. Owing also to the width of its opening, the bay affords very little shelter, except on its west-north-west side (that from which the wind on this coast commonly blows) by a small island, situated about two miles from the point whereon the castle stands, and connected with it by a chain of sand-banks and rocks, between which, however, there is a passage for small-craft. Aboukir island is surrounded by a continuation of the shoal that runs along the bottom of the bay; and which extends from the island about 1650 yards, or nearly a mile, in a north-east direction.

It appears that, on first taking up this anchorage, Viceadmiral Brueys held a council of flag-officers and captains to determine whether, in case of attack, the fleet should engage at anchor or under sail. All the officers, except Rear-admiral Blanquet, approved of the fleet's remaining at anchor; he main. tained, that it was only when a fleet could be supported by strong forts crossing each other in their fire, that any advantage was gained by anchoring. However, finding the majority against him, M. Blanquet requested that the Franklin might be placed as one of the seconds to the commander-in-chief. His request was granted, and the ships were formed in line a-head in the following order:-Guerrier, Conquérant, Spartiate, Aquilon, Peuple-Souverain, Franklin, Orient, Tonnant, Heureux, Mercure, Guillaume-Tell, Généreux, Timoléon; with, in an inner line, about 350 yards from the first, and about midway between that and the shoal, the Sérieuse frigate, nearly abreast of the opening between the Conquérant and Spartiate, the Artémise abreast of the Heureux, and the Diane, of the Guillaume-Tell.

The van-ship bore from Aboukir island south-east, distant about 2420 yards, or a mile and seven-eighths; which is rather more than double the extent of the shoal in the same direction. Between the Guerrier and her second astern, and between all the other line-of-battle ships successively, the distance was about 160 yards: so that, reckoning each of the 13 ships to

occupy, upon an average, a space of 70 yards, the length of the line was rather under a mile and five-eighths. But this line was not a straight one. From the centre ship, the Orient, the vanship bore north-west, the rear-ship south-east by south, and the Guerrier and Timoléon, from each other, about north-west half-north and south-east half-south. Hence the line was a curve or rather a very obtuse angle, having its projecting centre towards the sea. The edge of the shoal at the back of the line, on the contrary, was concave; so much so, that the Orient was nearly twice the distance from it that either the van or the rear ship was, particularly the latter. To protect his flanks, the French admiral, besides giving suitable stations to his bomb-vessels and gun-boats, erected a battery on Aboukir island, and mounted with two brass and two iron 12-pounders, a few pieces of a lighter caliber, and two 13-inch brass mortars.1 Having thus moored his fleet in, what he considered, a strong position, the French admiral awaited the issue of General Buonaparte's plans on shore. In the meanwhile vessels frequently arrived at Alexandria, with information that the British were on their return to the Egyptian coast; and on the 21st of July the two British frigates Seahorse and Terpsichore brought to for a few minutes, off the bay, as if they had been sent to reconnoitre. Besides hoisting French colours, Captain Foot made some of the private signals, obtained out of the French frigate Sensible, which the Seahorse had recently captured; and Captain Gage hoisted French colours over English, to make it appear that his frigate had been captured by the one in company. It is probable that this had the effect of masking the national character of the two British frigates, otherwise, doubtless, two or three of the fine French frigates (including the Junon) then at anchor would have slipped and given chase.

The short interval that had elapsed between the departure of one fleet and the arrival of the other had encouraged the belief, that the British were aware of the proximity of the French fleet, but for the want of sufficient strength, or for some other reason, declined attacking it. So that, when the Heureux, at 2 P.M. on the 1st of August, made the signal for a fleet of 12 sail of the line (Alexander and Swiftsure not then seen), in the northnorth-west, the French ships were still lying at single anchor, without springs on their cables, and with a great proportion of their crews on shore getting water. In an instant the men were in the text were subsequently brought off by the British.

1 The French accounts say, only two 12s and two mortars; but the guns stated