as pretend to be so, by aspiring to a superiority in one or the other; and, consequently, claiming too much deference and submission from the rest of the world. The allusion is to something faulty in the temper, and irregular in the judgment of those pretenders. Genuine goodness and solid wisdom can never lead to harm; but an ungrounded pretension to either of them may be very prejudicial,—and this is a point which is worth our enquiry.

We know from daily experience, that real goodness shews itself in a man's being gentle, and kind, and accommodating to others; and that it endears him to all impartial observers;-and that true wisdom not only makes men useful and valuable in society but ensures also their own credit and their own happiness.

On

Now, every one's goodness or righteousness must bear some proportion to his judgment and knowledge. Goodness and knowledge, however, do not necessarily suppose and constitute each other ;-because it is possible for a man to be very skilful and acute, and yet very profligate and wicked. the other hand, it is impossible to be really good, unless our goodness flows from reason and discretion; and unless our conduct proceeds from the right deductions and resolutions of our minds. The irrational creatures are incapable of virtue or of vice; because they have not the suitable faculties of knowledge, judgment, or choice. A man whose faculties are defective, can never gain extensive knowledge, for

want of capacity and his virtue and merit will, in the same degree, be contracted and insignificant. The greater are the abilities that God has given, the more incumbent it is on those who possess them, to be eminently good and useful. Where little is given, but little can be required;-it is where much has been given, that large demands will be made in

return.

As, therefore, righteousness or goodness depends upon wisdom or knowledge, and is connected with it;-as none should claim the character of being eminently righteous, unless he is also wise; and as a man, therefore to be truly good, must possess a considerable share of prudence and discretion;-let us, First. State the proper limits of knowledge, as far as it conduces to make men good; and,

Secondly. Shew what true knowledge is, or how vain are those pretensions to wisdom, which can have no other effect than that of being hurtful,—and even "destructive," to those who think themselves "over-wise," and who would be thought by others to be "righteous overmuch."

He

First. The desire of knowledge is, in some sort, natural to man, and appears to be strongly implanted in his mind. It results immediately from the endowments which we have received from God. created us" in his own image ;" and, as He is necessarily and absolutely perfect in Himself, he has taught us to aspire to all attainable perfection. But the perfection attainable by us is of gradual acquirement.

The inward faculties must be cultivated and improved; the understanding must be active, and diligently employed: and though we may not be able to reach a high degree of proficiency, yet our desires will outrun our acquisitions. Our knowledge and improvement, indeed, will always be confined to some certain bounds, and those not very wide at the best; though we cannot fix a barrier to our thoughts, beyond which they will not attempt to pass.

But though the desire of knowledge is natural to man, yet that desire ought to be regulated and adjusted by the boundaries which nature herself prescribes. We should labour after such only as is not above our condition,-such as is suited to our faculties, such as our abilities, and our circumstances in life may warrant us in pursuing. Useful improvement, that is plainly within our reach, we ought never to neglect. In such pursuits, all time is well employed; and all endeavours, with proper care, will be successful. But such knowledge as is only curious and amusing, or such as is founded only on vanity and pride, will not repay the labour spent upon it, and is always prejudicial to the mind. This must be the case, when we busily pry into any of those things which, by their very nature, are beyond our search, and cannot be discovered; or when we plunge into enquiries which are unfitted and unequal to our talents. The knowledge of God, as far as it is necessary to enable us properly to discharge our duty, as

reasonable and accountable creatures, is always within our reach; and is the easiest and most laudable study to which we can apply :—and yet, some points there may be, relating to God, and even to ourselves, which we can never explain,-which the very circumstances of our nature will not enable us to understand, and, which if we pretend to understand, we deceive ourselves. For instance, the moral part of ourselves is always within our inspection. We can marshal all our passions. We may learn to govern them, and keep them in proper discipline. We may mark out the relations in which we stand to God and to men; and thence we may deduce the most certain rules of duty and obligation. Such knowledge is good for us; as it makes us better and happier than we otherwise should be. For this, our faculties are framed; and of this it is a disgrace to be ignorant. At the same time, we are, in a great measure, ignorant of our natural constitution. We may make thousands of unavailing efforts to explain the mechanism of our bodies, or to shew wherein human nature consists. How much less able, then, must we be, to define the particular manner in which God exists, or to explain the inscrutable secrets of the Divine Nature. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for us. We cannot attain unto it."

As it is evidently impossible for short-sighted man to know or to comprehend all things, it is possible, that ambitious pretensions or anxious enquiries into abstruse and hidden points, may be presumptuous

The inward faculties must be cultivated and improved; the understanding must be active, and diligently employed: and though we may not be able to reach a high degree of proficiency, yet our desires will outrun our acquisitions. Our knowledge and improvement, indeed, will always be confined to some certain bounds, and those not very wide at the best; though we cannot fix a barrier to our thoughts, beyond which they will not attempt to pass.

But though the desire of knowledge is natural to man, yet that desire ought to be regulated and adjusted by the boundaries which nature herself prescribes. We should labour after such only as is not above our condition,-such as is suited to our faculties, such as our abilities, and our circumstances in life may warrant us in pursuing. Useful improvement, that is plainly within our reach, we ought never to neglect. In such pursuits, all time is well employed; and all endeavours, with proper care, will be successful. But such knowledge as is only curious and amusing, or such as is founded only on vanity and pride, will not repay the labour spent upon it, and is always prejudicial to the mind. This must be the case, when we busily pry into any of those things which, by their very nature, are beyond our search, and cannot be discovered; or when we plunge into enquiries which are unfitted and unequal to our talents. The knowledge of God, as far as it is necessary to enable us properly to discharge our duty, as