merce with foreign nations or among the several States, the regulation of which was vested in the General Government."

In 1867, in Mumford v. Wardwell (6 Wall, 423, 436), the United States Supreme Court again held that when California was admitted into the Union in 1850, the Act of Congress admitting her declares that she is so admitted on an equal footing in all respects, with the original States and that the:

"Settled rule of law in this Court is, that the shores of navigable waters and the soils under the same in the original States were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the several States and that the new States since admitted have the same rights, sovereignty and jurisdiction in that behalf as the original States possess within their respective borders."

"When the Revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign and in that character held the absolute right to their navigable waters and the soils under them, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution."

"Necessary conclusion is, that the ownership of the lot in question (flat in San Francisco Bay) when the State was admitted into the Union, became vested in the State as the absolute owners, subject only to the paramount right of navigation."

And, as recently as in 1935, the United States Supreme Court again held in Borax Ltd. v. Los Angeles (296 U. S. 10), that tidelands in California passed to the State upon her admission to the Union, said that the Federal Government had no right to convey tideland which had vested in the State by virtue of her admission. In that case the city of Los Angeles brought suit to quiet title to lands claimed to be tidelands owned by it under a legislative grant by the State of California; while the Borax Co. claimed under a patent of the United States in December 1881 which, in the words of the Court "purported to convey land on the Pacific Ocean."

The Court through Chief Justice Hughes quoted from the above cited case of McCready v. Virginia, and held that,

The lands in question were tidelands.

The Federal Government had no right to convey tidelands which had vested in the State by virtue of her admission,

Specifically, the term "public lands" did not include tidelands. In this connection the United States Supreme Court again held:

"The soils under tidewaters within the original States were reserved to them respectively, and the States since admitted to the Union have the same sovereignty and jurisdiction in relation to such lands within their borders as the original States possessed" (p. 15).

And, that these lands being tidelands, "title passed to California at the time of her admission to the Union in 1850."

"That the Federal Government had no power to convey tidelands which had thus vested in a State (citing Pollard v. Hagen, Goodtitle v. Kibbe above).

Further, to cap the climax, Mr. Ickes, former Secretary of the Interior, who agitated this Federal land grab, declared officially that he knew that such was the settled law. In his letter dated December 22, 1933, to Mr. Proctor of Long Beach, Calif., rejecting his application for a lease under the Federal Leasing Act of 1920, Mr. Ickes stated:

"It has been distinctly settled that

*

*

* * the title to the shore and lands under water in front of land so granted inures to the State within which they are situated * *. Such title to the shore and lands under water is regarded as incident to the sovereignty of the State *. "The foregoing is a statement of the settled law, and therefore no right can be granted to you either under the Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 437), or under any other public-land law to the bed of the Pacific Ocean either within or without the 3-mile limit. Title to the soil under the ocean within the 3-mile limit is in the State of California and the land may not be appropriated except by authority of the State."

I have stated that all courts of the land consistently have followed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, establishing a well-settled jurisprudence in this country, that the States and their grantees own the submerged lands within their borders.

By contrast the United States Supreme Court in June 1947 pretended that the State of California had "invaded" the title or paramount right asserted by the United States to an area of tideland within that State's boundary, and that California had converted to its own use oil which was extracted from those tidelands (which had ever before been recognized as its own property). "This alone,"

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said the Supreme Court, "would sufficiently establish the kind of concrete, actua. conflict of which we have jurisdiction under article III."

That smacks of the fabled wolf that ate up the helpless little lamb.

The United States Supreme Court had repeatedly recognized and judicially stated the right and title of the coastal States of the Union, including California, to the tidelands within their boundaries or jurisdiction.

In 1876, in McCready v. Virginia, above, the United States Supreme Court adjudicated with almost solemn and poetic dignity upon the united sovereignty of the people of the States, and held that the principle was long settled in this Court that each State owns the beds of all tidewaters within its jurisdiction, and owned the tidewaters themselves and the fish in them so far as they are capable of ownership, and that for this purpose the State represents its people, and that such ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty and in fact is a property right and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship.

What a far cry is that decree of the highest court of our land of the free, from that of the highest court of the same land of regimented nationalization, which now solemnly holds that where that sovereign right of ownership in the people of a State, which it now refers to as the "bare legal title" to the lands under the marginal sea is questioned by this Federal Government, the right of power and domination of the United States transcends those of a mere property

owner.

Thus for the first time the United States Supreme Court has adopted and put into effect the totalitarian doctrine of the supremacy of the State over the people, or that the people have no property or right whenever the Federal Government wishes to appropriate, because of its power and dominion.

The Supreme Court ignored all its prior jurisprudence on the subject of tidal ownership by the individual State for its sovereign people, and its repeated decisions since 1842 that the Original Thirteen States absolutely owned all their navigable waters and the soils under them for the common use of the sovereign people of each State, subject only to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the Federal Government (navigation, interstate and foreign commerce, and national defense), and that all States since admitted into the Union succeeded to the same ownership and rights of sovereignity.

However, the Supreme Court did, with seeming compunction, admit the right and power of Congress to legislate on the matter of recognizing the century old fact of tidal ownership in the States for their sovereign people, or ratify and confirm their totalitarian decree, either by positive action or inaction.

The response to this apparent challenge of the Supreme Court to the Congress of the elected representatives of the sovereign people of the States of the Union is awaited with universal attention and concern.

Here may we note in passing that of those who subscribed in the United States Senate to the totalitarian tidal land grab by opposing House Joint Resolution 225 on July 22, 1946, the following were retired from their high public office of trust by the sovereign people of their own State, viz:

Carvill (Democrat), of Nevada, defeated.

Guffey (Democrat), of Pennsylvania, defeated.
Huffman (Democrat), of Ohio, defeated.

La Follette (Republican), of Wisconsin, defeated.
Mead (Democrat), of New York, defeated.
Mitchell (Democrat), of Washington, defeated.
Murdock (Democat), of Utah, defeated.
Tunnell (Democrat), of Delaware, defeated.
Hart (Republican), of Connecticut, retired.

And finally, because of the seriousness of this situation, the policy of the United States Government since its beginning, formulated by statute, is so seriously threatened-this Congress, and this Congress alone on behalf of the sovereign people of all the States of the Union, can set at rest once and for all this entire matter by reaffirming its established policy through adoption of Senate bill 1545.

Mr. PEREZ. I thought I would call those cases and situations to your attention. I do want to try to impress you with the fact that this momentous question deserves more study and research than has been given to it apparently by the unknown author of H. R. 5991. I have tried to find out who the sponsor or the author of that bill is. I am

told it is parentless. H. R. 5992 is the administration measure, but both are introduced by the same author.

Mr. GOSSETT. I might say to the judge that these bills will be carefully gone over by the committee and any bill reported by the committee will be rather carefully written.

Mr. PEREZ. I am sure that is so, but I thought I would make those observations so you will think along those lines.

You will note in subparagraph (g) on page 3, the term "coastal States" shall mean those States any portion of which boarders upon the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean. Why leave out the Great Lakes when the Great Lakes have always been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be "open seas"?

As a matter of fact the United States Supreme Court has held most positively that the Great Lakes States, as well as all other coastal States, own their submerged tidal lands within their boundaries. In 1892, in the case entitled Illinois Central R. Co. v. People of the State of Illinois (146 U. S., p. 435) the Supreme Court held as follows, and I quote:

It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tidewaters within the limits of the several States, belong to the respective States within which they are found with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of Congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the States. This doctrine has been often announced by this Court, and is not questioned by counsel of any of the parties (Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 3, How. 212 (11:565); Wever v. Board of State Harbor Comrs. 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 57 (21: 798)).

The same doctrine is in this country held to be applicable to lands covered by fresh water in the Great Lakes over which is conducted an extended commerce with different States and foreign nations. These lakes possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide. In other respects they are inland seas, and there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and sovereignty over and ownership by the State of lands covered by tide waters that is not equally applicable to its ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by the fresh waters of these lakes.

The Supreme Court held that the Great Lakes were "high seas" in the earlier cases of Dutton v. Strong (1 Black (66 U. S.) 23), and The Genesee Chief (12 How. 443 (in 1851)); and also in United States v. Rodgers (150 U. S. 249, 256 (in 1893)).

I am not against the Great Lakes having their tidelands just as all other States and they are all entitled to them. But does it not bear inquiry? Is it because of influence of some statesmen or politicians from Illinois or other places that these bills define the Great Lakes as "inland lakes"? There should not be a distinction made to make fish of one and fowl of the other. And while they are attempting to make fish of Louisiana, Texas, and California, sirs, New York, New Jersey, Maine, and other coastal States will be the victims if these bills are enacted into law. Unwittingly, possibly, but just as certainly.

The only distinction I can see between H. R. 5991 and H. R. 5992 is that an attempt is made in H. R. 5991 to reserve to the coastal States a 3-mile marginal belt, under this definition, except for one ambiguity in H. R. 5991. Under H. R. 5992, the Federal Government would be recognized as having ownership control over the "submerged coastal lands" including the Continental Shelf. However, in some of

these provisions, it is quite vague and open to interpretation, and the States would be headed for trouble in any legal action or litigation because then the court would have to decide just what is meant by using the terms "marginal coast" in some places in the bill, or "submerged marginal lands" and "Continental Shelf."

You will note that both bills make the leasing law of 1920 applicable, except where there are provisions in conflict provided in this bill. I think we know that under the Leasing Act of 1920, the greatest latitude is afforded to the Secretary of the Interior to lease at will, without competitive bids, and at the nominal price of 50 cents an acre for a couple of years. There is a provision in this bill that after the second year, $1 will be the flat rental paid. However, as has been pointed out to you by Mr. Madden, in Louisiana, under our general and mandatory competitive bidding system, after advertisement, while Louisiana received as much as $103 per acre cash bonus for a lease, and 50 percent of that amount for subsequent years, during the primary term, the Secretary of the Interior under the Leasing Act of 1920, received 50 cents. Now there certainly should not be that disparagement. If you read closely the provisions of section 4, the Leasing Act of 1920 would apply in most cases; because the term “may” is used instead of "shall.”

When a request by any responsible and qualified person interested in purchasing oil and gas leases is received, the Secretary "may" offer for sale on competitive sealed bidding, oil and gas leases on such area.

"May lease." It does not say he shall do it. He can still resort to the Leasing Act of 1920 under this bill.

There is another provision in this bill which I think I should call to your attention and that is subparagraph (b) of section 4. Mr. GOSSETT. To which bill do you refer, Judge?

Mr. PEREZ. They are twin bills, in that regard especially. It provides the leasing unit shall be in reasonably compact form and such areas may be determined by the secretary.

* * * shall not be less than 640 acres, or more than 2,500 acres, if within the known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field.

From my observation, in geophysical and exploration work in the Gulf of Mexico, adjoining my district, my parish in Louisiana, the making of a detailed geophysical exploration is a most expensive job. Next, it is the most expensive operational undertaking of any oil-drilling operations in the country. Some of the oil companies operating in the Gulf a few miles offshore have spent as much as $2,000,000 to build a platform for drilling and a storm comes along and does $500,000 worth of damage to it and they have to rebuild it. What group of businessmen, under those circumstances would go to that expense, undertake that hazard? Lives have been lost in those undertakings. Who would accept that responsibility to have the Secretary of the Interior say, "You can have a 640-acre lease and no more, and unless oil is produced, it is not possible because it is only on known geologic structures of a known producing oil or gas field that it is required to call for competitive bids." If there is no known producing, then the Secretary of the Interior may use his own good judgment and pleasure. There is no way of preventing his giving those leases away at 50 cents per acre to favored friends or others. He does not have to advertise.

Think over that one little possibility especially in these days of scandal in Washington, with 5-percenters and deep freezers. The latter would be pikers in connection with the door you would be opening to graft in this provision.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Does not that same possibility exist within the States?

Mr. PEREZ. No, sir; because within the States, sir, there is a mandatory provision of our law that requires competitive bidding after advertisement. I am only calling that to your attention, gentlemen, and I may appear to be a little unduly critical. Study it over, in the light of my statement, and see if that possibility exists, there.

There is another provision in this bill which would make it impossible of execution and operation. Under subparagraph (i) on page 9 of H. R. 5991 and the same subparagraph in the other bill, if any lands are leased and any operator should be charged or possibly convicted of any implication in restraint of trade in the sale of his oil, his lease is canceled. That may be a justifiable provision, but I say that it makes it impossible of development, because we have seen quite a few antitrust suits brought, some properly and others not.

Now in H. R. 5991 there is a provision which would give to the States certain management within the 3-mile limit of the marginal belt as defined and about which I have already commented.

Would this subcommittee or committee recommend to the Congress that it enact legislation at this late date to take away from the States of the Union some of their territorial boundaries which have been fixed by the treaty of independence with Great Britain in 1783, by acts of Congress, admitting these States into the Union as equals to the Original States? And this would affect the Original States as well as the States which were admitted by Congress under an equal footing. For instance, Massachusetts, one of the Original States, held a charter from the Crown which extended 10 leagues into the sea. Ten leagues into the sea is 33 miles.

By the treaty made between the Thirteen Original States and Great Britain in 1783, Britain acknowledged the 13 States by names to be sovereign independent States to which the British Crown relinquished all claims to government, "proprietary," and territorial rights to every part thereof, within 20 leagues of the shore. The Alabama boundary extended 6 leagues from the shore; Georgia, 20 leagues from the sea coast; Louisiana, the same as Texas, 3 leagues from the coast, not 3 miles; Mississippi, 6 leagues. Some of the acts of Congress specified "from shore"; others specified "from coast." Now there is a distinction between the shore line and the coast line. But I do not believe this committee would recommend to Congress, and I do not believe Congress would purposely at this late date seek, to change the boundaries, the rights, and property of the people of these various States of the Union.

Now gentlemen, for a period of over 100 years, the United States Supreme Court has held that the people of the States in their collective sovereign capacity own the tidelands, the waters and the fish within them, which included all of the resources of the tidelands. In MacCready v. Virginia, in 1876, which is cited in this little memo which I have filed with you previously, the Supreme Court held that that ownership belonged to the people of the State in their collective sov