are granted a credit of two years, or twice the time allowed ordinary preemptors on offered lands.

Nor is this all. The preemption right in question covers three sections of land containing iron ore and coal. The act passed on the 1st of July, 1864, made it lawful for the President to cause tracts embracing coal beds or coal fields to be offered at public sale in suitable legal subdivisions to the highest bidder, after public notice of not less than three months, at a minimum price of $20 per acre, and any lands not thus disposed of were thereafter to be liable to private entry at said minimum. By the act of March 3, 1865, the right of preemption to coal lands is granted to any citizen of the United States who at that date was engaged in the business of coal mining on the public domain for purposes of commerce; and he is authorized to enter, according to legal subdivisions, at the minimum price of $20 per acre, a quantity of land not exceeding 160 acres, to embrace his improvements and mining premises. Under these acts the minimum price of three sections of coal lands would be thirty-eight thousand four hundred dollars ($38,400).

By the bill now in question these sections containing coal and iron are bestowed on this company at the nominal price of $1.25 per acre, or two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400), thus making a gratuity or gift to the New York and Montana Iron Mining and Manufacturing Company of thirty-six thousand dollars ($36,000).

On what ground can such a gratuity to this company be justified, especially at a time when the burdens of taxation bear so heavily upon all classes of the people?

Less than two years ago it appears to have been the deliberate judgment of Congress that tracts of land containing coal beds or coal fields should be sold, after three months' notice, to the bidder at public auction who would give the highest price over $20 per acre, and that a citizen engaged in the business of actual coal mining on the public domain should only secure a tract of 160 acres, at private entry, upon payment of $20 per acre and formal and satisfactory proof that he in all respects came within the requirements of the statute. It can not be that the coal fields of Montana have depreciated nearly twentyfold in value since July, 1864. So complete a revolution in the land policy as is manifested by this act can only be ascribed, therefore, to an inadvertence, which Congress will, I trust, promptly correct.

Believing that the preemption policy-so deliberately adopted, so long practiced, so carefully guarded with a view to the disposal of the public lands in a manner that would promote the population and prosperity of the country-should not be perverted to the purposes contemplated by this bill, I would be constrained to withhold my sanction even if this company were, as natural persons, entitled to the privileges of ordinary preemptors; for if a corporation, as the name and the absence of any designation of individuals would denote, the measure before me is liable to another fatal objection.

Why should incorporated companies have the privileges of individual preemptors? What principle of justice requires such a policy? What motive of public welfare can fail to condemn it? Lands held by corporations were regarded by ancient laws as held in mortmain, or by "dead hand," and from the time of Magna Charta corporations required the royal license to hold land, because such holding was regarded as in derogation of public policy and common right. Preemption is itself a special privilege, only authorized by its supposed public benefit in promoting the settlement and cultivation of vacant territory and in rewarding the enterprise of the persons upon whom the privilege is bestowed. "Preemption rights," as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, are founded in an enlightened public policy, rendered necessary by the enterprise of our citizens. The adventurous pioneer, who is found in advance of our settlements, encounters many hardships, and not unfrequently dangers from savage incursions. He is generally poor, and it is fit that his enterprise should be rewarded by the privilege of purchasing the spot selected by him, not to exceed 160 acres.”

It may be said that this company, before they obtain a patent, must prove that within two years they "have erected and have in operation in one or more places on the said lands iron works with a capacity for manufacturing at least 1,500 tons of iron per annum." On the other hand, they are to have possession for two years of more than 12,000 acres of the choice land of the Territory, of which nearly 2,000 acres are to contain iron ore and coal and over 10,000 acres to be of timber land selected by themselves. They will thus have the first and exclusive choice. In fact, they are the only parties who at this time would have any privilege whatever in the way of obtaining titles in that Territory. Inasmuch as Montana has not yet been organized into a land district, the general preemption laws for the benefit of individual settlers have not yet been extended to that country, nor has a single acre of public land in the Territory yet been surveyed. With such exclusive and extraordinary privileges, how many companies would be willing to undertake furnaces that would produce 5 tons per day in much less time than two years?

It is plain the pretended consideration on which the patent is to issue bears no just proportion to that of the ordinary preemptor, and that this bill is but the precursor of a system of land distribution to a privileged class, unequal, unjust, and which ought not to receive the sanction of the General Government. Many thousand pioneers have turned their steps to the Western Territories, seeking, with their wives and children, homesteads to be acquired by sturdy industry under the preemption laws. On their arrival they should not find the timbered lands and the tracts containing iron ore and coal already surveyed and claimed by corporate companies, favored by the special legislation of Congress, and with boundaries fixed even in advance of the public surveys-a departure from the salutary provision requiring a settler upon unsurveyed lands to limit the

boundaries of his claim to the lines of the public survey after they shall have been established. He receives a title only to a legal subdivision, including his residence and improvements. The survey of the company may not accord with that which will hereafter be made by the Government, while the patent that issues will be descriptive of and confer a title to the tract as surveyed by the company.

I am aware of no precedent for granting such exclusive rights to a manufacturing company for a nominal consideration. Congress have made concessions to railway companies of alternate sections within given limits of the lines of their roads. This policy originated in the belief that the facilities afforded by reaching the parts of the country remote from the great centers of population would expedite the settlement and sale of the public domain. These incidental advantages were secured without pecuniary loss to the Government, by reason of the enhanced value of the reserved sections, which are held at the double minimum. Mining and manufacturing companies, however, have always been distinguished from public-improvement corporations. The former are, in law and in fact, only private associations for trade and business on individual account and for personal benefit. Admitting the proposition that railroad grants can stand on sound principle, it is plain that such can not be the case with concessions to companies like that contemplated by this measure. In view of the strong temptation to monopolize the public lands, with the pernicious results, it would seem at least of doubtful expediency to lift corporations above all competition with actual settlers by authorizing them to become purchasers of public lands in the Territories for any purpose, and particularly when clothed with the special benefits of this bill. For myself, I am convinced that the privileges of ordinary preemptors ought not to be extended to incorporated companies.

A third objection may be mentioned, as it exemplifies the spirit in which special privileges are sought by incorporated companies.

Land subject to Indian occupancy has always been scrupulously guarded by law from preemption settlement or encroachment under any pretext until the Indian title should be extinguished. In the fourth section of this act, however, lands held by "Indian title” are excepted from prohibition against the patent to be issued to the New York and Montana Iron Mining and Manufacturing Company.

The bill provides that the patent "shall convey no title to any mineral lands except iron and coal, or to any lands held by right of possession, or by any other title, except Indian title, valid at the time of the selection of the said lands." It will be seen that by the first section lands in "Indian reservations" are excluded from individual preemption right, but by the fourth section the patent may cover any Indian title except a reservation; so that no matter what may be the nature of the Indian title, unless it be in a reservation, it is unprotected from the privilege conceded by this bill. Without further pursuing the subject, I return the bill to the Senate

without my signature, and with the following as prominent objections to its becoming a law:

First. That it gives to the New York and Montana Iron Mining and Manufacturing Company preemption privileges to iron and coal lands on a large scale and at the ordinary minimum-a privilege denied to ordinary preemptors. It bestows upon the company large tracts of coal lands at one-sixteenth of the minimum price required from ordinary preemptors. It also relieves the company from restrictions imposed upon ordinary preemptors in respect to timber lands; allows double the time for payment. granted to preemptors on offered lands; and these privileges are for purposes not heretofore authorized by the preemption laws, but for trade and manufacturing.

Second. Preemption rights on such a scale to private corporations are unequal and hostile to the policy and principles which sanction preemption laws.

Third. The bill allows this company to take possession of land, use it, and acquire a patent thereto before the Indian title is extinguished, and thus violates the good faith of the Government toward the aboriginal tribes. ANDREW JOHNSON.

To the House of Representatives:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 16, 1866.

A careful examination of the bill passed by the two Houses of Congress entitled "An act to continue in force and to amend 'An act to establish a bureau for the relief of freedmen and refugees, and for other purposes '' has convinced me that the legislation which it proposes would not be consistent with the welfare of the country, and that it falls clearly within the reasons assigned in my message of the 19th of February last, returning, without my signature, a similar measure which originated in the Senate. It is not my purpose to repeat the objections which I then urged. They are yet fresh in your recollection, and can be readily examined as a part of the records of one branch of the National Legislature. Adhering to the principles set forth in that message, I now reaffirm them and the line of policy therein indicated.

The only ground upon which this kind of legislation can be justified is that of the war-making power. The act of which this bill is intended as amendatory was passed during the existence of the war. By its own provisions it is to terminate within one year from the cessation of hostilities and the declaration of peace. It is therefore yet in existence, and it is likely that it will continue in force as long as the freedmen may require the benefit of its provisions. It will certainly remain in operation as a law until some months subsequent to the meeting of the next session of Congress, when, if experience shall make evident the necessity of additional legislation, the two Houses will have ample time to mature

and pass the requisite measures.

In the meantime the questions arise,

Why should this war measure be continued beyond the period designated in the original act, and why in time of peace should military tribunals be created to continue until each "State shall be fully restored in its constitutional relations to the Government and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United States"?

It was manifest, with respect to the act approved March 3, 1865, that prudence and wisdom alike required that jurisdiction over all cases concerning the free enjoyment of the immunities and rights of citizenship, as well as the protection of person and property, should be conferred upon some tribunal in every State or district where the ordinary course of judicial proceedings was interrupted by the rebellion, and until the same should be fully restored. At that time, therefore, an urgent necessity existed for the passage of some such law. Now, however, war has substantially ceased; the ordinary course of judicial proceedings is no longer interrupted; the courts, both State and Federal, are in full, complete, and successful operation, and through them every person, regardless of race and color, is entitled to and can be heard. The protection granted to the white citizen is already conferred by law upon the freedman; strong and stringent guards, by way of penalties and punishments, are thrown around his person and property, and it is believed that ample protection will be afforded him by due process of law, without resort to the dangerous expedient of "military tribunals," now that the war has been brought to a close. The necessity no longer existing for such tribunals, which had their origin in the war, grave objections to their continuance must present themselves to the minds of all reflecting and dispassionate men. Independently of the danger, in representative republics, of conferring upon the military, in time of peace, extraordinary powers—so carefully guarded against by the patriots and statesmen of the earlier days of the Republic, so frequently the ruin of governments founded upon the same free principles, and subversive of the rights and liberties of the citizenthe question of practical economy earnestly commends itself to the consideration of the lawmaking power. With an immense debt already burdening the incomes of the industrial and laboring classes, a due regard for their interests, so inseparably connected with the welfare of the country, should prompt us to rigid economy and retrenchment, and influence us to abstain from all legislation that would unnecessarily increase the public indebtedness. Tested by this rule of sound political wisdom, I can see no reason for the establishment of the "military jurisdiction" conferred upon the officials of the Bureau by the fourteenth section of the bill. By the laws of the United States and of the different States competent courts, Federal and State, have been established and are now in full practical operation. By means of these civil tribunals ample redress is afforded for all private wrongs, whether to the person or the property of the citizen, without denial or unnecessary delay. They are open to all, without regard