if it was to be continued; and would drive them to fave themselves by a peace that, independent of this, France poffeffed means which would infallibly destroy their bank and their whole paper fyftem. He faid, he knew very well it was generally conjectured, that Buonaparte would not leave Italy, and the army which had conquered under him, and which adored him he affured [us that nothing could be more unfounded than the conjecture; that Buonaparte had for more than ten days left Italy for Raftadt, to prefide over the congrefs which was formed for adjusting the affairs of the empire. He faid, that Pitt himfelf was fo confident of the abfolute neceffity of peace, that, after the naval victory over the Dutch, he had fignified his readiness to treat on the fame terms which he had offered before that action: we could not then rely on the affiftance of England. What, he asked, would be our fituation if peace fhould be made with England, before our differences with France would be accommodated. But, he continued, if even England fhould be able to continue the war, and America fhould unite with her, it would not be in our power to injure France. We might indeed wound her ally; but, if we did, it would be fo much the worfe for us. After having ftated the dangers attending us, if we fhould engage in the war, he proceeded to the advantages we might derive from a neutral fituation: and infifted, at large, on the wealth which would naturally flow into our country, from the deftruction of England. He next proceeded to detail the propofitions which are in fubftance in the paper annexed, marked (A.) except that he infifted, that we should engage to ufe our influence with our government for the loan. He stated exprefsly, that the propofitions were to be confidered as made by us; that M. Talleyrand would not be refponfible for the fuccefs of any one of them; he would only under

not have ventured to have offered fuch propofitions; but that his fituation had been very materially changed by the peace with the emperor : By that peace he had acquired, in an high degree, the confidence of the directory, and now poffeffed great influence with that body; that he was alfo clofely connected with Buona parte, and the generals of the army in Italy; and was to be confidered as firmly fixed in his poft, at least for five or fix months; that, under these circumstances, he could undertake to offer, in our behalf, propofitions which, before this increafe of influence, he could not have hazarded. M. Y. then called our attention to our own fituation, and to the force France was capable of bringing to bear upon us. He faid that we were the beft judges of our capacity to resist, so far as depended on our own refources; and ought not to deceive ourselves on fo interefting a fubject. The fate of Venice was one which might be fal the United States. But he proceeded to obferve, it was probable we might rely on forming a league with England. If we had fuch a reliance, it would fail us. The fituation of England was fuch, as to compel Pitt to make peace on the terms of France. A variety of caufes were in operation, which made fuch an effect abfolutely certain. To fay nothing of the oppofition in England to the minifter and to the war, an oppofition which the fears of the naon would increafe to fay nothing of a war against England which was preparing in the north an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, under the command of Buonaparte, spread upon the coaft of France, and aided by all the vast resources of his genius, would most probably be enabled to invade England; in which event their government would be overturned: but, fhould this invafion not be abfolutely effected, yet the alarm it would fpread through the nation, the enormous expense it muft produce, would infallibly ruin them,

take to ufe his influence with the directory in fupport of them. The propofition, he faid, concerning a fufpenfion of hoftilities on the part of France, was one which proceeded entirely from himfelf: M. Talleyrand had not been confulted upon it; and he could not undertake to fay, that that gentleman would confent even to lay it before the directory. The propofition for an advance to the government of France, of as much money as was due from it to our citizens on contract, and as might be determined to be due for veffels improperly captured and condemned, was, he faid, indifpenfible: unless we made that, it was unneceffary to make any other; for the others would not be received. He expatiated on the vast advantages we should derive from delay it was, he said, abfolutely to gain our caufe. He returned to the danger of our fituation, and the policy of making, with France, any accommodation which France would affent to. Perhaps, faid he, you believe that, in returning and expofing to your countrymen the unreasonableness of the demands of this government, you will unite them in their refiftance to thofe demands. You are mistaken: you ought to know that the diplomatic kill of France and the means fhe poffeffes in your country, are fufficient to enable her, with the French party in America, to throw the blame which will attend the rupture of the negotiations on the federalifts, as you term yourselves, but on the British party, as France terms you; and you may affure yourselves this will be done. He concluded with declarations of being perfectly difinterested; and declared, that his only motives for fpeaking thus freely were his friendship for M. Talleyrand, and his wifh to promote the interests and peace of the United States. We told him, that the freedom with which he had spoken, and which was agreeable to us, would induce us to speak freely alfo; and for once to accom

pany our view of the prefent ftate of things with a retrofpect of the paft; that America was the only na tion upon earth which felt and had exhibited a real friendship for the republic of France; that, among the empires round her, which were compelled to bend beneath her power and to obey her commands, there was not one which had voluntarily ac knowledged her government, or ma nifefted for it, fpontaneously, any mark of regard. America alone had ftepped forward and given the most unequivocal proofs of a pure and fincere friendship, at a time when almoft the whole European world, when Auftria, Germany, Pruffia, Ruffia, Spain, Sardinia, Holland, and Britain, were leagued against France. When her fituation was in truth hazardous, and it was dangerous to hold even friendly intercourfe with her, America alone ftood forward, and openly and boldly avowed her enthufiafm in favour of the republic, and her deep and fincere interest in its fate. From that time to the present, the government and people of the United States have uniformly mani fefted a fincere and ardent friendship for France, and have, as they conceive, in no fingle inftance given to this republic juft caufe of umbrage: if they have done fo, they wish it to be pointed out to them. After the determination of France to break off all regular intercourfe with them, they have fent three envoys extraordinary, to endeavour to make fuch explanations as might produce recon ciliation: these envoys are prepared to investigate, and wish to investigate any measures which may have given offence; and are perfuaded that they can entirely juftify the conduct of their government. To this diftant, unoffending, friendly republic, what is the conduct and the language of France? Wherever our property can be found, fhe feizes and takes it from us; unprovoked, fhe determines to treat us as enemies; and our making no refiftance, produces no diminution

of hostility against us: she abuses and infults our government, endeavours to weaken it in the estimation of the people, recalls her own minifter, refufes to receive ours; and, when extraordinary means are taken to make fuch explanations, as may do away mifunderstandings, and fuch alterations in the existing relations of the two countries, as may be mutually fatisfactory and may tend to produce harmony, the envoys who bear thefe powers are not received; they are not permitted to utter the amicable wishes of their country; but, in the haughty tyle of a master, they are told, that unless they will pay a fum to which their refources fcarcely extend, that they may expect the vengeance of France, and, like Venice, be erafed from the lift of nations; that France will annihilate the only free republic upon earth, and the only nation in the universe which has voluntarily manifefted for her a cordial and real friendship! What impreffion must this make on the mind of America, if without provocation France was determined to make war upon us, unless we purchased peace? We could not eally believe that even our money would fave us : our independence would never ceafe to give offence, and would always furnifh a pretext for fresh demands. On the advantages of neutrality it was unneceffary to fay any thing: all the efforts of our government were exerted to maintain it; and we would never willingly part with it. With refpect to a political connexion with Britain, we told him, that America had never contemplated it. Whether the danger he reprefented that government to be in was or was not real, we fhould not undertake to decide. Britain, we believed, had much reafon to wifh for peace; and France had much reafon to wifh for peace alfo if peace already exifted, it would not change the courfe America would purfue. M. Y. manifefted the most exceffive impatience. He interrupted us and faid, This

eloquent differtation might be true: America might have manifested and he believed had manifefted great friendship for France, and had just complaints against her; but he did not come to liften to those complaints. The minifter would, on our request, make for us certain propofitions to the directory; he had stated them to us; and all the answer he wished was, yes or no; did we or did we not folicit the minister to make the

propofitions for us. We told him that, without going further into the difcuffion, we chofe to remark one or two things: they were, that the exifting treaty gave to France certain advantages which were very effential; that especially the American coaft afforded a protection, near two thoufand miles in extent, to the prizes made by France on her enemies, and refufed that protection to the prizes taken from her; that she might be affured, that in cafe of war these advantages would be loft for ever. We alfo told him, we were convinced that France mifcalculated on the parties in America: that the extreme injuftice offered to our country would unite every man againft her. M. X. informed us, that M. Talleyrand would not confent even to lay this propofition before the directory, without previously receiving the fifty thoufand pounds, or the greater part of it. M. Y. left in writing his. propofitions, and we returned the anfwer annexed and marked (B.)

fubject it was impoffible for us to change the answer we had already given. We told him further, that we confidered it as degrading our country to carry on further fuch an indirect intercourfe as we had for fome time fubmitted to, and had determined to receive no propofitions, unless the perfons who bore them had acknowledged authority to treat with us. He faid that, perhaps M. Y. might have written powers from the minister; and we replied, that if he had, we should receive his communications with pleasure. He spoke of a probable peace with England; and, having requefted us to be at home in the afternoon, left us.

About three o'clock he came, and, after fome conversation, in which we repeated in fubftance what is ftated above, he showed us a paper, which he faid was a copy of a letter prepared for us, by M. Talleyrand, requesting an explanation of part of the prefident's fpeech, and which he faid would be fent, unless we came into the propofitions which had been made us. We wished to take a copy of it, which he declined permitting, faying, he was forbidden to allow it. We spoke of the letter coming to us as a measure we had no expectation of preventing; and he faid, he could not understand that we wished it delayed. To which we anfwered, that the delay of a few days could not be defired, unless a hope exifted, that the directory might become more friendly to our country. He faid, that intelligence had been received from the United States, that, if colonel Burr and mr, Madison had conftituted the miffion, the differences between the two nations would have been accommodated before this time. He added, as a fact he was not inftructed to communicate, that M. Talleyrand was preparing a memorial to be fent out to the United

States, complaining of us, as being unfriendly to an accommodation with France. We replied to his intelligence from the United States, that

the minifter's correfpondents in Ame rica took a good deal on themselves, when they undertook to fay how the directory would have received colonel Burr and mr. Madifon; and that, with refpect to the memorial of M, Talleyrand, it would not be eafy for him to convince our countrymen, that the statements we fhould make were untrue. If, however, we were confident that our conduct would be condemned, M. Talleyrand might be affured that the fear of cenfure would not induce us to deferve it: but that we should act in a manner which our own judgments and confciences would approve of; and we trusted, we fhould be fupported by the great body of candid and honest men. In this con verfation we again stated, that Ame. rica had taken a neutral pofition; that she had faithfully fought to preferve it; that a loan of money, to one of the belligerent powers, was directly to take part in the war; and that to take part in the war against her own judgment and will, under the coercion of France, was to furrender our independence.

EXHIBIT (A.)

[Inclosed in the Envoys' Letter, No. 2, dated November 8, 1797.] I. The American envoys fhall remain here for fix months, in the fame manner and upon the fame footing, with regard to etiquette, as did M. D'Aranjo, the envoy of Portugal.

II. There fhall be named a com miffion of five members, agreeably to a form to be established, for the purpofe of deciding upon the reclamations of the Americans, relative to the prizes made on them by the French privateers,

III. The American envoys will engage, that their government shall pay the indemnifications, or the a mount of the fums already decreed to the American creditors of the French republic, and thofe which fhall be adjudged to the claimants by the commiffioners. This payment

fhall be made under the name of an advance to the French republic, who will repay it in a time and manner to be agreed upon.

IV. One of the American envoys hall return to America, to demand of his government the neceffary powers to purchase, for cafh, the thirtytwo millions of Dutch refcriptions, belonging to the French republic, in cafe the envoys fhould conclude a treaty which fhall be approved by the

two nations.

V. In the interval, the definitive treaty fhall proceed for the termination of all differences exifting between the French republic and the United States, fo as that the treaty may be concluded immediately on the return of the deputy.

VI. The queftion of the rôle d'équipage fhall remain fufpended until the return of the deputy, and the commiffion fhall not pronounce upon any reclamation where this point fhall be in queftion.

VII. During the fix months grant ed for the going and returning of the deputy, hoftilities against the Americans fhall be fufpended, as well as the process for condemnation be fore the tribunals; and the money of the prizes already condemned, in the hands of the civil officers of the nation, fhall remain there, without being delivered to the privateers-men, until the return of the deputy.

EXHIBIT (B.)

[Received with the Envoys' Letter, No. 2, dated 8th November, 1797.] The envoys extraordinary and minifters plenipotentiary of the United States, cannot avoid obferving the very unufual fituation in which they are placed, by the manner in which they are alone permitted to make communications on the objects of their miffion. They are called upon to pledge their country to a very great amount, to anfwer demands which appear to them as extraordinary as they were unexpected, with

out being permitted to difcufs the reafon, the juftice, or the policy on which thofe demands are founded, and not only without affurances that the rights of the United States will in future be refpected; but without a document to prove that those to whom they are required to open themfelves without referve, and at whose inftance they are called on to facrifice fo much, are empowered, even by the minifter, to hold any communication with them: Yet, fuch is the anxious and real folicitude of the envoys to feize any occalion which may afford a hope, however distant, of coming to thofe explanations which they fo much wish to make with this republic, that they pafs over the uncommon and informal modes which have been adopted, and will only confider the propofitions themselves.

I. The minifters of the United States will permit no perfonal confi→ derations to influence their negotiations with the French republic. Although they expected, that the extraordinary means adopted by their government, to reconcile itself to that of France, would have been received with fome degree of attention; yet, they are too folicitous to enter upon the important and interesting duty of their miffion, to permit themselves to be reftrained by forms or etiquette.

II. On this article it is believed there can be no difagreement.

III. This article, as explained, would oblige the United States to advance, not to their own citizens, but to the government of France, fums equivalent to the depredations made by the corfairs of the republic on the American commerce, and to the contracts made with their citizens by France; and this advance, inftead of benefitting the citizens of the United States, would leave them precifely what they now are, the creditors of the French republic: the more extenfive the depredations, and the more confiderable the contracts uncomplied with, the more would the government of France receive