much support the Allied Governments might give it. As pointed out in my August 4, 12 p.m. neither Kolchak nor his civilian colleagues have been able to modify or control the forces of reaction and corruption which have surrounded them from the very beginning of the movement. I have discussed with Government officials, who I believe are earnest and well meaning men, the feasibility of the adopting certain immediate measures to win back popular support and confidence. These included some guarantees of personal security; an effort at least to punish military officials who are speculating in army supplies while the soldiers are without food, are commandeering railway cars and selling them at enormous prices; the creation of some provisional council of peasants and Zemstvo representatives with whom Kolchak could occasionally confer. But it is quite evident that they are powerless even to attempt such measures. 2d. Would it be possible with the assistance of the Allies to effect changes in personnel and methods? I have [confidence?] the Kolchak government might, with the exercise of tact and judgement and above all patience, be shaped into an instrument with which to combat Bolshevism. But it would be a long and at times a most discouraging task. For the moment we can only await the outcome of the present crisis. Should the Government survive, it can continue only provided it receives immediate help from the Allies. I will summarize in my next and final report the specific help which will be required. MORRIS 861.01/106: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State ОмSK, August 11, 1919, 11 a.m. [Received August 12, 10:50 p.m.] Having expressed in my August 8th, 5 p.m., the belief that it will be possible with Allied assistance and counsel, so to strengthen the Kolchak government that it will be able ultimately to rescue the Russian people from Bolshevik tyranny, I now submit for the Department's consideration a summary of my conclusions on the specific measures of assistance which will be required. First, in order to furnish the military supplies and the credits which Admiral Kolchak has so earnestly requested (see my July 27th, 4 p.m.), it will be necessary for the United States and the Allies: "Ante, p. 399. 1, To extend, if the present critical situation is successfully met within the next month, formal recognition to Kolchak and his associates, as the Provisional Government of Russia. Without this recognition and the substantial assistance which it implies, the Kolchak government, even though it should survive the present military crisis, could not, in my judgment, continue to function much longer. 2, To grant to the Provisional Government the following credits: for military supplies, as reported in my July 31st, 6 p.m., $90,000,000; for commercial help (see my telegram August 8th, 5 p.m.), $70,000,000 [$75,000,000]; for the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (August 9th, 5 p.m.36), $20,000,000; making total credits required of $185,000,000. To this total I would suggest adding $15,000,000 to cover expenses and salaries of Inter-Allied railway inspectors and the experts and commissions hereinafter referred to, making a final total of $200,000,000. 3, To agree to and cooperate with the plan whereby all monetary tokens, estimated at 13,500,000,000 rubles, now circulating in Siberia and other non-Bolshevik territory of Russia, shall be exchanged for standard Russian State Bank notes. This plan contemplates the immediate release of the notes now at Vladivostok and the placing of a contract with the American Bank Note Company for the immediate printing of additional notes to the amount of about 9,000,000,000 rubles (see my telegram August 4th, 11 a.m.). Second, in order to keep open the line of communication from Vladivostok to Omsk and thus permit the prompt transportation of the supplies and materials imported under the credits stated above, it will be necessary: 1, To continue the inter-Allied railway agreement and increase the number of Allied inspectors (see my telegram July 27th, 5 [4?] p.m.37). 2, To supply at least 40,000 additional troops to take the place of the Czechs (see my July 22nd, midnight, and July 30th, 5 p.m.3). 38 3, To place to the credit of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, to be expended by it as conditions might require, the sum of $20,000,000 in addition to the amount already [omission] and treat the total as a portion of the credits granted to the Kolchak government (see my telegram of August 5th, 10 p.m.1o). 40 Ante, p. 292. Apparently an incorrect reference; telegram from Omsk, Aug. 9, 5 p.m., p. 270, may be intended. Third, in order to ensure an honest and efficient use of credits and distribution of supplies it will be necessary in my judgment: 1, To organize in Siberia an Allied military supply committee and authorize it to appoint not less than 300 military inspectors for the purpose of supervising the delivery and use of the military supplies furnished (see my telegram July 31st, 6 p.m.). 2, To organize in Siberia a committee of commercial experts and authorize them to appoint [omission] agent and to supervise the delivery and distribution of goods purchased under the commercial credit (see my August 8th, 5 p.m.). Fourth, in addition to the above measures and in order to give to the Russian people the help and advice which they believe the United States is peculiarly fitted to give them, our Government should in my judgment: 1, Appoint a diplomatic representative at the seat [of] the Kolchak government; 2, associate with the representative a commercial expert, a financial expert, a labor expert and an agricultural expert; and 3, continue the Red Cross activities at the present strength during the coming winter. In submitting this plan for the consideration of the Department may I emphasize again what appear to me in the limited field of my observation the three absolutely essential requirements: the formal recognition of the Kolchak government, the grant of credits and the despatch of at least 25,000 American troops to assist in guarding the railway. Unless our policy includes all of these measures we can do little if anything to help Russia by way of Siberia and we will be forced to abandon eastern Siberia to Japanese domination. MORRIS 861.00/5021 : Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Morris), temporarily at Omsk, to the Secretary of State ОмSK, August 12, 1919, 5 a.m. Supplementing my August 11, 11 a.m.: Kolchak returned from his visit to the northern army yesterday, brought Dietrichs back with him and made him Secretary of War and Chief of Staff in place of Lebedeff, appointed the Cossack leader Ivanoff-Rinoff Lieutenant General in the Siberian Army and then immediately left for the southern army. During his stay he met the Allied representatives and told us that the Siberian Army was not sufficiently organized to make a stand at the Tobol River and would therefore continue to retreat to the Ishim River which is only 170 miles west of Omsk; that Dietrichs urged as a military measure the immediate evacuation of Omsk, but that he himself feared that the Government would fall if this were done. He had decided therefore not to evacuate Omsk, not to remove the gold reserve which is stored here, and not to accede, as long as the crisis lasts, to the demands of liberals on one side or Cossacks on the other who desired to change the structure of his Government. As emergency measures he was trying to gather from various sources 20,000 soldiers to [on] whose personal loyalty he could depend; he had ordered all civil employees of the Government between the ages of eighteen and forty to report at once for military duty at the front; and he also proposed to consolidate the Government departments in one building and thus release for military purposes the many large buildings they now occupy. From the Allied Governments he requested the following assistance: 1, Their confidence and sympathy for three or four weeks longer by which time he believed the future of his Government would be decided. 2, Not to stop shipment of materials already arranged for the rifles from America, donated equipment from Great Britain—and not to discontinue the discussions (being made?) with our War Department for additional equipment. 3, Not to postpone the discussion among the Allied Governments of any comprehensive plan of assistance which as a result of the conferences here we have submitted to our Governments. In this connection I am glad to report that Sir Charles Eliot, Count Martel, and General Takayana Gito [Takayanagi?] heartily in agreement with the conclusions summarized in my August 11, 11 a.m. and have so reported to their respective Governments. Finally he requested as imperative the following concrete measures: release of the ruble notes in the possession of Heid at Vladivostok; acceptance by the Japanese, French, and British banks at Harbin and Vladivostok of the Government's proposal to guarantee them against loss by a deposit of gold if they would consent to purchase Siberian notes and so keep the notes in circulation a few weeks longer; despatch of sufficient troops to guard the Chinese Eastern which has been deserted by the Chinese troops who undertook to guard it. I submit the following comments on these requests: In view of the action of the Supreme Council (at Paris?) I think we should do everything possible to encourage Kolchak at this time. Would the 42 See section on Release to the Kolchak Government of the Russian State Bank Notes Printed in the United States, post, pp. 453 ff.; see also Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, pp. 72 ff. Department consider favorably suggesting a purely personal message from the President to Admiral Kolchak expressing confidence in his motives and purposes, appreciation of the serious difficulties which confront him, and the hope that he may meet them successfully and thus permit our Government to assist the Russian people in a larger way to establish the liberal institutions for which they are struggling? I believe that such a message would give him great encouragement. I hope the Government will feel justified in continuing the shipment of rifles. I agree with Admiral Kolchak that the Allies should not postpone the discussion of plans for greater assistance as the question of time is of utmost importance. 43 I recommend the release of the notes at Vladivostok although I appreciate the difficulties suggested in your August 8, 7 p.m. I doubt whether the Kolchak government can or will use them under present conditions; but if requested I think Heid should be instructed to deliver them. The establishment of the yen in eastern Siberia and Manchuria would in my judgment be most unfortunate. We have no American banks interested in the proposal to buy rubles; the French and British banks will, I think, accept the proposal; and the Japanese banks will, of course, refuse. In reference to guarding the Chinese Eastern, Great Britain has already consented to use the Hampshire regiment which has left Omsk, France will supply a small contingent and General Graves has telegraphed Stevens that he has 2,000 men available. All preparations have been made to evacuate the few Americans who are still [here?]. In view of the decision not to move the Government from Omsk conditions will probably remain unchanged for several weeks, and I shall be free to start eastward unless the Department desires me to stay longer. I will await further instructions. MORRIS 861.00/4954: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris), temporarily at Omsk For Morris. WASHINGTON, August 12, 1919, 5 p.m. Referring to your July 30, 5 p.m." President informed Mission at Paris August 8, 5 p.m., in response to direct inquiry from Mr. Clemenceau that United States with utmost regret will be unable to |