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1,400 and about a thousand escaped in the dark. Included were two companies deserting from Rozanoff's according to the best information and several hundred workmen tried to join Gaida probably majority being arrested by widespread picket lines. Gaida seemed dazed and loudly blamed Allies for his fiasco though he was urged to leave Russia.

Doctor Geiman and Captain Murmyc, members of government proclaimed in Gaida's train, visited acting British High Commissioner Lampson yesterday to pay respects but Lampson refused to see them and probably this discouraged them, no efforts being made to visit any American official, as far as I am informed. Present whereabouts of members of the defeated government unknown. No Czechs joined Gaida here. Besides Tomsk Gaida sent for steamship Pechenge and searches are now being made aboard them. Rozanoff's view of Gaida's [apparent omission] seems to have changed after 2:15 this morning when he wrote Čeček requesting disarmament and surrender to him for his disposition of Gaida and Czecho-Slovak staff who had remained with him after his departure from the front. Rozanoff claimed Allied commanders conference yesterday decided that they were not Czecho-Slovak citizens. No such decision was made but acting Czecho-Slovak Commissioner Broz read memorandum reciting well-known facts that Gaida and these officers are Czecho-Slovak citizens enrolled in Czecho-Slovak reserve and received permission to serve in Kolchak's army and never have been dismissed therefrom. Repeated to Morris, Harris, Stevens. MACGOWAN

861.01/171: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TOKYO, November 20, 1919, 9 a.m. [Received November 20, 7:53 a.m.] I volunteer the following comment on recent telegrams from Harris, Smith and Macgowan: I think our representatives in Siberia must be extremely careful not to become involved in the political intrigues which will necessarily prevail while the final outcome of the Kolchak movement hangs in the balance. As long as the Kolchak government lasts we are bound, it seems to me, by the pledges of the Supreme Council in Paris, given to Kolchak last spring, to continue our moral support to his government. While I have never been able to share Harris' optimism I have felt that his attitude of unwavering loyalty to Kolchak was the only creditable position for the representatives of our government to take after the Paris decision. I have realized, however, that such an attitude

was easier to maintain in Omsk than in Eastern Siberia where Kolchak's local representatives made cooperation or assistance almost impossible. This distinction must be kept in mind if one would understand the position of Graves and Smith on the one hand and Harris and, in somewhat less degree, Teusler on the other hand. Stevens and his colleagues with rare patience made a sincere effort to cooperate in railway operation with the Kolchak military representatives. The partial failure of this effort was in my judgment chiefly due to the concealed antagonism and intrigue of the Japanese military which placed Kolchak (who I believe earnestly desired cooperation) in an impossible position. The wonder is that under the circumstances Stevens kept the railway going at all.

I hope that our Government will not feel impelled to withdraw our activities from Siberia at this time. If ever the efforts of a people need a steadying influence it is now in Siberia. But I recognize that to remain will impose upon us the duty of undertaking some larger economic relief. All our representatives in Siberia are agreed on that and every consideration of humanity, the promises we have made, our future relation with Japan, our own trade in the Orient, our national interests-emphasize the wisdom of such an enterprise and I hope that some practicable means can be devised. I believe with Smith that Japan would be prepared better now than a year ago to cooperate with us.

MORRIS

861.00/5835

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Baker)

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to your communication of November 25, 1919,97 enclosing copy of a telegram from Major General Graves, at Vladivostok, number 563, November 18,97 in which General Graves states that Colonel Krakovetsky, one of the three members of the Vladivostok Zemstvo directorate, together with five others, entered American headquarters building and are now claiming asylum.

Without in any way passing upon the question as to the right of the American military forces to furnish asylum to political refugees in such cases, it would seem that such action might easily be misconstrued by the contending factions to the embarrassment and disadvantage of the American command. It would therefore seem desirable for the Commander to cause these refugees to leave the quar

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ters as promptly as possible before any question as to their surrender shall arise, having in mind, however, the general dictates of humanity.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

861.00/5945: Telegram

The American member of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (Smith) to the Secretary of State, transmitted by the Consul at Vladivostok (Macgowan)

647. [From Smith:]

VLADIVOSTOK, December 19, 1919, 1 p.m.

[Received December 21, 12:25 a.m.]

"Semenoff, who I personally know, has recently been sending telegrams to be given General Graves and myself. He states that he is ashamed of his past actions toward Americans for which he was only in part responsible. He says that he has always been opposed to the Omsk Government because it was reactionary and that he only recognized it because the Japanese forced him to do so. Two days ago he sent a telegram outlining a representative form of government proposed by him to Kolchak. It is to be composed of representatives to be elected in proportion to numbers of each from the Cossacks, Zemstvos, Buriats, city population, cooperatives and labor unions. He says that he has presented this to Kolchak who consents. He has asked General Graves and myself to give him our ideas. We simply told him that any government to be successful here must have the consent of the people and that all classes should have representation. To this he [omission], and believed that with such a representation the large masses of the people will consent. He proposes that a general proclamation be issued giving the people a certain time to give consent. He says that the civil authorities must direct affairs hereafter and the military will only be for the protection of the civil. He says that there will be a few bands of criminals who will not consent but that will be all.

The Chinese Commissioner tells me that the Japanese military tried to compel Semenoff to form a government of Mongolia, Manchuria and Eastern Siberia but that he refused. This naturally makes the Chinese look upon him differently than formerly.

The Czechs state that recently Kolchak ordered the arrest of the Pepelaieff Ministry but Semenoff refused to allow this to be done. The only apparent difference between Semenoff and Pepelaieff is that the latter wants only representatives from the Zemstvos and municipalities called while the former wants all existing bodies to have representation.

In his last telegram Semenoff stated that there is no front army at present, that the Bolsheviki have no opposition, that locomotives are frozen and trains cannot move west of Krasnoyarsk. Czechs partly confirm the report. Repeated to Tokyo. Smith."

MACGOWAN

Efforts by the United States to Maintain Unity of Policy with Japan in

Siberia

861.00/4191: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOKYO, March 31, 1919, 12 p.m.

[Received April 1, 2:15 a.m.]

The discussions in Government circles referred to in the last paragraph of my March 23, 4 p.m.1 have apparently reached a conclusion and the silence of the past two weeks was broken this afternoon when General Tanaka, Minister of War, called upon me. He referred to the conflict of policy between our respective forces in Siberia and the embarrassing position in which he was placed, being held responsible for the activities of the Japanese troops, and yet being without any agreed policy to guide him. He admitted that the Cossack military commanders were oppressing the population, and this oppression had led to unrest and disorder. He stated that the Japanese troops were being changed and new divisions substituted for the old ones, and that now was the time to define our joint policy for the future. He expressed his personal conviction that military activities should be confined hereafter simply to the guarding of the railway. This however was a diplomatic question and his only reason for seeking this confidential talk with me was to urge upon me the importance of a frank exchange of views with Viscount Uchida and obtain a speedy understanding between our Governments.

In reply I briefly reviewed the causes which led to the joint expedition and explained the policy which General Graves had pursued. I concluded by expressing my willingness to discuss the question with the Foreign Minister if he so desired. General Tanaka then explained that he proposed to submit to the Cabinet tomorrow the views which he had expressed to me and that I would probably hear from the Foreign Minister.

This interview indicates to me that the dominant influences in the General Staff have abandoned any plans they may have cherished for independent action in Siberia, are prepared to cooperate with General Graves and to modify their previous policy of supporting

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local Cossack leaders. This interview is supported by a letter received this morning from General Graves, in which he states that IvanoffRinoff has sought a meeting with him, with a view to a better understanding, and had recently stated that the public abuse of Americans had not succeeded and they were now going to try other tactics; that a Colonel Butenko is showing a more conciliatory spirit; that his only serious difficulty is with the representatives of Japan. . . . Should the Foreign Minister consult me on this question of policy, would the Department approve of my suggesting, as my personal view the policy I submitted for consideration in the last paragraph of my telegram of March 8, 10 a.m.??

MORRIS

861.00/4197: Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

PARIS, April 1, 1919, 4 p.m.
[Received April 2, 4:10 a.m.]

1421. Your cipher telegram 1346, March 28th, 6 p.m.3 Our reports do not show telegrams from General Graves number 214, March 17th, and 229, March 26th, nor any telegram from Admiral Rodgers number 216, March 16th.*

The President authorizes instruction to General Graves as below provided the Secretary of War concurs. Please consult with him accordingly. General Graves should be instructed that the United States favors economic rehabilitation of the country and feels strongly that a policy of political moderation among the several Russian factions is a necessary condition. In particular General Graves should be told that his mission is to insure, in cooperation with his allies, uninterrupted operation of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways and it is suggested that the movements of his forces be limited to a zone of say three miles on either side of the railways within which zone he should exercise definite police power and prevent any disturbance that might interfere with the operation of the railways. It is suggested further that the Department might say to the Governments having forces in Siberia that in [the] view of the American Government the inter-Allied forces in Siberia have been retained there for the purpose of protecting the railways and the men operating them under the direction of the Inter-Allied Committee, that the American Government suggests the establishment of a zone as proposed above and that the Inter-Allied Committee might issue a statement to this effect and add that they will not permit any

'Ante, p. 475.

"Not printed.

These telegrams not found in the files of the Department of State.

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