269.952 1.928 5.933 3,233 80,302 168,224 3,886 11,139 7 624,730 70.829 2,584 8,341 361,768 Year Canada Belgium Sweden West Columbia Norway Poland Israel Italy Yugo- Dominican Tunisia Japan Portugal Denmark Total AMERICAN MINING CONGRESS, Senator RUSSELL B. LONG, Chairman, Senate Finance Committee, U.S. Senate, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: May I commend you for scheduling a hearing on the International Anti-Dumping Code for Thursday, June 27. The prospect of the International Anti-Dumping Code becoming effective on July 1, in view of the many disparities between the Code and existing U.S. law and the manner in which the executive branch has negotiated the Code in disregard of the prerogatives of the U.S. Senate, certainly makes this hearing most timely. Even as the hour grows late, I am hopeful that something can be done at least to delay the implementation of the Code until the Congress has had an adequate opportunity to consider the conflicts between the Code and the U.S. law and also between the Code and long-pending legislative proposals to improve the existing U.S. Antidumping Act, such as S. 1726. Both these conflicts can be reviewed in the Staff Study and Comparative Analysis, prepared by the American Mining Congress and sent to members of the Senate Finance Committee on November 1, 1967 and included in the Committee's Compendium of Papers on Legislative Oversight Review of U.S. Trade Policies. Why the Code was negotiated and agreed to by the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, in the face of S. Con. Res. 100 adopted in 1966, has never ceased to amaze me. Certainly the "blockade" against Congress dealing objectively with our own U.S. antidumping law-because the Executive in effect on July 1 pre-empts the Congress from the field because of “existing international agreement"-may have far-reaching consequences for U.S. trade policy. The June 27 hearing should be most significant and I hope that the Senate Finance Committee will make timely effort to delay U.S. implementation of the International Code pending proper Congressional consideration. Respectfully, J. ALLEN OVERTON, Jr., [TELEGRAM] J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.: LITTLE ROCK, ARK., June 25, 1968. On June 27 the Senate Finance Committee will hold a 1-day hearing on the International Anti-Dumping Code scheduled to become effective July 1, 1968. The cement industry will submit information showing there was no legal authorization for negotiation of code. Furthermore, that code is in serious conflict with the existing antidumping law and cannot become effective without congressional legislation. This point is substantiated by Tariff Commission report filed with the findings committee in March. Urgently request that you contact administration and seek postponement of July 1 effective date. This is of great concern to the cement industry. JOHN E. MILLER, Jr., Vice President, Arkansas Cement Corp. STATEMENT SUBMITTED On Behalf of THE COPPER & Brass FABRICATORS COUNCIL, INC., T. E. VELTFORT, MANAGING DIRECTOR INTRODUCTION On October 31, 1967, a statement on U.S. Foreign Trade Policies was submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance on behalf of the domestic brass mill industry. In this statement a full description of the industry was included, as well as a comprehensive review of the adverse effects on the industry resulting from excessive imports of brass mill products made by low-wage labor abroad. PURPOSE OF STATEMENT The injurious impact of imports on the industry has been aggravated by dumping which the Antidumping Act of 1921, as implemented by current regulations, has been unable to prevent. It is the sense of our present statement that the ineffective enforcement of the Antidumping Act of 1921 must be remedied by appropriate amendment. In the meantime, however, immediate action should be taken on S. Con. Res. 38 to prevent the International Antidumping Code, which is in conflict with the Antidumping Act of 1921 and which was agreed to on behalf of the United States without the Authority of the Congress, from going into effect on July 1, 1968 without congressional approval. DEFINITIVE ACTION AGAINST DUMPING IS IMPERATIVE The Antidumping Act of 1921 recognized dumping for what it really is; a discriminatory and therefore unfair trade practice involving sales by foreign vendors to buyers in this country at prices lower than they charge at home. This interpretation of dumping is quite consistent with the structure of our domestic laws and regulations against discriminatory pricing as being repugnant to fair competition. But an idea that claims of dumping might and would be used as a non-tariff barrier against imports has gradually developed. It has in recent years apparently become one of the principal aspects of the dumping problem as our latter-day foreign policy steadily edged toward international free trade. Over the years the enforcement of the Act has become quite ineffective and the efforts to establish a finding of dumping under regulations implementing the Act, a frustrating and futile experience. The available record of dumping cases (1934–1967) illustrates this discouraging situation : Either a law against dumping is not needed because this unfair practice is really rare (which many injured industries will certainly dispute!) or the law as administered has been ineffective. The brass mill industry has had two painful instances of how ineffective the antidumping procedures can be, even when the Treasury Department has established presumptive evidence of the price discrimination involved. In one case, for example, copper tube was being sold in this country by a Canadian company at a special discount not available to its Canadian customers. After several years of investigation based on extensive evidence furnished by the domestic industry, during which time, of course, the dumping continued, the Treasury Department confirmed that dumping had occurred. It dismissed the complaint, however, on the company's assurance that dumping had ceased and relied on its promise that it would not be resumed. There is evidence that dumping has since recurred, although somewhat more subtly managed. But no further action appears practicable under present interpretation of the law and regulations. A second case involved sheet copper from Yugoslavia, sold in this country at a price offered regularly at ten percent below the competition. Its result was a disastrous price demoralization in the concentrated markets in this country where the Yugoslavian product was sold. As far as the domestic mills were concerned, the prices which they had to lower drastically in a vain attempt to meet this local competition, however, had to be generally offered in a far wider market to avoid alleged price discrimination under our domestic laws. The Treasury again made a preliminary finding of dumping, but ultimately dismissed the case because it could not satisfy itself as to the price in Yugoslavia and had to depend on prices in certain free countries abroad. Also, it reasoned that the quantity involved was relatively small; related to the national market this was true, but the Treasury disregarded the chain effect of the dumping on the entire domestic market. It was because of experiences of this kind that the brass mill industry strongly supported the efforts of Senator Hartke and Congressman Herlong and more than 100 fellow senators and congressmen in bills successively introduced in the Congress since 1965, to make government action against dumping reasonably effective without opening the door to its possible misuse as a non-tariff barrier. When in 1964 the Treasury did issue new regulations in apparent recognition of the ineffectiveness of the antidumping procedure, these fell considerably short of requirements. The conclusion still remains that remedial legislation is needed. We must, therefore, repeat our urgent request that S. 1726 and the companion bills in the House be passed and so make the Antidumping Act what is should be, an effective weapon against an exceedingly unfair trade practice. Despite the fact that the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 gave our Kennedy Round negotiation team no authority to deal with dumping, and notwithstanding the adoption in 1966 of S. Con. Res. 100, stating it was the sense of the Congress that no agreement or other arrangements applicable under the laws of the United States should be entered into under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 except in accordance with prior legislative authority delegated by the Congress, the so-called International Antidumping Code was agreed to in the Kennedy Round, with an effective date of July 1, 1968. In view of a general complaint that the International Antidumping Code was in serious conflict with the Antidumping Act of 1921 and would tend even further to vitiate the effectiveness of our antidumping procedure, S. Con. Res. 38 was introduced, stating it to be the sense of Congress that the provisions of the International Antidumping Code are inconsistent with, and in conflict with, the provisions of the Antidumping Act of 1921; that the President should send the International Antidumping Code to the Senate for its advice and consent; and that the provisions of the International Antidumping Code should become effective in the United States only at the time specified in legislation enacted by the Congress to implement the Code. In a report requested by the Senate Finance Committee in connection with S. Con. Res. 38, the Tariff Commission on March 13, 1968 gave as its three to two majority opinion a confirmation of the fact that the International Antidumping Code was inconsistent with, and in conflict with, the Antidumping Act of 1921 and could not be put into effect without appropriate legislation. Logically the Commission would find it impossible to enforce the Code if it is allowed to go into effect on July 1, 1968. Even the Tariff Commission minority, while disagreeing with the overall approach of the majority and recommending a case by case determination, nevertheless agreed that where inconsistencies between the Code and the Act occurred under these circumstances, the provisions of the Act should prevail. Obviously without Congressional action, which the minority fails to mention, its recommendation would be an invitation to further chaos. In the meanwhile the Treasury published proposed extensive amendments to its antidumping Regulations to conform them to the International Antidumping Code, and invited the written opinions of those interested. No report has been made on the opinions received, but the Treasury has now issued amended Antidumping Regulations (T.D. 68-148) which after purportedly giving due consideration to these opinions, put the conforming regulations in effect on July 1, 1968. This date is only a short time ahead. Immediate Congressional action is imperative to prevent the International Antidumping Code and the Treasury's new conforming regulations from going into effect as planned. Without such action, the preemption by the Kennedy Round negotiators of the legislative power to amend the Antidumping Act of 1921 without Congressional delegation, would go unchallenged. The resultant legal complications as disputes over the control of our antidumping procedure arose, together with the impracticability of the required simultaneous consideration of the complaints by both the Treasury and the Tariff Commission and the far more restricted interpretation of injury, domestic industry, the market and other pertinent factors, would reduce even further the already slim chance of effective remedial action in bona fide dumping cases. RECOMMENDATION Pending favorable action on the badly needed amendment of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as proposed in S. 1726 by Mr. Hartke and his cosponsors, immediate action needs to be taken on S. Con. Res. 38 which states in effect that it is the sense of the Congress that the International Anti-dumping Code be submitted to |