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lading shall be issued, that the shipment shall be from one consignor to one consignee; but, when goods are so loaded and when by the terms of sale they become the property of the consignee upon delivery to the carrier, the latter has no right to inquire whether the consignee obtained his title from one or several owners. If carriers accord a carload rating in case the consignor is the owner, they should extend the same privilege when the consignee is the owner.- Buckeye Buggy Co. v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 620.

Whether a carrier may distinguish between a forwarding agent and the actual owner of the goods, discussed but not decided.― Buckeye Buggy Co. v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 620.

Where the carrier owns the commodity it transports, and so is indifferent whether its profit accrues from the sale or the transportation, the only remedy available to the independent operator is to secure to him a reasonable rate.- McGrew v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 630. Even if the carrier owns the commodities it transports, it can extend itself no other and different privileges than it extends to every other shipper. In re Grain Rates of Chicago G. W. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 33.

[16] Devices for giving preference.

Discrimination through classification,- see post, notes [77]-[80]. Rebates paid in the guise of commissions for obtaining business are unlawful.-U. S. v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 152 Fed. 269.

Any device by which the net amount collected by the carrier from the shipper and retained, is reduced below the rate given in the published schedule, is a rebate.- U. S. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 148 Fed. 646.

If a carrier has published a schedule of rates to points beyond its own lines, transportation to such points at less than such rates is an unlawful rebate.-U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., 148 Fed. 719.

Phrase "by any device whatever" in the Elkins Act interpreted and applied.-U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrig. Co., 145 Fed. 1007, 142 Fed. 247. The lawfulness of a 66 dummy" transit company as a device for procuring rebates in violation of law.-U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrig. Co., 142 Fed. 247, 145 Fed. 1007.

The compression of cotton by a railroad cannot be used to effectuate a disparity in rates for a similar transportation service.- Muskogee Club V. Mo. K. & T. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 356.

A carrier may not grant rebates by the device of allowances to elevator owners who in some manner return a portion thereof to the shippers.-Allowances to Elevators by U. Pac. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 99.

Where the owner of the grain also owns the elevators with which the carrier makes an arrangement for elevation of the grain, if the allowance involves a profit over the actual cost of the service rendered, it becomes a rebate. It is not a rebate or discrimination where the allowance does not exceed the actual cost.- Allowances to Elevators by U. Pac. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 99.

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Tap line allowances" are equivalent to rebates or reductions from the published rates.- Central Y. P. Assn. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 10 Inters. Com. R. 505.

Free passes given to shippers on account of their traffic are a rebate or device resulting in discrimination.- Milk Prod. P. Assn. v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 92.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will look beyond the device of a development or other subsidiary company in which the carrier or its owners hold the stock. In re Grain Rates of Chicago G. W. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 33.

To bear a part of the cartage expense of one shipper and not of another is equivalent to a rebate to the former.- Hezel M. Co. v. St. L. A. & T. H. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 571, 3 Inters. Com. R. 701, 5 I. C. C. R. 57.

Arbitrary differentials resulting in discriminations are unlawful.— Toledo Prod. Exch. & E. Kemble v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 492, 569, 3 İnters. Com. R. 830, 5 I. C. C. R. 166.

The method of rate making used by the carrier must not afford a cover for discrimination and injustice.-N. Y. Prod. Exch. v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 13, 28, 553, 3 I. C. C. R. 137.

Commissions paid to soliciting agents, when divided with the shippers, are equivalent to a rebate. In re Underbilling, 1 Inters. Com. R. 813, 1 I. C. C. R. 633.

A carrier cannot discriminate between shippers by arbitrary tests or lines of demarcation.- Providence Coal Co. v. Providence & W. Coal Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 316, 363, 1 I. C. C. R. 86.

[17] Intent of carrier.

An intent to give or receive a preference in violation of Elkins Act, § 1, is shown by a conscious, intentional doing of that which the law prohibits.- Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. U. S., 157 Fed. 830.

In the case of an equivocal act which is unlawful if so intended, but not otherwise, or which is claimed to have been accidental, casual, or through mistake, evidence of unconnected but similar facts is always admissible to show intent or system, or rebut accident.-U. S. v. Milwaukee Refrig. Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247, 145 Fed. 1007.

[18] Public right not affected by private agreements.

The public right to a just relation of rates cannot be abridged or enlarged by agreements between carriers with each other, nor by promises made to shippers.- Commercial Club v. Ch. & N. W. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 387.

An agreement entered into by a carrier for the purpose of developing traffic, whether improvident or not, cannot be permitted to result in discrimination.- Milk Prod. P. Assn. v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 92.

[19] Lowest rate given should be the standard.

Granting of rebates as evidence that rates rebated from are unnecessarily high,—see ante, § 26, note [36].

While it may be true that a local railway's share of an interstate rate may not be a legitimate basis on which a state railroad commission can establish and enforce a purely local rate, yet whenever, under the guise or pretense of a rebilling rate, some merchants are given a low local rate, the Interstate Commerce Commission is justified in making that the rate for all, and is not bound to inquire whether it furnishes adequate return to the railroad company.- Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Miss. R. R. Commission, 203 U. S. 496, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 163.

No rate can possibly be reasonable that is higher than anybody else has to pay.-U. S. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 148 Fed. 646.

If a railroad choses to establish as to a certain favored class, a rate so low as to be unremunerative, justice demands and the law will require, that the rate be granted to all alike.- Alabama & V. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 86 Miss. 667, 38 So. 356.

The fact that another was charged less is material evidence tending to show that the smaller charge was a reasonable one.— Great Western R. Co. v. Sutton, L. R. 4 H. L. 226.

[20] Payment of rebate to person other than shipper.

That rebates are paid to some one other than the shipper is immaterial.— U. S. v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 152 Fed. 269.

[21] Statutes forbidding discriminations — Validity.

Purpose of acts regulating railroads,- see ante, § 1, note [32]. What statutes regulating rates amount to a regulation of interstate commerce,― see ante, § 25, note [14].

The Interstate Commerce Act is not unconstitutional as depriving shippers of a natural right to make a private or secret contract for as advantageous a freight rate as they can obtain. No shipper has such a right.— U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Fed. 305.

It being settled that Congress has authority to require that railroad rates shall be uniform, it necessarily follows that to preserve uniformity Congress may prohibit the doing of any act or thing whatever by any person or corporation calculated to impair uniformity, and may enforce such prohibitions by such penal provisions as it deems requisite.— U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Fed. 305.

An act forbidding "all discriminations" in rates, with no qualifying word like "unjust ", is unconstitutional.- Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 1.

An act to prevent discriminations, etc., by express companies is valid. Adams Exp. Co. v. State, 161 Ind. 328, 67 N. E. 1033.

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Discriminations based on amount shipped unlawful at common law, see post, note [44].

Construction of statutes declaratory of common law,—see ante, § 1, note [31a].

Statutes requiring charging of reasonable rates merely declaratory of common law,- see ante, § 26, note [1].

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The provision in the Constitution of Colorado that no undue or unreasonable discrimination shall be made in charges or facilities for transportation of freight or passengers within this state, imposes no greater obligation on a carrier than the common law imposed.- Atchison, T. & S. R. Co. v. D. & N. O. R. Co., 110 U. S. 667, 4 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 185.

The Interstate Commerce Act, in so far as it forbids unjust or unreasonable rates, is an express legislative adoption of the principles of the common law, which obliged a carrier to carry for all, without unjust or unreasonable discrimination either in charges or in the facilities for actual transportation.- Tift v. So. R. Co., 123 Fed. 789.

Section 4 of the North Carolina Act as to discriminations, etc., is construed as simply declaratory of the common law, and hence does not require a railroad to give one express company the same facilities it gives another.- Atlantic Exp. Co. v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 111 N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393, 18 L. R. A. 393.

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General rules of statutory construction, see ante, § 1, notes [23]-[40].

Statute providing penalties for unjust discrimination construed as penal,- see ante, § 1, note [35].

The term " a like kind of traffic," as used in Interst. Com. Act, § 2, does not mean traffic that is identical, but that is of "a like kind"

with other freight in the elements of a fair and just classification.N. Y. Board of Trade v. Pa. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 660, 734, 755, 800, 4 I. C. C. R. 447.

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An act of the Illinois Legislature forbidding unjust discriminations, etc., does not interfere with or abrogate prior contracts fairly made.Chicago & A. R. Co. v. C. V. & W. Coal Co., 79 Ill. 121.

The provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act forbidding discriminations, etc., apply to contracts made before the passage of the Act, and forbid the execution of contracts for rates discriminatory under the Act.- Southern Wire Co. v. St. L. Bridge & T. Co., 38 Mo. App. 191.

[25] Determination of comparative reasonableness of rates general.

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Whether rates are discriminatory is a question of fact,- see ante, note [14].

Secrecy of a rate not the test of its lawfulness,- see ante, note [12]. Dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions as justification for disparities in rates,- see post, notes [32]-[57].

Determination as to discriminations through classification,- see post, note [79].

Burden of proof as to discriminatory acts,- see post, note [85]. Where two routes exist the rate over shorter route the reasonalble rate,- see also, ante, § 26, note [37].

Published rates the standard of reasonableness,- see ante, § 28, note [13].

Power of Commission to determine as to rates,- see post, § 49, notes [6]-[12].

Matters to be considered in determining as to reasonableness of rates, see also post, § 49, notes [38]-[71].

Where a coal company owned by a railroad purchases coal at the mines or breakers, under a contract fixing the price to the vendor on the basis of a percentage of the average price received at tidewater in another state, the Interstate Commerce Commission may inquire into the manner in which the transaction was carried on and compel the testimony of witnesses, and the production of contracts, with view to ascertaining whether this transaction was the means whereby the railroads gave preferential rates to the coal companies.- Interst. Com. Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 24 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 563.

In determining whether a given rate is discriminative, conditions. abroad as well as at home, and the interests of all classes and not of a single class should be considered.- Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interst.

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