[2] Scope and application of section.

The long and short haul clause applies to a through route over connecting lines.- Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 700.

Interst. Com. Act, § 4, is based on distance and relates to the actual transportation charges, and not to demurrage charges, which are in the nature of charges for storage in the cars of the carrier.- Pennsylvania Millers' Assn. v. Phila. & R. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 531.

The long and short haul clause does not apply unless the lesser is included within the longer distance.— Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Walker, 110 Ky. 961, 23 Ky. L. R. 453, 63 S. W. 20.

[3] What constitutes a "line."

Under Interst. Com. Act, § 4, there is a clear distinction between "railroad" and "line." Two carriers may use the same 66 road," but each has its separate "line." Joint use of the same trackage by lease or otherwise, does not constitute the same "line."- Interst. Com. Commission v. C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 56 Fed. 925.

The word "line" in the long and short haul clause of the Interstate Commerce Act means a physical line, and not a mere business arrangement.- Daniels v. Ch. R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 458; Boston & A. R. Co. v. Boston & L. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 291, 400, 500, 1 I. C. C. R. 158

The physical connection of two roads which unite in carrying traffic under joint tariffs, constitutes an extended "line" of which each road forms a part. Daniels v. Ch. R. I. & R. P. R. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 458.

[4] Common-law rule.

Unless prohibited by law, a carrier may charge higher fares to way stations than their proportion of the distance.- State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 433.

At common law, a carrier might discriminate in favor of longer distances.- Hersh v. Northern Central R. Co., 74 Pa. 182.

[5] Duty of carrier under statutory provisions.

Meaning of term rate," see ante, § 26, note [26].

Duty to charge rates reasonable in themselves,- see ante, § 26, note [29].

A carrier cannot utilize intermediate points as prey on which to nourish its terminals.- Gustin v. Burl. & M. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 481.

Denying equal through rates to intermediate stations and exacting higher rates therefrom, is unlawful.- Chicago F. P. Cov. Co. v. Ch. & N. W. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 316.

Carrier making low export rates must treat intermediate localities alike as to such rates and not violate the long and short haul rule.— Board of R. R. Comrs. v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 304. In the application of export rates, intermediate territory should not be discriminated against. In no case should the rate from the more distant point to the seaboard be less than that from intermediate points on the same line.- Export & Domestic Rates, 8 Inters. Com. R. 214.

Whatever line participates in a low export rate must make a corresponding rate on similar traffic from intermediate points on its line.— Export & Domestic Rates, 8 Inters. Com. R. 214.

It is proper for a carrier, within reasonable limits, to accept less per ton per mile upon long hauls than upon short ones, and to widen the disparity between such rates as the difference in distance increases. Colorado F. & I. Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 488. Competitive passenger rates cannot be reduced, under Interst. Com. Act, 4, without reducing intermediate rates.- In re Passenger Tariffs & Rate Wars, 2 Inters. Com. R. 340, 2 I. C. C. R. 513.

[6] Prohibited acts also an unjust discrimination.

Unjustified departures from the long and short haul rule constitute undue prejudice to the intermediate locality and shippers and traffic therefrom. Violation of Act to Reg. Commerce by St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 290.

A greater charge for a shorter than a longer haul is an unreasonable charge and an unlawful discrimination, as well as a violation of the long and short haul rule.- Phillips Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 93.

The exaction, without lawful excuse of a greater compensation in the aggregate for the shorter than the longer haul over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer, forbidden by Inters. Com. Act, § 4, is only a form of unjust discrimination or undue preference, to which Congress desired to call particular attention because of its prevalence in certain sections of the country.— McClelen v. So. R. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 588.

The provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act forbidding unjust discriminations, etc., apply even where a departure from the long and short haul rule of the act is justified, if the disparity is so great as to amount to discrimination.- Raworth v. No. Pac. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 614, 3 Inters. Com. R. 857, 5 I. C. C. R. 234.

[7] Violation a question of fact.

Whether given rates violate provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act is a question of fact.- Export & Domestic Rates, 8 Inters. Com. R. 214.

[8] No definite rule.

It is impossible to apply any definite rule to the solution of any question arising under Interst. Com. Act, § 4.-Danville v. So. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 409.

[9] Validity of statutes.

The provision of the Constitution of Kentucky that a railroad shall not charge more for a longer than shorter haul, the shorter distance being included within the longer, in so far as it applies to a long haul from a place without to a place within the state, and a shorter haul on the same line between points wholly within the state, is invalid as an interference with interstate commerce.- - Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 277.

The statute of Illinois as to compensation of carriers for long and short hauls construed by the state court to apply to commerce between points within and points without the state in so far as the transportation was within the state, is unconstitutional to the extent to which it applies to such interstate commerce.- Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup. Ct. R. 4, revg. s. c. 105 Ill. 236.

An act prohibiting a carrier from charging for transportation for any specific distance a greater sum than it charges for a greater distance, is valid.- Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Anderson, 72 Neb. 856, 101 N. W. 1019.

It is constitutional to vest a state railroad commission with power to permit roads to charge less for a longer than for a shorter distance.— Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 633, 21 Ky. L. R. 232, 51 S. W. 164, 1012.

There seems to be no limitation on the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to grant relief from the long and short haul rule, when, after investigation, the Commission is satisfied that the interests of commerce and common fairness to the railroads advise that such permission be granted.- Railroad Commission of Ga. v. Clyde Ss. Co., 4 Inters. Com. R. 120, 5 I. C. C. R. 326.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will not relieve a carrier from the long and short haul section except upon a verified petition and after investigation into the facts. In re Southern Pac. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 16, 1 I. C. C. R. 6.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will not grant, ex parte and in advance, relief from the long and short haul section, but will require the carrier to take the initiative and fix the rates, and then will decide on their justice when complaint is made.- In re Louisville & N. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 16, 278, 1 I. C. C. R. 31.

Standards of comparison,- see post, note [22].

Matters justifying departure from long and short haul rule,- see post, notes [24]-[35].

On an application by a carrier for relief from the long and short haul rule, he may present every material reason for an order granting the permission.- Railroad Commission of Ga. v. Clyde Ss. Co., 4 Inters. Com. R. 120, 5 I. C. C. R. 326.

[14]

Whether application for relief must be made in advance of charging rates.

Where a violation of the long and short haul section of the Interstate Commerce Act is complained of, competition which is controlling on traffic and rates produces of itself the dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions, and the carrier has a right of his own motion to take it into account in fixing rates to the competitive point. Relief from the section arises from the law and not the discretion of the Commission.East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 181 C. S. 11, 21 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 516, revg. s. c. 99 Fed. 52.

The provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, § 4, authorizing a carrier to apply to the Interstate Commerce Commission for leave to charge a less rate for a longer than a shorter haul, does not make it unlawful per se for the carrier to charge such less rate without first applying to the Commission. It may put the rate in force and when challenged in the courts or before the Commission, may show the justifying circumstances.- Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 74 Fed. 803, revg. s. c. 57 Fed. 1005; affd. 167 U. S. 633, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 986.

It is not necessary for a carrier to apply to the Interstate Commerce Commission for relief from Interst. Com. Act, § 4, when the circumstances and conditions are substantially dissimilar, since the carrier, in acting upon them, would commit no breach of the law, though it would be responsible in case it were found that the circumstances and

conditions were misconceived or misjudged.—Interst. Com. Commission v. C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 56 Fed. 925.

To authorize a greater charge for a shorter than a longer haul, under Interst. Com. Act, § 4, it is not necessary that the carrier should first obtain permission from the Commission. It is enough if the "circumstances and conditions" are not in fact "substantially similar.” The carrier may determine this at his own risk, subject to liability for violating the Act, if the Commission and the court do not, upon inquiry, sustain his view.-Interst. Com. Commission v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 50 Fed. 295; appeal dismissed, 81 Fed. 1005, 149 U. S. 264, 13 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 837.

Upon applications by carriers to be relieved from the application. of the long and short haul clause, the Interstate Commerce Commission must determine each case upon its own facts and special circumstances.- Petition of Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 323.

[16]

Facts justifying relief by commission.

The Interstate Commerce Commission may grant relief from the long and short haul rule to enable a carrier to meet, at competitive points, the rates and facilities offered by a carrier not under the Commission's jurisdiction.-Matter of Application of A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 593.

[17] Effect of exoneration.

Permission or exoneration by a state commission, under the long and short haul section of the Kentucky statute, can have no retroactive effect.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Van Cleave, 110 Ky. 968, 23 Ky. L. R. 479, 63 S. W. 22.

Under the statute of Kentucky, authorizing the railroad commission to permit, in special cases, the charging of less for a long than a short haul and to prescribe the extent to which the carrier may be relieved from the provisions of the long and short haul section, the courts cannot revise an order of the commission refusing an application by a carrier to be allowed to charge less for a long than for a short haul.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 104 Ky. 226, 20 Ky. L. R. 1380, 47 S. W. 598, 43 L. R. A. 541.

[19] Proceedings before commission where violation is alleged.

If the pleadings show a departure from the long and short haul rule, an order will be issued against such violation of the Interstate Com