Such terms as "to try, "17/ "convicted, "18/ except...impeachment, "19/ "conviction of..., "pardons for offenses... 1/20/ crimes except...impeachment, shall be by jury, 11 "trial of all ,,21/ "the party are all terms limited in context to criminal matters. In considering the legal and widely understood meaning of the phrase "other high crimes and misdemeanors" 23/ it is clear that it is limited solely to criminal conduct. Moreover, it is consistent with the well-established rule of construction stated in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27 (1892): The framers of the Constitution employed words in Just as statutes are to be construed to uphold the intent of the drafters, United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (18 U. S.) 76, 95 (1820), so should we uphold the intent of the drafters of the 17/ U. S. Const., art. I, sec. 3, cl. 6. Constitution that impeachable offenses be limited to criminal violations. Also, as penal statutes have been strictly construed in favor of the accused, id., so should we construe the impeachment provisions of the Constitution. To do any less would violate the Due Process Clause and the prohibitions against ex post facto laws, concepts deeply rooted in our Constitution. Clearly, the Framers did not envisage the emasculation of such fundamental principles to implement the impeachment provision. V. THE AMERICAN IMPEACHMENT PRECEDENTS Some of the proponents of presidential impeachment place great emphasis on the cases involving federal judges to support the proposition that impeachment will lie for conduct which does This view is apparently most appealing to those broad constructionists who favoring a severely weakened Chief Executive argue that certain non-criminal "political" offenses may justify impeachment. Yet, when subjected to the scrutiny of history, reason, and legal precedent, this thesis fails for a number of reasons that are manifest. In addition, not of itself constitute an indictable offense. careful examination of the provisions of the Constitution, the uniform |