gland, whether in Parliament or in the Press, was unseasonable or indiscreet; much of it factious toward the British Government itself; much of it disrespect ful to the American Government; but none of it of any ultimate importance or consequence in regard to either Government, for the following reasons:

1. Both Governments sincerely desired peace. Great Britain could never have retreated from the Arbitra tion in violation of the Treaty, whatever the Press might say, and whoever should be in power as Minister.

2. Freedom of debate is essential to freedom of institutions. To be sure, the Press in Great Britain, and somewhat, but less so, in the United States, is prone to take upon itself rather lofty airs, and to speak of public affairs quite absolutely, as if it were the Government. But nobody is deceived by this, not even the Press itself. We, the English-speaking nations, thank heaven, possess the capability of living in the atmosphere of oral and written debate. It was safe to predict that howmuchsoever Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville might feel annoyed by the din of words around them, it would not induce them to break faith with the United States.

3. It was not the voice of the English Press which could seriously affect us. We looked rather to the state of opinion in the French, German, and Italian speaking countries of Europe, which, on the whole, though differing as to the legal right of the United States to recover on the national claims, yet decisive ly agreed with us in affirming that those claims were

comprehended within the scope of the Treaty as maintained by the United States.

What Europe dreaded, what all European opinion sought to prevent, was a rupture between Great Britain and the United States, to disturb the money. market of Europe, and impede the payment by France of the indemnity due to Germany. And all men saw that the United States must and would resent the refusal by Great Britain to observe the stipulations of the Treaty of Washington.

PRESENTATION OF COUNTER-CASES.

Such were the circumstances, in the presence of which arrived the time, namely, the 15th of April, at which the two Governments were to file at Geneva their respective Counter-Cases.

The British Government was so solicitous to fulfill on its part all the stipulations of the Treaty, that it caused special inquiry to be made whether the Amer ican Government had any objection to Great Brit ain filing her Counter-Case without prejudice to her position regarding consequential damages; to which Mr. Fish replied that the British Government was bound to file its Counter-Case, but its doing so would not prejudice any position it had taken, nor affect any position of the United States.

Accordingly, on the 15th of April, the CounterCases of Great Britain and the United States were duly filed, with express reservation of all the rights of both Governments.

The British Counter-Case, consisting of four vol

umes folio, contains little new matter, being in part, at least, defensive argument in response to the Amer. ican "Case."

The American Counter-Case, consisting of two volumes folio, replies argumentatively to the British "Case," and brings forward a large body of docu mentary proofs, responsive to matters contained in that "Case," which, although utterly foreign to the question at issue, required to be met, because considered material by Great Britain, namely, allegations of default on the part of the United States in the execution of their own neutrality laws, to the preju dice of other Governments.

The introduction of all this matter into the British Case, the iteration of it in the British Counter-Case and the British Argument, and the extreme promi nence given to it, as we shall hereafter see, by the British Arbitrator, serve to illustrate the singular unreasonableness and injustice of the angry com plaints emitted in England against the American Case.

The American Case contains no suggestion which is not strictly pertinent to the issues raised by the Treaty. It discusses the conduct of the British Gov. ernment relatively to the United States during our Civil War, with strict application to the "Alabama Claims." It charges that, in those transactions, the British Government was guilty of culpable omission to observe the requirements of the law of nations as respects the United States, and with responsible neg. ligence in the non-execution of the neutrality laws of

Great Britain. That was the very question present ed by the Treaty.

Great Britain professed to be so much offended by the character of certain of the proofs adduced in the American Case, rigorously pertinent to the question as all those proofs were, that she would not suffer any appropriate answer to those proofs to be brought forward in her Counter-Case or in her Argument: it was not compatible with self-respect,-it would be giving dignity to undignified arguments, we were told by the British Press. Meanwhile, the very mat ter which the British Government could not condescend to notice was both material and important to such a degree as very much to inflame the temper and exercise the ingenuity of Sir Alexander Cockburn, the "representative" of Great Britain at Geneva.

Now, the American Case, if conceived in any other spirit than that of just and fair exposition of the precise issue, question, that is, whether the British Government had or had not incurred responsibility for its want of due diligence in the matter of Confederate cruisers fitted out in the ports of Great Britain,-I say, if the American Government, in the preparation of its Case, had not been animated by the spirit of perfect fairness and justness, it might have gone into the inquiry of the political conduct of Great Britain. in other times, and with reference to other nations, in the view of imputing to her habitual disregard of the law of nations in illustration of her present conduct toward the United States. We might have charged that, while her statesmen contend that they could do

nothing outside of an Act of Parliament, they had no such Act until 1819, and were therefore, prior to that time, confessedly impotent, and we might have added willfully so, to observe the duties of neutrality; we might have scrutinized her national history to select conspicuous examples of her acts of violence, in dis regard of the law of nations, against numerous States, including ourselves; we might have appealed to ev ery volume of international law in existence, from the time of Grotius to this day, and cited page after page to the conclusion of the unjust international policy of Great Britain; and we might have argued from all this to infer intentional omission of the British Gov. ernment to prevent the escape of the Alabama and the Florida.

But such arguments, you will say, would have been forced, remote, of doubtful relevance, and of a nature offensive to England. Be it so: they would, if you please, have been irrelevant, impertinent, offensive. And no such arguments are found in the American Case.

But such are the arguments which pervade the British Case, Counter-Case, and Argument, and the opinions of the British member of the Tribunal. Instead of defending its own conduct in the matter at issue, the British Government travels out of the record to find fault with the conduct of the United States at other times, and with respect to other 'nations. It presumes to take upon itself the function of personating Spain, Portugal, Nicaragua, and to drag before the Tribunal at Geneva controversies between