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(9) The recent United States decision to accept a 25 percent IAEA regular budget assessment was based upon a correct interpretation of existing law. It was not the intent of Congress that the United States contributions to all United Nationsrelated organizations and activities be reduced_pursuant to the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113; 113 Stat. 1501,-405 et seq.), which sets 22 percent assessment rates as benchmarks for the general United Nations budget, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, and the International Labor Organization. Rather, contributions for an important and effective agency such as the IAEA should be maintained at levels commensurate with the criticality of its mission.
(10) The Secretary should negotiate a gradual and sus-
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the funds author-
"(e) CONTENT OF REPORTS.—Each report under subsection (a)
() DETERMINATION EXEMPTING FOREIGN PERSONS FROM CER-
of that list".
ACT OF 1999.
50 USC 1701 note.
(b) SPECIFIED NUCLEAR ITEM DEFINED.-Section 823 of the North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 is amended by inserting 113 Stat. at the end the following:
1501A-473. “(5) SPECIFIED NUCLEAR ITEM.—The term “specified nuclear item' includes
"(A) nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or technology the transfer of which to North Korea would be required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to be subject to an agreement for cooperation, as defined in section 11 b. of that Act (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.), between the United States and North Korea; and
"(B) components that are listed on Annex A or Annex B to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 5/Part 1, or any subsequent
revision thereof).”. SEC. 1308. ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES 50 USC 2368.
AND ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF NUCLEAR,
BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. (a) REPORT.-Not later than March 1, 2003, and annually there- Deadline. after, the President shall transmit to the designated congressional President. committees an annual report on the transfer by any country of weapons, technology, components, or materials that can be used to deliver, manufacture (including research and experimentation), or weaponize nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons (in this section referred to as “NBC weapons") to any country other than a country referred to in subsection (d) that is seeking to possess or otherwise acquire such weapons, technology, or materials, or other system that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to develop, acquire, or deliver NBC weapons.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.-Each such report shall include
(1) the transfer of all aircraft, cruise missiles, artillery weapons, unguided rockets and multiple rocket systems, and related bombs, shells, warheads and other weaponization technology and materials that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be intended for the delivery of NBC weapons;
(2) international transfers of MTCR equipment or technology to any country that is seeking to acquire such equipment or any other system that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be used to deliver NBC weapons; and
(3) the transfer of technology, test equipment, radioactive materials, feedstocks and cultures, and all other specialized materials that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to manufacture NBC weapons.
(c) CONTENT OF REPORT.—Each such report shall include the following with respect to preceding calendar year:
(1) The status of missile, aircraft, and other NBC weapons delivery and weaponization programs in any such country, including efforts by such country or by any subnational group to acquire MTCR-controlled equipment, NBC-capable aircraft, or any other weapon or major weapon component which may
be utilized in the delivery of NBC weapons, whose primary use is the delivery of NBC weapons, or that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to deliver NBC weapons.
(2) The status of NBC weapons development, acquisition, manufacture, stockpiling, and deployment programs in any such country, including efforts by such country or by any subnational group to acquire essential test equipment, manufacturing equipment and technology, weaponization equipment and technology, and radioactive material, feedstocks or components of feedstocks, and biological cultures and toxins.
(3) A description of assistance provided by any person or government, after the date of the enactment of this Act, to any such country or subnational group in the acquisition or development of
(A) NBC weapons;
(B) missile systems, as defined in the MTCR or that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be used to deliver NBC weapons; and
(C) aircraft and other delivery systems and weapons that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to deliver NBC weapons.
(4) A listing of those persons and countries that continue to provide such equipment or technology described in paragraph (3) to any country or subnational group as of the date of submission of the report, including the extent to which foreign persons and countries were found to have knowingly and materially assisted such programs.
(5) A description of the use of, or substantial preparations to use, the equipment of technology described in paragraph (3) by any foreign country or subnational group.
(6) A description of the diplomatic measures that the United States, and that other adherents to the MTCR and other arrangements affecting the acquisition and delivery of NBC weapons, have made with respect to activities and private persons and governments suspected of violating the MTCR and such other arrangements.
(7) An analysis of the effectiveness of the regulatory and enforcement regimes of the United States and other countries that adhere to the MTCR and other arrangements affecting the acquisition and delivery of NBC weapons in controlling the export of MTCR and other NBC weapons and delivery system equipment or technology.
(8) A summary of advisory opinions issued under section 11B(b)(4) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401b(b)(4)) and under section 73(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(d)).
(9) An explanation of United States policy regarding the transfer of MICR equipment or technology to foreign missile programs, including programs involving launches of space vehicles.
(10) A description of each transfer by any person or government during the preceding 12-month period which is subject to sanctions under the Iran Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of Public Law 102-484).
(d) EXCLUSIONS.—The countries excluded under subsection (a) are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
(e) CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT.—The Secretary shall make every effort to submit all of the information required by this section in unclassified form. Whenever the Secretary submits any such information in classified form, the Secretary shall submit such classified information in an addendum and shall also submit concurrently a detailed summary, in unclassified form, of that classified information. (f) DEFINITIONS. In this section:
(1) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “designated congressional committees” means
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) MISSILE; MTCR; MTCR EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY.The terms “missile”, “MTCR”, and “MTCR equipment or technology” have the meanings given those terms in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
(3) PERSON.—The term “person” means any United States or foreign individual, partnership, corporation, or other form of association, or any of its successor entities, parents, or subsidiaries.
(4) WEAPONIZE; WEAPONIZATION.—The term "weaponize" or "weaponization" means to incorporate into, or the incorporation into, usable ordnance or other militarily useful means of delivery. (g) REPEALS.
(1) IN GENERAL.—The following provisions of law are repealed:
(A) Section 107 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note).
(B) Section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5606).
(C) Section 1607(a) of the Iran Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–484).
50 USC 1701 (D) Paragraph (d) of section 585 of the Foreign Oper- note. ations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in section 101(c) of title I of division A of Public Law 104–208; 110 Stat. 3009–171). 22 USC 2656
(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 585 of the Foreign note. Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, is amended
22 USC 2656 (A) in paragraph (b), by adding "and" at the end; note. and
(B) in paragraph (c), by striking "; and" and inserting
a period. SEC. 1309. THREE-YEAR INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND NON- Deadline.
PROLIFERATION STRATEGY. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall prepare and submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a 3-year international arms control and nonproliferation strategy. The strategy shall contain the following:
(1) A 3-year plan for the reduction of existing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and for controlling the proliferation of these weapons.
(2) Identification of the goals and objectives of the United States with respect to arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
(3) A description of the programs, projects, and activities of the Department of State intended to accomplish goals and objectives described in paragraph (2).
Subtitle B_Russian Federation Debt
Reduction for Nonproliferation
22 USC 5952 note.
SEC. 1311. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the “Russian Federation Debt for Nonproliferation Act of 2002". SEC. 1312. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) It is in the vital security interests of the United States to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to additional states or to terrorist organizations, and to ensure that other nations obligations to modify their stockpiles of such arms in accordance with treaties, executive agreements, or political commitments are fulfilled.
(2) In particular, it is in the vital national security interests of the United States to ensure that,
(A) all stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material in the Russian Federation are secure and accounted for;
(B) stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material that are excess to military needs in the Russian Federation are monitored and reduced;
(C) any chemical or biological weapons, related materials, and facilities in the Russian Federation are destroyed;
(D) the Russian Federation's nuclear weapons complex is reduced to a size appropriate to its post-Cold War missions, and its experts in weapons of mass destruction technologies are shifted to gainful and sustainable civilian employment;
(E) the Russian Federation's export control system blocks any proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the means of delivering such weapons, and materials, equipment, know-how, or technology that would be used to develop, produce, or deliver such weapons; and
(F) these objectives are accomplished with sufficient monitoring and transparency to provide confidence that they have in fact been accomplished and that the funds provided to accomplish these objectives have been spent efficiently and effectively.
(3) United States programs should be designed to accomplish these vital objectives in the Russian Federation as rapidly