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in two columns, the 6th division on Mars-la-Tour, the sth from St Hubert northwards--became evident, and the II. towards the Rezonville-Vionville plateau. And shortly after army, pivoting on the I., wheeled to the right and moved 9.15 A.M. he suddenly discovered the truth. The entire French eastward. Suddenly the IX. corps fell right on the
Battle of Battle of
army lay on his right fiank, and his nearest supports centre of the French line (Amanvillers), and a most Gravelotte Vionville were almost a day's march distant. In this crisis he desperate encounter began, superior control, as before, Salat Mars-las made up his mind at once to attack with every ceasing after the guns had opened fire. Prince Frederick Privat
available man, and to continue to attack, in the con- Charles, however, a little farther north, again asserted his tactical viction that his audacity would serve to conceal his weakness. ability, and about 7 P.M. he brought into position no less than five All day long, therefore, the Brandenburgers of the III. corps, army corps for the final attack. The sudden collapse of French supported ultimately by the X. corps and part of the IX., resistance, due to the frontal attack of the Guards (St. Privat) and attacked again and again. The enemy was thrice their strength, the turning movement of the Saxons Roncourt), rendered the but very differently led, and made no adequate use of his use of this mass unnecessary, but the resolution to use it was superiority (battle of Vionville-Mars-la Tour).
there. On the German right (I. army), about Gravelotte, all Meanwhile Prince Frederick Charles, at Pont-à-Mousson, superior leading ceased quite early in the afternoon, and at was still confident in the French retreat to the Meuse, and had night the French still showed an unbroken front. Until midnight, even issued orders for the 17th on that assumption. Firing had when the prince's victory was reported, the suspense at headbeen heard since 9.15 A.M., and about noon Alvensleben's first quarters was terrible. The I. army was exhausted, no steps report had reached him, but it was not till after 2 that he had been taken to ensure support from the III. army, and the realized the situation. Then, mounting his horse, he covered IV. corps (II. army) lay inactive 30 m. away. the 15 m. to Flavigny over crowded and difficult roads within This seems a fitting place to discuss the much-disputed point the hour, and on his arrival abundantly atoned for his strategic of Bazaine's conduct in allowing himself to be driven back into errors by his unconquerable determination and tactical skill. Metz when fortune had thrown into his hands the great
Bazaloe When darkness put a stop to the fighting, he considered the opportunity of the 16th and 17th of August. He position. Cancelling all previous orders, he called all troops had been appointed to command on the roth, but the within reach to the battle-field and resigned himself to wait for presence of the emperor, who only left the front early on the them. The situation was indeed critical. The whole French 16th, and their dislike of Bazaine, exercised a disturbing influence army of five corps, only half of which had been engaged, lay in on the headquarters staff officers. During the retreat to Metz front of him. His own army lay scattered over an area of 30 m. the marshal had satisfied himself as to the inability of his corps by 20, and only some 20,000 fresh troops-of the IX. corps commanders to handle their troops, and also as to the ill-will
could reach the field during the forenoon of the 17th of the staff. In the circumstances he felt that a battle in the The 1716 OhAugustHe did not then know that Moltke had already inter- open field could only end in disaster; and, since it was proved
vened and had ordered the VII., VIII. and II. corps ? that the Germans could outmarch him, his army was sure to be to his assistance. ·. Daylight revealed the extreme exhaustion of overtaken and annihilated if he ventured beyond the shelter both men and horses. The men lay around in hopeless confusion of the fortress. But near Meiz he could at least inflict very amongst the killed and wounded, each where sleep had over severe punishment on his assailants, and in any case his presence taken him, and thus the extent of the actual losses, heavy in Metz would neutralize a far superior force of the enemy for enough, could not be estimated. Across the valley, bugle wecks or months. What use the French government might sounds revealed the French already alert, and presently a long choose to make of the breathing space thus secured was their line of skirmishers approached the Prussian position. But they business, not his; and subsequent events showed that, had they halted just beyond rifle range, and it was soon evident that they not forced MacMahon's hand, the existence of the latter's were only intended to cover a further withdrawal. Presently nucleus army of trained troops might have prevented the came the welcome intelligence that the reinforcements were well investment of Paris. Bazaine was condemned by court-martial on their way.
after the war, but if the case were reheard to-day it is certain About noon the king and Moltke drove up to the ground, that no charge of treachery could be sustained. and there was an animated discussion as to what the French On the German side the victory at St Privat was at once would do next. Aware of their withdrawal from his immediate followed up by the headquarters. Early on the 19th the investfront, Prince Frederick Charles reverted to his previous idea ment of Bazaine's army in Metz was commenced. A new.army, and insisted that they were in full retreat towards the north, the Army of the Meuse (often called the IV.), was as soon as and that their entrenchments near Point du Jour and St Hubert possible formed of all troops not required for the maintenance (see map in article Metz) were at most a rearguard position of the investment, and marched off under the command of the Moltke was inclined to the same view, but considered the alterna- crown prince of Saxony to discover and destroy the remainder tive possibility of a withdrawal towards Metz, and about 2 P.. of the French field army, which at this moment was known to orders were issued to meet these divergent opinions. The be at Châlons. whole army was to be drawn up at 6 Am. on the 18th in an The operations which led to the capture of MacMahon's army échelon facing north, so as to be ready for action in either in Sedan call for little explanation. Given seven corps, each direction. The king and Moltke then drove to Pont-à-Mousson, capable of averaging 15 m. a day for a week in succesand the troops bivouacked in a state of readiness. The rest sion, opposed to four corps only, shaken by defeat Campaiga of the 17th was spent in restoring order in the shattered III. and unable as a whole to cover more than 5 m. a day, and X. corps, and by nightfall both corps were reported fit for the result could hardly be doubtful. But Moltke's method of action. Strangely enough, there were no organized cavalry conducting operations left his opponent many openings which reconnaissances, and no intelligence of importance was collected could only be closed by excessive demands on the marching during the night of the 17th-18th.
power of the men. Trusting only to his cavalry screen to Early on the 18th the troops began to move into position in secure information, he was always without any definite fixed the following order from left to right: XII. (Saxons), Guards, point about which to manquvre, for whilst the reports of the IX., VIII. and VII. The X. and III. were retained in reserve. screen and orders based thereon were being transmitted, the
The idea of the French retreat was still uppermost in the enemy was free to move, and generally their movements were
Of the I. army the I. corps was retained on the east side of Metz. was marching due west on Paris, MacMahon, under political The 11. corps belonged to the II. army, but had not yet reached the pressure, was moving parallel to them, but on a northerly route,
to attempt the relief of Metz.
So unexpected was this move and so uncertain the information the troops of the active army, they ignored the potentialities which called attention to it, that Moltke did not venture to of the Garde Nationale. change at once the direction of march of the whole army, but Meanwhile, both as a contrast to the events that centred on he directed the Army of the Meuse northward on Damvillers Paris and because in point of time they were decided for the and ordered Prince Frederick Charles to detach two corps from most part in the weeks immediately following Sedan, we must the forces investing Metz to reinforce it. For the moment, briefly allude to the sieges conducted by the Germans - Paris therefore, MacMahon's move had succeeded, and the opportunity (9.0.), Metz (q.v.) and Belfort (9.0.) excepted. Old and ruined existed for Bazaine to break out. But at the critical moment as many of them were, the French fortresses possessed consider. the hopeless want of real efficiency in MacMahon's army com-able importance in the eyes of the Germans. Strassburg, in pelled the latter so to delay his advance that it became evident particular, the key of Alsace, the standing menace to South to the Germans that there was no longer any necessity for the Germany and the most conspicuous of the spoils of Louis XIV.'s III. army to maintain the direction towards Paris, and that Roubkriege, was an obvious target. Operations were begun the probable point of contact between the Meuse army and the on the oth of August, three days after Wörth, General v. Werder's French lay nearer to the right wing of the III. army than to corps (Baden troops and Prussian Landwehr) making the siege. Prince Frederick Charles's investing force before Metz. The French commandant, General Uhrich, surrendered after
The detachment from the II. army was therefore counter-a stubborn resistance on the 28th of September. Of the smaller manded, and the whole III, army changed front to the north, fortresses many, being practically unarmed and without garrisons, while the Meuse army headed the French off from the east. capitulated at once. Toul, defended by Major Huck with 2000 The latter came into contact with the head of the French columns, mobiles, resisted for forty days, and drew upon itself the efforts during the 29th, about Nouart, and on the 30th at Buzancy of 13,000 men and 100 guns. Verdun, commanded by General (battle of Beaumont); and the French, yielding to the force Guérin de Waldersbach, held out till after the fall of Metz. Some of numbers combined with superior moral, were driven north of the fortresses lying to the north of the Prussian line of advance westward upon Sedan (9.0.), right across the front of the III. on Paris, e.g. Mézières, resisted up to January 1871, though of army, which was now rapidly coming up from the south, course this was very largely due to the diminution of pressure
During the 31st the retreat practically became a rout, and caused by the appearance of new French field armies in October, the morning of the ist of September found the French crowded On the oth of September a strange incident took place at the around the little fortress of Sedan, with only one line of retreat surrender of Laon. A powder magazine was blown up by the to the north-west still open. By II A.M. the XI. corps (III. soldiers in charge and 300 French and a few German soldiers were army) had already closed that line, and about noon the Saxons killed by the explosion. But as the Germans advanced, iheir (Army of the Meuse) moving round between the town and the lines of communication were thoroughly organized, and the belt Belgian frontier joined bands with the XI., and the circle of of country between Paris and the Prussian frontier subdued and investment was complete. The battle of Sedan was closed garrisoned. Most of these fortresses were small town enceintes, about 4.15 P.M. by the hoisting of the white flag. Terms were dating from Vauban's time, and open, under the new conditions agreed upon during the night, and the whole French army, of warfare, to concentric bombardment from positions formerly with the emperor, passed into captivity.
(F.N.M.) out of range, upon which the besieger could place as many guns Thus in five weeks one of the French field armies was im- as he chose to employ. In addition they were usually deficient prisoned in Metz, the other destroyed, and the Germans were free in armament and stores and garrisoned by newly-raised troops.
to march upon Paris. This seemed easy. There could Belfort, where the defenders strained every nerve to keep the
be no organized opposition to their progress, and Paris, besiegers out of bombarding range, and Paris formed the only opera.
if not so defenceless as in 1814, was more populous. exceptions to this general rule.
Starvation was the best method of attacking an over The policy of the new French government was defined by crowded fortress, and the Parisians were not thought to be proof Jules Favre on the 6th of September. “It is for the king of against the deprivation of their accustomed luxuries. Even Prussia, who has declared that he is making war on the Moltke hoped that by the end of October he would be “shooting the Empire and not on France, to stay his hand; we hares at Creisau," and with this confidence the German III. and shall not cede an inch of our territory or a stone of our NatioaIV. armies left the vicinity of Sedan on the 4th of September. fortresses.” These proud words, so often ridiculed The march called for no more than good staff arrangements, and as empty bombast, were the prelude of a national effort which the two armies arrived before Paris a fortnight later and gradually re-established France in the eyes of Europe as a great power, even encircled the place the III. army on the south, the IV. on though provinces and fortresses were ceded in the peace that that the north side in the last days of September. Headquarters effort proved unable to avert. They were translated into action were established at Versailles. Meanwhile the Third Empire by Léon Gambetta, who escaped from Paris in a balloon on the bad fallen, giving place on the 4th of September to a republican 7th of October, and established the headquarters of the defence Government of National Defence, which made its appeal to, at Tours, where already the“ Delegation of the central governand evoked, the spirit of 1792. Henceforward the French nation, ment—which had decided to remain in Paris--had concentrated which had left the conduct of the war to the regular army and the machinery of government. Thenceforward Gambetta and had been little more than an excited spectator, took the burden his principal assistant de Freycinet directed the whole war in
the open country, co-ordinating it, as best they could with the The regular army, indeed, still contained more than 500,000 precarious means of communication at their disposal, with men (chiefly recruits and reservists), and 50,000 sailors, marines, Trochu's military operations in and round the capital. His douaniers, &c., were also available. But the Garde Mobile, critics-Gambetta's personality was such as to ensure him framed by Marshal Niel in 1868, doubled this figure, and the numerous enemies among the higher civil and military officials, addition of the Garde Nationale, called into existence on the 15th over whom, in the interests of La Patrie, he rode rough-shodof September, and including all able-bodied men of from 31 to have acknowledged the fact, which is patent enough in any case, 60 years of age, more than trebled it. The German staff had of that nothing Gambetta's driving energy enabled France course to reckon on the Garde Mobile, and did so beforehand, in a few weeks to create and to equip twelve army corps, reprebut they wholly underestimated both its effective members and senting thirty-six divisions (600,000 rifles and 1400 guns), after its willingness, while, possessing themselves a system in which all her organized regular field troops had been destroyed or all the military elements of the German nation stood close behind neutralized. But it is claimed that by undue interference with 1 The 13th corps (Vinoy), which had followed MacMahon's
army of campaign, and by forcing them to act when the troops were
the generals at the front, by presuming to dictate their plans at some distance, was not involved in the catastrophe of Sedan, and by good luck as well as good management evaded the German unready, Gambetta and de Freycinet nullified the efforts of pursuit and returned safely to Paris.
themselves and the rest of the nation and subjected France
« De fease
to a humiliating treaty of peace. We cannot here discuss the German army, for field operations. The latter were at first justice or injustice of such a general condemnation, or even misdirected to the upper Seine, and yet another opportunity whether in individual instances Gambetta trespassed too far into arose for the French to raise the siege of Paris. But D'Aurelle the special domain of the soldier. But even the brief narrative utilized the time he had gained in strengthening the army and given below must at least suggest to the reader the existence in imparting drill and discipline to the new units which gathered amongst the generals and higher officials of a dead weight of round the original nucleus of the 15th and 16th corps. All this passive resistance to the Delegation's orders, of unnecessary was, however, unknown and even unsuspected at the German distrust of the qualities of the improvised troops, and above headquarters, and the invaders, feeling the approaching crisis, all of the utter fear of responsibility that twenty years of literal became more than uneasy as to their prospects of maintaining obedience had bred. The closest study of the war cannot lea the siege of Paris. to any other conclusion than this, that whether or not At this moment, in the middle of November, the general Gambetta as a strategist took the right course in general or situation was as follows: the German III. and Meuse armies, in particular cases, no one else would have taken any course investing Paris, had had to throw off important whatever.
detachments to protect the enterprise, which they had On the approach of the enemy Paris hastened its preparations undertaken on the assumption that no further field campaiga. for defence to the utmost, while in the provinces, out of reach armies of the enemy were to be encountered. The of the German cavalry, new army corps were rapidly organized maintenance of their communications with Germany, relatively out of the few constituted regular units not involved in the unimportant when the struggle took place in the circumstances previous catastrophes, the depot troops and the mobile national of field warfare, had become supremely necessary, now that the guard. The first-fruits of these efforts were seen in Beauce, army had come to a standstill and undertaken a great siege, where early in October important masses of French troops which required heavy guns and constant replenishment of prepared not only to bar the further progress of the invader ammunition and stores. The rapidity of the German invasion but actually to relieve Paris. The so-called "fog of war" had left no time for the proper organization and full garrisoning the armed inhabitants, francs-tireurs, sedentary national guard of these communications, which were now threatened, not merely and volunteers--prevented the German cavalry from venturing by the Army of the Loire, but by other forces assembling on the far out from the infantry camps around Paris, and behind this area protected by Langres and Belfort. The latter, under screen the new 15th army corps assembled on the Loire. But General Cambriels, were held in check and no more by the Baden an untimely demonstration of force alarmed the Germans, troops and reserve units (XIV. German corps) under General all of whom, from Moltke downwards, had hitherto disbelieved Werder, and eventually without arousing attention they were in the existence of the French new formations, and the still able to send 40,000 men to the Army of the Loire. This army, unready 15th corps found itself the target of an expedition of still around Orleans, thus came to number perhaps 150,000 the I. Bavarian corps, which drove the defenders out of Orleans men, and opposed to it, about the 14th of November, the Ger. after a sharp struggle, while at the same time another expedition mans had only the Army Detachment of about 40,000, the II. swept the western part of Beauce, sacked Châteaudun as a army being still distant. It was under these conditions that the punishment for its brave defence, and returned via Chartres, famous Orleans campaign took place. After many vicissitudes which was occupied.
of fortune, and with many misunderstandings between Prince After these events the French forces disappeared from German Frederick Charles, Moltke and the grand-duke, the Germans eyes for some weeks. D'Aurelle de Paladines, the commander were ultimately victorious, thanks principally to the brilliant of the “ Army of the Loire” (15th and 16th corps), improvised fighting of the X. corps at Beaune-la-Rolandc(28th of November), a camp of instruction at Salbris in Sologne, several marches out which was followed by the battle of Loigny-Poupry on the 2nd of reach, and subjected his raw troops to a stern régime of drill of December and the second capture of Orleans after heavy and discipline. At the same time an" Army of the West” began fighting on the 4th of December. to gather on the side of Le Mans. This army was almost The result of the capture of Orleans was the severance of the imaginary, yet rumours of its existence and numbers led the two wings of the French army, henceforward commanded German commanders into the gravest errors, for they soon came respectively by Chanzy and Bourbaki. The latter fell back at to suspect that the main army lay on that side and not on the once and hastily, though not closely pursued, to Bourges. Loire, and this mistaken impression governed the German But Chanzy, opposing the Detachment between Beaugency and dispositions up to the very eve of the decisive events around the Forest of Marchenoir, was of sterner metal, and in the five Orleans in December. Thus when at last D'Aurelle took the days' general engagement around Beaugency (December 7-11) offensive from Tours (whither he had transported his forces, the Germans gained little or no real advantage.' Indeed their now 100,000 strong) against the position of the I. Bavarian corps solitary material success, the capture of Beaugency, was due near Orleans, he found his task easy. The Bavarians, out-chiefly to the fact that the French there were subjected to numbered and unsupported, were defeated with heavy losses in conflicting orders from the military and the governmental the battle of Coulmiers (November 9), and, had it not been for authorities. Chanzy then abandoned little but the field of the inexperience, want of combination, and other technical battle, and on the grand-duke's representations Prince Frederick weaknesses of the French, they would have been annihilated. Charles, leaving a mere screen to impose upon Bourbaki (who What the results of such a victory as Coulmiers might have been, allowed himself to be deceived and remained inactive), hurried had it been won by a fully organized, smoothly working army thither with the II. army. After that Chanzy was rapidly of the same strength, it is difficult to overestimate. As it was, driven north-westward, though always presenting a stubborn the retirement of the Bavarians rang the alarm bell all along the front. The Delegation left Tours and betook itself to Bordeaux, line of the German positions, and that was all.
whence it directed the government for the rest of the war. But Then once again, instead of following up its success, the French all this continuous marching and fighting, and the growing army disappeared from view. The victory had emboldened severity of the weather, compelled Prince Frederick Charles the fog of war to make renewed efforts, and resistance to to call a halt for a few days. About the 19th of December, the pressure of the German cavalry grew daya by day. The therefore, the Germans (II. army and Detachment) were closed Bavarians were reinforced by two Prussian divisions and by all up in the region of Chartres, Orleans, Auxerre and Fontaineavailable cavalry commands, and constituted as an "army bleau, Chanzy along the river Sarthe about Le Mans and Bourbaki detachment " under the grand-duke Friedrich Franz of Mecklen- still passive towards Bourges. burg-Schwerin to deal with the Army of the Loire, the strength During this, as during other halts, the French government of which was far from being accurately known. Meantime the and its generals occupied themselves with fresh plans of camcapitulation of Metz on the 28th of October had set free the paign, the former with an eager desire for results, the latter veterans of Prince Frederick Charles, the best troops in the 1 (Chanzy excepted) with many misgivings. Ultimately, and
13 fatally, it was decided that Bourbaki, whom nothing could move capacity for a single great effort and no more. But they were towards Orleans, should depart for the south-east, with a view unreliable in the hands of the veteran regular general, because to relieving Belfort and striking perpendicularly against the long they were heterogeneous in recruiting, and unequal in experience line of the Germans' communications. This movement, bold and military qualities, and the French staff in those days was to the point of extreme rashness judged by any theoretical rules wholly incapable of moving-masses of troops with the rapidity of strategy, seems to have been suggested by de Freycinet. demanded by the enemy's methods of war, so that on the whole As the execution of it fell actually into incapable hands, it is it is difficult to know whether to wonder more at their missing difficult to judge what would have been the result had a Chanzy success or at their so nearly achieving it. or a Faidherbe been in command of the French. At any rate The decision, as we have said, was fought out on the Loire it was vicious in so far as immediate advantages were sacrificed and the Sarthe. Nevertheless the glorious story of the “ Défense to hopes of ultimate success which Gambetta and de Freycinet nationale” includes two other important campaigns—that of did wrong to base on Bourbaki's powers of generalship Late Faidherbe in the north and that of Bourbaki in the east. in December, for good or evil, Bourbaki marched off into Franche In the north the organization of the new formations was Comté and ceased to be a factor in the Loire campaign. A begun by Dr Testelin and General Farre. Bourbaki beld the mere calculation of time and space sufficed to show the German command for a short time in November before pro
Faldheadquarters that the moment had arrived to demolish the ceeding to Tours, but the active command in field berbe's stubborn Chanzy
operations came into the hands of Faidherbe, a general campaigai Prince Frederick Charles resumed the interrupted offensive, whose natural powers, so far from being cramped by pushing westward with four corps and four cavalry divisions years of peace routine and court repression, had been developed Le Maps.
which converged on Le Mans. There on the roth, by a career of pioneer warfare and colonial administration.
with and 12th of January 1871 a stubbornly contested General Farre was his capable chief of staff. Troops were raised battle ended with the retreat of the French, who owed their from fugitives from Metz and Sedan, as well as from depot troops defeat solely to the misbehaviour of the Breton mobiles. These, and the Garde Mobile, and several minor successes were won by after deserting their post on the battlefield at a mere threat of the national troops in the Seine valley, for here, as on the side the enemy's infantry, fled in disorder and infected with their of the Loire, mere detachments of the investing army round terrors the men in the reserve camps of instruction, which broke Paris were almost powerless. But the capitulation of Metz up in turn. But Chanzy, resolute as ever, drew off his field army came too soon for the full development of these sources of intact towards Laval, where a freshly raised corps joined him. military strength, and the German I. army under Manteuffel, The prince's army was far too exhausted to deliver another released from duty at Metz, marched north-eastward, capturing effective blow, and the main body of it gradually drew back into the minor fortresses on its way. Before Faidherbe assumed better quarters, while the grand duke departed for the north command, Farre had fought several severe actions near Amiens, to aid in opposing Faidherbe Some idea of the strain to which but, greatly outnumbered, had been defeated and forced to the invaders had been subjected may be gathered from the fact retire behind the Somme. Another French general, Briand, that army corps, originally 30,000 strong, were in some cases had also engaged the enemy without success near Rouen. reduced to 10,000 and even fewer bayonets. And at this moment Faidherbe assumed the command on the 3rd of December, and Bourbaki was at the head of 120,000 men! Indeed, so threaten- promptly moved forward. A general engagement on the little ing seemed the situation on the Loire, though the French south river Hallue (December 23), east-north-east of Amiens, was of that river between Gien and Blois were mere isolated brigades, fought with no decisive results, but Faidherbe, feeling that his that the prince hurried back from Le Mans to Orleans to take troops were only capable of winning victories in the first rush, personal command. A fresh French corps, bearing the number drew them off on the 24th. His next effort, at Bapaume 25, and being the twenty-first actually raised during the war, (January 2-3, 1871), was more successful, but its effects were appeared in the field towards Blois. Chanzy was again at the counterbalanced by the surrender of the fortress of Péronne head of 156,000 men He was about to take the offensive (January 9) and the consequent establishment of the Germans against the 40,000 Germans lest near Le Mans when to his bitter on the line of the Somme. Meanwhile the Rouen troops had disappointment he received the news of the armistice “We been contained by a strong German detachment, and there was have still France," he had said to his staff, undeterred by the no further chance of succouring Paris from the north. But news of the capitulation of Paris, but now he had to submit, Faidħerbe, like Chanzy, was far from despair, and in spite of the for even if his improvised army was still cheerful, there were deficiencies of his troops in equipment (50,000 pairs of shoes, many significant tokens that the people at large had sunk into supplied by English contractors, proved to have paper soles), apathy and hoped to avoid worse terms of peace by discontinuing he risked a third great battle at St Quentin (January 19). This the contest at once.
time he was severely defeated, though his loss in killed and So ended the critical period of the “ Défense nationale” It wounded was about equal to that of the Germans, who were may be taken to have lasted from the day of Coulmiers to the commanded by Goeben. Still the attempt of the Germans to last day of Le Mans, and its central point was the battle of surround him failed and he drew off his forces with his artillery Beaune-la-Rolande Its characteristics were, on the German and trains unharmed. The Germans, who had been greatly side, inadequacy of the system of strategy practised, which impressed by the solidity of his army, did not pursue him far, became palpable as soon as the organs of reconnaissance met and Faidherbe was preparing for a fresh effort when he received with serious resistance, misjudgment of and indeed contempt orders to suspend hostilities. for the fighting powers of “new formations," and the rise of a The last episode is Bourbaki's campaign in the east, with its spirit of ferocity in the man in the ranks, born of his resentment mournful close at Pontarlier Before the crisis of the last week at the continuance of the war and the ceaseless sniping of the of November, the French forces under General Crémer, Cambriels' franc-tireur's rifle and the peasant's shot-gun. On the French successor, had been so far successful in minor enterprises that, side the continual efforts of the statesmen to stimulate the as mentioned above, the right wing of the Loire army, severed generals to decisive efforts, coupled with actual suggestions as to from the left by the battle of Orleans and subsequently held the plans of the campaign to be followed (in default, be it said, of inactive at Bourges and Nevers, was ordered to Franche Comté the generals themselves producing such plans), and the pro- to take the offensive against the XIV corps and other German fessional soldiers' distrust of half-trained troops, acted and troops there, to relieve Belfort and to strike a blow across the reacted upon one another in such a way as to neutralize the invaders' line of communications. But there were many delays powerful, if disconnected and erratic, forces that the war and in execution. The staff work, which was at no time satisfactory the Republic had unchained As for the soldiers themselves, in the French armies of 1870, was complicated by the snow, their most conspicuous qualities were their uncomplaining the bad state of the roads, and the mountainous nature of the endurance of fatigues and wet bivouacs, and in action their country, and Bourbaki, a brave general of division in action,
lo tho Bast.
but irresolute and pretentious as a commander in chief, was not End of July, French 250,000, Germans 384,000 under arms.
425,000 the man to cope with the situation. Only the furious courage and Middle of November
After the surrender patient endurance of hardships of the rank and file, and the good of Paris and the qualities of some of the generals, such as Clinchant, Crémer and disarmament of Billot, and junior staff officers such as Major Brugère (afterwards
Bourbaki's army .
835,000 generalissimo of the French army), secured what success was The date of the armistice was the 28th of January, and that attained.
of the ratification of the treaty of Frankfurt the 23rd of May Werder, the German commander, warned of the imposing 1871 concentration of the French, evacuated Dijon and Dôle just in time to avoid the blow and rapidly drew together his volume, and the following list only includes a very short selection
BIBLIOGRAPHY.—The literature of the war is ever increasing in campaige forces behind the Ognon above Vesoul. furious made amongst the most important works.
attack on one of his divisions at Villersexel (January 9) General. ---German official history, Der deulsch-französische Krieg cost him 2000 prisoners as well as his killed and (Berlin, 1872-1881, English and French translations), monographs
of the German general staff (Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften); Moltke, wounded, and Bourbaki, heading for Belfort, was actually nearer Gesch, des deutsch-französ. Krieges (Berlin, 1891 English translation) to the fortress than the Germans. But at the crisis more time and Gesammelte Schriften des G F M Grafen v. Mollke (Berlin, was wasted, Werder (who had almost lost hope of maintaining 1900 ), French official history, La Guerre de 1870-1871 (Paris, himself and had received both encouragement and stringent (General Palat), Hist. de la guerre de 1870-1871 (Paris, 1901-1907):
S(the fullest and most accurate account): P Lehautcourt instructions to do so) slipped in front of the French, and took up
v. Verdy du Vernois, Studien über den Krieg a long weak line of defence on the river Lisaine, almost within 1870-1871 (Berlin, 1892-1896): G. Cardinal von Widdern, Krilische cannon shot of Belfort. The cumbrous French army moved up Tage 1870-1871 (French translation, Journées critiques). Events and attacked him there with 150,000 against 60,000 (January preceding the war are dealt with in v Bernhardi, Zwischen zwei 15-17, 1871). It was at last repulsed, thanks chiefly to Bourbaki's English translation); G. Lehmann, Die Mobilmachung 1870-1871 inability to handle his forces, and, to the bitter disappointment (Berlin, 1905). of officers and men alike, he ordered a retreat, leaving Belfort Briefe liber Strategie (English
translation, Letters on Strategy
the of , to its fate
Ere this, so urgent was the necessity of assisting Werder, Privat (Paris, 1904-1906): Maistre, Spicheren (Paris, 1908): v. Manteuffel had been placed at the head of a new Army of the Schell
, Die Operationen der 1. Armee unter Gen. von Steinmetz (Berlin, South. Bringing two corps from the I. army opposing Faidherbe 1872; English translation); F. Hocnig, Taktik der Zukunft (English and calling up a third from the armies around Paris, and a fourth translation, and 24 Stunden Moltke' schen Strategie (Berlin, 1892;
English and French translations). from the II. army, Manteuffel hurried southward by Langres
For the war in Alsace and Champagne H Kunz, Schlacht ron to the Saône. Then, hearing of Werder's victory on the Lisaine, Wörth (Berlin, 1891), and later works by the same author: H. he deflected the march so as to cut off Bourbaki's retreat, Bonnal, Fröschweiler (Paris, 1899), Hahnke, Die Operationen des drawing off the left flank guard of the latter (commanded with
III, Armee bis Sedan (Berlin, 1873; French translation). much icat and little real effect by Garibaldi) by a sharp feint seine Armeen (Berlin, 1877), Die Operationen der II. Armee an die
For the war in the Provinces. v, der Goltz, Léon Gambetta und attack on Dijon. The pressure of Werder in front and Manteuffel Loire (Berlin, 1875); Die sieben Tage von Le Mans (Berlin, 1873): in flank gradually forced the now thoroughly disheartened Kunz, Die Zusammensetzung, der französ Provinzialheeren; de French forces towards the Swiss frontier, and Bourbaki, realizing Freycinet, La Guerre en province (Paris, 1871), L. A. Hale, The at once the ruin of his army and his own incapacity to re-establishi (Berlin, 1892); Blume, 'Operationen v. Sedan bis zum Ende d. Kriegs its efficiency, shot himself, though not fatally, on the 26th of (Berlin, 1872; English translation), v Schell
, Die Operationen der 1. January Clinchant, his successor, acted promptly enough to Armee unter Gen. v. Goeben (Berlin, 1873; English translation); remove the immediate danger, but on the 29th he was informed Count Wartensleben, Feldzug der Nordarmce unter Gen. 9. Manteufsei of the armistice without at the same time being told that Belfort translation); Faidherbe, Campagne de l'armée du nord (Paris, 1872).
(Berlin, 1872), Operationen der Sudarmee (Berlin, 1872, English and the eastern theatre of war had been on Jules Favre's demand For the sieges: Frobenius, Kriegsgesch. Beispiele d. Festungskriegs expressly excepted from its operation. Thus the French, the aus d. deutsch-franz, Kg. (Berlin, 1899-1900), Goetze, Tätigkeit leaders distracted by doubts and the worn-out soldiers fully der deutschen Ingenieuren (Berlin, 1871. English translation). aware that the war was practically over, stood still, while Lehautcourt ").
The most useful bibliography is that of General Palat (" P.
(C. F A.) Manteuffel completed his preparations for hemming them in. On the ist of February General Clinchant led his troops into FRANÇOIS DE NEUFCHÂTEAU, NICOLAS LOUIS, COUNT Switzerland, where they were disarmed, interned and well cared (1750-1828), French statesman and poet, was born at Saffais for by the authorities of the neutral state The rearguard fought near Rozières in Lorraine on the 17th of April 1750, the son of a a last action with the advancing Germans before passing the school-teacher. He studied at the Jesuit college of Neufchâteau frontier On the 16th, by order of the French government, in the Vosges, and at the age of fourteen published a volume Belfort capitulated, but it was not until the uth of March that of poetry which obtained the approbation of Rousseau and of the Germans took possession of Bitche, the little fortress on the Voltaire. Neufchâteau conferred on him its name, and he was Vosges, where in the early days of the war de Failly had illus- elected member of some of the principal academies of France. trated so signally the want of concerted action and the neglect In 1783 he was named procureur-général to the council of Santo of opportunities which had throughout proved the bane of the Domingo. He had previously been engaged on a translation French armies.
of Ariosto, which he finished before his return to France five The losses of the Germans during the whole war were 28.000 years afterwards, but it perished during the shipwreck which dead and 101,000 wounded and disabled, those of the French, occurred during his voyage home. After the Revolution he 156,000 dead (17,000 of whom died, of sickness and wounds, as was elected deputy suppléant to the National Assembly, was prisoners in German hands) and 143,000 wounded and disabled. charged with the organization of the Department of the Vosges, 720,000 men surrendered to the Germans or to the authorities and was elected later to the Legislative Assembly, of which he of neutral states, and at the close of the war there were still first became secretary and then president In 1793 he was 250,000 troops on foot, with further resources not immediately imprisoned on account of the political sentiments, in reality available to the number of 280,000 more. In this connexion, very innocent, of his drama Pamela ou la ucrtu récompenséc and as evidence of the respective numerical yields of the German (Théatre de la Nation, ist August 1793), but was set free a few system working normally and of the French improvised for days afterwards at the revolution of the oth Thermidor In the emergency, we quote from Berndt (Zahl im Kriege) the 1797 he became minister of the interior, in which office he following comparative figures:
distinguished himself by the thoroughness of his administration Jules Favre, it appears, neglected to inform Gambetta of the in all departments. It is to him that France owes its system exception.
of inland navigation. He inaugurated the museum of the Louvre.