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who was at that time a court preacher in Dresden, he returned to Leipzig in the spring of 1689, and began to give Bible lectures of an exegetical and practical kind, at the same time resuming the Collegium Philobiblicum of earlier days. He soon became popular as a lecturer; but the peculiarities of his teaching almost immediately aroused a violent opposition on the part of the university authorities; and before the end of the year he was interdicted from lecturing on the ground of his alleged pietism. Thus it was that Francke's name first came to be publicly associated with that of Spener, and with pietism. Prohibited from lecturing in Leipzig, Francke in 1690 found work at Erfurt as “deacon” of one of the city churches. Here his evangelistic fervour attracted multitudes to his preaching, including Roman Catholics, but at the same time excited the anger of his opponents; and the result of their opposition was that after a ministry of fifteen months he was commanded by the civil authorities (27th of September 1691) to leave Erfurt within forty-eight hours. The same year witnessed the expulsion of Spener from Dresden. In December, through Spener's influence, Francke accepted an invitation to fill the chair of Greek and oriental languages in the new university of Halle, which was at that time being organized by the elector Frederick III. of Brandenburg; and at the same time, the chair having no salary attached to it, he was appointed pastor of Glaucha in the immediate neighbourhood of the town. He afterwards became professor of theology. Here, for the next thirty-six years, until his death on the 8th of June 1727, he continued to discharge the twofold office of pastor and professor with rare energy and success. At the very outset of his labours he had been profoundly impressed with a sense of his responsibility towards the numerous outcast children who were growing up around him in ignorance and crime. After a number of tentative plans, he resolved in 1695 to institute what is often called a “ragged school,” supported by public charity. A single room was at first sufficient, but within a year it was found necessary to purchase a house, to which another was added in 1697. In 1698 there were 100 orphans under his charge to be clothed and fed, besides 500 children who were taught as day scholars. The schools grew in importance and are still known as the Francke'sche Stiftungen. The education given was strictly religious. Hebrew was included, while the Greek and Latin classics were neglected; the Homilies of Macarius took the place of Thucydides. The same principle was consistently applied in his university teaching. Even as professor of Greek he had given great prominence in his lectures to the study of the Scriptures; but he found a much more congenial sphere when in 1698, he was appointed to the chair of theology. Yet his first courses of lectures in that department were readings and expositions of the Old and New Testament; and to this, as also to hermeneutics, he always attached special importance, believing that for theology a sound exegesis was the one indispensable requisite. “Theologus nascitur in scripturis,” he used to say; but during his occupancy of the theological chair he lectured at various times upon other branches of theology also. Amongst his colleagues were Paul Anton (1661–1730), Joachim J. Breithaupt (1658–1732) and Joachim Lange (1670–1744),—men like-minded with himself. Through their influence upon the students, Halle became a centre from which pietism (q.v.) became very widely diffused over Germany. His principal contributions to theological literature were: Manuductio ad lectionem, Scripturae Sacrae ''' Praelectiones hermeneuticae (1717); Commentatio de scopo librorum Veteris et Novi Testamenti (1724); and Lectiones, paraeneticae (1726–1736).4 The Afanududio was translated into English in 1813, under the title A Guide to the Reading and Study of # Scriptures. An account of his orphanage, entitled Segensvolle # c. (1709), which subsequently passed through several editions, has also been partially translated, under the title. The Footsteps of Divine Providence: or, The bountiful Hand eaven defraying the Expenses of Faith. See H. E. F. Guericke's A. H. Francke (1827), which has been transIated into English (The Life of A. H. Francke, 1837); Gustave Kramer's Beiträge zur Geschichte A. H. Francke's (1861), and Neue Beiträge (1875); A. Stein, A. H. Francke (3rd ed., 1894); article in Herzog-Hauck's Realencyklopädie (ed. 1899); nuth, Die #a: Stiftungen #ed., 1903).
FRANCKEN. Eleven painters of this family cultivated their art in Antwerp during the 16th and 17th centuries. Several of these were related to each other, whilst many bore the same Christian name in succession. Hence unavoidable confusion in the subsequent classification of paintings not widely differing in style or execution. When Franz Francken the first found a rival in Franz Francken the second, he described himself as the “elder,” in contradistinction to his son, who signed himself the “younger.” But when Franz the second was threatened with competition from Franz the third, he took the name of “the elder,” whilst Franz the third adopted that of Franz “the younger.”
It is possible, though not by any means easy, to sift the works of these artists. The eldest of the Franckens, Nicholas of Herenthals, died at Antwerp in 1596, with nothing but the reputation of having been a painter. None of his works remain. He bequeathed his art to three children. Jerom Francken, the eldest son, after leaving his father's house, studied under Franz Floris, whom he afterwards served as an assistant, and wandered, about 1560, to Paris. In 1566 he was one of the masters employed to decorate the palace of Fontainebleau, and in 1574 he obtained the appointment of court painter from Henry III., who had just returned from Poland and, visited Titian at Venice. In 1603, when Van Mander wrote his biography of Flemish artists, Jerom Francken was still in Paris living in the then aristocratic Faubourg St Germain. Among his earliest works we should distinguish a “Nativity” in the Dresden museum, executed in cooperation with Franz Floris. Another of his important pieces is the “Abdication of Charles V.” in the Amsterdam museum. Equally interesting is a “Portrait of a Falconer,” dated 1558, in the Brunswick gallery. In style these pieces all recall Franz Floris. Franz, the second son of Nicholas of Herenthals, is to be kept in memory as Franz Francken the first. He was born about 1544, matriculated at Antwerp in 1567, and died there in 1616. He, too, studied under Floris, and never settled abroad, or lost the hard and gaudy style which he inherited from his master. Several of his pictures are in the museum of Antwerp, one dated 1597 in the Dresden museum represents “Christ on the Road to Golgotha,” and is signed by him as D. Ö (Den ouden) F. Franck. Ambrose, the third son of Nicholas of Herenthals, has bequeathed to us more specimens of his skill than Jerom or Franz the first. He first started as a partner with Jerom at Fontainebleau, then he returned to Antwerp, where he passed for his gild in 1573, and he lived at Antwerp till 1618. His best works are the “Miracle of the Loaves and Fishes” and the “Martyrdom of St Crispin,” both large and ambitious compositions in the Antwerp museum. In both these pieces a fair amount of power is displayed, but marred by want of atmosphere and shadow or by hardness of line and gaudiness of tone. There is not a trace in the three painters named of the influence of the revival which took place under the lead of Rubens. Franz Francken the first trained three sons to his profession, the eldest of whom, though he practised as a master of gild at Antwerp from 16oo to 1610, left no visible trace of his labours behind. Jerom the second took service with his uncle Ambrose. He was born in 1578, passed for his gild in 1607, and in 162o ‘produced that curious picture of “Horatius Cocles defending the Sublician Bridge” which still hangs in the Antwerp museum. The third son of Franz Francken the first is Franz Francken the second, who signed himself in pictures till 1616 “theyounger,” from 1630 till his death “the elder” F. Francken. These pictures are usually of a small size, and are found in considerable numbers in continental collections. Franz Francken the second was born in 1581. In 1605 he entered the gild, of which he subsequently became the president, and in 1642 he died. His earliest composition is the “Crucifixion ” in the Belvedere at Vienna, dated 1606. His latest compositions as “the younger” F. Francken are the “Adoration of the Virgin” (1616) in the gallery of Amsterdam, and the “Woman taken in Adultery.” (1628) in Dresden. From 1616 to 1630 many of his pieces are signed F. Francken; then come the “Seven Works of Charity” (1630) at Munich, signed “the elder F. F.,” the “Prodigal Son" (1633) at the Louvre, and other almost countless examples. It is in F. Francken the second's style that we first have evidence of the struggle which necessarily arose when the old customs, hardened by Van Orley and Floris, or Breughel and De Vos, were swept away by Rubens. But F. Francken the second, as before observed, always clung to small surfaces; and though he gained some of the freedom of the moderns, he lost but little of the dryness or gaudiness of the earlier Italo-Flemish revivalists. F. Francken the third, the last of his name who deserves to be recorded, passed in the Antwerp gild in 1639 and died at Antwerp in 1667. His practice was chiefly confined to adding figures to the architectural or landscape pieces of other artists. As Franz Pourbus sometimes put in the portrait figures for Franz Francken the second, so Franz Francken the third often introduced the necessary personages into the works of Pieter Neefs the younger (museums of St Petersburg, Dresden and the Hague). In a “Moses striking the Rock,” dated 1654, of the Augsburg gallery, this last of the Franckens signs D. G. (Den ouden) F. Franck. In the pictures of this artist we most clearly discern the effects of Rubens's example. FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (1870-1871). The victories of Prussia in 1866 over the Austrians and their German allies (see SEVEN WEEks' WAR) rendered it evident to the statesmen and soldiers of France that a struggle between the two nations could only be a question of time. Army reforms were at once undertaken, and measures were initiated in France to place the armament and equipment of the troops on a level with the requirements of the times. The chassepot, a new breechloading rifle, immensely superior to the Prussian needle-gun, was issued; the artillery trains were thoroughly overhauled, and a new machine-gun, the mitrailleuse, from which much was expected, introduced. Wide schemes of reorganization (due mainly to Marshal Niel) were set in motion, and, since these required time to mature, recourse was had to foreign alliances in the hope of delaying the impending rupture. In the first week of June 1870, General Lebrun, as a confidential agent of the emperor Napoleon III., was sent to Vienna to concert a plan of joint operations with Austria against Prussia. Italy was also to be included in the alliance, and it was agreed that in case of hostilities the French armies should concentrate in northern Bavaria, where the Austrians and Italians were to join them, and the whole immense army thus formed should march via Jena on Berlin. To what extent Austria and Italy committed themselves to this scheme remains uncertain, but that the emperor Napoleon believed in their bona fides is beyond doubt. Whether the plan was betrayed to Prussia is also uncertain, and almost immaterial, for Moltke's plans were based on an accurate estimate of the time it would take Austria to mobilize and on the effect of a series of victories on French soil. At any rate Moltke was not taken into Bismarck's confidence in the affair of Ems in July 1870, and it is to be presumed that the chancellor had already satisfied himself that the schemes of operations prepared by the chief of the General Staff fully provided against all eventualities. These schemes were founded on Clausewitz's view of the objects to be pursued in a war against France—in the first place the defeat of the French field armies and in the second the occupation of Paris. On these lines plans for the strategic deployment of the Prussian army were prepared by the General Staff and kept up to date year by year as fresh circumstances (e.g. the co-operation of the minor German armies) arose and new means of communication came into existence. The campaign was actually opened on a revise of 1868-1869, to which was added, on the 6th of May 1870, a secret memorandum for the General Staff. Under the German organization then existing the preliminary to all active operations was of necessity full and complete mobilization. Then followed transport by road and rail to the line selected for the “strategic deployment,” and it was essential that no part of these operations should be disturbed by action on the part of the enemy. But no such delay imposed itself of necessity upon the French, and a vigorous offensive was so much
in harmony with their traditions that the German plan had to be framed so as to meet such emergencies. On the whole, Moltke concluded that the enemy could not undertake
this offensive before the eighth day after mobilization. : At that date about five French army corps (150,000 ment men) could be collected near Metz, and two corps of the (70,000) near Strassburg; and as it was six days' march £
from Metz to the Rhine, no serious attack could be delivered before the fourteenth day, by which day it could be met by superior forces near Kirchheimbolanden. Since, however, the transport of the bulk of the Prussian forces could not begin till the ninth day, their ultimate line of detrainment need not be fixed until the French plans were disclosed, and, as it was important to strike at the earliest moment possible, the deployment was provisionally fixed to be beyond the Rhine on the line WittlichNeunkirchen-Landau. Of the thirteen North German corps three had to be left behind to guard the eastern frontier and the coast, one other, the VIII., was practically on the ground already and could concentrate by road, and the remaining nine were distributed to the nine through railway lines available. These ten corps were grouped in three armies, and as the French might violate Belgian neutrality or endeavour to break into southern Germany, two corps (Prussian Guard and Saxon XII. corps) were temporarily held back at a central position around Mainz, whence they could move rapidly up or down the Rhine valley. If Belgian neutrality remained unmolested, the reserve would join the III. army on the left wing, giving it a two to one superiority over its adversary; all three armies would then wheel to the right and combine in an effort to force the French army into a decisive battle on the Saar on or about the twenty-third day. As in this wheel the army on the right formed the pivot and was required only to stand fast, two corps only were allotted to it; two corps for the present formed the III. army, and the remaining five were assigned to the II. army in the centre.
When (16th-17th July) the South German states decided to throw in their lot with the rest, their three corps were allotted to the III. army, the Guards and Saxons to the II. army, whilst the three corps originally left behind were finally distributed one to each army, so that up to the investment of Metz the order of battle was as follows:
y: General v. Steinmetz VII. , v. Zastrow
(C. of S., v. Sperling) VIII. , v. Goeben
(2nd) and 4th eval: divisions otal . . 180,000 Grand Total . . . 475,000 (The units within brackets were those at first retained in Germany.) On the French side no such plan of operations was in existence when on the night of the 15th of July Krieg mobil was telegraphed all over Prussia. An outline scheme had indeed been positions prepared as a basis for agreement with Austria and of the Italy, but practically no details were fixed, and the French troops were without transport and supplies. Never- forces. theless, since speed was the essence of the contract, the troops
If therefore they began a forward movement on the 23rd (eighth day) the case foreseen by Moltke had arisen, and it became necessary to detrain the II. army upon the Rhine. Without waiting for further confirmation of this intelligence, Moltke, with the consent of the king, altered the arrangements accordingly, a decision which, though foreseen, exercised the gravest influence on the course of events. As it happened this decision was premature, for the French could not yet move. Supply trains had to be organized by requisition from the inhabitants, and even arms and ammunition procured for such reserves as had succeeded in joining. Nevertheless, by almost superhuman exertions on the part of the railways and administrative services, all essential deficiencies were made good, and by the 28th of July (13th day) the troops had received all that was absolutely indispensable and might well have been led against the enemy, who, thanks to Moltke's premature action, were for the moment at a very serious disadvantage. But the French generals were unequal to their responsibilities. It is now clear that, had the great Napoleon and his marshals been in command, they would have made light of the want of cooking pots, cholera belts, &c., and, by a series of rapid marches, would have concentrated odds of at least three to one upon the heads of the Prussian columns as they struggled through the defiles of the Hardt, and won a victory whose political results might well have proved decisive. To meet this pressing danger, which came to his knowledge during the course of the 29th, Moltke sent a confidential staff officer, Colonel v. Werdy du Vernois, to the III. army to impress upon the crown prince the necessity of an immediate advance to distract the enemy's attention from the I. and II. armies; but, like the French generals, the crown prince pleaded that he could not move until his trains were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, the French. intelligence service not only failed to inform the staff of this extraordinary opportunity, but it allowed itself to be hypnotized by the most amazing rumours. In imagination they saw armies of Ioo,ooo men behind every forest, and, to guard against these dangers, the French troops were marched and counter-marched along the frontiers in the vain hope of discovering an ideal defensive position which should afford full scope to the power of their new weapons. As these delays were exerting a most unfavourable effect on public opinion not only in France but throughout Europe, the emperor decided on the 1st of August to initiate a movement towards the Saar, chiefly as a guarantee of good faith to the Austrians and Italians.. On this day the French corps held the following positions from right to left:
battery), seeing the overwhelming numbers opposed to them, fell back fighting and vanished to the northward, having given a very excellent example of steadiness and discipline to their enemy. The latter contented themselves by occupying Saarbrücken and its suburb St Johann, and here, as far as the troops were concerned, the incident closed. Its effect, however, proved far-reaching. The Prussian staff could not conceive that nothing lay behind this display of five whole divisions, and immediately took steps to meet the expected danger. In their excitement, although they had announced the beginning of the action to the king's headquarters at Mainz, they forgot to notify the close and its results, so that Moltke was not in possession of the facts till noon on the 3rd of August. Meanwhile, Steinmetz, left without instructions and fearing for the safety of the II. army, the heads of whose columns were still in the defiles of the Hardt, moved the I. army from the neighbourhood of Merzig obliquely to his left front, so as to strike the flank of the French.army if it continued its march towards Kaiserslautern, in which direction it appeared to be heading. Whilst this order was in process of execution, Moltke, aware that the II. army was behind time in its march, issued instructions to Steinmetz for the 4th of August which entailed a withdrawal to the rear, the idea being that both armies should, if the French advanced, fight a defensive battle in a selected position farther back. Steinmetz obeyed, though bitterly resenting the idea of retreat. This movement, further, drew his left across the roads reserved for the right column of the II. army, and on receipt of a peremptory order from Prince Frederick Charles to evacuate the road, Steinmetz telegraphed for instructions direct to the king, over Moltke's head. In reply he received a telegram from Moltke, ordering him to clear the road at once, and couched in terms which he considered as a severe reprimand. An explanatory letter, meant to soften the rebuke, was delayed in transmission and did not reach him till too late to modify the orders he had already issued. It must be remêmbered that Steinmetz at the front was in a better position to judge the apparent situation than was Moltke at Mainz, and that all through the day of the 5th of August he had received intelligence indicating a change of attitude in the French army. The news of the German victory at Weissenburg on the 4th (see below) had in fact completely paralysed the French headquarters, and orders were issued by them during the
Action of Saarbricken.
course of the 5th to concentrate the whole army of the £" - - - SpichRhine on the selected position of Cadenbronn. As a ren.
preliminary, Frossard's corps withdrew from Saarbrücken and began to entrench a position on the Spicheren heights, 3000 yds. to the southward. Steinmetz, therefore, being quite unaware of the scheme for a great battle on the Saar about the 12th of August, felt that the situation would best be met, and the letter of his instructions strictly obeyed, by moving his whole command forward to the line of the Saar, and orders to this effect were issued on the evening of the 5th. In pursuance of these orders, the advanceguard of the 14th division (Lieutenant General von Kameke) reached Saarbrücken about 9 A.M. on the 6th, where the Germans found to their amazement that the bridges were intact. To secure this advantage was the obvious duty of the commander on the spot, and he at once ordered his troops to occupy a line of low heights beyond the town to serve as a bridge-head. As the leading troops deployed on the heights Frossard's guns on the Spicheren Plateau opened fire, and the advanced guard battery replied. The sound of these guns unchained the whole fighting instinct carefully developed by a long course of Prussian manoeuvre training. Everywhere, generals and troops hurried towards the cannon thunder. Kamcke, even more in the dark than Steinmetz as to Moltke's intentions and the strength of his adversaries, attacked at once, precisely as he would have done at manoeuvres, and in half an hour his men were committed beyond recall. As each fresh unit reached the field it was hurried into action where its services * This was the celebrated "baptème defeu" of the prince imperial were most needed, and each fresh general as he arrived took a new view of the combat and issued new orders. On the other side, Frossard, knowing the strength of his position, called on his neighbours for support, and determined to hold his ground. Victory seemed certain. There were sufficient troops within easy reach to have ensured a crushing numerical superiority. But the other generals had not been trained to mutual support, and thought only of their own immediate security, and their staffs were too inexperienced to act upon even good intentions; and, finding himself in the course of the afternoon left to his own devices, Frossard began gradually to withdraw, even before the pressure of the 13th German division on his left flank (about 8 P.M.) compelled his retirement. When darkness ended the battle the Prussians were scarcely aware of their victory. Steinmetz, who had reached the field about 6 P.M., rode back to his headquarters without issuing any orders, while the troops bivouacked where they stood, the units of three army corps being mixed up in almost inextricable confusion. But whereas out of 42,900 Prussians with 120 guns, who in the morning lay within striking distance of the enemy, no fewer than 27,ooo, with 78 guns were actually engaged; of the French, out of 64,000 with 21o guns only 24,ooo with 90 guns took part in the action. Meanwhile on the German left wing the III. army had begun its advance. Early on the 4th of August it crossed the frontier and fell upon a French detachment under Abel Douay, £.: which had been placed near Weissenburg, partly to burg. cover the Pigeonnier pass, but principally to consume the supplies accumulated in the little dismantled fortress, as these could not easily be moved. Against this force of under 4ooo men of all arms, the Germans brought into action successively portions of three corps, in all over 25,000 men with 90 guns. After six hours' fighting, in which the Germans lost some 1500 men, the gallant remnant of the French withdrew deliberately and in good order, notwithstanding the death of their leader at the critical moment. The Germans were so elated by their victory over the enemy, whose strength they naturally overestimated, that they forgot to send cavalry in pursuit, and thus entirely lost touch with the enemy. Next day the advance was resumed, the two Bavarian corps moving via Mattstall through the foothills of the Vosges, the V. corps on their left towards Preuschdorf, and the XI. farther to the left again, through the wooded plain of the Rhine valley. The 4th cavalry division scouted in advance, and army headquarters moved to Sulz. About noon the advanced patrols discovered MacMahon's corps in position on the left bank of the Sauer (see WöRTH: Battle of). As his army was dispersed over a wide area, the crown prince determined to devote the 6th to concentrating the troops, and, probably to avoid alarming the enemy, ordered the cavalry to stand fast. At night the outposts of the I. Bavarians and V. corps on the Sauer saw the fires of the French encampment and heard the noise of railway traffic, and rightly conjectured the approach of reinforcements. MacMahon had in fact determined to stand in the very formidable position he had selected, and he counted on receiving support both from the 7th corps (two divisions of which were being railed up from Colmar) and from the 5th corps, which lay around Bitche. It was also quite possible, and the soundest strategy, to withdraw the bulk of the troops then facing the German I. and II. armies to his support, and these would reach him by the 8th. He was therefore justified in £ battle, though it was to his interest to delay it as long as possible. At dawn on the 6th of August the commander of the V. corps outposts noticed certain movements in the French lines, and to clear up the situation brought his guns into action. As at Spicheren, the sound of the guns set the whole machinery of battle in motion. The French artillery immediately accepted the Prussian challenge. The I. Bavarians, having been ordered to be ready to move if they heard artillery fire, immediately advanced against the French left, encountering presently such a stubborn resistance that parts of their line began to give way. The Prussians of the V. corps felt that they
Battle of Worth.
could not abandon their allies, and von Kirchbach, calling on the XI. corps for support, attacked with the troops at hand. When the crown prince tried to break off the fight it was too late. Both sides were feeding troops into the firing line, as and where they could lay hands on them. Up to 2 P.M. the French fairly held their own, but shortly afterwards their right yielded to the overwhelming pressure of the XI. corps, and by 3.30 it was in full retreat. The centre held on for another hour, but in its turn was compelled to yield, and by 4.30 all organized resistance was at an end. The débris of the French army was hotly pursued by the German divisional squadrons towards Reichshofen, where serious panic showed itself. When at this stage the supports sent by de Failly from Bitche came on the ground they saw the hopelessness of intervention, and retired whence they had come. Fortunately for the French, the German 4th cavalry division, on which the pursuit should have devolved, had been forgotten by the German staff, and did not reach the front before darkness fell. Out of a total of 82,000 within reach of the battlefield, the Germans succeeded in bringing into action 77,500. The French, who might have had 50,000 on the field, deployed only 37,000, and these suffered a collective loss of no less than 20,1oo; some regiments losing up to 90% and still retaining some semblance of discipline and order. Under cover of darkness the remnants of the French army escaped. When at length the 4th cavalry division had succeeded in forcing a way through the confusion of the battlefield, all-touch with the enemy had been lost, and being without firearms the troopers were checked by the French stragglers in the woods and the villages, and thus failed to establish the true line of retreat of the French. Ultimately the latter, having gained the railway near Lunéville, disappeared from the German front altogether, and all trace of them was lost until they were discovered, about the 26th of August, forming part of the army of Châlons, whither they had been conveyed by rail via Paris. This is a remarkable example of the strategical value of railways to an army operating in its own country. In the absence of all resistance, the III. army now proceeded to carry out the original programme of marches laid down in Moltke's memorandum of the 6th of May, and marching on a broad front through a fertile district it reached the line of the Moselle in excellent order about the 17th of August, where it halted to await the result of the great battle of GravelotteSt Privat. We return now to the I. army at Saarbrücken. Its position on the morning of the 7th of August gave cause for the gravest anxiety. At daylight a dense fog lay over the country, and through the mist sounds of heavy firing came from the direction of Forbach, where French stragglers had rallied during the night. The confusion on the battlefield was appalling, and the troops in no condition to go forward. Except the 3rd, 5th and 6th cavalry divisions no closed troops were within, a day's march; hence Steinmetz decided to spend the day in reorganizing his infantry, under cover of his available cavalry. But the German cavalry and staff were quite new to their task. The 6th cavalry division, which had bivouacked on the battlefield, sent on only one brigade towards Forbach, retaining the remainder in reserve. The 5th, thinking that the 6th had already undertaken all that was necessary, withdrew behind the Saar, and the 3rd, also behind the Saar, reported that the country in its front was unsuited to cavalry movements, and only sent out a few officers’ patrols. These were well led, but were too few in number, and their reports were consequently unconvincing. In the course of the day Steinmetz became very uneasy, and ultimately he decided to concentrate his army by retiring the VII. and VIII. corps behind the river on to the I. (which had arrived, near Saarlouis), thus clearing the Saarbrücken-Metz road for the use of the II. army. But at this moment Prince Frederick Charles suddenly modified his views. During the 6th of August his scouts had reported considerable French forces near Bitche (these were the 5th, de Failly's corps), and early in the morning of the 7th he received a telegram from Moltke
AMovesneats ore the Saar.
informing him that MacMahon's beaten army was retreating on the same place (the troops observed were in fact those which had marched to MacMahon's assistance). The prince forthwith deflected the march of the Guards, IV. and X. corps, towards Rohrbach, whilst the IX. and XII. closed up to supporting distance behind them. Thus, as Steinmetz moved away to the west and north, Frederick Charles was diverging to the south and east, and a great gap was opening in the very centre of the German front. . This was closed only by the III. corps, still on the battle-field, and by portions of the X. near Saargemünd," whilst within striking distance lay 130,000 French troops, prevented only by the incapacity of their chiefs from delivering a decisive counter-stroke. - Fortunately for the Prussians, Moltke at Mainz took a different view. Receiving absolutely no intelligence from the front during the 7th, he telegraphed orders to the I. and II. armies (10.25 P.M.) to halt on the 8th, and impressed on Steinmetz the necessity of employing histcavalry to clear up the situation. The I. army had already begun the marches ordered by Steinmetz. It was now led back practically to its old bivouacs amongst the unburied dead. Prince Frederick Charles only conformed to Moltke's order with the III. and X. corps; the remainder executed their concentration towards the south and east. During the night of the 7th of August Moltke decided that the French army must be in retreat towards the Moselle and forthwith busied himself with the preparation of fresh tables of march for the two armies, his object being to swing up the left wing to outflank the enemy from the south. This work, and the transfer of headquarters to Homburg, needed time, hence no fresh orders were issued to either army, and neither commander would incur the responsibility of moving without any. The I. army therefore spent a fourth night in bivouac on the battlefield. But Constantin von Alvensleben, commanding the III. corps, a man of very different stamp from his colleagues, hearing at first hand that the French had evacuated St Avold, set his corps in motion early in the morning of the 10th August down the St Avold-Metz road, reached St Avold and obtained conclusive evidence that the French were retreating. During the 9th the orders for the advance to the Moselle were issued. These were based, not on an exact knowledge of where the French army actually stood, but on the opinion
#" Moltke had formed as to where it ought to have been Moselle, on military grounds solely, overlooking the fact that
the French staff were not free to form military decisions but were compelled to bow to political expediency. Actually on the 7th of August the emperor had decided to attack the Germans on the 8th with the whole Rhine Army, but this decision was upset by alarmist reports from the beaten army of MacMahon. He then decided to retreat to the Moselle, as Moltke had foreseen, and there to draw to himself the remnants of MacMahon's army (now near Lunéville). At the same time he assigned the executive command over the whole Rhine Army to Marshal Bazaine. This retreat was begun during the course of the 8th and 9th of August; but on the night of the 9th urgent telegrams from Paris induced the emperor to suspend the movement, and during the 10th the whole army took up a strong position on the French Nied. Meanwhile the II. German army had received its orders to march in a line of army corps on a broad front in the general direction of Pont-à-Mousson, well to the south of Metz. The I. army was to follow by short marches in échelon on the right; only the III. corps was directed on Falkenberg, a day's march farther towards Metz along the St Avold-Metz road. The movement was begun on the 10th, and towards evening the French army was located on the right front of the III. corps. This entirely upset Moltke's hypothesis, and called for a complete modification of his plans, as the III. corps alone could not be expected to resist the impact of Bazaine's five corps. The III. corps therefore received orders to stand fast for the moment, and the remainder of the LI. army was instructed to wheel to the * The II. corps had not yet arrived from Germany,
right and concentrate for a great battle to the east of Metz on the 16th or 17th. Before, however, these orders had been received the sudden retreat of the French completely changed the situation. The Germans therefore continued their movement towards the Moselle. On the 13th the French took up a fresh position 5 m. to the east of Metz, where they were located by the cavalry and the advanced guards of the I. army. Again Moltke ordered the I. army to observe and hold the enemy, whilst the II. was to swing round to the north. The cavalry was to scout beyond the Moselle and intercept -all communication with the heart of France (see METz). Colombe By this time the whole German army had imbibed the Bor:y. ye idea that the French were in full retreat and endeavouring to evade a decisive struggle. When therefore during the morning of the 14th their outposts observed signs of retreat in the French position, their impatience could no longer be restrained; as at Wörth and Spicheren, an outpost commander brought up his guns, and at the sound of their fire, every unit within reach spontaneously got under arms (battle of ColombeyBorny). In a short time, with or without orders, the I., VII., VIII. and IX. corps were in full march to the battle-field. But the French too turned back to fight, and an obstinate engagement ensued, at the close of which the Germans barely held the ground and the French withdrew under cover of the Metz forts. Still, though the fighting had been indecisive, the conviction of victory remained with the Germans, and the idea of a French retreat became an obsession. To this idea Moltke gave expression in his orders issued early on the 15th, in which he laid down that the “fruits of the victory” of the previous evening could only be reaped by a vigorous pursuit towards the passages of the Meuse, where it was hoped the French might yet be overtaken. This order, however, did not allow for the hopeless inability of the French staff to regulate the movement of congested masses of men, horses and vehicles, such as were now accumulated in the streets and environs of Metz. Whilst Bazaine. had come to no definite decision whether to stand and fight or continue to retreat, and was merely drifting under the impressions of the moment, the Prussian leaders, in particular Prince Frederick Charles, saw in imagination the French columns in rapid orderly movement towards the west, and calculated that at best they could not be overtaken short of Verdun. In this order of ideas the whole of the II. army, followed on its right rear by two-thirds of the I. army (the I. corps being detached to observe the eastern side of the fortress), were pushed on towards the Moselle, the cavalry far in advance towards the Meuse, whilst only the 5th cavalry division was ordered to scout towards the Metz-Verdun road, and even that was disseminated over far too wide an area. Later in the day (15th) Frederick Charles sent orders to the III. corps, which was on the right flank of his long line of columns and approaching the Moselle at Corny and Novéant, to march via Gorze to Mars-la-Tour on the Metz-Verdun road; to the X. corps, strung out along the road from Thiaucourt to Pontà-Mousson, to move to Jarny; and for the remainder to push on westward to seize the Meuse crossings. No definite information as to the French army reached him in time to modify these instructions. Meanwhile the 5th (Rheinbaben's) cavalry division, at about 3 P.M. in the afternoon, had come into contact with the French cavalry in the vicinity of Mars-la-Tour, and gleaned intelligence enough to show that no French infantry had as yet reached Rezonville. The commander of the X. corps at Thiaucourt, informed of this, became anxious for the security of his flank during the next day's march and decided to push out a strong flanking detachment under von Caprivi, to support von Rheinbaben and maintain touch with the III. corps marching on his right rear. Von Alvensleben, to whom the 6th cavalry division had meanwhile been assigned, seems to have received no local intelligence whatsoever, and at daybreak on the 16th he began his march