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who was at that time a court preacher in Dresden, he returned | FRANCKEN. Eleven painters of this family cultivated their to Leipzig in the spring of 1689, and began to give Bible lectures art in Antwerp during the 16th and 17th centuries. Several of an exegetical and practical kind, at the same time resuming of these were related to each other, whilst many bore the same the Collegium Philobiblicum of earner days. He soon became Christian name in succession. Hence unavoidable confusion in popular as a lecturer; but the peculiarities of his teaching almost the subsequent classification of paintings not widely differing immediately aroused a violent opposition on the part of the in style or execution. When Franz Francken the first found a university authorities; and before the end of the year he was rival in Franz Francken the second, he described himself as the interdicted from lecturing on the ground of his alleged pietism. “elder,” in contradistinction to his son, who signed bimself Thus it was that Francke's name first came to be publicly the "younger.” But when Franz the second was threatened associated with that of Spener, and with pietism. Prohibited with competition from Franz the third, he took the name of from lecturing in Leipzig, Francke in 1690 found work at Erfurt “the elder," whilst Franz the third adopted that of Franz" the as “ deacon " of one of the city churches. Here his evangelistic younger." fervour attracted multitudes to his preaching, including Roman It is possible, though not by any means easy, to sift the works Catholics, but at the same time excited the anger of his opponents; of these artists. The eldest of the Franckens, Nicholas of and the result of their opposition was that after a ministry of Herenthals, died at Antwerp in 1596, with nothing but the fifteen months he was commanded by the civil authorities reputation of having been a painter. None of his works remain. (27th of September 1691) to leave Erfurt within forty-eight He bequeathed his art to three children. Jerom Francken, the hours. The same year witnessed the expulsion of Spener from eldest son, after leaving his father's house, studied under Franz Dresden.
Floris, whom he afterwards served as an assistant, and wandered, In December, through Spener's influence, Francke accepted about 1560, to Paris. In 1566 he was one of the masters employed an invitation to fill the chair of Greek and oriental languages to decorate the palace of Fontainebleau, and in 1574 he obtained in the new university of Halle, which was at that time being the appointment of court painter from Henry III., who had just organized by the elector Frederick III. of Brandenburg; and at returned from Poland and visited Titian at Venice. In 1603, the same time, the chair having no salary attached to it, he was when Van Mander wrote his biography of Flemish artists, Jerom appointed pastor of Glaucha in the immediate neighbourhood Prancken was still in Paris living in the then aristocratic of the town. He afterwards became professor of theology. Here, Faubourg St Germain. Among his earliest works we should for the next thirty-six years, until his death on the 8th of June distinguish a “Nativity "in the Dresden museum, executed in co1727, he continued to discharge the twofold office of pastor and operation with Franz Floris. Another of his important pieces professor with rare energy and success. At the very outset of is the “ Abdication of Charles V.” in the Amsterdam museum. his labours he had been profoundly impressed with a sense of his Equally interesting is a "Portrait of a Falconer,” dated 1558, in responsibility towards the numerous outcast children lwho were the Brunswick gallery. In style these pieces all recall Franz growing up around him in ignorance and crime. After a number Floris. Franz, the second son of Nicholas of Herenthals, is to of tentative plans, he resolved in 1695 to institute what is often be kept in memory, as Franz Francken the first. He was born called a “ragged school,” supported by public charity, A single about 1544, matriculated at Antwerp in 1567, and died there in room was at first sufficient, but within a year it was found 1616. He, too, studied under Floris, and never settled abroad, necessary to purchase a house, to which another was added in or lost the hard and gaudy style which he inherited from his 1697. In 1698 there were 100 orphans under his charge to be master. Several of his pictures are in the museum of Antwerp; clothed and fed, besides 500 children who were taught as day one dated 1597 in the Dresden museum represents “ Christ on scholars. The schools grew in importance and are still known as the Road to Golgotha," and is signed by him
as D. 0 (Den ouden) the Francke'sche Stiftungen. The education given was strictly F. Franck. · Ambrose, the third son of Nicholas of Herenthals, religious. Hebrew was included, while the Greek and Latin has bequeathed to us more specimens of his skill than Jerom or classics were neglected; the Homilies of Macarius took the place Franz the first. He first started as a partner with Jerom at of Thucydides. The same principle was consistently applied in Fontainebleau, then he returned to Antwerp, where he passed his university teaching. Even as professor of Greek he had given for his gild in 1573, 'and he lived at Antwerp till 1618. His great prominence in his lectures to the study of the Scriptures; best works are the “ Miracle of the Loaves and Fishes " and the but he found a much more congenial sphere when in' 1698, he “ Martyrdom of St Crispin,” both large and ambitious comwas appointed to the chair of theology. Yet his first courses positions in the Antwerp museum. In both these pieces a fair of lectures in that department were readings and expositions of amount of power is displayed, but marred by want of atmosphere the Old and New Testament; and to this, as also to hermeneutics, and shadow or by hardness of line and gaudiness of tone. There he always attached special importance, believing that for theology is not a trace in the three painters named of the influence of the a sound exegesis was the one indispensable requisite. “Thco- revival which took place under the lead of Rubens. Franz logus nascitur in scripturis," he used to say; but during his Francken the first trained three sons to his profession, the eldest occupancy of the theological chair he lectured at various times of whom, though he practised as a master of gild at Antwerp upon other branches of theology also. Amongst his colleagues from 1600 to 1610, left no visible trace of his labours behind. were Paul Anton (1661-1730), Joachim J. Breithaupt (1658–1732) Jerom the second took service with his uncle Ambrose. He and Joachim Lange (1670-1744), --men like-minded with him was born in 1578, passed for his gild in 1607, and in 1620 self. Through their influence upon the students, Halle became 'produced that curious picture of “Horatius Cocles defending a centre from which pietism (2.0.) became very widely diffused the Sublician Bridge” which still hangs in the Antwerp museum. over Germany.
The third son of Franz Francken the first is Franz Francken His principal contributions to theological literature were: Manu- the second, who signed himself in pictures till 1616" the younger," ductio ad lectionem Scripturae Sacrae (1693); Praelectiones herme from 1630 till his death “ the elder" F. Francken. These neuticae (1717): Commentatio de scopo librorum Veteriset Novi pictures are usually of a small size, and are found in considerable Manuductio was translated into English in 1813, under the title A numbers in continental collections. Franz Francken the second Guide to the Reading and Study of the Holy Scriptures. An account was born in 1581. In 1605 he entered the gild, of which he of his orphanage, entitled Segensvolle Fussstapfen, &c. (1709), which subsequently became the president, and in 1642 he died. His subsequently passed through several editions, has also been partially earliest composition is the “ Crucifixion” in the Belvedere at or. The bountiful Hand of Heaven defraying the Expenses of Faith. Vienna, dated 1606. His latest compositions as “the younger" See H. E. F. Guericke's A. H. Francke (1827), which has been trans- F. Francken are the " Adoration of the Virgin" (1616) in the lated into English (The Life, of, A. i. Francke, 1837): Gustave gallery of Amsterdam, and the “Woman taken in Adultery Beiträge (1875): A. Stein, A. H. Francke (3rd ed., 1894): article (1628) in Dresden. From 1616 to 1630 many of his pieces are in Herzog-Hauck's Realencyklopädie (ed. 1899): Knuth, Die signed F. Francken; then come the “ Seven Works of Charity Francke'schen Stiftungen (2nd ed., 1903).
(1630) at Munich, signed" the elder F. F.,” the " Prodigal Son "
(1633) at the Louvre, and other almost countless examples. I in harmony with their traditions that the German plan had to It is in F. Francken the second's style that we first have evidence be framed so as to meet such emergencies. On the wbole, of the struggle which necessarily arose when the old customs, Moltke concluded that the enemy could not undertake
Strategic hardened by Van Orley and Floris, or Breughel and De Vos, this offensive before the eighth day after mobilization.
deploy. were swept away by Rubens. But F. Francken the second, as At that date about five French army corps (150,000 ment before observed, always clung to small surfaces; and though men) could be collected near Metz, and two corps
German he gained some of the freedom of the moderns, he lost but little (70,000) near Strassburg; and as it was six days' march of the dryness or gaudiness of the earlier Italo-Flemish revivalists. from Metz to the Rhine, no serious attack could be F. Francken the third, the last of his name who deserves to be delivered before the fourteenth day, by which day it could be met recorded, passed in the Antwerp gild in 1639 and died at Antwerp by superior forces near Kirchheimbolanden. Since, however, the in 1667. His practice was chiefly confined to adding figures to transport of the bulk of the Prussian forces could not begin till the the architectural or landscape pieces of other artists. As Franz ninth day, their últimate line of detrainment need not be fixed Pourbus sometimes put in the portrait figures for Franz Francken until the French plans were disclosed, and, as it was important the second, so Franz Francken the third often introduced the to strike at the earliest moment possible, the deployment was necessary personages into the works of Pieter Neefs the younger provisionally fixed to be beyond the Rhine on the line Wittlich. (museums of St Petersburg, Dresden and the Hague). In a Neunkirchen-Landau. Of the thirteen North German corps three à Moses striking the Rock," dated 1654, of the Augsburg gallery, had to be left behind to guard the eastern frontier and the this last of the Franckcns signs D. 7 (Den ouden) F. Franck.coast, one other, the VIII., was practically on the ground already In the pictures of this artist'we most clearly discern the effects of and could concentrate by road, and the remaining nine were Rubens's example.
distributed to the nine through railway lines available. These FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (1870-1871). The victories of ten corps were grouped in three armies, and as the French might Prussia in 1866 over the Austrians and their German allics (see violate Belgian neutrality or endeavour to break into southern SEVEN WEEKS' War) rendered it evident to the statesmen and Germany, two corps (Prussian Guard and Saxon XII. corps) soldiers of France that a struggle between the two nations could were temporarily held back at central position around Mainz, only be a question of time. Army reforms were at once under- whence they could move rapidly up or down the Rhine valley. taken, and measures were initiated in France to place the If Belgian neutrality remained unmolested, the reserve would join armament and equipment of the troops on a level with the the III. army on the left wing, giving it a two to one superiority requirements of the times. The chassepot, a new breech over its adversary; all three armies would then wheel to the loading rifle, immensely superior to the Prussian needle-gun, right and combine in an effort to force the French army into a was issued; the artillery trains were thoroughly overhauled, decisive battle on the Saar on or about the twenty-third day. and a new machine-gun, the mitrailleuse, from which much was As in this wheel the army on the right formed the pivot and was expected, introduced. Wide schemes of reorganization (due required only to stand fast, two corps only were allotted to it; mainly to Marshal Niel) were set in motion, and, since these two corps for the present formed the III. army, and the remaining required time to mature, recourse was had to foreign alliances five were assigned to the II. army in the centre. in the hope of delaying the impending rupture. In the first When (16th-17th July) the South German states decided to week of June 1870, General Lebrun, as a confidential agent of throw in their lot with the rest, their three corps were allotted to the emperor Napoleon III., was sent to Vienna to concert a the III. army, the Guards and Saxons to the II. army, whilst plan of joint operations with Austria against Prussia. Italy the three corps originally left behind were finally distributed was also to be included in the alliance, and it was agreed that one to each army, so that up to the investment of Metz the order in case of hostilities the French armies should concentrate in of battle was as follows: northern Bavaria, where the Austrians and Italians were to
Headquarters: join them, and the whole immense army thus formed should
The king of Prussia (General v. Moltke, chief of staff). march via Jena on Berlin. To what extent Austria and Italy
(I. corps, v. Manteuffel) committed themselves to this scheme remains uncertain, but General v. Steinmetz VII.
(C. of S., v. Sperling) that the emperor Napoleon believed in their bona fides is beyond
v. Goeben doubt.
(ist) and 3rd cavalry divisions
Total 85,000 Whether the plan was betrayed to Prussia is also uncertain,
Guard Pr. August of Württemand almost immaterial, for Moltke's plans were based on an
berg accurate estimate of the time it would take Austria to mobilize
(11. corps, v. Fransecky)
INI. v. Alvensleben II. and on the effect of a series of victories on French soil.
IV. v. Alvensleben I. rate Moltke was not taken into Bismarck's confidence in the Prince Frederick Charles
v. Manstein affair of Ems in July 1870, and it is to be presumed that the
(C. of S., v. Stichle) X. v. Voigts-Rhetz chancellor had already satisfied himself that the schemes of
XII. (Saxons) crown prince
of Saxony operations prepared by the chief of the General Staff fully
5th and 6th cavalry divisions provided against all eventualities. These schemes were founded
Total 210,000 on Clausewitz's view of the objects to be pursued in a war against
V. corps, v. Kirchbach France--in the first place the defeat of the French field armies
(VI.) v. Tümpling
XI. and in the second the occupation of Paris. On these lines plans III. Army:
I. Bavariar, v. der Tann for the strategic deployment of the Prussian army were prepared crown prince of Prussia
v. Hartmann -minor
Baden div. arose and new means of communication came into existence.
(2nd) and 4th cavalry divisions
Total The campaign was actually opened on a revise of 1868-1869,
180,000 to which was added, on the 6th of May 1870, a secret memo
Grand Total: 475,000 randum for the General Staff.
(The units within brackets were those at first retained in Germany.) Under the German organization then existing the preliminary On the French side no such plan of operations was in existence to all active operations was of necessity full and complete when on the night of the 15th of July Krieg mobil was telegraphed mobilization. Then followed transport by road and rail to the all over Prussia. An outline scheme had indeed been Positions Mne selected for the“ strategic deployment,” and it was essential prepared as a basis for agreement with Austria and that no part of these operations should be disturbed by action Italy, but practically no details were fixed, and the French on the part of the enemy. But no such delay imposed itself of troops were without transport and supplies. Never
forces. accessity upon the French, and a vigorous offensive was so much I theless, since speed was the essence of the contract, the troops
by the General Stafi and kept up to date year by year as fresh (c. of S., v. Blumenthal berieteniberg div. ; v. Werder
were burried up without waiting for their reserves, and delivered, I battery), seeing the overwhelming numbers opposed to them, as Moltke had foreseen, just where the lie of the railways and fell back fighting and vanished to the northward, baving convenience of temporary supply dictated, and the Prussian given a very excellent example of steadiness and disIntelligence Department was able to inform Moltke on the 22nd cipline to their enemy. The latter contented them- 'Action of of July (seventh day of mobilization) that the French stood selves, by occupying Saarbrücken and its suburb St Bricken. from right to left in the following order, on or near the frontier: Johann, and here, as far as the troops were concerned, Ist corps Marshal MacMahon, duke of Magenta, Strassburg the incident closed. Its effect, however, proved far-reaching. 5th corps
General de Failly, Saargemund and Bitche The Prussian staff could not conceive that nothing lay behind and corps
General Frossard, St Avold 4th corps General de Ladmirault, Thionville
this display of five whole divisions, and immediately took steps
to meet the expected danger. In their excitement, although they With, behind them: 3rd corps Marshal Bazaine, Metz
had announced the beginning of the action to the king's headGuard General Bourbaki, Nancy
quarters at Mainz, they forgot to notify the close and its results, 6th corps Marshal Canrobert, Chalons
so that Moltke was not in possession of the facts till noon on the 7th corps General Félix Douay, Belfort
3rd of August. Meanwhile, Steinmetz, left without instructions If therefore they began a forward movement on the 23rd and fearing for the safety of the II. army, the heads of whose (eighth day) the case foreseen by Moltke had arisen, and it became columns were still in the defiles of the Hardt, moved the I. army necessary to detrain the II. army upon the Rhine. Without from the neighbourhood of Merzig obliquely to his left front, so waiting for further confirmation of this intelligence, Moltke, with as to strike the flank of the French army if it continued its the consent of the king, altered the arrangements accordingly, march towards Kaiserslautern, in which direction it appeared to a decision which, though foreseen, exercised the gravest influence be heading. on the course of events. As it happened this decision was pre Whilst this order was in process of execution, Moltke, aware mature, for the French could not yet move. Supply trains had that the II. army was behind time is its march, issued instructions to be organized by requisition from the inhabitants, and even to Steinmetz for the 4th of August which entailed
Moltke, arms and ammunition procured for such reserves as had succeeded a withdrawal to the rear, the idea being that both in joining. Nevertheless, by almost superhuman exertions armies should, if the French advanced, fight a defensive Frederick on the part of the railways and administrative services, all battle in a selected position farther back. Steinmetz Charles essential deficiencies were made good, and by the 28th of July obeyed, though bitterly resenting the idea of retreat. anesteia (13th day) the troops had received all that was absolutely indis- | This movement, further, drew his left across the roads, pensable and might well have been led against the enemy, who, reserved for the right column of the II. army, and on receipt ibanks to Moltke's premature action, were for the moment at of a peremptory order from Prince Frederick Charles to evacuate a very serious disadvantage. But the French generals were the road, Steinmetz telegraphed for instructions direct to the unequal to their responsibilities. It is now clear that, had the king, over Moltke's head. In reply he received a telegram from great Napoleon and his marshals been in command, they would | Moltke, ordering him to clear the road at once, and couched have made light of the want of cooking pots, cholera belts, &c., in terms which he considered as a severe reprimand. An exand, by a series of rapid marches, would have concentrated planatory letter, meant to soften the rebuke, was delayed in odds of at least three to one upon the heads of the Prussian transmission and did not reach him till too late to modify the columns as they struggled through the defiles of the Hardt, and orders he had already issued. It must be remembered that won a victory whose political results might well have proved Steinmetz at the front was in a better position to judge the decisive.
apparent situation than was Moltke at Mainz, and that all To meet this pressing danger, which came to his knowledge through the day of the sth of August he had received intelliduring the course of the 29th, Moltke sent a confidential stafi gence indicating a change of attitude in the French army. officer, Colonel v. Verdy du Vernois, to the III. army to impress The news of the German victory at Weissenburg on the 4th upon the crown prince the necessity of an immediate advance to (see below) had in fact completely paralysed the French headdistract the enemy's attention from the I. and II. armies; but, quarters, and orders were issued by them during the like the French generals, the crown prince pleaded that he could course of the 5th to concentrate the whole army of the
Spichnot move until his trains were complete. Fortunately for the Rhine on the selected position of Cadenbronn. As a Germans, the Prench intelligence service not only failed to preliminary, Frossard's corps withdrew from Saarinform the staff of this extraordinary opportunity, but it allowed brücken and began to entrench a position on the Spicheren itself to be hypnotized by the most amazing rumours. In heights, 3000 yds. to the southward. Steinmetz, therefore, being imagination they saw armies of 100,000 men behind every forest, quite unaware of the scheme for a great battle on the Saar about and, to guard against these dangers, the French troops were the 12th of August, felt that the situation would best be met, marched and counter-marched along the frontiers in the vain and the letter of his instructions strictly obeyed, by moving his hope of discovering an ideal defensive position which should whole command forward to the line of the Saar, and orders to afford full scope to the power of their new weapons.
this effect were issued on the evening of the 5th. In pursuance As these delays were exerting a most unfavourable effect on of these orders, the advance guard of the 14th division (Lieutenant public opinion not only in France but throughout Europe, the General von Kameke) reached Saarbrücken about 9 A.M. on emperor decided on the ist of August to initiate a movement the 6th, where the Germans found to their amazement that the towards the Saar, chiefly as a guarantee of good faith to the bridges were intact. To secure this advantage was the obvious Austrians and Italians..
duty of the commander on the spot, and he at once ordered his On this day the French corps held the following positions from troops to occupy a line of low heights beyond the town to right to left:
serve as a bridge-head. As the leading troops deployed on the Ist corps Hagenau
heights Frossard's guns on the Spicheren Plateau opened fire, Forbach
and the advanced guard battery replied. The sound of these 3rd corps
Bouzonville 4th corps
guns unchained the whole fighting instinct carefully developed 5th corps Bitche
by a long course of Prussian manoeuvre training. Everywhere, Chalons
generals and troops hurried towards the cannon thunder, 7th corps Belfort and Colmar
Kameke, even more in the dark than Steinmetz as to Moltke's Guard near Metz
intentions and the strength of his adversaries, attacked at once, The French and corps was directed to advance on the following precisely as he would have done at manquvres, and in hall an morning direct on Saarbrücken, supported on the flanks by two hour his men were committed beyond recall. As each fresh anit divisions from the sth and 3rd corps. The order was duly carried reached the field it was hurried into action where its services out, and the Prussians (one battalion, two squadrons and a 1 This was the celebrated " baptême de feu " of the prince imperial
wore most needed, and each fresh general as he arrived took a could not abandon their allies, and von Kirchbach, calling on the new view of the combat and issued new orders. On the other XI. corps for support, attacked with the troops at hand. When side, Frossard, knowing the strength of his position, called on the crown prince tried to break off the fight it was too late. his neighbours for support, and determined to hold his ground. Both sides were feeding troops into the firing line, as and where Victory seemed certain. There were sufficient troops within they could lay hands on them. Up to 2 P.M. the French fairly easy reach to have ensured a crushing numerical superiority. held their own, but shortly afterwards their right yielded to the But the other generals had not been trained to mutual support, overwhelming pressure of the XI. corps, and by 3.30 it was and thought only of their own immediate security, and their in full retreat. The centre held on for another hour, but in staffs were too inexperienced to act upon even good intentions; its turn was compelled to yield, and by 4.30 all organized and, finding himself in the course of the afternoon left to his own resistance was at an end. The débris of the French army was devices, Frossard began gradually to withdraw, even before the hotly pursued by the German divisional squadrons towards pressure of the 13th German division on his left flank (about Reichshofen, where serious panic showed itself. When at this 8 P.M.) compelled his retirement. When darkness ended the stage the supports sent by de Failly from Bitche came on the battle the Prussians were scarcely aware of their victory. Stein- ground they saw the hopelessness of intervention, and retired metz, who had reached the field about 6 P.M., rode back to his whence they had come. Fortunately for the French, the German headquarters without issuing any orders, while the troops 4th cavalry division, on which the pursuit should have devolved, bivouacked where they stood, the units of three army corps had been forgotten by the German staff, and did not reach the being mixed up in almost inextricable confusion. But whereas front before darkness fell
. Out of a total of 82,000 within
reach out of 42,900 Prussians with 120 guns, who in the morning lay of the battlefield, the Germans succeeded in bringing into action within striking distance of the enemy, no fewer than 27,000, 77,500. The French, who might have had 50,000 on the field, with 78 guns were actually engaged; of the French, out of 64,000 deployed only 37,000, and these suffered a collective loss of with 210 guns only 24,000 with 90 guns took part in the action. no less than 20,100; some regiments losing up to 90% and still
Meanwhile on the German left wing the III. army had begun retaining some semblance of discipline and order. its advance. Early on the 4th of August it crossed the frontier Under cover of darkness the remnants of the French army
and fell upon a French detachment under Abel Douay, escaped. When at length the 4th cavalry division had succeeded Ancelose of which had been placed near Weissenburg, partly to in forcing a way through the confusion of the battlefield,
cover the Pigeonnier pass, but principally to consume all -touch with the enemy had been last, and being without
the supplies accumulated in the little dismantled firearms the troopers were checked by the French stragglers fortress, as these could not easily be moved. Against this force in the woods and the villages, and thus failed to establish the of under 4000 men of all arms, the Germans brought into action true line of retreat of the French. Ultimately the latter, having successively portions of three corps, in all over 25,000 men with gained the railway near Lunéville, disappeared from the German go guns. After six hours' fighting, in which the Germans lost front altogether, and all trace of them was lost until they were some 1500 men, the gallant remnant of the French withdrew discovered, about the 26th of August, forming part of the army deliberately and in good order, notwithstanding the death of of Chalons, whither they had been conveyed by rail via Paris. their leader at the critical moment. The Germans were so elated This is a remarkable example of the strategical value of railways by their victory over the enemy, whose strength they naturally to an army operating in its own country. overestimated, that they forgot to send cavalry in pursuit, and In the absence of all resistance, the III. army now proceeded thus entirely lost touch with the enemy.
to carry out the original programme of marches laid down in Next day the advance was resumed, the two Bavarian corps Moltke's memorandum of the 6th of May, and marching on a moving via Mattstall through the foothills of the Vosges, the broad front through a fertile district it reached the line of the V. corps on their left towards Preuschdorf, and the XI. farther Moselle in excellent order about the 17th of August, 'where it to the left again, through the wooded plain of the Rhine valley. halted to await the result of the great battle of GravelotteThe 4th cavalry division scouted in advance, and army head-St Privat. quarters moved to Sulz. About noon the advanced patrols We return now to the I. army at Saarbrücken. Its position discovered MacMahon's corps in position on the left bank of the on the morning of the 7th of August gave cause for the gravest Sauer (see WÖRTA: Battle of). As his army was dispersed over anxiety. At daylight a dense fog lay over the country, a wide area, the crown prince determined to devote the 6th to and through the mist sounds of heavy firing came
Move concentrating the troops, and, probably to avoid alarming the from the direction of Forbach, where French stragglers he Saar. enemy, ordered the cavalry to stand fast.
had rallied during the night. The confusion on the At night the outposts of the I. Bavarians and V. corps on the battlefield was appalling, and the troops in no condition to go Sauer saw the fires of the French encampment and heard the forward. Except the 3rd, 5th and 6th cavalry divisions no noise of railway traffic, and rightly conjectured the approach closed troops were within a day's march; hence Steinmetz of reinforcements. MacMahon had in fact determined to stand decided to spend the day in reorganizing his infantry, under in the very formidable position he had selected, and he counted cover of his available cavalry. But the German cavalry and on receiving support both from the 7th corps (two divisions of staff were quite new to their task. The 6th cavalry division, which were being railed up from Colmar) and from the 5th corps, which had bivouacked on the battlefield, sent on only one which lay around Bitche. It was also quite possible, and the brigade towards Forbach, retaining the remainder in reserve. soundest strategy, to withdraw the bulk of the troops then The sth, thinking that the 6th had already undertaken all facing the German I. and II. armies to his support, and these that was necessary, withdrew behind the Saar, and the 3rd, would reach him by the 8th. He was therefore justified in also behind the Saar, reported that the country in its front was accepting battle, though it was to his interest to delay it as long unsuited to cavalry movements, and only sent out a few officers! as possible.
patrols. These were well led, but were too few in number, and At dawn on the 6th of August the commander of the V. corps their reports were consequently unconvincing. outposts noticed certain movements in the French lines, and to In the course of the day Steinmetz became very uneasy, and
clear up the situation brought his guns into action. ultimately he decided to concentrate his army by retiring the As at Spicheren, the sound of the guns set the whole VII. and. VIII. corps behind the river on to the I. (which had
machinery of battle in motion. The French artillery arrived, near Saarlouis), thus clearing the Saarbrücken-Metz immediately accepted the Prussian challenge. The I. Bavarians, road for the use of the II. army. But at this moment Prince having been ordered to be ready to move if they heard artillery Frederick Charles suddenly modified his views. During the 6th fre, immediately adyanced against the French left, encountering of August his scouts had reported considerable French forces presently such a stubborn resistance that parts of their line near Bitche (these were the sth, de Pailly's corps), and early began to give way. The Prussians of the V. corps felt that they in the morning of the 5th he received a telegram from Moltke
9 informing him that MacMahon's beaten army was retreating right and concentrate for a great battle to the east of Metz on on the same place (the troops observed were in fact those which the 16th or 17th. had marched to MacMahon's assistance). The prince forthwith Before, however, these orders had been received the sudden deflected the march of the Guards, IV. and X. corps, towards retreat of the French completely changed the situation. The Rohrbach, whilst the IX. and XII. closed up to supporting Germans therefore continued their movement towards the distance behind them. Thus, as Steinmetz moved away to the Moselle. On the 13th the French took up a fresh position s m. west and north, Frederick Charles was diverging to the south to the east of Metz, where they were located by the cavalry and east, and a great gap was opening in the very centre of the and the advanced guards of the I. army. German front. This was closed only by the III. corps, still on Again Moltke ordered the I. army to observe and hold the the battle-field, and by portions of the X. pcar Saargemünd,' enemy, whilst the II. was to swing round to the north. The whilst within striking distance lay 130,000 French troops, cavalry was to scout beyond the Moselle and intercept
Battle of prevented only by the incapacity of their chiefs from delivering all communication with the heart of France (see Metz).
Colombey a decisive counter-stroke.
By this time the whole German army had imbibed the Borny. Fortunately for the Prussians, Moltke at Mainz took a different idea that the French were in full retreat and endeavourview. Receiving absolutely no intelligence from the front ing to evade a decisive struggle.' When therefore during the during the 7th, he telegraphed orders to the I. and II. armies morning of the 14th their outposts observed signs of retreat (10:25 P.M.) to halt on the 8th, and impressed on Steinmetz in the French position, their impatience could no longer be the necessity of employing his cavalry to clear up the situation. restrained; as at Wörth and Spicheren, an outpost commander The I. army had already begun the marches ordered by Stein- brought up his guns, and at the sound of their fire, every unit metz. It was now led back practically to its old bivouacs within reach spontaneously got under arms (battle of Colombeyamongst the unburied dead. Prince Frederick Charles only Borny). In a short time, with or without orders, the I., VII., conformed to Moltke's order with the IȚI. and X. corps; the VIII. and IX. corps were in full march to the battle-field. But remainder executed their concentration towards the south and the French too turned back to fight, and an obstinate engage east.
ment ensued, at the close of which the Germans barely held During the night of the 7th of August Moltke decided that the ground and the French withdrew under cover of the Metz the French army must be in retreat towards the Moselle and forts. forthwith busied himself with the preparation of fresh tables of Still, though the fighting had been indecisive, the conviction march for the two armies, his object being to swing up the left of victory remained with the Germans, and the idea of a French wing to outflank the enemy from the south. This work, and retreat became an obsession. To this idea Moltke gave expression the transfer of headquarters to Homburg, needed time, hence no in his orders issued early on the 15th, in which he laid down fresh orders were issued to either army, and neither commander that the “ fruits of the victory" of the previous evening could would incur the responsibility of moving without any. The only be reaped by a vigorous pursuit towards the passages of the I. army therefore spent a fourth night in bivouac on the battle-Meuse, where it was hoped the French might yet be overtaken. field. But Constantin von Alvensleben, commanding the III. This order, however, did not allow for the hopeless inability of corps, a man of very different stamp from his colleagues, hearing the French staff to regulate the movement of congested masses at first hand that the French had evacuated St Avold, set his of men, horses and vehicles, such as were now accumulated in the corps in motion early in the morning of the roth August down streets and environs of Metz. Whilst Bazaine. had come to no the St Avold-Metz road, reached St Avold and obtained con- definite decision whether to stand and fight or continue to retreat, clusive evidence that the French were retreating.
and was, merely drifting under the impressions of the moment, During the gth the orders for the advance to the Moselle were the Prussian leaders, in particular Prince Frederick Charles, issued. These were based, not on an exact knowledge of where saw in imagination the French columns in rapid orderly move
the French army actually stood, but on the opinion ment towards the west, and calculated that at best they could Advance
Moltke had-formed as to where it ought to have been not be overtaken short of Verdun.
the French staff were not free to form military decisions its right rear by two-thirds of the I. army (the I. corps being but were compelled to bow to political expediency.
detached to observe the eastern side of the fortress), were pushed Actually on the 7th of August the emperor had decided to on towards the Moselle, the cavalry far in advance towards the attack the Germans on the 8th with the whole Rhine Army, Meuse, whilst only the 5th cavalry division was ordered to scout but this decision was upset by alarmist reports from the beaten towards the Metz-Verdun road, and even that was disseminated army of MacMahon. He then decided to retreat to the Moselle, over far too wide an area. as Moltke had foreseen, and there to draw to himself the remnants Later in the day (15th) Frederick Charles sent orders to the of MacMahon's army (now near Lunéville). At the same time III. corps, which was on the right flank of his long line of columns he assigned the executive command over the whole Rhine Army and approaching the Moselle at Corny and Novéant, to march to Marshal Bazaine. This retreat was begun during the course of via Gotze to Mars-la-Tour on the Metz-Verdun road; to the the 8th and 9th of August; but on the night of the oth urgent X. corps, strung out along the road from Thiaucourt to Ponttelegrams from Paris induced the emperor to suspend the move-à-Mousson, to move to Jarny; and for the remainder to push on ment, and during the 10th the whole army took up a strong west ward to seize the Meuse crossings. No definite information position on the French Nied.
as to the French army reached him in time to modify these Meanwhile the II. German army had received its orders to instructions. march in a line of army corps on a broad front in the general Meanwhile the 5th (Rheinbaben's) cavalry division, at about direction of Pont-à-Mousson, well to the south of Metz. The 3 P.m. in the afternoon, had come into contact with the French I. army was to follow by short marches in échelon on the right; cavalry in the vicinity of Mars-la-Tour, and gleaned intelligence only the III. corps was directed on Falkenberg, a day's march enough to show that no «French infantry had as yet reached farther towards Metz along the St Avold-Metz road. The Rezonville. The commander of the X. corps at Thiaucourt, movement was begun on the roth, and towards evening the informed of this, became anxious for the security of his flank French army was located on the right front of the II]. corps. during the next day's march and decided to push out a strong This entirely upset Moltke's hypothesis, and called for a complete flanking detachment under von Caprivi, to support von Rheinmodification of his plans, as the III. corps alone could not be baben and maintain touch with the III. corps marching on his expected to resist the impact of Bazaine's five corps. The III. right rear. corps therefore received orders to stand fast for the moment, Von Alvensleben, to whom the 6th cavalry division had mean. and the remainder of the II. army was instructed to wheel to the while been assigned, seems to have received no local intelligence
· The II. corps had not yet arrived from Germany. whatsoever; and at daybreak on the 16th he began his march
to the Moselle.