fairly stated? If revelation is thought of as God's personal word, and redemption as his personal deed, is it reasonable to view them either as open to a sort of scientific prediction or as capricious and unintelligible? Even in the middle ages there were not wanting those- the St Victors, Bonaventura-who sought to vindicate mystical if not moral redemption as the central thought of Christianity,

V. Earlier Modern Period.--It will be seen that apologetics by no means reissued unchanged from the long period of authority. The compromise of Aquinas, though not unchallenged, holds the field and that even with Protestants. G. W. Leibnitz devotes an introductory chapter in his Théodicée, 1710 (as against Pierre Bayle), to faith and reason. He is a good enough Lutheran to quote as a 'mystery" the Eucharist no less than the Trinity, while he insists that truths above are not against reason. Stated thus baldly, has the distinction any meaning? The more celebrated and central thesis of the book-this finite universe, the best of all such that are possible-also restates positions of Augustine and Aquinas.

Before modern philosophy began its carcer, there was a great revival of ancient philosophy at the Renaissance; sometimes anti-Christian, sometimes pro-Christian. The latter furnishes apologies by Marsilio Ficino, Agostino Steuco, J. L. Vives. Early in the modern period occurs the great name of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). A staunch Roman Catholic, but belonging to a school of Augustinian enthusiasts (the Jansenists), whom the Church put down as heretics, he stands pretty much apart from the general currents. His Pensées, published posthumously, seems to have been meant for a systematic treatise, but it has come to us in fragments. Once again, a lay apologist! A layman's work may have the advantage of originality or the drawback of imperfect knowledge. Pascal's work exhibits both characters. It has the originality of rare genius, but it borrows its material (as industrious editors have shown) from very few sources-the Pugio Fidei, M. de Montaigne, P. Charron. Ideas as well as learning are largely Montaigne's. The latter's cheerful man-of-the-world scepticism is transfigured in Pascal to a deep distrust of human reason, in part, perhaps, from anti-Protestant motives. But this attitude, while not without parallels both earlier (Ghazali, Jehuda Halevi) and later (H. L. Mansel), has peculiarities in Pascal. It is fallen man whom he pursues with his fierce scorn; his view of man's nature-intellect as well as character-is to be read in the light of his unflinching Augustinianism. Again, Pascal, unlike most apologists, belongs to the small company of saintly souls. This philosophical sceptic is full of humble joy in salvation, of deep love for the Saviour.

Another French Roman Catholic apologist, P. D. Huct (16301721)—within the conditions of his age a prodigy of learning (in apologetics see his Demonstratio Evangelica)—is not uninfluenced by Pascal (Traité de la faiblesse de l'esprit humaine).

As we might expect, Protestant lands are more busily occupied with apologetics. Intolerant reliance upon force presents greater difficulties to them; soon it grows quite obsolete. Benedict Spinoza, the eminent Jewish pantheist (1632-1677), to whom miracle is impossible, revelation a phrase, and who renews pioneer work in Old Testament criticism, finds at least a fair measure of liberty and comfort in Holland (his birth-land). Bayle, the historical sceptic, lectured and published his learned Dictionnaire (1696) at Rotterdam. From Holland, earlier, had proceeded an apologetic work by a man of European fame. Hugo Grotius's De Veritate Christianae Religionis (1627) is partly the medieval tradition:-Oppose Mahommedans and Jews! It is partly practical:-Arm Christian sailors against religious danger! But in its cool spirit it forecasts the coming age, whose master is John Locke. His Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) is the thesis of " a whole century" of theologians. And his Essay on the Human Understanding (1690) is almost a Bible to men of education during the same period; its lightest word treasured. Locke does not break with the compromise of Aquinas. But he transfers attention from contents to proof. Reason proves that a revelation has been made-and then submits. Leibnitz has to supplement rather than correct Locke on this point,

| In such an atmosphere, deism readily uttered its protest against mysterious revelation. Deism is, in fact, the Thomist natural theology (more clearly distinguished from dogmatic theology than in the middle ages, alike by Protestants and by the post-Tridentine Church of Rome) now dissolving partnership with dogmatic and starting in business for itself. Or it is the doctrine of unfallen man's "natural state "-a doctrine intensified in Protestantism-separating itself from the theologians' grave doctrine of sin: If Socinianism had challenged natural theology-Christ, according to it, was the prophet who first revealed the way to eternal life-it had glorified the natural powers of man; and the learning of the Arminian divines (friends of Grotius and Locke) had helped to modernize Christian apologetics upon rational lines. Deism now taught that reason, or "the light of nature," was all-sufficient.

Not to dwell upon earlier continental "Deists" (mentioned by Viret as quoted first in Bayle's Dictionary and again in the introduction to Leland's View of the Deistical Writers), Lord Herbert of Cherbury (De Veritate, 1624; De Religione Gentilium, 1645?-according to J. G. Walch's Bibliotheca Theologica (1757) not published complete until 1663) was universally understood as hinting conclusions hostile to Christianity (cf. also T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, ch. xxxi.; Spinoza, Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus, 1670, ch. xiv.). Professedly, Herbert's contention merely is that non-Christians feeling after the "supreme God" and the law of righteousness must have a chance of salvation. Herbert was also epoch-making for the whole 18th century in teaching that priests had corrupted this primitive faith. During the 18th century deism spread widely, though its leaders were "irrepressible men like Toland, men of mediocre culture and ability like Anthony Collins, vulgar men like Chubb, irritated and disagreeable men like Matthew Tindal, who conformed that he might enjoy his Oxford fellowship and wrote anonymously that he might relieve his conscience " (A. M. Fairbairn). More distinguished sympathizers are Edward Gibbon, who has the deistic spirit, and David Hume, the historian and philosophical sceptic, who has at least the letter of the deistic creed (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion), and who uses Pascal's appeal to "faith" in a spirit of mockery (Essay on Miracles). In France the new school found powerful speaking-trumpets, especially Voltaire, the idol of his age-a great denier and scoffer, but always sincerely a believer in the God of reason--and the deeper but wilder spirit of J. J. Rousseau. Others in France developed still more startling conclusions from Locke's principles, E. B. Condillac's sensationalism-Locke's philosophy purged of its more ideal if less logical elements-leading on to materialism in J. O. de la Mettrie; and at least one of the Encyclopedists (P. H. von Holbach) capped materialism with confessed atheism.

In Germany the parallel movement of "illumination " (H. S. Reimarus; J. S. Semler, pioneer in N.T. criticism; and a layman, the great Lessing) took the form of "rationalism" within the church-interpreting Bible texts by main force in a way which the age thought "enlightened" (H. E. G. Paulus, 1761-1851, &c.).

Among the innumerable English anti-deistic writers (see W. Law, The Case of Reason; R. Bentley, or "Phileleutherus Lipsiensis "; &c., &c.), three are of chief importance. Nathaniel Lardner (Arian, 1684-1768) stands in the front rank of the scholarship of his time, and uses his vast knowledge to maintain the genuineness of all books of the New Testament and the perfect accuracy of its history. Joseph Butler, a very original, careful and honest thinker, lifts controversy with deists from details to principles in his Analogy of Religion both Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature (1736). This title introduces us to a new conception. Deists and orthodox in those days agreed in recognizing not merely natural theology but natural religion-" essential religion," Butler more than once styles it, the expression shows how near he stood intellectually to those he criticized. But morally he stood aloof, In part i.-on Natural Religion-he defends a moral or punishing Deity against the sentimental softness of the age. The God of Nature, whom deists confess, does punish in time, if they will

but look at the facts; why not in eternity? Morality," as others have confessed, is "the nature of things"! Not the Being of God is discussed-Butler will not waste words on triflers (as he thinks them) who deny that-but God's character. Unfortunately (perhaps) Butler prefers to argue on admitted principles; holds much of his own moral belief in reserve; tries to reduce everything to a question of probable fact. If this hampers him in part i., the situation appears still worse in part ii., which is directly occupied with the defence of Christianity. Butler says nothing about incomprehensible mysteries, and protests that reason is the only ground we have to proceed upon. But by treating the atonement simply as revealed (and unexplained) matter of fact-in spite of some partial analogies in human experience, a thing essentially anomalous-Butler repeats, and applies to the moral contents of Christianity, what Aquinas said of its speculative doctrines. (Whether one calls the unknowable a revealed mystery or an unexplained and inexplicable fact makes little difference.) William Paley (17431805) borrows from many writers; he borrows Lardner's learning and Butler's" particular evidence for Christianity," viz. miracles, prophecy and "history"; and he states his points with perfect clearness. No man ever filled a typical position more exactly than Paley. Eighteenth-century ethics-Hedonism, with a theological background. Empiricist Natural Theology-the argument from Design. Christian Evidences-the strong probability of the resurrection of Christ and the consequent authority of his teaching. Horae Paulinae-mutual confirmations of Acts and Epistles; better, though one-sided. When such exclusively "external" arguments are urged, the contents of Christianity go for next to nothing.

reason."

VI. Later Modern Period.-Towards the end of the 18th century a new epoch of reconstruction begins in the thought and life of civilization. The leader in speculative philosophy is Immanuel Kant, though he includes many agnostic elements, and draws the inference (which some things in the letter of Butler might seem to warrant) that the essence of Christianity is an ethical theism. While he thus created a new and more ethical" rationalism," Kant's many-sided influence, alike in philosophy and in theology, worked to further issues. He (and other Germans, but not G. W. F. Hegel) was represented in England in a fragmentary way by S. T. Coleridge (1772-1834), probably the most typical figure of his period-another layman. His general thought was that "rationalism" represents an uprising of the lower reason or 66 understanding" against the higher or true The mysteries of theology are its best part-not alien to reason but of its substance, the "logos." This is to upset the compromise of Aquinas and go back to a Christian platonism. Of course the difficulty revives again: If a philosophy, why supernaturally revealed? Thomas Arnold,. criticizing Edward Hawkins, appeals rather to the atonement as deeper neglected truth. So in Scotland, Thomas Erskine and Thomas Chalmers-the latter in contradiction to his earlier position-hold that the doctrine of salvation, when translated into experience, furnishes "internal evidence "-a somewhat broader use of the phrase than when it applies merely to evidence of date or authorship drawn from the contents of a book. This gives a new and moral filling to the conception of "supernatural revelation." The attempt to work out either of the reactions against Thomism in new theological systems is pretty much confined to Germany. Hegel's theological followers, of every shade and party, represent the first, and Schleiermacher's the second. Schleiermacher rejects natural religion in favour of the positive religions, while the school of A. Ritschl and W. Herrmann reject natural theology outright in favour of revelation-a striking external parallel to early Socinianism. British and American divines, on the other hand, are slow to suspect that a new apologetic principle may mean a new system of apologetics, to say nothing of a new dogmatic. Among the evangelicals, for the most part, natural theology, far from being rejected, is not even modified, and certain doctrines continue to be described as incomprehensible mysteries. No Protestant, of course, can agree with Roman Catholic theology that (supernatural) faith is an

obedient assent to church authority and the mysteries it dictates. To Protestantism, faith is personal trust. But the principle is hardly ever carried out to the end. Mysterious doctrines are ascribed by Protestants to scripture; so half of revelation is regarded as matter for blind assent, if another half is luminous in experience. The movement of German philosophy which led from Kant to Hegel has indeed found powerful British champions (T. H. Green, J. and E. Caird, &c.), but less churchly than Coleridge (or F. D. Maurice or B. F. Westcott), though churchly again in J. R. Illingworth and other contributors to Lux Mundi (1890). Before this wave of thought, H. L. Mansel tried (1858) to play Pascal's game on Kantian principles, developing the sceptical side of Kant's many-faceted mind. But as he protested against relying on the human conscience-the one element of positive conviction spared by Kant-his ingenuity found few admirers except H. Spencer, who claims him as justifying antiChristian agnosticism. Butler's tradition was more directly continued by J. H. Newman-with modifications on becoming a Roman Catholic in the light of the church's decision in favour of Thomism. A. M. Fairbairn (Catholicism, Roman and Anglican, | ch. v., and elsewhere) and E. A. Abbott (Philomythus, and elsewhere) suspect Newman of a sceptical leaven and extend the criticism to Butler's doctrine of "probability." Yet it seems plain that any theology, maintaining redemption as historical fact (and not merely ideal), must attach religious importance to conclusions which are technically probable rather than proven. If we transfer Christian evidence from the "historical" to the "philosophical" with H. Rashdall-we surely cut down Christianity to the limits of theism. And the inner mind of Butler has moral anchorage in the Analogy, quite as much as in the Sermons. It is in part ii. more than in part i. of his masterpiece that the light seems to grow dim. Another of the Oxford converts to Rome, W. G. Ward, made vigorous contributions to natural theology.

VII. Contents of Modern Apologetics.-Superficially regarded, philosophy ebbs and flows, whatever progress the debate may reveal to speculative insight. Old positions re-emerge from forgetfulness, and there is always a philosophy to back every case." More visible dangers arise for the apologist in the region of science, historical or physical. There the progress of truth, within whatever limits, is manifest. Essays and Reviews (1860) was a vehement announcement of scientific results-startling English conservatism awake for the first time. And in the scientific region the great apologetic classics, like Butler, are hopelessly out of date. The modern apologist must do ephemeral work-unless it should chance that he proves to be the skir misher, pioneering for a modified dogmatic. He holds a watching brief. While he must beware of hasty speech, he has often to plead that new knowledge does not really threaten faith; or that it is not genuinely established knowledge at all; or else, that faith has mistaken its own grounds, and will gain strength by concentrating on its true field. The work is not always well done; but the Christian church needs it.

1. Apologetics and Philosophy.-The main part of this subject is discussed under THEISM. Some notes may be added on special points. (a) Freewill is generally assumed on the Christian side (R.C. Church; Scottish philosophy; H. Lotze; J. Martineau; W. G. Ward. Not in a libertariam sense; Leibnitz. New and obscure issues raised by Kant). But there is no continuous tradition or steady trend of discussion. (b) Personal immortality is affirmed as philosophically certain by the Church of Rome and many Protestant writers. Others teach "conditional immortality." Others base the hope on belief in the resurrection of Christ. (c) Theodicy-the tradition of Leibnitz is preserved (on libertarian lines) by Martineau (A Study of Religion, 1883). See also F. R. Tennant's Origin and Propagation of Sin (1902)→ sin a "bye-product " of a generally good evolution. Others find in the gospel of redemption the true theodicy. (d) The problem of Christian apologetic has been simplified in the past by the prevalence of the Christian ethics and temper even among many non-Christians (e.g. J. S. Mill). But hereafter it may not prove possible for the apologist to assume as unchallenged the Christian

2. Apologetics and Physical Science.-(a) Copernicanism has won its battles and the Church of Rome would fain have its error forgotten. The admission is now general that the Bible cannot be expected to use the language of scientific astronomy. Still, it is not certain that the shock of Copernicanism on supernatural Christianity is exhausted. (b) Geology has also won its battles, and few now try to harmonize it with Genesis. (c) Evolution came down from the clouds when C. Darwin and A. R. Wallace succeeded in displacing the naïf conception of special creation by belief in the origin of species out of other species through a process of natural law. This gave immense vogue to wider and vaguer theories of evolutionary process, notably to H. Spencer's grandiose cosmic formula in terms of mechanism. Here the apologist has more to say. The special Darwinian hypothesisnatural "selection"-may or may not be true; it was at least a fruitful suggestion. If true, it need not be exhaustive. Again, evolution itself need not apply everywhere. We are offered a philosophical rather than a scientific speculation when E. Caird (Evolution of Religion, 1893) tries to vindicate Christianity as the highest working of nature-true just because evolved from lower religions. The Christian apologist indeed may himself seek, following John Fiske, to philosophize evolution as a restatement of natural theology-" one God, one law, one clement and one far-off divine event "--and as at least pointing towards personal immortality. But if evolution is to be the whole truth regarding Christianity, we should have to surrender both supernatural revelation and divine redemption. And these, it may be strongly urged, contain the magic of Christianity. Losing them it might sink into a lifeless theory.

As far as pure science goes, the inference from science in favour of materialism has visibly lost much of its plausibility, and Protestant apologists would probably be prepared to accept in advance all verified discoveries as belonging to a different region from that of faith. Roman Catholic apologetic prefers to negotiate in detail.

3. Apologetics and History.-History brings us nearer the heart of the Christian position. (a) Old Testament criticism won startling victories towards the end of the 19th century. It blots out much supposed knowledge, but throws a vivid and interesting light on the reconstrued process of history. Most Protestants accept the general scheme of criticism; those who hang back make not a few concessions (e.g. J. Orr, Problem of the O.T., 1906). The Roman Catholic Church again prefers an attitude of reserve. (b) New Testament criticism raises even more delicate issues. Positively it may be affirmed that the recovered figure of the historical Jesus is the greatest asset in the possession of modern Christian theology and apologetics. The "Lives" of Christ, Roman Catholic and Protestant, "critical" (D. F. Strauss, A. Renan, &c., &c.) and "believing,' imply this at least. Negatively, "unchallenged historical certainties" are becoming few in number, or are disappearing altogether, through the industry of modern minds. True, the Tübingen criticism of F. C. Baur and his school-important as the first scientific attempt to conceive New Testament conditions and literature as a whole-has been abandoned. (A. Ritschl's Entstehung der all-katholischen Kirche, 2nd edition, 1857, was an especially telling reply.) The synoptic gospels are now treated with considerable respect. It is no longer suggested in responsible quarters that they are party documents sacrificing truth to tendency." But not all quarters are responsible; and in the effort to grasp scientifically, i.e. accurately, the amazing facts of Christ and primitive Christianity, every imaginable hypothesis is canvassed. Even the Roman Catholic Church produced the Abbé Loisy (though he undertakes to play off church certainties against historical uncertainties). Hitherto at least the fourth gospel has been the touchstone. The authorship of the epistles is in many cases a matter of subordinate importance; at least for Protestants or for those surrendering Bible infallibility, which Rome can hardly do. (c) New Testament history.

real historical figure-a point well-nigh overlooked by Strauss, and denied by some modern advocates of a mythical theory; (2) that Jesus is knowable (not one "of whom we really know very little "-B. Jowett) in his teaching, example, character, historical personality; and that he is full of moral splendour. On the other hand, faith has no special interest in claiming that we can compose a biographical study of the development of Jesus. Certainly no early writer thought of providing material for such use. It is a common opinion in Germany that our material is in fact too scanty or too self-contradictory. Yet the fascination of the subject will always revive the attempt. If it succeeds, there will be a new line of communication along which that great personality will tell on men's minds and hearts. If it fails-there are other channels; character can be known and trusted even when we are baffled by a thing necessarily so full of mystery as the development of a personality. Notably, the manifest non-consciousness of personal guilt in Jesus suggests to us his sinlessness. (3) Apologists maintain that Jesus "claimed " Messiahship. There are speculative constructions of gospel history which eliminate that claim; and no doubt apologetics could-with more or less difficultyrestate its position in a changed form if the paradox of to-day became accepted as historical fact to-morrow. The central apologetic thesis is the uniqueness of the "only-begotten"; it is here that "the supernatural passes into the substance of Christian faith. But most probably the description of Jesus as thus unique will continue to be associated with the allegationHe told us so; he claimed Messiahship and "died for the claim." (See preface to 5th ed. of Ecce Homo.) Nor did so superhuman a claim crush him, or deprive his soul of its balance. He imparted to the title a grander significance out of the riches of his personality. (4) In the light of this the "argument from prophecy" is reconstructed. It ceases to lay much stress upon coincidences between Old Testament predictions or types and events in Christ's career. It becomes the assertion; historically, providentially, the expectation of a unique religious figure arose "the" Messiah; and Jesus gave himself to be thought of as that great figure. (5) It is also claimed as certain that Jesus had marvellous powers of healing. More reserve is being shown towards the other or "nature" miracles. These latter, it may be remarked, are more unambiguously supernatural. But, if Jesus really cured leprosy or really restored the dead to life, we have miracle plainly enough in the region of healing. (6) For Jesus' own resurrection several lines of evidence are alleged. (i.) All who believe that in any sense Christ rose again insist upon the impression which his personality made during life. It was he whose resurrection seemed credible! Some practically stop here; the apologist proceeds. (ii.) There is the report of the empty grave; historically, not easily waved aside. (iii.) We have New Testament reports of appearances of the risen Jesus; subjective? the mere clothing of the impression made by his personality during life? or objective? "telegrams" from heaven (Th. Keim)-"Veridical Hallucinations"? or something even more, throwing a ray of light perhaps on the state and powers of the happy dead? (iv.) There is the immense influence of Jesus Christ in history, associated with belief in him as the risen Son of God.

"

In view of the claims of Jesus, different possibilities arise. (i.) The evangelists impute to him a higher claim than he made. This may be called the rationalistic solution; with sympathy in Christ's ethical teaching, there is relief at minimizing his great claim. So, brilliantly, Wellhausen's Gospel commentaries and Introduction. (Mark fairly historical; other gospels' fuller account of Christ's teaching and claims unreliable.) (ii.) The claim was fraudulent (Reimarus; Renan, ed. 1; popular anti-Christian agitation). This is a counsel of despair. (iii.) He was an enthusiastic dreamer, expecting the world's end. This the apologist will recognize as the most plausible hostile alternative. He may feel bound to admit an element of illusion in Christ's vision of the future; but he will contend that the apocalyptic form did not destroy the spiritual content of Christ's revelations-nay, that it was itself the

vehicle of great truths. So he will argue as the essence of the matter that (iv.) he who has occupied Christ's place in history, and won such reverence from the purest souls, was what he claimed to be, and that his many-sidedness comes to focus and harmony when we recognize him as the Christ of God and the Saviour of the world.

To a less extent, similar problems and alternatives arise in regard to the church:-Catholicism a compromise between Jewish Christianity and Pauline or Gentile Christianity (F. C. Baur, &c.); Catholicism the Hellenizing of Christianity (A. Ritschl, A. Harnack); the Catholic church for good and evil the creation of St Paul (P. Wernle, H. Weinel); the church supernaturally guided (R.C. apologetic; in a modified degree High Church apologetic); essential-not necessarily exclusivetruth of Paulinism, essential error in first principles of Catholicism (Protestant apologetic).

LITERATURE. Omitting the Christian fathers as remote from the present day, we recognize as works of genius Pascal's Pensées and Butler's Analogy, to which we might add J. R. Seeley's Ecce Homo (1865). The philosophical, Platonist, or Idealist line of Christian defence is represented among recent writers by J. R. Illingworth [Anglican), in Personality, Human and Divine (1894), Divine Immanence (1898), Reason and Revelation (1902), who at times seems rather to presuppose the Thomist compromise, and A. M. Fairbairn [Congregationalist), in Place of Christ in Modern Theology (1893), Philosophy of the Christian Religion (1902). The appeal to ethical or Christian experience" internal evidence "--is found especially in E. A. Abbott [Christianity supernatural and divine, but not miraculous], Through Nature to Christ (1877), The Kernel and the Husk (1886), The Spirit on the Waters (1897), &c., or A. B. Bruce, Chief End of Revelation (1881), The Miraculous Element in the Gospels (1886), Apologetics (1892), and other works; Bruce's posthumous article, "Jesus" in Encyc. Bib., was understood by some as exchanging Christian orthodoxy for bare theism, but probably its tone of aloofness is due to the attempt to keep well within the limits of what the author considered pure scientific history. Scholarly and apologetic discussion on the gospels and life of Jesus is further represented by the writings of W. Sanday or (earlier) of J. B. Lightfoot. Much American work of merit on the character of Christ is headed by W. E Channing, and by H. Bushnell (in Nature and the Supernatural). For defence of Christ's resurrection, reference may be made to H. Latham's The Risen Lord and R. Mackintosh's First Primer of Apologetics. For modification in light of recent scholarship of argument from prophecy, to Richm's Messianic Prophecy, Stanton's Jewish and Christian Messiah, and Woods's Hope of Israel. Roman Catholic apologetics of necessity, Thomist -is well represented by Professor Schanz of Tübingen. The whole Ritschl movement is apologetic in spirit; best English account in A. E. Garvie's Ritschlian Theology (1899). See also the chief church histories or histories of doctrine (Harnack; Loofs; Hagenbach; Shedd); A. S. Farrar's Critical History of Free (ie. anti-Christian) Thought (Bampton Lectures, 1862); R. C. Trench's Introduction to Notes on the Miracles, and F. W. Macran's English Apologetic Theology (1905). For the 18th century, G. V. Lechler's Geschichte des englischen Deismus (1841); Mark Pattison in Essays and Reviews (1860); Leslie Stephen's English Thought in 18th Century (agnostic); John Hunt, Religious Thought in England (3 vols., 1870-1873). (R. MA.) APOLOGUE (from the Gr. åróλoyos, a statement or account), a short fable or allegorical story, meant to serve as a pleasant vehicle for some moral doctrine or to convey some useful lesson. One of the best known is that of Jotham in the Book of Judges (ix. 7-15); others are "The City Rat and Field Rat," by Horace, "The Belly and its Members," by the patrician Menenius Agrippa in the second book of Livy, and perhaps most famous of all, those of Aesop. The term is applied more particularly to a story in which the actors or speakers are taken from the brute creation or inanimate nature. An apologue is distinguished from a fable in that there is always some moral sense present, which there need not be in a fable. It is generally dramatic, and has been defined as ་་ a satire in action." It differs from a parable in several respects. A parable is equally an ingenious tale intended to correct manners, but it can be true, while an apologue, with its introduction of animals and plants, to which it lends our ideas and language and emotions, is necessarily devoid of real truth, and even of all probability. The parable reaches heights to which the apologue cannot aspire, for the points in which brutes and inanimate nature present analogies to man are principally those of his lower nature, and the lessons taught by the apologue seldom therefore reach beyond prudential

morality, whereas the parable aims at representing the relations between man and God. It finds its framework in the world of nature as it actually is, and not in any grotesque parody of it, and it exhibits real and not fanciful analogies. The apologue seizes on that which man has in common with creatures below him, and the parable on that which he has in common with God. Still, in spite of the difference of moral level, Martin Luther thought so highly of apologues as counsellors of virtue that he edited and revised Aesop and wrote a characteristic preface to the volume. The origin of the apologue is extremely ancient and comes from the East, which is the natural fatherland of everything connected with allegory, metaphor and imagination. Veiled truth was often necessary in the East, particularly with the slaves, who dared not reveal their minds too openly. It is noteworthy that the two fathers of apologue in the West were slaves, namely Aesop and Phaedrus. La Fontaine in France; Gay and Dodsley in England; Gellert, Lessing and Hagedorn in Germany; Tomas de Iriarte in Spain, and Krilov in Russia, are leading modern writers of apologues. Length is not an essential matter in the definition of an apologue. Those of La Fontaine are often very short, as, for example, "Le Coque et la Perle." On the other hand, in the romances of Reynard the Fox we have medieval apologues arranged in cycles, and attaining epical dimensions. An Italian fabulist, Corti, is said to have developed an apologue of "The Talking Animals" to the bulk of twenty-six cantos. La Motte, writing at a time when this species of literature was universally admired, attributes its popularity to the fact that it ménage et flatte l'amour-propre by inculcating virtue in an amusing manner without seeming to dictate or insist. This was the ordinary 18th-century view of the matter, but Rousseau contested the educational value of instruction given in this indirect form.

A work by P. Soullé, La Fontaine et ses devanciers (1866), is a history of the apologue from the earliest times until its final triumph in France.

APOLOGY (from Gr. åroλoyla, defence), in its usual sense, an expression of regret for something which has been wrongfully said or done; a withdrawal or retraction of some charge or imputation which is false. In an action for libel, the fact that an apology has been promptly and fully made is a plea in mitigation of damages. The apology should have the same form of publicity as the original charge. If made publicly, the proper form is an advertisement in a newspaper; if made within the hearing of a few only, a letter of apology, which may be read to those who have heard what was said, should be sufficient. By the English Libel Act 1843, s. 2, it was enacted that in an action for libel contained in a newspaper it is a defence for the defendant to plead that the libel was inserted without actual malice and without gross negligence, and that before the commencement of the action and at the earliest opportunity afterwards he inserted in the newspaper a full apology for the libel, or, where the newspaper in which the libel appeared was published at intervals exceeding one week, he offered to publish the apology in any newspaper selected by the plaintiff. The apology must be full and must be printed in as conspicuous a place and manner as the libel was.

The word "apology " or " apologia " is also used in the sense of defence or vindication, the only meaning of the Greek àñoλoyía, especially of the defence of a doctrine or system, or of religious or other beliefs, &c., e.g. Justin Martyr's Apology or J. H. Newman's Apologia pro vita sua. (See APOLOGETICS.) APONEUROSIS (Gr. ȧró, away, and veûpov, a sinew), in anatomy, a membrane separating muscles from each other. APOPHTHEGM (from the Gr. ȧróleyμa), a short and pointed utterance. The usual spelling up to Johnson's day was apothegm, which Webster and Worcester still prefer; it indicates the pronunciation-i.e. "apothem "--better than the other, which, however, is more usual in England and follows the derivation. Such sententious remarks as Knowledge is Power are apophthegms. They become "proverbs" by age and acceptance. Plutarch made a famous collection in his Apophthegmata Laconica.