tion, that it would promote and secure the circulation of gold and silver coin. A most ingenious combination of these conflicting pretexts, may be seen in the report of Secretary Hamilton. in favor of establishing the first bank. Were there no traditionary or other evidence extant, as to the appliances by which these laws were passed through Congress, the history of the late special session, in regard to the two bills before us, and the kindred measures concerted for similar purposes of relief, might throw a flood of light upon the discipline that could have been adopted, to prevent an adequate expression of the permanent interests of the whole people, in carrying out measures, to gratify the cupidity of a particular clsss.

The operations of this Bank, together with those created by the several States, having supplied the channels of circulation with a cheaper and more convenient currency than gold and silver, these universal equivalents were, of course, carried by the balance of trade to other countries, leaving only the local and factitious currency of banks, to fulfil their duties in the interchanges of the community, as well as in all public payments. When the period for which the first Bank was chartered had expired, State Banks were employed by the Government in a similar manner; all public taxes, as well as interchanges between individuals, being conducted in their currency. Upon their suspension in 1814, this currency was still received into the treasury. From the absence of all practical check upon its profuse issue, it soon became so discordant in value, that the equality of taxation required by the Constitution was overthrown. But so effectually had gold and silver been expelled from circulation, by the substitution of currency of no intrinsic value, that a sufficient amount for public payments could not be commanded, without great delay and inconvenience. Under the pressure of this emergency, many leading individuals who had zealously opposed the establishment of the former Bank, as a perversion of the Constitution, found themselves compelled to acquiesce in the necessity and propriety of incorporating that of 1816, as affording the only efficient means, which could then be devised, for carrying on the public service.

It must be obvious to the most casual observer, that both these Banks were created upon grounds of public necessity,

which could not be urged in favor of chartering any paperissuing corporation at the time when the two bills in question were brought before Congress. No public debt of any importance existed, nor was there any discrepancy in the value of the currency employed in public payments. When the States of Maryland, Kentucky and Ohio, undertook to expel the branches of the late Bank from their respective jurisdictions, by imposing taxes upon their operations, the question of the constitutionality of the charter of the Bank, by Congress, came before the Supreme Court of the United States, for solemn decision, in the case of Macculloch vs. Maryland.* The judgment of that august tribunal, which has been regarded, by many, as closing this general question, turned upon the political necessity of that Bank, leaving the constitutionality of any future Bank, incorporated under a different state of things, wholly untouched. The distinct and irresistible inference from the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall upon that case, is, that when the public service may be carried on with security and convenience without the interposition of such an agent as the Bank, its incorporation cannot be justified by any grant of power in the Constitution. That such is the case at the present time, is conclusively proved by the efficient operations of the government under the Sub-Treasury law, repealed by Congress while these bills were before it. The incorporation of "an oldfashioned Bank of the United States," for the relief of the people, by promoting individual convenience, however general, is not authorized by the judgment of the Supreme Court. On that point, the question of constitutionality is quite as open as at the commencement of the present form of government.

Independent of the fact, that the public service may now be efficiently conducted without recourse to the Charter of any corporation by Congress, the two bills before us contain provisions which directly conflict with the most important safeguard against the corrupt misuse of the public money, which is contained in the Constitution:-"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money, shall be published from time to time." * 4 Wheaton's Reports, 316.

The laws incorporating the two Banks of the United States, constitute neither of them the Treasury. That of 1791, contains no provisions on the subject. The sixteenth

section of that of 1816, provides that the deposite of the money of the United States, in places where the Bank and its branches may be established, shall be made in the Bank and its branches, "unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and direct,"-assigning the reasons for such direction to Congress. Upon directions for depositing the public money in certain State Banks, given by Secretary, now Chief Justice, Taney, in 1833, it was argued by the friends of the late Bank, that the law intended to make that Bank the Treasury, and that, consequently, these directions were illegal; indeed, resolutions were adopted by the Senate, denouncing these directions as unconstitutional, which were afterwards expunged from the journals. But the idea, that the Bank was intended to be made the Treasury, can be found in no law. The sixteenth section of each of these bills, on the other hand, expressly provides, that the public money shall be deposited with the Bank or Corporation respectively, unless otherwise directed by law, and they both contain the further and more important enactment, that the public money deposited with them, "shall be taken and deemed to be in the Treasury of the United States." The title "Fiscal," appended to the Bank and Corporation proposed to be created by these bills respectively, became appropriate to their functions. Had either of these bills been made a law, they would have created a new fisc, or Treasury.-not merely a Treasury Bank, but the Treasury itself.

Now, as no money can be drawn from the Treasury, but in violation of the Constitution, except in consequence of appropriations made by law, could the public money in the Treasury have been applied to commercial facilities, as provided by these two bills? Under the issue of three dollars of promises to pay specie, for each dollar actually in possession, as contemplated by both, a rise of prices, increased importations, and unfavorable foreign exchanges, must have inevitably created enormous demands for the fulfilment of these promises. Could the public money in the treasury be constitutionally applied to the rescue of these corporations from discredit? We are aware that it has been seri

ously proposed, as an effectual mode of preventing such catastrophes, to increase the rates of protective duties. But this must prove futile whenever the rate is carried beyond twenty or thirty per cent. The experience of every commercial country in the world, has proved that the only consequence of a higher rate of impost, is to encourage illicit traffic. The revenue is lessened, at the expense of the honest and fair dealer. As the artificial counterpoise, sanctioned by these bills, in the shape of increased currency, is two hundred per cent., no possible rate of impost duty can prevent the constant drain it would occasion. The public treasury, under such a system, must be exposed to continual hazard, besides the violation of the Constitution.

In all governments worthy of the name, the mainspring of the public service is the Treasury. All the functions of sovereignty, in every branch, whether civil or military, are dependant upon the security and efficiency of its operations. The grant of the control of the public revenue to a corporation of private individuals, irresponsible either in person or property, for mismanagement, for any future period, whether of twenty or an hundred years,—is, in effect, an abdication of the most essential functions of the

government, for that time. Can this be constitutionally done by any existing Congress? Whatever may have been decided by the Supreme Court, every individual in the community, must judge for himself, upon a question of essential revolution of the government under which he lives. May those who have been chosen to administer trusts so expressly defined, grant away the most important powers over the industry and subsistence of the people, for a term of years, or forever, at their option, to be held as private property, not to be resumed, or modified, except by the consent of the grantees? After such grant to a private corporation shall have passed through the forms of law, can neither any subsequent Congress, nor the States, nor the people, change the management of the revenue, however defective it may be found by experience? Such is held to be the effect of chartering "an oldfashioned Bank of the United States." It would seem, that such a grant is so totally inconsistent with the objects of the government, established by the Constitution, as to demonstrate, that no authority for it can be derived from that instrument. VOL. I.-NO 1.

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Any law passed by Congress, pursuant to its expressly granted powers, may be repealed at the pleasure of the same, or a subsequent Congress, whatever may be the private rights involved. The army may be disbanded,-the navy sold, and the brave defenders of the country of both services, turned into civil life, without warning or provision. All contracts and permanent arrangements for their support, may be at once ended by law. Is it "necessary and proper” to obviate the possibility of such injustice, for the present Congress to put the control of the military power of the Union wholly beyond the reach of a future Congress, by interposing the vested rights of a corporation of irresponsible individuals, giving them absolute authority over the army and navy, for one or more generations to come? The implied power in the Constitution, is as full, for this purpose, as to settle the principles and details of the administration of the public revenue, and to grant the absolute control over it to such a corporation, for any specific period. The primary object mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution, "to establish justice," is exposed to much greater danger from a corporation controlling the revenues, than from one vested with the military power of the Union. Neither the State tribunals, nor those of the United States, can enforce contracts while the public service is carried on in a depreciated medium. Of this there has been ample experience in some of the States. Courts may, indeed, render judgments-issue executions and order their ministerial officers to collect the amounts required; but, in practice, all this ceremony has always been found as ineffectual to secure the strict fulfilment of contracts in lawful currency, as though paper money had been, in fact, a tender in payment, whenever the public service is conducted in currency whose value is at the mercy of irresponsible corporations, absolved from the obligation of performing their promises. The arguments derived from individual convenience, become extremely fashionable and popular under these circumstances. Would it not be convenient to every individual in the community, to be permitted to administer justice for himself, in his own way? Such arguments may be urged as strongly and as plausibly in favor of Lynch law, as of Bank law.

Similar suggestions of individual advantage and personal convenience, constitute the only grounds, applicable at the