53

Judge English resigned six days before the date set for trial in the Senate. The House Managers stated that the resignation in no way affected the right of the Senate to try the charges, but recommended that the impeachment proceedings be discontinued." The recommendation was accepted by the House, 290 to 23.80

b. Articles of Impeachment

Article I charged that Judge English "did on divers and various occasions so abuse the powers of his high office that he is hereby charged with tyranny and oppression, whereby he has brought the administration of justice in [his] court. . into disrepute, and . . . is guilty of misbehavior falling under the constitutional provision as ground for impeachment and removal from office." The article alleged that the judge had "willfully, tyrannically, oppressively and unlawfully" disbarred lawyers practicing before him, summoned state and local officials to his court in an imaginary case and denounced them with profane language, and without sufficient cause summoned two newspapermen to his court and threatened them with imprisonment. It was also alleged that Judge English stated in open court that if he instructed a jury that a man was guilty and they did not find him guilty, he would send the jurors to jail.

Article II charged that Judge English knowingly entered into an "unlawful and improper combination" with a referee in bankruptcy, appointed by him, to control bankruptcy proceedings in his district for the benefit and profit of the judge and his relatives and friends, and amended the bankruptcy rules of his court to enlarge the authority of the bankruptcy receiver, with a view to his own benefit.

Article III charged that Judge English "corruptly extended favoritism in diverse matters," "with the intent to corruptly prefer" the referee in bankruptcy, to whom English was alleged to be "under great obligations, financial and otherwise."

Article IV charged that Judge English ordered bankruptcy funds within the jurisdiction of his court to be deposited in banks of which he was a stockholder, director and depositor, and that the judge entered into an agreement with each bank to designate the bank a depository of interest-free bankruptcy funds if the bank would employ the judge's son as a cashier. These actions were stated to have been taken "with the wrongful and unlawful intent to use the influence of his . . . office as judge for the personal profit of himself" and his family and friends. Article V alleged that Judge English's treatment of members of the bar and conduct in his court during his tenure had been oppressive to both members of the bar and their clients and had deprived the clients of their rights to be protected in liberty and property. It also alleged that Judge English "at diverse times and places, while acting as such judge, did disregard the authority of the laws, and... did refuse to allow... the benefit of trial by jury, contrary to his... trust and duty as judge of said district court, against the laws of the United States and in violation of the solemn oath which he had taken to administer equal and impartial justice." Judge English's conduct in making decisions and orders was alleged to be such "as to excite fear and distrust and to inspire a widespread belief, in and beyond his judicial district

54

... that causes were not decided in said court according to their merits," "[a]ll to the scandal and disrepute" of his court and the administration of justice in it. This "course of conduct" was alleged to be "misbehavior" and "a misdemeanor in office."

c. Proceedings in the Senate

The Senate, being informed by the Managers for the House that the House desired to discontinue the proceedings in view of the resignation of Judge English, approved a resolution dismissing the proceedings by a vote of 70 to 9.81

12. DISTRICT JUDGE HAROLD LOUDERBACK (1932-1933)

a. Proceedings in the House

A resolution directing an inquiry into the official conduct of District Judge Louderback was adopted by the House in 1932. A subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee took evidence. The full Judiciary Committee submitted a report in 1933, including a resolution that the evidence did not warrant impeachment, and a brief censure of the Judge for conduct prejudicial to the dignity of the judiciary.s2 A minority consisting of five Members recommended impeachment and moved five articles of impeachment from the floor of the House.83 The five articles were adopted as a group by a vote of 183 to 143.84

b. Articles of Impeachment

Article I charged that Louderback "did... so abuse the power of his high office, that he is hereby charged with tyranny and oppression, favoritism and conspiracy, whereby he has brought the administration of justice in the court of which he is a judge into disrepute, and by his conduct is guilty of misbehavior." It alleged that Louderback used "his office and power of district judge in his own personal interest" by causing an attorney to be appointed as a receiver in bankruptcy at the demand of a person to whom Louderback was under financial obligation. It was further alleged that the attorney had received "large and exorbitant fees" for his services; and that these fees had been passed on to the person whom Louderback was to reimburse for bills incurred on Louderback's behalf.

Article II charged that Louderback had allowed excessive fees to a receiver and an attorney, described as his "personal and political friends and associates," and had unlawfully made an order conditional upon the agreement of the parties not to appeal from the allowance of fees. This was described as "a course of improper and unlawful conduct as a Judge." It was further alleged that Louderback "did not give his fair, impartial, and judicial consideration" to certain objections; and that he "was and is guilty of a course of conduct oppressive and unjudicial."

Article III charged the knowing appointment of an unqualified person as a receiver, resulting in disadvantage to litigants in his court. Article IV charged that "misusing the powers of his judical office for the sole purpose of enriching" the unqualified receiver mentioned in Article III, Louderback failed to give "fair, impartial, and judicial

$1 Id. 344, 348.

876 CONG. REC. 4913 (1933): H.R. REP. No. 2065, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1933). 76 CONG. REC. 4914 (1933); H.R. REP. NO. 2065, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1933). 84 76 CONG. REC. 4925 (1988).

55

consideration" to an application to discharge the receiver; that "sitting in a part of the court to which he had not been assigned at the time, he took jurisdiction of a case although knowing that the facts and law compelled dismissal; and that this conduct was "filled with partiality and favoritism" and constituted "misbehavior" and a "misdemeanor in office."

Article V, as amended, charged that "the reasonable and probable result" of Louderback's actions alleged in the previous articles "has been to create a general condition of widespread fear and distrust and disbelief in the fairness and disinterestedness" of his official actions. It further alleged that the "general and aggregate result" of the conduct had been to destroy confidence in Louderback's court, "which for a Federal judge to destroy is a crime and misdemeanor of the highest order." 85

. Proceedings in the Senate

A motion by counsel for Judge Louderback to make the original Article V more definite was consented to by the Managers for the House, resulting in the amendment of that Article.86

Some Senators who had not heard all the testimony felt unqualified to vote upon Articles I through IV, but capable of voting on Article V, the omnibus or "catchall" article.87

Judge Louderback was acquitted on each of the first four articles, the closest vote being on Article I (34 guilty, 42 not guilty). He was then acquitted on Article V, the vote being 45 guilty. 34 not guilty-short of the two-thirds majority required for conviction.

13. DISTRICT JUDGE HALSTED L. RITTER (1933-1936)

a. Proceedings in the House

A resolution directing an inquiry into the official conduct of District Judge Ritter was adopted by the House in 1933.88 A subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee took evidence in 1933 and 1934. A resolution that Ritter "be impeached for misbehavior, and for high crimes and misdemeanors." and recommending the adoption of four articles of impeachment, was reported to the full House in 1936, and adopted by a vote of 181 to 146.89 Before trial in the Senate, the House approved a resolution submitted by the House Managers, replacing the fourth original articles with seven amended ones, some charging new offenses.90

b. Articles of Impeachment

Article I charged Ritter with "misbehavior" and "a high crime and misdemeanor in office," in fixing an exorbitant attorney's fee to be paid to Ritter's former law partner, in disregard of the "restraint of propriety... and... danger of embarrassment"; and in "corruptly and unlawfully" accepting cash payments from the attorney at the time the fee was paid.

Article II charged that Ritter, with others, entered into an "arrangement" whose purpose was to ensure that bankruptcy property

56

would continue in litigation before Ritter's court. Rulings by Ritter were alleged to have "made effective the champertous undertaking" of others, but Ritter was not himself explicitly charged with the crime of champerty or related criminal offenses. Article II also repeated the allegations of corrupt and unlawful receipt of funds and alleged that Judge Ritter "profited personally" from the "excessive and unwarranted" fees, that he had received a free room at a hotel in receivership in his court, and that he "wilfully failed and neglected to perform his duty to conserve the assets" of the hotel.

Article III, as amended, charged Ritter with the practice of law while on the bench, in violation of the Judicial Code. Ritter was alleged to have solicited and received money from a corporate client of his old law firm. The client allegedly had large property interests within the territorial jurisdiction of Ritter's court. These acts were described as "calculated to bring his office into disrepute," and as a "high crime and misdemeanor.”

Article IV, added by the Managers of the House, also charged practice of law while on the bench, in violation of the Judicial Code.

Articles V and VI, also added by the Managers, alleged that Ritter had violated the Revenue Act of 1928 by willfully failing to report and pay tax on certain income received by him-primarily the sums described in Articles I through IV. Each failure was described as a "high misdemeanor in office."

...

Article VII (former Article IV amended) charged that Ritter was guilty of misbehavior and high crimes and misdemeanors in office because "the reasonable and probable consequence of [his] actions or conduct. . . as an individual or . . . judge, is to bring his court into scandal and disrepute," to the prejudice of his court and public confidence in the administration of justice in it, and to "the prejudice of public respect for and confidence in the Federal judiciary," rendering him "unfit to continue to serve as such judge." There followed four specifications of the "actions or conduct" referred to. The first two were later dropped by the Managers at the outset of the Senate trial; the third referred to Ritter's acceptance (not alleged to be corrupt or unlawful) of fees and gratuities from persons with large property interests within his territorial jurisdiction. The fourth, or omnibus, specification was to "his conduct as detailed in Articles I, II, III and IV hereof, and by his income-tax evasions as set forth in Articles V and VI hereof.”

Before the amendment of Article VII by the Managers, the omnibus clause had referred only to Articles I and II, and not to the criminal allegations about practice of law and income tax evasion. c. Proceedings in the Senate

Judge Ritter was acquitted on each of the first six articles, the guilty vote on Article I falling one vote short of the two-thirds needed to convict. He was then convicted on Article VII-the two specifications of that Article not being separately voted upon-by a single vote, 56 to 28.91 A point of order was raised that the conviction under Article VII was improper because on the acquittals on the substantive charges of Articles I through VI. The point of order was overruled by the Chair, the Chair stating, "A point of order is made as to Article VII

S. Doc. No. 200, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 637-38 (1986).

57

in which the respondent is charged with general misbehavior. It is a separate charge from any other charge."

d. Miscellaneous

After conviction, Judge Ritter collaterally attacked the validity of the Senate proceedings by bringing in the Court of Claims an action to recover his salary. The Court of Claims dismissed the suit on the ground that no judicial court of the United States has authority to review the action of the Senate in an impeachment trial.93

sa Id. 638.

Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 300, cert denied, 300 U.S. 668 (1936).