est firmitudinis. Itaque spes est aua in inductione View of vera." History of the liberal arts as they were called, consisted of two Philosophy, branches, the trivium and the quadrivium; of which the former comprehended grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics; the latter music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, to which was added, about the end of the eleventh century, the study of a number of metaphysical subtleties equally useless and unintelligible. 26 exposed as futile by Lord Ba con; Hitherto the works of the ancient Greek philosophers had been read only in imperfect Latin translations; and before the scholastic system was completely established, Plato and Aristotle had been alternately looked up to as the oracle in science. The rigid schoolmen, however, universally gave the preference to the Stagyrite; because his analysis of body into matter and form is peculiarly calculated to keep in countenance the most incredible doctrine of the Romish church (see TRANSUBSTANTIATION): and upon the revival of Greek learning, this preference was continued after the school philosophy had begun to fall into contempt, on account of much useful information contained in some of his writings on subjects of natural history, and his supposed merit as a natural philosopher. At last the intrepid spirit of Luther and his associates set the minds of men free from the tyranny of ancient names, as well in human science as in theology; and many philosophers sprung up in different countries of Europe, who professed either to be eclectics, or to study nature, regardless of every authority but that of reason. Of these the most eminent beyond all comparison was Francis Bacon Lord Verulam. This illustrious man having read with attention the writings of the most celebrated ancients, and made himself master of the sciences which were then cultivated, soon discovered the absurdity of pretending to account for the phenomena of nature by syllogistic reasoning from hypothetical principles; and with a boldness becoming a genius of the first order, undertook to give a new chart of human knowledge. This he did in his two admirable works, intitled, 1. De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum; and, 2. Novum organum scientiarum, sive Judicia vera de interpretatione Natura. In the former of these works, he takes a very minute survey of the whole circle of human science, which he divides into three great branches, history, poetry, and philosophy, corresponding to the three faculties of the mind, memory, imagination, and reason. Each of these general heads is subdivided into minuter branches, and reflections are made upon the whole, which, though we can neither copy nor abridge them, will amply reward the perusal of the attentive reader. The purpose who esta- of the Novum Organum is to point out the proper method of interpreting nature; which the author shows thod of can never be done by the logic which was then in fainquiry. shion, but only by a painful and fair induction. "Homo naturæ minister (says he) et interpres tantum facit et intelligit, quantum de naturæ ordine re, vel mente observaverit; nec amplius scit aut potest. Syllogismus ad principia scientiarum non adhibetur, ad media axiomata frustra adhibetur, cum sit subtilitati naturæ longe impar. Assensum itaque constringit, non res. Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesseræ sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsa (id quod basis rei est) confusæ sint et temere à rebus abstractæ, nihil in iis quæ superstruuntur, 2.7 blishes a better me Bacon's To hypotheses and preconceived opinions, which he Philosophy calls idola theatri, this great man was not less inimical than to syllogisms; and since his days almost every philosopher of eminence, except Descartes and bis followers (see DESCARTES and CARTESIANS) has professed to study nature according to the method of induction so accurately laid down in the Novum Organum. On this method a few improvements have perhaps been made; but notwithstanding these, Lord Bacon must undoubtedly be considered as the author of that philosophy which is now cultivated in Europe, and which will continue to be cultivated as long as men shall have more regard for matters of fact than for hypothetical opinions. Of this mode of philosophising we shall now give a short, though we hope not inaccurate, view, by stating its objects, comparing it with that which it superseded, explaining its rules, and pointing out its uses; and from this view it will appear, that its author shares with Aristotle the empire of science. 28 THE universe, that unbounded object of the contem-View of his plation, the curiosity, and the researches of man, may philosophy. be considered in two different points of view. In the first place, it may be considered merely as a collection of existences, related to each other by means of resemblances and distinction, situation, succession, and derivation, as making parts of a whole. In this view it is the subject of pure description. To acquire an acquaintance with, or a knowledge of, the universe in this point of view, we must enumerate all the beings in it, mention all their sensible qualities, and mark all these relations for each. But this would be labour immense; and when done, an undistinguishable chaos. A book containing every word of a language would only give us the materials, so to speak, of this language. To make it comprehensible, it must be put into some form, which will comprehend the whole in a small compass, and enable the mind to pass easily from one word to another related to it. Of all relations among words, the most obvious are those of resemblance and derivation. An etymological dictionary, therefore, in which words are classed in consequence of their resemblances, and arranged by means of their derivative distinctions, will greatly facilitate the acquisition of the language. Just so in nature: The objects around us may be grouped by means of their resemblance, and then arranged in those groups by means of their distinctions and other relations. In this classification we are enabled to proceed by means of our faculty of abstracting our attention from the circumstances in which things differ, and turning it to those only in which they agree. By the judicious employment of this faculty we are able not only to distribute the individuals into classes, but also to distribute those classes into others still more comprehensive, by discovering circumstances of resemblance among them: for the fewer the circumstances are which concur to form that resemblance which has engaged our attention, the greater is the number of similar circumstances which are neglected; and the more extensive will be the class of individuals in which the resemblance is observed. 29 Thus Natural a number of individuals resembling each other in the history. View of single circumstance of life, composes the most extensive Bacon's KINGDOM of ANIMALS. If it be required, that they Philosophy, shall further resemble in the circumstance of having feathers, a prodigious number of animals are excluded, and we form the inferior class of BIRDS. We exclude a great number of birds, by requiring a further similarity of web feet, and have the order of ANSERES. If we add lingua ciliata, we confine the attention to the genus of ANATES. In this manner may the whole objects of the universe be grouped, and arranged into kingdoms, classes, orders, genera, and species. Such a classification and arrangement is called NATURAL HISTORY; and must be considered as the only foundation of any extensive knowledge of nature. To the natural historian, therefore, the world is a collection of existences, the subject of descriptive arrangement. His aim is threefold. 1. To observe with care, and describe with accuracy, the various objects of the universe. 2. To determine and enumerate all the great classes of objects; to distribute and arrange them into all their subordinate classes, through all degrees of subordination, till he arrive at what are only accidental varieties, which are susceptible of no farther distribution; and to -mark with precision the principles of this distribution and arrangement, and the characteristics of the various assemblages. 3. To determine with certainty the particular group to which any proposed INDIVIDUAL belongs. DESCRIPTION, therefore, ARRANGEMENT, and REFERENCE, constitute the whole of his employment; and in this consists all his science. Did the universe continue unchanged, this would constitute the whole of our knowledge of nature: but we are witnesses of an uninterrupted succession of changes, and our attention is continually called to the EVENTS which are incessantly happening around us. These form a set of objects vastly more interesting to us than the former; being the sources of almost all the pleasures or pains we receive from external objects. We are therefore much interested in the study of the events which happen around us, and strongly incited to prosecute it but they are so numerous and so multifarious, that the study would be immense, without some contrivance for abbreviating and facilitating the task. The same help offers itself here as in the study of what may be called quiescent nature. Events, like existences, are susceptible of classification, in consequence of resemblances and distinction; and by attention to these, we can acquire a very extensive acquaintance with active nature. Our attention must be chiefly directed to those circumstances in which many events resemble each other, while they differ perhaps in a thousand others. Then we must attend to their most general distinctions; then to distinctions of smaller extent, and so on. It is in this way accordingly that we have advanced in our knowledge of active nature, and are gradually, and by no means slowly, forming assemblages of events more and more extensive, and distributing these with greater and greater precision into their different classes. In the zealous and attentive prosecution of this task a very remarkable and interesting observation occurs: In describing those circumstances of similarity among events, and particularly in distributing them according to those similarities, it is impossible for us to overlook View of that constancy which is observed in the changes of nature in the events which are the objects of our contem- Bacon's plation. Events which have once been observed to ac- Philosophy. company each other are observed always to do so. 31 The rising of the sun is always accompanied by the Constancy light of day, and his setting by the darkness of night. in the Sound argument is accompanied by conviction, impulse changes of by motion, kindness by a feeling of gratitude, and the nature perception of good by desire. The unexcepted experience of mankind informs us, that the events of nature go on in certain regular trains; and if sometimes exceptions seem to contradict this general affirmation, more attentive observation never fails to remove the exception. Most of the spontaneous events of nature are very complicated; and it frequently requires great attention and penetration to discover the simple event amidst a crowd of unessential circumstances which are at once exhibited to our view. But when we succeed in this discovery, we never fail to acknowledge the perfect uniformity of the event to what has been formerly observed. 32 But this is not all: We firmly believe that this uni- universally formity will still continue; that fire will melt wax, will expected. burn paper, will harden clay, as we have formerly observed it to do; and whenever we have undoubted proofs that the circumstances of situation are precisely the same as in some former case, though but once observed, we expect with irresistible and unshaken confidence that the event will also be the same. It is not surely necessary to adduce many proofs of the universality of this law of human thought. The whole language and actions of men are instances of the fact. In all languages there is a mode of construction which is used to express this relation as distinct from all others, and the conversation of the most illiterate never confounds them, except when the conceptions themselves are confounded. The general employment of the active and passive verb is regulated by it. Turris eversa est à militibus; turris eversa est terræ motu, express two relations, and no schoolboy will confound them. The distinction therefore is perceived or felt by all who can speak grammatically. Nor is any language without general terms to express this relation, cause-effect-to occasion. Nay, it is a fact in the mind of brutes, who hourly show that they expect the same uses of every subject which they formerly made of it; and without this, animals would be incapable of subsistence, and man incapable of all improvement. From this alone memory derives all its value; and even the constancy of natural operation would be useless if not matched or adapted to our purposes by this expectation of any confidence in that constancy. After all the labours of ingenious men to discover the foundation of this irresistible expectation, we must be contented with saying that such is the constitution of the human mind. It is an universal fact in human thought; and for any thing that has been yet discovered, it is an ultimate fact, not included in any other still more general. We shall soon see that this is sufficient for making it the foundation of true human knowledge; all of which must in like manner be reduced to ultimate facts in human thought. We must consider this undoubted feeling, this persuasion of the constancy of nature, as an instinctive anticipation of events similar to those which we have 3 B 2 already View of already experienced. The general analogy of nature Bacon's should have disposed philosophers to acquiesce in this, Philosophy, however unwelcome to their vanity. In no instance of essential consequence to our safety or well-being are we left to the guidance of our boasted reason; God has given us the surer conduct of natural instincts. No case is so important as this: In none do we so much stand in need of a guide which shall be powerful, infallible, and rapid in its decisions. Without it we must remain incapable of all instruction from experience, and therefore of all improvement. Our sensations are undoubtedly feelings of our mind. But all those feelings are accompanied by an instinctive reference of them to something distinct from the feelings themselves. Hence arises our perception of external objects and our very notions of this externeity (pardon the term). In like manner, this anticipation of events, this irresistible connection of the idea of fire with the idea of burning, is also a feeling of the mind: and this feeling is by a law of human nature referred, without reasoning, to something external as its cause; and, like our sensation, it is considered as a sign of that external something. It is like the conviction of the truth of a mathematical proposition. This is referred by us to something existing in nature, to a necessary and external relation subsisting between the ideas which are the subjects of the proposition. The conviction is the sign or indication of this relation by which it is brought to our view. In precisely the same manner, the irresistible connection of ideas is interpreted as the sensation or sign of a necessary connection of external things or events. These are supposed to include something in their nature which renders them inseparable companions. To this bond of connection between external things we Our know- give the name of CAUSATION. All our knowledge of ledge of this relation of cause and effect, is the knowledge or causation. consciousness of what passes in our own minds during the contemplation of the phenomena of nature. If we adhere to this view of it, and put this branch of knowledge on the same footing with those called the abstract sciences, considering only the relations of ideas, we shall acquire demonstrative science. If we take any other view of the matter, we shall be led into inextricable mazes of uncertainty and error. 33 We see then that the natural procedure of our faculty of abstraction and arrangement, in order to acquire a more speedy and comprehensive knowledge of natural events, presents them to our view in another form. We not only see them as similar events, but as events naturally and necessarily conjoined. And the expression of resemblance among events is also an expression of concomitancy; and this arrangement of events in consequence of their resemblance is in fact the discovery of those accompaniments. The trains of natural appearance being considered as the appointments of the Author of Nature, has occasioned them to be considered also as consequences of laws imposed on his works by their great author, and every thing is said to be regulated by fixed laws. But this is the lanLaws of guage of analogy. When a sovereign determines on nature ex- certain trains of conduct for his subjects, he issues his plained. orders. These orders are laws. He inforces the observance of them by his authority; and thus a certain regularity and constancy of conduct is produced. But should a stranger, ignorant of the promulgation 34 of these laws, and of the exerted authority of the ma- View of gistrate, observe this uniformity of conduct, he would Bacon's ascribe it to the genius and disposition of the people; Philosophy. and his observation would be as useful to him for di recting the tenor of his own conduct, as the knowledge of the subject himself of the real source of this constancy is for directing his. Just so in nature, while the theologian pretends, from his discoveries concerning the existence and superintendance of God, to know that the constant accompa niment of events is the consequence of laws which the great Author and Governor of the universe has imposed on his works, the ordinary philosopher, a stranger to this scene, and to the unsearchable operations of the SUPREME MIND, must ascribe this constancy to the nature of the things. There is a great resemblance between the expression natural law and grammatical rule. Rule in strict language implies command; but in grammar it expresses merely a generality of fact, whether of flexion or construction. In like manner, a LAW OF NATURE is to the philosopher nothing but the expression of a generality of fact. A natural or physical law is a generally observed fact; and whenever we treat any subject as a generally observed fact, we treat it physically. It is a physical law of the understanding that argument is accompanied by conviction; it is a physical law of the affection that distress is accompanied by pity; it is a physical law of the material world that impulse is accompanied by motion. And thus we see that the arrangement of events, or the discovery of those general points of resemblance, is in fact the discovery of the laws of nature; and one of the greatest and most important is, that the laws of na ture are constant. 35 There is no question that this view of the universe is incomparably more interesting and important than that which is taken by the natural historian; contemplating every thing that is of value to us, and, in short, the whole life and movement of the universe. This Object of study, therefore, has been dignified with the name of philosophy. PHILOSOPHY and of SCIENCE; and natural history has been considered as of importance only in so far as it was conducive to the successful prosecution of philosophy. But the philosopher claims a superiority on another account he considers himself as employed in the discovery of causes, saying that philosophy is the study of the objects of the universe as related by causation, and that it is by the discovery of these relations that he communicates to the world such important knowledge. Philosophy, he says, is the science of causes. The vulgar are contented to consider the prior of two inseparably conjoined events as the cause of the other; the stroke on a bell, for instance, as the cause of sound. But it has been clearly shown by the philosopher, that between the blow on the bell and the sensation of sound there are interposed a long train of events. The blow sets the bell a trembling; this agitates the air in contact with the bell; this agitates the air immediately beyond it; and thus between the bell and the ear may be 36 interposed a numberless series of events, and as many Causes. more between the first impression on the ear and that last impression on the nerve by which the mind is af fected. He can no longer therefore follow the nomenclature of the vulgar. Which of the events of this train therefore is the cause of the sensation? None of them: View of them: It is that something which inseparably connects Bacon's any two of them, and constitutes their bond of union. Philosophy. These bonds of union or causes he considers as residing in one or both of the connected objects: diversities in this respect must therefore constitute the most important distinctions between them. They are therefore with great propriety called the qualities, the properties of these respective subjects. 37 inferred from effects. sice. As the events from which we infer the existence of these qualities of things resemble in many respects such events as are the consequences of the exertion of our own powers, these qualities are frequently denominated POWERS, forces, energies. Thus, in the instance just now given of the sound of a bell, we infer the powers of impulse, elasticity, nervous irritability, and animal sensibility. In consequence of this inference of a necessary connection between the objects around us, we not only infer the posterior event from the prior, or, in common language, the effect from the cause, but we also infer the prior from the posterior, the cause from the effect. We not only expect that the presence of a magnet will be followed by certain motions in iron-filings, but when we observe such motions, we infer the presence and agency of a magnet. Joy is inferred from merriment, poison from death, fire from smoke, and impulse from motion. And thus the appearances of the universe are the indications of the powers of the objects in it. Ap. pearances are the language of nature, informing us of their causes. And as all our knowledge of the sentiments of others is derived from our confidence in their veracity; so all our knowledge of nature is derived from our confidence in the constancy of natural operations. A veracity and credulity necessarily resulting from that law of our mental constitution by which we are capable of speech, conduct us in the one case; and the constancy of nature, and the principle of induction, by which we infer general laws from particular facts, conduct us in the other. As human sentiment is inferred from language, and the existence of external things from sensation; so are the laws of nature, and the powers of natural objects, inferred from the phenomena. It is by the successful study of this language of nature that we derive useful knowledge. The knowledge of the influence of motives on the mind of man enables the statesman to govern kingdoms, and the knowledge of the powers of magnetism enables the mariner to pilot a ship through the pathless ocean. Such are the lofty pretensions of philosophy. It is to be wished that they be well founded; for we may be persuaded that a mistake in this particular will be fatal to the advancement of knowledge. An author of great † Ancient reputation t gives us an opportunity of deciding this Metaphy- question in the way of experiment. He says that the ancients were philosophers, employed in the discovery 38 Discoveries of causes, and that the moderns are only natural histoof Aristotle rians, contenting themselves with observing the laws of and New- nature, but paying no attention to the causes of things. If he speak of their professed aim, we apprehend that the assertion is pretty just in general. With very few exceptions indeed it may be affirmed of his favourite Aristotle, the philosopher xar' skox, and of Sir Isaac Newton. We select these two instances, both because they are set in continual opposition by this author, and because it will be allowed that they were the most emiment students of nature (for we must not yet call 3 ton compared. them philosophers) in ancient and modern times. Ari- View of Discimus hinc tandem qua causa argentea Phœbe. We may now desire the champions of the science of causes to name any one cause which has really been discovered by their great master, whether in the operations of mind or of body. But they must not on this occasion adduce the investigation of any natural law, in which he has sometimes succeeded. With still greater confidence may we challenge them to produce any remarkable instance of the explanation of natural phenomena either of mind or body. By explanation we mean an account of the production, and an appreciation of all the circumstances, susceptible of a scrupulous comparison with fact, and perfectly consistent with it. It is here that the weakness of this philosopher's pretensions is most conspicuous; and his followers candidly acknowledge, that in the inquiries which proceed by experiment, we have not derived great assistance from Aristotle's philosophy. But this, say they, does not derogate from the pre-eminence of his philosophy, because he has shown that the particular fields of observation are to be cultivated only by means of experiment. But surely every field of observation is particular. There is no abstract View of abstract object of philosophical research, the study of Bacon's which shall terminate in the philosophy of universals. Philosophy. In every kind of inquiry, that cause alone must be supposed to act which we understand so far as to be able to appreciate its effects in particular circumstances, and compare them with fact, and see their perfect coincidence. If we have discovered causes, they are known as far as they are discovered. Their genuine effects are known, and therefore the phenomena which result from their agency are understood. When therefore it is acknowledged, as it must be acknowledged, that mankind have made but little advances in the knowledge of nature, notwithstanding the pretended discovery of causes by Aristotle, and the conducting clue of his philosophy, till of late years; and when it is also allowed that now, while we are every day making great additions to this subordinate knowledge, the causes which Aristotle has discovered are forgotten, and his philosophy is neglected; there is great room for suspecting (to say the least), that either the causes which philosophy pretends to have discovered are not real, or that Aristotle and his followers have not aimed at the discovery of causes, but only at the discovery of natural laws, and have failed in the attempt. 39 Philosophi There seems here to be a previous question: Is it poscal causes sible to discover a philosophical cause, that something discovered which is neither the prior nor the posterior of the two immediately adjoining events, but their bond of union, and this distinct from the union itself? It is evident that this is an inquiry purely experimental. It is of human knowledge we speak. This must depend on the nature of the human mind. This is a matter of contingency, known to us only by experiment and observation. By observing all the feelings and operations of the mind, and classing and arranging them like any other object of science, we discover the general laws of human thought and human reasoning; and this is all the knowledge we can ever acquire of it, or of any thing else. Much has been written on this subject. The most acute observation and sound judgment have been employed in the study; and we may venture to say, that considerable progress has been made in pneumatology. Many laws of human thought have been observed, and very distinctly marked; and philosophers are busily employed, some of them with considerable success, in the distribution of them into subordinate classes, so as to know their comparative extent, and to mark their distinguishing characters with a precision similar to what has been attained in botany and other parts of natural history; so that we may hope that this study will advance like others. But in all these researches, no phenomena have occurred which look like the perception or contemplation of these separate objects of thought, these philosophical causes, this POWER in abstracto. No philosopher has ever pretended to state such an object of the mind's observation, or attempted to group them into classes. We may say at once, without entering into any detail, that those causes, those bonds of necessary union between the naturally conjoined events or objects, are not only perceived by means of the events alone, but are perceived solely in the events, and cannot be distinguished from the conjunctions themselves. They are neither the objects of separate observation, nor the productions of memory, nor inferences drawn from reflec I tion on the laws by which the operation of our own View of minds are regulated; nor can they be derived from Bacon's other perceptions in the way of argumentative inference. Philosophy, We cannot infer the paroxysm of terror from the appearance of impending destruction, or the fall of a stone when not supported, as we infer the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square. This last is implied in the very conception or notion of a square; not as a consequence of its other properties, but as one of its essential attributes: and the contrary proposition is not only false, but incapable of being distinctly conceived. This is not the case with the other phenomenon, or any matter of fact. The proofs which are brought of a mathematical proposition, are not the reason of its being true, but the steps by which this truth is brought into our view; and frequently, as in the instance now given, this truth is perceived, not directly, but consequentially, by the inconceivableness of the contrary proposition. Mr Hume derives this irresistible expectation of Mr Hume's events from the known effect of custom, the association petitio of ideas. The corelated event is brought into the mind principii. by this well known power of custom, with that vivacity of conception which constitutes belief or expectation. But without insisting on the futility of his theory of belief, it is sufficient to observe, that this explanation begs the very thing to be proved, when it ascribes to custom a power of any kind. It is the origin of this very power which is the subject in dispute. Besides, on the genuine principles of scepticism, this custom involves an acknowledgement of past events, of a something different from present impressions, which, in this doctrine (if doctrine it can be called), are the only certain existences in nature: and, lastly, it is known that one clear experience is a sufficient foundation for this unshaken confidence and anticipation. General custom can never, on Mr Hume's principles, give superior vivacity to any particular idea. theory a 42 Another This certain nonentity of it as a separate object of hypothesis observation, and this impossibility to derive this notion respecting of necessary and causal connection between the events casual conof the universe from any source, have induced two of nection. the most acute philosophers of Europe, Mr Leibnitz and Father Malebranche, to deny that there is any such connection, and to assert that the events of the universe go on in corresponding trains, but without any causal connection, just as a well regulated clock will keep time with the motions of the heavens without any kind of dependence on them. This harmony of events was pre-established by the Author of the Universe, in subserviency to the purposes he had in view in its for mation. All those purposes which are cognisable by us, may certainly be accomplished by this perfect adjustment. But without insisting on the fantastic wildness of this ingenious whim, it is quite enough to observe, that it also is a begging of the question, because it supposes causation when it ascribes all to the agency of the Deity. Thus have we searched every quarter, without being able to find a source from which to derive this perceptien of a necessary connection among the events of the universe, or of this confident expectation of the continuance of physical laws; and yet we are certain of the feeling, and of the persuasion, be its origin what it may: for we speak intelligibly on this subject; we speak familiarly of cause, effect, power, energy, necessary connection, motives and their influence, argument and con viction, |