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All objects divided in

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How we come to the knowledge of mind.

But in numberless changes produced by external objects on each other, we observe no such fitness in the effects, no such subserviency to the well-being of the agent. In such cases, therefore, we make no such inference of thought or design.

Thus, then, there is presented to our observation an important distinction, by which we arrange all exterto thinking and un-. nal objects into two classes. The first resembles ourthinking selves, in giving external marks of that thought or inbeings. tention of which we are conscious; and we suppose in them the other properties which we discover in ourselves, but cannot immediately observe in them, viz. thought, perception, memory, foresight, and all that collection of faculties which we feel in ourselves, and which constitute the animal. The other class of objects exhibits no such appearances, and we make no such inference. And thus we divide the whole of external nature into the classes of THINKING and UNTHINKING beings. Our first judgments about these classes will be very inaccurate; and we will naturally ascribe the differences, which we do not very well understand, to the differences in organical structure, which we clearly observe. But when we have knocked down or perhaps smothered an animal, we find that it no longer gives the former mark of thought and intention, and that it now resembles the class of unthinking beings: And yet it still retains all that fitness of organical structure which it had before; it seems only to want the intention and the will. This obliges us to conclude that the distinction does not arise from a difference in organical structure, but from a distinct substance common to all thinking beings, but separable from their organical frame. To this substance we ascribe thought, intention, contrivance, and all that collection of faculties which we feel in ourselves. To this substance in ourselves we refer all sensations, pleasures, pains, remembrances, desires, purposes; and to this aggregate, however imperfectly understood, we give the name MIND. Our organical -frame, which seems to be only the instrument of information and operation to the mind, we call our body. As the animating principle is not, like our body, the of mind as immediate object of the senses, we naturally conceive understood it to be a substance essentially different from those which by mankind in rude are the objects of our senses. The rudest people have ages. shown a disposition to form this conclusion. Observing that animal life was connected with breathing, it was natural to imagine that breathing was living, and that . breath was life. It is a remarkable fact, that in most languages the term for expressing breath is at least one of the terms for expressing the soul; m, vua, spiritus, in the Hebrew, Greek and Latin, express both; gheist, or ghost, in the Teutonic, comes from gheisen, to "breath or sigh;" dūcha or dūha, "the soul," in Sclavonic, comes from duichat, "to breathe;" so in the Gaelic does anal come from anam; and the same relation is found between the two words in the Malay and other eastern languages. We believe that most persons can recollect some traces of this notion in their early

8

The nature

tion.

conceptions of things; and many who do not consider Introduethemselves as uncultivated, believe that the soul quits the body along with the last breath. Among the Tartar nations hanging is considered with particular horror, on account of the ungraceful and filthy exit which the soul is obliged to make from the body.

But the observation of the same appearances of Their opi thought and intention in fishes and other animals nion not which do not breathe, would soon show that this was just. but a rude conception. Very little refinement indeed is necessary to convince us that air or breath cannot be the substance which thinks, wishes, and designs; and that the properties of this substance, whatever it is, must be totally different from, and incompatible with, any thing that we know of the immediate objects of our senses.

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one is the

senses.

Hence we are led to conclude that there are two of the twe kinds of substanees in nature: One, which is the prin- kinds of ciple of sensation; and therefore cannot be the object substances of our senses, any more than light can be the object of in nature, the microscope. This substance alone can feel, think, object of desire, and propose, and is the object of reflection alone. reflection The objects of our senses compose the other class, and alone, the therefore can have none of the other properties which other of the are not cognoscible by the senses. These bave all the properties which our senses can discover; and we can have no evidence of their having any other, nor indeed any conception of their having them. This class is not confined to the unorganized masses of matter; for we see that the bodies of animals lose after death that organical form, and are assimilated to all the rest of unthinking beings. It has arisen from such views as this, that while all nations have agreed to call this class of objects by the name BODY, which originally expresses our organical frame, some nations, farther advanced in cultivation or refinement, have contrived an abstract term to express this, general substance of which all inanimate beings are composed. Such a term we have in the words materies, ¿λ.

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immaterial

substances

Matter, then, is that substance which is immediate- The disly cognoscible by our senses. Whatever, therefore, tinction beis not thus immediately cognoscible by our senses is tween manot material, and is expressed by a negative term, and terial and called immaterial: hence it is that mind is said to be imrsaterial. It is of importance to keep in mind this is very imdistinction, merely grammatical. Little more is ne-portant. cessary for detecting the sophisms of Helvetius, Mirabeau, and other sages of the Gallic school, who have been auxious to remove the ties of moral and religious obligation by lowering our conceptions of our intellectual nature. It will also serve to show how hastily they have formed their opinions who have ascribed to the immediate agency of mind all those relations which are observed in the actions of bodies on each other at a distance. The connecting principles of such relations è distante (if there be any such), are not the immediate objects of our senses: they are therefore immaterial. But it does not follow that they are minds. There may be many immaterial substances which are not minds. We know nothing of any object whatever but by the observation of certain appearances, which suggest to our minds the existence and agency of its qualities or powers. Such phenomena are the natural signs of these qualities, and it is to those signs that we must always have recourse when we wish to conceive

Introduc- conceive without ambiguity concerning them. What tion. is the characteristic phenomenon of mind, or what is the distinguishing quality which brings it into view? It is INTENTION and it may be asserted with the utmost confidence, that we have no other mark by which mind is immediately suggested to us, or that would ever have made us suppose that there existed another mind besides our own. The phenomenon by which this quality is suggested to us is art, or the employment of means to gain ends; and the mark of art is the supposed conduciveness of these ends to the well-being of the agent. Where this train is not observed, design or intention is never thought of; and therefore where intention is not perceived in any immaterial substance, if any such has ever been observed, it is an abuse of language to call it mind. We do not think that even perception and intelligence entitle us to give the name mind to the substance in which they are inherent, because it is from marks of intention alone that we infer the existence of mind; and although these must be accompanied with perception and intelligence, it does not follow that the substance which can perceive and understand must also desire and propose. However difficult we may find it to separate them, they are evidently separable in imagination. And let not this assertion be too hastily objected to; for the separation has been made by persons most eminent for their knowledge, and discernment. When Leibnitz ascribed to his MONADES, or what we call the ultimate ATOMS of matter, a perception of their situation in the universe, and a motion precisely suited to this perception, he was the farthest in the world from supposing them animated or endowed with minds. It is true indeed, that others, who think and call themselves philosophers, are much more liberal in their application of this term. A modern author of great metaphysical eminence says, "I call that mind which moves, and that body which is moved." This class of philosophers assert that no motion whatever is begun except by the agency of an animating principle, which (after Aristotle) they call Nature, and which has in these days been exalted to the rank of a god. All this jargon (for it is nothing else) has arisen from the puzzle in which naturalists think themselves involved in attempting to explain the production of motion in a 'body at a distance from that body which is conceived as the cause of this motion. After having been reluctantly obliged, by the reasonings of Newton, to abandon their methods of explaining such phenomena by the impulses of an intervening fluid, nothing seemed left but the assertion that these motions were produced by minds, as in the case of our own exertions. These explanations (if they deserve the name) cannot, he objected to in any other way than as an abuse of language, and as the introduction of an unmeaning jargon. We have, and can have, no notion of mind different from those of our own minds; and we discover the existence of other minds as we discover the existence of bodies, by means of phenomena which are characteristic of minds, that is, which resemble those phenomena that follow the exertion of our own mental faculties, that is, by the employment of means to attain selfish ends; and where such appearances are not observed, no existence of a mind is inferred. When we see a man fall from the top of a house, and dash out his brains on the pavement, we never ascribe this motion to his mind. Al

tion.

though the fitness of many of the celestial motions for Introducmost important purposes make us suppose design and contrivance some where, and therefore a Supreme Mind, we no more think of inferring a mind in the earth from the fitness of its motions for purposes most beneficial to its inhabitants, than of inferring a mind in a bit of bread from its fitness for nourishing our bodies. It is not from the mere motions of animals that their minds are inferred, but from the conduciveness of these motions to the well-being of the animal.

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duces mo

The term mind therefore, in the ordinary language The mind of all men, is applied to what desires and wills at the is not that same time that it perceives and understands. If we which procall that mind which produces motion, we must derive tion, but our notions of its qualities or attributes from observing that which their effects. We must therefore discover the general desires and laws by which they act, that is, the general laws ob- wills, served in those motions which we consider as their effects. Now these are the general, laws of motion; and in none of these can we find the least coincidence with what we are accustomed to call the laws of mind.. Nay, it has been the total want of similarity which has given rise to the distinction which all men, in all ages and countries, have made between mind and matter. This distinction is found in all languages; and it is an unpardonable liberty which men take with language when they use a term of distinction, a specific term, to express things of a different species. What these authors have been pleased to call mind, the whole world besides have called by another name, FORCE; which, though borrowed from our own exertions, is yet sufficiently distinctive, and never leads us to confound things that are different, except in the language of some modern philosophers, who apply it to the laws of the agency of mind; and, when speaking of the force of motives, &c. com-. mit the same mistakes which the followers of Aristotle commit in the use of the term mind, Force, in the language of these philosophers, means what connects the operations of mind; as mind, in the language of Lord Monboddo, is that which connects the operations of body.

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Those are not less to blame who consider this Nature The prinof Aristotle, this principle of motion, as an existence ciple of or substance different both from matter and from the motion not distinct minds of intelligent creatures. Aristotle calls it in some from matter places ex. He might with equal propriety, and and mind. equal consistency with his other doctrines, have called mind, og ros, or an e durauis. Besides, we have no evidence for the separability of this wong xa from body as we have for the separability of such minds as our own, the genuine x. Nay, his whole doctrines, when maturely considered, assume their absolute inseparability.

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an abuse of

language.

This doctrine of elemental minds, therefore, as the Elemental immediate causes of the phenomena of the material minds are world, is an abuse of language. It is a jargon; and it is a frivolous abuse, for it offers no explanation whatever. The phenomena are totally unlike the phenomena of ordinary minds, and therefore receive no explanation from them; and since our knowledge of these quasi minds must be derived entirely from the phenomena, it will be precisely the same, although we express it in common language. We shall not indeed raise the wonder of our hearers, as those do who fill the world with minds which they never suspected to exist; but we shall 3 G 2

not

Introduc- not bewilder their imaginations, confound their ideas, and mislead their judgments.

tion.

15

ful conse

materia

lism.

We flatter ourselves that our readers will not think The dread these observations unseasonable or misplaced. Of all mistakes that the naturalist can fall into, there is none quences of more fatal to his progress in knowledge than the confounding things which are essentially different; and of all the distinctions which can be made among the objects of our contemplation, there is none of equal philosophical importance with this between mind and matter: And when we consider the consequences which na turally follow from this confusion of ideas, and particularly those which follow from sinking the mental faculties of man to a level with the operations of mechanics or chemistry, consequences which the experience of the present eventful day shows to be destructive of all that is noble or desirable in human nature, and of all that is comfortable in this life, and which blasts every hope of future excellence-we cannot be too anxious to have this capital distinction put in the plainest point of view, and expressed in the most familiar characters," so that he who runneth may read." When we see the frenzy which the reasoning pride of man has raised in our neighbourhood, and hear the dictates of philosophy incessantly appealed to in defence of whatever our hearts shudder at as shocking and abominable; and when we see a man (A), of great reputation as a naturalist, and of professed humanity and political moderation, congratulating his countrymen on the rapid improvement and almost perfection of philosophy; and after giving a short sketch of the constitution of the visible universe, summing up all with a table of elective attractions, and that particular combination and mode of crystallization which constitutes GOD (horresco referens)-is it not full time for us to stop short, and to ask our own hearts "whither are you wandering?"-But sound philosophy, reasoning from effects to their causes, will here listen to the words of our sacred oracles: "By their fruits ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles ?" The absurd consequences of the sceptical philosophy of Berkeley and Hume have been thought, by men of undoubted discernment, sufficient reasons for rejecting it without examination. The no less absurd and the shocking consequences of the mechanical philosophy now in vogue should give us the same abhorrence; and should make us abandon its blood-stained road, and return to the delightful paths of nature, to survey the works of God, and feast our eyes with the displays of mind, which offer themselves on every hand in designs of the most extensive influence and the most beautiful contrivance. Following the guidance of heavenly wisdom, we shall indeed find, that "all her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace."

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The extent

phical

study.

Such is the scene of our observation, the subject of of philoso- philosophical study. Its extent is almost unbounded, reaching from an atom to God himself. It is absolutely necessary forthe successful cultivation of this immense field of knowledge, that it be committed to the care of different cultivators, and that its various portions be

tion.

treated in different ways: and, accordingly, the various Introdectastes of men have given this curiosity different directions; and the study, like all other tasks, has been promoted by this division of labour.

Some philosophers have attended only to the appearances of fitness which are exhibited in every quarter of the universe; and by arranging these into different classes, and interpreting them as indications of thought and intention, have acquired the knowledge of many classes of sentient and intelligent beings, actuated by propensities, and directed by reason.

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animal in.

While the contemplation of these appearances indi-The nature cates thought and design in any individual of one of and uses of these classes, and brings its propensities and purposes of action, and the ends gained by these actions, into view, the contemplation of these propensities, purposes, and ends, occasions an inference of a much more general kind. All these intelligent beings give indications of knowledge and of power; but their knowledge bears, in general, no proportion to their power of producing changes in nature, and of attaining important ends; and their power is neither always, nor in the most important cases, the consequence of their knowledge. Where the effect of their actions is most eminently conducive to their important interests, the power of attaining these valuable ends is generally independent on any attention to the fitness of the means, and the exertion is frequently made without even thinking of the important end. The well-being of the individual is secured against any danger from its ignorance, indolence, or inattention, by an instinctive propensity, which leads it to the performance of the necessary action, which is thus made immediately and ultimately desirable, without any regard to its ultimate and important end. Thus, in our own nature, the support of animal life, and the improvement of the means of subsistence by a knowledge of the objects which surround us, are not entrusted to our apprehensions of the importance of these ends, but are committed to the surer guides of hunger and curiosity.

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between

that of re

The same observers discover a connection between There is a the individuals of a class, different from that which connection arises from the mere resemblance of their external ap- the indivipearance, or even of their propensities and pursuits; duals of a the very circumstances which produced the classifica-class of anition. They observe, that these propensities are such, mals differthat while each individual seeks only its own enjoy-ent from ment, these enjoyments are in general such as contri- semblance. bute to the support of the species and the enjoyment of other individuals. Thus, in the classes of animals, and in human nature, the continuance of the race, and the enjoyment of the whole, are not entrusted to the apprehension we entertain of the importance of these ends, but are produced by the operation of sexual love and the love of society.

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connection

The same observers find that even the different classes There is al of sentient beings are connected together: and while so a link of the whole of each class aim only at their own enjoy-C ment, they contribute, in some way or other, to the sentient be well-being of the other classes. Even man, the selfish ings of diflord ferent clas

(A) M. de la Metherie, editor of the Journal de Physique. See bis prefaces to the volumes for 1,792 and 1793, January and July.

between

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Introduc- lord of this sublunary world, is not the unconnected inhabitant of it. He cannot, in every instance, reap all the fruits of his situation, without contributing to the enjoyment of thousands of the brute creation. Nay, it may be proved to the satisfaction of every intelligent man, that while one race of animals, in consequence of its peculiar propensities, subsists by the destruction of another, the sum total of animal life and enjoyment is prodigiously increased. See a very judicious dissertation on this curious and puzzling subject, entitled A Philosophical Survey of the Animal Creation; where it appears that the increase of animal life and enjoyment which is produced by this means, beyond what could possibly obtain without it, is beyond all conception. See likewise the last edition of King's Originof Evil, by Dr Law, late bishop of Carlisle.

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The end of

nection is

21

All-nature, animate and inani

mate, and un

Thus the whole assemblage seems connected, and this con- jointly employed in increasing the sum total of possible the accu- happiness. This fitness of the various propensities of mulation of sentient and intelligent beings, this subserviency to a happiness. general purpose, strikes these observers as a mark of intention, evidently distinct from, and independent of, all the particular intentions, and superior to them all; and thus it irresistibly leads them to infer the existence of a SUPREME MIND, directing the whole of this INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM, while the individuals of which it consists appear the unconscious instruments in the hand of a great Artist, with which he executes his grand and beneficent purposes. But the observation goes yet further. The bodies of the inanimate creation are not only connected with each other by a mutual dependence of properties, and the relation of causation, but they are also connected thinking, with the sentient beings by a subserviency to their purposes of enjoyment. The philosopher observes that this connection is admirably kept up by the constancy of natural operations and the expectations of intelligent beings. Had either of these circumstances been wanting, had either the operations of nature been without rule, or had sentient beings no perception or expectation of their uniformity; the subserviency would be totally at an end. This adjustment, this fitness, of which the effect is the enjoyment of the sentient inhabitants of the universe, appear to be the effect of an intention of which this enjoyment is the final cause. This constancy, therefore, in the operations of nature, both in the intellectual and material world, and the concomitant expectation of sentient beings, appear the effects of laws imposed on the different parts of the universe by the Supreme Mind, who has formed both these classes of beings so admirably suited to each other.

is connect

ed.

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theology.

The origin To such observers the world appears a WORK OF ART, of natural a system of means employed for gaining certain proposed ends, and it carries the thoughts forward to an ARTIST; and we infer a degree of skill, power, and good intention in this Artist, proportioned to the ingenuity, extent and happy effect which we are able to discern in his works. Such a contemplation of nature therefore, terminates in NATURAL THEOLOGY, or the discovery of the existence and attributes of Our mode GOD.

23

of reasoning on the Our notions of this Supreme Mind are formed from operations the indications of design which we observe, and which we interpret in the same way as in the actions of men.

of Gol.

These notions, therefore, will differ from our notions Introducof other minds only in the degrees which we are able to tion. abserve, and which we assign to these faculties; for the phenomenon or the effect is not only the mark, but also the measure of its supposed cause. These degrees must be ascertained by our own capacity of appreciating the extent, the multiplicity, and the variety of the contrivance. Accordingly, the attributes of the Supreme, Mind, in the theological creed of a rude Indian, are much more limited than in that of a European philosopher. In proportion as our understandings are enlarged, and as our acquaintance with the operations of nature around us is extended, we shall perceive higher degrees of power, of skill, and of kind intention: and since we find that the scene of observation is unbounded, we cannot affix any boundaries to these attributes in our own imagination, and we are ready to suppose that they are infinite or unbounded in their own nature. When our attentive survey of this universe, and a careful comparison of all its parts, as far as we can understand or appreciate them, have made us conclude that it is que design, the work of one Artist; we are under the necessity of inferring, that, with respect to this universe, his power, wisdom, and benevolence, are indeed infi

nite.

24

When men have been led to draw this conclusion from The system the appearances of fitness which are observed every- of nature where around them, they consider that constancy which is governed by gethey observe in natural operations, whether in the ma-neral laws. terial or the intellectual system, and that expectation of, and confidence in, this constancy, which renders the universe a source of enjoyment to its sentient inhabitants, as the consequences of laws imposed by the Almighty Artist on his works, in the same manner as they would consider the constancy in the conduct of any people as the consequences of laws promulgated and enforced by the supreme magistrate.

mind.

25

26

There can be no doubt of this view of nature being The nature extremely captivating, and likely to engage the curio- and prosity of speculative men; and it is not surprising that gress of the the phenomena of mind have been keenly studied in study of all ages. This part of the study of nature, like all others, was first cultivated in subserviency to the wants of social life; and the general laws of moral sentiment were the first phenomena which were considered with attention. This gradually ripened into a regular sys- The rise of tem of moral duty, accompanied by its congenial study, moral senthe investigation or determination of the summum bo-timents and num, or the constituents of human felicity; and these of moral two branches of intellectual science were always kept in duty. a state of association by the philosophers of antiquity. Jurisprudence, the science of government, legislation, and police, were also first cultivated as arts, or at least in immediate subserviency to the demands of cultivated society; and all these so nearly related parts of the study of human nature, had made a very considerable Progress, in the form of maxims or precepts for directing the conduct, before speculative men, out of mere curiosity, treated them as subjects of philosophical study. Our moral sentiments, always involving a feeling of obligation, are expressed in a language considerably different from the usual language of pure philosophy, speaking of things which ought to be, rather than of things which are; and this distinction of lapguage was increased by the very aim of the writers,

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which

Introduc- which was generally to influence the conduct as well tion. as the opinions of their scholars. It was reserved for modern times to bring this study into the pure form of philosophy, by a careful attention to the phenomena of moral sentiment, and classing these according to their generality, and ascertaining their respective ranks by an appeal to experiment, that is, to the general conduct of mankind: and thus it happens that in the modern treatises on ethics, jurisprudence, &c. there is less frequent reference made to the officia or duties, or to the constituents of the summum bonum, than among the ancients, and a more accurate description of the human mind, and discrimination of its various moral feelings.

27

The origin It was hardly possible to proceed far in these disof logic and quisitions without attending to the powers of the unother intellectual derstanding. Differences of opinion were supported sciences. by reasonings, or attempts to reasoning. Both sides

28

could not be in the right, and there must be some court of appeals. Rules of argumentation behoved to be acquiesced in by both parties; and it could hardly escape the notice of some curious minds, that there were rules of truth and falsehood as well as of right and wrong. Thus the human understanding became an object of study, first in subserviency to the demands of the moralists, but afterwards for its own sake; and it gradually grew up into the science of logic. Still further refinement produced the science of metaphysics, or the philosophy of universals. But all these were in fact posterior to the doctrines of morals; and disquisitions on beauty, the principles of taste, the precepts of rhetoric and criticism, were the last additions to the study of the phenomena of mind. And now, since the world seems to have acquiesced in the mode of investigation of general laws by experiment and observation, and to agree that this is all the knowledge that we can acquire of any subject whatever, it is to be expected that this branch of philosophical discussion will attain the same degree of improvement (estimated by the coincidence of the doctrines with fact and experience) that has been attained by some others.

The parThe occupations, however, of ordinary life have tial pracoftener directed our efforts towards material objects, tice of na- and engaged our attention on their properties and retural phi- lations; and as all sciences have arisen from arts, and losophy preceded were originally implied in the maxims and precepts of its study those arts, till separated from them by the curious as a sci- speculatist, the knowledge of the material system of nature was possessed in detached scraps by the practitioners in the various arts of life long before the natural philosopher thought of collecting them into a body of scientific doctrines. But there have not been wanting in all ages men of curiosity who have been struck by the uniformity of the operations of nature in the material world, and were eager to discover their

ence.

causes.

Accordingly, while the moralists and metaphysicians turned their whole attention to the phenomena of mind, and have produced the sciences of pneumatology, logic, ethics, jurisprudence, and natural theology, these observers of nature have found sufficient employ ment in considering the phenomena of the material world.

The bodies of which it consists are evidently con3

tion.

29 The nature

the defi

nected by means of those properties by which we Introduc observe that they produce changes in each other's situation. This assemblage of objects may therefore be justly called a system. We may call it the MATERIAL SYSTEM. It is frequently termed NATURE; and the of the materms NATURAL APPEARANCES, NATURAL CAUSES, terial syNATURAL LAWS, have been generally restricted to those stem, with which take place in the material system. This re- nition of striction, however, is improper, because there is no dif- that and ference in the manner in which we form our notions other of those laws, and reason from them, both with re-term spect to mind and body. Or if there is to be any restriction, and if any part of the study of the universe is to be excluded in the application of these terms, it is that part only which considers moral obligation, and rather treats of what ought to be than of what is. As has been already observed, there is a considerable difference in the language which must be employed; but still there is none in the principles of investigation. We have no proof for the extent of any moral law but an appeal to the feelings of the hearts of men, indicated by the general laws or facts which are observed in their actions.

30

sense in

its bad con

But this is only a question of the propriety of lan-The unre guage. And no great inconvenience would arise from stricted the restriction now mentioned if it were scrupulously which some adhered to; but unfortunately this is not always the of these case. Some authors use the term natural law to ex- terms are press every coincidence of fact; and this is certainly used, and the proper use of the term. The French writers ge- sequences. nerally use the term loy physique in this enlarged sense. But many authors, misled by, or taking advantage of, the ambiguity of language, after having established a law founded on a copious and perhaps unexcepted induction of the phenomena of the material system (in which case it must be considered in its restricted sense), have, in their explanation of phenomena, extended their principle much farther than the induction on which they had founded the existence of the physical law. They have extended it to the phenomena of mind, and have led their followers into great and dangerous mistakes. Languages, like every other production of human skill, are imperfect. They are deficient in terms, and are therefore figurative. The most obvious, the most frequent, and the most interesting uses of language, have always produced the appropriated terms, and the progress of cultivation has never completely supplied new ones. There are certain analogies or resemblances, or certain associations of ideas, so plain, that a term appropriated to one very familiar object will serve to suggest another analogous to it, when aided by the concomitant circumstances of the discourse; and this with sufficient precision for the ordinary purposes of social communication, and without leading us into any considerable mistakes and it is only the rare and refined disquisitions of the curious speculatist that bring the poverty and imperfection of language into view, and make us wish for words as numerous as our thoughts. is hardly a sentence, even of common discourse, in which there are not several figures either of single words or of phrases; and when very accurate discrimi nation is required, it is almost impossible to find words or phrases to express distinctions which we clearly feel. We believe it impossible to express, by the scanty vocabulary

There

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