That section provides that every deed shall, I tive, not only as to those who have actual until duly recorded, or lodged for record in knowledge of the occupation, but as to all the clerk's office, be void and of no effect against subsequent judgment creditors without notice, and against subsequent bona fide purchasers and mortgagees for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, whose deed or mortgage shall have been first duly recorded. the world. It is the duty of an intending In the argument of the cause before the Court of Chancery the principal question mooted was whether a tax collector's deed, given to a purchaser at a tax sale under the Tax Adjustment Act of 1898, was invalid as against a bona fide purchaser from the prior owner who had no notice of the tax sale, or of the deed made pursuant thereto, and whose deed is first recorded; the contention on the part of complainant's counsel being that a tax deed was not within the purview of section 54 of the Act Concerning Conveyances. The learned Vice Chancellor before whom the cause was heard reached the conclusion that a tax deed did not come within the scope of the statute, and that although not recorded, it was valid and effectual as against subsequent judgment creditors, purchasers, and mortgagees of the original owners, whether they had notice of its existence or not. The result of this conclusion led the Vice Chancellor to advise a decree declaring the title of the complainant in and to the lands and premises involved in the litigation to be good, valid, and effectual, and that the defendant had no estate, right, title, or interest therein. [1] We do not find it necessary to determine the very interesting question whether or not an unrecorded tax deed is void and of no effect against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration not having notice thereof, whose deed has been first duly recorded. And for this reason: The proof is convincing that shortly after the tax sale in 1909 the complainant entered into possession of the two lots involved in this litigation, (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. inclosed them with a fence, and used them in his contracting business, storing ashes, stones, and other débris on the land, and For this reason the decree under review should be affirmed. (91 N. J. Eq. 110) WARD v. PEOPLE'S BANK OF EAST ORANGE. (No. 9.) Nov. 19, 1919.) (Syllabus by the Court.) WAIVER OF OATH. keeping there his wagons used by him in his 1. EQUITY 343-ANSWER AS EVIDENCE ON business. These wagons, all of them, had his name thereon. This use and occupation of the premises by the complainant continued without interruption from the year 1909 until the institution of this suit; it was open and notorious, obvious to every one visiting the premises. [2] The statute makes an unrecorded deed void only as against judgment creditors, bona fide purchasers, and mortgagees who have no notice thereof, and it is entirely settled, both in this state and elsewhere, that possession of land, if open, notorious, and unequivocal, constitutes notice of the right, or claim of right, under which the party in possession occupies it; and this notice is effec Where a bill prays for answer without oath, such answer is not evidence for defendant, but is available to complainant as evidence in his favor. 2. EQUITY 343-ANSWER AS EVIDENCE ON WAIVER OF OATH. In such case, complainant is entitled to use so much of the answer as makes in his favor, without being bound by that part which is against him. 3. PLEDGES 51-BILL IN EQUITY FOR RE DEMPTION. A bill in equity to redeem a pledge will not lie, unless it alleges some other ground of equitable jurisdiction. (108 A.) 4. PLEDGES 51-JURISDICTION OF BILL IN | acted unfairly in the transactions, but that EQUITY FOR REDEMPTION. Such bill will lie when it sets up a proper case for account in equity, and discovery. Black and Williams, JJ., dissenting. Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by William R. Ward, a lunatic, by guardian, against the People's Bank of East Orange. From the decree of a Vice Chancellor directing a dismissal of the bill, complainant appeals. Reversed, and cause reinstated with directions. complainant had adduced no proof on that subject; and, thirdly, that as there was nothing to show that anything was due from the bank to complainant, or that he was entitled to an accounting, none would be decreed. The bank seems to have presented no evi dence, but to have relied on the record and complainant's evidence. [1, 2] It is urged on this appeal that the inquisition and proceedings connected therewith, adjudicating lunacy during a period overreaching the transactions between the Walter L. McDermott, of Jersey City (Wil-parties, at least put the burden of proof on liam H. Carey, of Jersey City, on the brief), for appellant. Jerome D. Gedney, of East Orange, for respondent. PARKER, J. The gravamen of the bill was that complainant, while of unsound mind, although not so judicially declared, had dealings with the defendant bank as a depositor and borrower on collateral, and that the bank officials, knowing his mental condition, took advantage of it in their dealings with him; that later a commission appointed under the statute conducted an inquiry into his mental condition, and found that he was of unsound mind, not only at the time of the inquiry, but from a time antedating most, if not all, of his transactions with the bank. It alleged an unsettled state of the accounts between them; that certain collateral had been improperly sold, that the bank refused information to the guardians as to the account, and prayed a discovery and accounting by the bank, and that if as a result any balance was found in favor of the bank, complainant's securities should be delivered up on payment of such balance. The answer, which, as prayed by the bill, was not under oath, denied all knowledge or actual notice of insanity at the time of the dealings; averred that the bank had acted throughout with entire fairness and good faith; that it had always been ready to furnish any reasonable statements of the account, and annexed certain schedules, purporting to contain the various items of that account. There was a general replication in the form prescribed by rule of court. The case being brought to hearing on bill, answer, and proofs before Vice Chancellor Foster, he directed a dismissal of the bill on the grounds: First, that it was incumbent on complainant to show that the bank had actual knowledge of his mental condition at the time of the dealings in question, and on this point no evidence had been presented except the production of the inquisition, and that this was not enough; secondly, that complainant should show that the bank had the bank to show actual ignorance of lunacy and fair dealing. See Yauger v. Skinner, 14 N. J. Eq. 389. If the point be well taken, respondent does not adequately answer it by the argument that complainant, by relying on the answer as an admission of certain elements in his case, must accept also statements therein detrimental to his case. The rule is otherwise. Where a bill prays for answer without oath, such answer is not evidence for the defendant, but is evidence against him. Symmes v. Strong, 28 N. J. Eq. 131; Reed v. Cumberland Ins. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 393, 396; and in Hageman v. Brown, 76 N. J. Eq. 126, 73 Atl. 862, it was said that the very object of waiving oath to an answer is to have the benefit of admissions therein without entitling defendant to have the answer treated as evidence in his favor. We find it unnecessary on this appeal to deal with the effect of the inquisition as prima facie proof of defendant's knowledge of insanity at a prior time, or with the burden, if any, of showing fairness and good faith, as we conclude that the decree should be reversed on other grounds. [3, 4] The bill alleged, and the answer admitted, various pledges of collateral, loans, and other financial dealings between the parties; that some of the collateral had been sold, and some still remained in pledge. The prayer was that an account be taken to ascertain and determine the amount owing, if anything, by complainant to the bank, and that upon payment of the amount so found due, the defendant might be decreed to surrender the securities, etc. This stamps the suit as one for redemption of a pledge, which rests on the same general rules as one for redemption from a chattel mortgage. Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (1st Ed.) § 1231. One of these rules is that the pledgor may maintain an equitable action for an account, where the amount due is unsettled, and for redemption on payment of the amount found due. Id. and section 1230, and cases cited; Rennie v. Deshon, 31 N. J. Eq. 378; Chambers v. Kunzman, 59 N. J. Eq. 433, 45 Atl. 599. It is true that a bill to redeem a pledge will not ordinarily lie except upon the allegation of For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Some other ground of equitable jurisdiction, such as account or discovery. 31 Cyc. 860. The defendant seems to have recognized complainant's right to both of these, by annexing to the answer what purport to be copies of collateral notes and somewhat lengthy book accounts, which indicate on the face of things a proper case for accounting and for discovery under oath. What the results would have been if this answer had been under oath, and consequently evidence for defendant, need not now be considered. As we have seen, the unsworn answer is available to complainant so far as he accepts its admissions, but not to defendant as to allegations in its own interest disputed by complainant. The replication on file is a general denial on the truth of the answer. Story, Eq. Pl. § 878. As a consequence, complainant is entitled on the hearing to question the correctness of the alleged account, including the propriety of any sales of his securities made by the bank, and, upon ascertainment by the court of the amount, if any, owing by him to the bank on such accounting, and payment of such amount, which he has tendered by his bill, to have back his pledged securities, or such of them as have not been rightfully disposed of and can be restored to him, proper allowance being made in the account for any securities found to have been unlawfully sold and to be not reasonably capable of restoration. Let the decree dismissing the bill be reversed, and the cause reinstated, with directions to order an account and discovery as to matters germane thereto, and further relief appropriate to the results of the accounting. BLACK and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent. (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) 2. COVENANTS 21 mm No CONSTRUCTION WHERE LANGUAGE UNAMBIGUous. Where the language of a covenant is unambiguous, clear, and specific, the rule is similar to that adopted in the construction of statutes, that no room is left either for interpretation or construction. 3. APPEAL AND ERROR 1176(2)-DIRECTING JUDGMENT ON REVERSAL. Where the judgment of the Supreme Court, reversing a judgment of the district court for plaintiff in an action on a casualty policy, by inadvertence further directed that judgment be entered for defendant, its judgment will be was to require the issuance of a venire de novo reversed, as the legal effect of the reversal in the court below. Appeal from Supreme Court. Action by Rachel A. Lynch, executrix, etc., against the Commercial Casualty Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Supreme Court, and plaintiff appeals. Judgment of Supreme Court re versed. Coult & Smith, of Newark, for appellant. William E. Holmwood, of Newark, for appellee. MINTURN, J. The defendant company issued a policy of insurance to plaintiff's testatrix, insuring her against damage arising from bodily injuries received by any person while upon the premises 306-308 Market street, in Newark. One Joseph M. Haberbush sustained such injuries, and recovered judgment therefor, in the Newark district court, the amount of which judgment was paid by plaintiff. This suit was instituted to recover reimbursement for the liability thus established and the judgment so paid. The issue presented is based upon certain exceptions contained in the policy of insurance, which, after the usual covenants proLYNCH V. COMMERCIAL CASUALTY INS. viding for such payments, excepts from the (93 N. J. Law, 425) CO. (No. 19.) (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 17, 1919.) (Syllabus by the Court.) obligation the following: "Except claims arising by reason of: (1) Injuries or death caused by any person employed in violation of law while in charge of or operating any elevator, or by any person so 1. INSURANCE 435-CONSTRUCTION OF EX- employed under the age of 16 years where no CEPTION IN ACCIDENT POLICY. age limit is fixed by law for elevator attendants, or by any person otherwise employed in violation of law as to age or under the age of 14 years where there is no legal restriction as to age of employment." Where a provision in a policy of accident insurance contains an exception from liability, where the injury is caused by any person employed under the age of 16 years, and in the case at bar it appeared that the injury was the It was established on the trial that the acproximate result of the absence of a boy of cident to Haberbush arose out of the negli14 years from the elevator, which was in his gence of a boy of 14 years of age, who, while charge, held, that the case was within the ex-in ception contained in the policy, and defendant in charge of the elevator in the building, left was not liable thereon for injuries sustained it unattended, on the first floor, and during by one who fell into the unprotected opening, his absence some one upon an upper floor caused by the ascending of the elevator while pulled the rope, causing the elevator to asthe boy was absent. cend, thus leaving the opening on the first (108 A.) floor unguarded, into which Haberbush fell | ioner and the sister, and having the title taken and was injured. in the name of the sister. The district court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court reversed, upon the ground that the case presented was clearly within the age limitation prescribed in the policy. [1] We think this conclusion of the Supreme Court was correct, for the reasons stated in the opinion of that court. We agree that the proximate cause of the accident was the absence of the boy from his post of duty. The pulling of the elevator rope by another simply presented the condition which made the accident possible, and which would have been prevented, if the boy had been attending to his duty. The immediate and proximate cause of the damage, therefore, was the absence of the boy from the unprotected opening thus created, and into which Haberbush fell. [2] Where, as in the case at bar, the language of a covenant is unambiguous, clear, and specific, the rule is similar to that adopted in the construction and interpretation of statutes, that no room is left either for interpretation or construction. Thorley v. United States, 113 U. S. 310, 5 Sup. Ct. 491, 28 L. Ed. 999; Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 9 Sup. Ct. 651, 32 L. Ed. 1060; Gillard v. Manufacturers' Co., 107 Atl. 448. [3] The judgment of the Supreme Court, however, in ordering a reversal, further directs that judgment be entered for the defendant. This manifestly was an inadvertence, since the legal effect of the reversal was to require the issuance of a venire de novo in the court below. Appeal from Court of Chancery. Suit by Beatrice I. Goll, trustee, and others, against Mary K. Stefanski and others. From decree for complainants, defendants appeal. Case remanded for technical modification of the decree, and, subject to such modification, decree affirmed. Harry T. Davimos, of Newark, for appellants. or John O. Frey, of Newark, for respondents. WHITE, J. The complainant Goll is trustee in bankruptcy for Francis Stefanski, a Polish Catholic priest, who was spiritual and business advisor of a young woman, Dominika Michalewska, from whom he borrowed, as the Vice Chancellor expressed it "took," $2,000, with which he purchased two houses and the lot upon which they were erected, with the express agreement that the title should be taken in the name of the young woman, Dominika, as security for her $2,000. Instead of which, however, he had the title made to his sister, Mary K. Stefanski. Complainants' claim is that the title was taken in Mary for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of Francis and particularly of defrauding the young woman Dominika. Mary claims, however, that she is the owner of the property in fee, that she advanced the sum of $700 to her brother towards the purchase of the property at the time it was purchased, and that he, at that time, owed her various other sums which For this reason, the judgment of the Su- she had previously loaned to him, making up preme Court will be reversed. (91 N. J. Eq. 144) GOLL et al. v. STEFANSKI et al. (No. 50.) (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 17, 1919.) 1. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 187-PROTECTION OF INNOCENT LENDER HOLDING LE GAL TITLE. Where a priest, to defraud his parishioner and his own creditors, purchased certain property with funds furnished by the parishioner and his own sister, and had the title taken in the name of his sister, unless such sister was a party to his fraud she was entitled to protection of her legal title to the extent of her loan to her brother to buy the property. 2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES the full consideration of $2,000 paid for the property. The Vice Chancellor found that, with the exception of the $700 alleged loan from Mary, the other pretended advances by her were never made. After an examination of the evidence, we agree with this finding, and in fact, if it had been before us, might have extended the same finding to the $700 loan. [1] The learned Vice Chancellor was also convinced that the defendant Francis Stefanski had the premises in question conveyed to his sister Mary in fraud of his creditors, and particularly for the purpose of defrauding the young woman Dominika. With this finding we agree, but standing alone it is not enough to entitle Dominika's loan of $2,000 to priority over the $700 loan of Mary Stefanski who holds the legal title. Unless Mary was a party to the fraud, she is enti301(3)-EVI-tled to the protection of her legal title to the extent of her loan. Demarest v. Terhune, 18 N. J. Eq. 532. DENCE SHOWING KNOWLEDGE OF FRAUD BY Evidence held to show that a priest's sister was a party to his contemplated fraud on a [2] The question therefore is: Was Mary parishioner and his own creditors in purchasing a party to the fraud? The Vice Chancellor property with funds borrowed from the parish- did not expressly pass upon this point, but For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 3. DAMAGES 132(8)-DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES NOT EXCESSIVE. an examination of the evidence convinces us | 2. NEW TRIAL 168-VERDICT CONTRARY TO that she was. Assuming that the $700 loan LAW. was actually made, the other alleged advanc- When satisfied that the jury did not underes from Mary were fictitious and merely got- stand the case or the evidence, or made inadten up for the purpose of attempting to bol-vertent errors in computation or otherwise, or ster up her claim for a fee-simple title to based its verdict and damages on prejudice or sympathy, rather than on reason or judgment, the property. Her claim to a fee under the it is the duty of Supreme Judicial Court to circumstances is therefore a fraud, and, tak- order a new trial. en in conjunction with the evidence purpose of her brother at the time of the conveyance, it is sufficient, we think, viewed in the light of all the other circumstances in the case, to establish the fact that Mary was a party to her brother's fraud at the time the conveyance was made. This view, of course, besides resulting in Mary's loss of the fee in favor of the trustee in bankruptcy of Francis, would, if the question were before us, result also in her loss of the lien given her by the decree of the Court of Chancery for her $700 loan, subject to the prior lien in favor of Dominika for her $2,000 loan; but this $700 loan lien item of the decree was not appealed from, and is therefore not before us. Upon a careful examination of all the evidence in the case, therefore, we think that the decree should in substance be affirmed. Through inadvertence, however, as it would seem, the Vice Chancellor appears to have assumed that the conveyance in question to Mary was made by Francis himself, and that therefore the proper remedy was to set the conveyance aside. Such, however, was not the case. The conveyance was from a former owner direct to Mary at the instance of Francis. The conveyance should not, therefore, be set aside, for that would vest the legal title in the former owner who was no party to the fraud and is not a party to these proceedings. The decree should declare a trust in favor of the trustee in bankruptcy subject to the liens as indicated in the decree of the Court of Chancery appealed from and should order a conveyance accordingly. The case is remanded to the Court of Chancery in order that the decree may be technically modified as above indicated, and, subject to such modification, the decree is affirmed, with costs. (118 Me. 325) received a severe electric shock, so that his hand A verdict for $2,412.50 in favor of one who was cruelly burned, and was totally disabled about four months, and one of his fingers was amputated, and another stiff and peculiarly sensitive, so that he has to wear a glove or mitten when the weather is at all cold, and his earning capacity is in a degree impaired, and a the violin was lost, was not so grossly excessive source of part of his income gained by playing as to warrant a conclusion that it represented anything but the deliberate and honest judgment of the jury. 4. MASTER AND SERVANT 346-PURPOSE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. The main purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is the creation of a new and wider remedy for victims of industrial accidents, and a new tribunal for the administration of such remedy. 5. MASTER AND SERVANT 394-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; WHEN REMEDY EXCLU 7. MASTER AND SERVANT 394-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; REMEDY OF EMPLOYÉ BY COMMON-LAW ACTION. The remedy of an employé who has elected men's Compensation Act, § 7, is by common-law to claim his common-law rights, under Workaction simply. 8. MASTER AND SERVANT 401-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; PLEADING IN COMMONLAW ACTION BY EMPLOYÉ. In any case, regardless of the number of workmen employed by one not assenting to the NADEAU v. CARIBOU WATER, LIGHT & Workmen's Compensation Act, an employé in POWER CO. jured by the negligence of a nonassenting employer may bring and maintain his common-law (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov. 20, action, alleging due care on his own part, and 1919.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR 1004(1)-REVIEW OF VERDICT FOR DAMAGES. A verdict giving damages is conclusive as to the amount, where it appears that the jury's judgment was honestly and understandingly exercised. he need not allege the employer to be nonassenting. 9. MASTER AND SERVANT 401-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; PLEADING IN COMMONLAW ACTION BY SERVANT. Where a servant brings a common-law action against a master employing more than five |