upon themselves. The Lords have no voice in questions of expenditure, save that of a formal assent to the Appropriation Acts. They are excluded from it by the spirit, and by the forms of the constitution. Not less exclusive has been the right of the Commons to grant taxes, to meet the public expenditure. These rights of the rights are indeed inseparable; and are founded on Exclusive Commons concerning taxation. the same principles. Taxation," said Lord Chatham, "is no part of the governing, or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. In legislation the three estates of the realm are alike concerned; but the concurrence of the peers and the Crown to a tax, is only necessary to clothe it with the form of a law. The gift and grant is of the Commons alone." 1 On these principles, the Commons had declared that a money bill was sacred from amendment. In their gifts and grants, they would brook no meddling. Such a position was not established without hot controversies.2 Nor was it ever expressly admitted by the Lords; but as they were unable to shake the strong determination of the Commons, they tacitly acquiesced, and submitted. For one hundred and fifty years, there was scarcely a dispute upon this privilege. The Lords, knowing how any amendment affecting a charge upon the people, would be received by the Commons, either abstained from making it, or averted misunderstanding, by not returning the amended bill. And when an amendment was made, to which the Commons could not agree, on the ground of privilege alone, it was their custom 1 Parl. Hist. xvi. 99. 2 The Reports of the conferences between the two Houses (1640–1703), containing many able arguments on either side, are collected in the Appendix to the third volume of Hatsell's Precedents, and in the Report of the Committee on Tax Bills, 1860. 8 To the claim, as very broadly asserted by the Commons in 1700, at a conference upon the Bill for the Sale of Irish Forfeited Estates, the Lords replied: "If the said assertions were exactly true, which their Lordships cannot allow." to save their privilege, by sending up a new bill, embracing the Lords' amendment. But if the Lords might not amend money bills, could they not reject them? This very question was dis- Power of the cussed in 1671. The Commons had then denied Lords to reject a money bill. the right of amendment, on the broadest grounds. In reply, the Lords argued thus: "If this right should be denied, the Lords have not a negative voice allowed them, in bills of this nature; for if the Lords, who have the power of treating, advising, giving counsel, and applying remedies, cannot amend, abate, or refuse a bill in part, by what consequence of reason, can they enjoy a liberty to reject the whole? When the Commons shall think fit to question it, they may pretend the same grounds for it." The Commons, however, admitted the right of rejection. "Your Lordships," they said, "have a negative to the whole." "The king must deny the whole of every Bill, or pass it; yet this takes not away his negative voice. The Lords and Commons must accept the whole general pardon or deny it; yet this takes not away their negative." And again in 1689, it was stated by a committee of the Commons, that the Lords are to pass all or reject all, without diminution or alteration." 2 But these admissions cost the Commons nothing, at that time. To reject a money bill, was to withhold supplies from the Crown, - an act of which the Lords were not to be suspected. The Lords themselves were fully alive to this difficulty, and complained that "a hard and ignoble choice was left to them, either to refuse the Crown supplies when they are most necessary, or to consent to ways and proportions of aid, which neither their own judgment or interest, nor the good of the government and people, can admit."" In argu 1 Hatsell, iii. 405, 422, 423. 66 2 lbid. 452. This admission, however, is not of equal authority, as it formed part of the reasons reported from a committee, which were recommitted, and not adopted by the House. 8 Conference, 1671; Hatsell, iii. 405. ment, the Commons were content to recognize this barren right; yet so broad were the grounds on which they rested their own claims of privilege, and so stubborn was their temper in maintaining them,—that it may well be questioned whether they would have submitted to its practical exercise. If the Lords had rejected a bill for granting a tax,- would the Commons have immediately granted another? Would they not rather have sat with folded arms, rejoicing that the people were spared a new impost; while the king's treasury was beggared by the interference of the Lords? Taxes were then of a temporary character. Temporary nent taxes. They were granted for one year, or for a longer period, acand perma- cording to the exigencies of the occasion. Hearth money was the first permanent tax, imposed in 1663.1 No other tax of that character appears to have been granted, until after the Revolution; when permanent duties were raised on beer,2 on salt, on vellum and paper, on houses, and on coffee. These duties were generally granted as a security for loans; and the financial policy of permanent taxes increased with the national debt, and the extension of public credit. This policy somewhat altered the position of the Lords, in relation to tax bills. Taxes were from time to time varied and repealed; and to such alterations of the law, the Lords might have refused their assent, without withholding supplies from the Crown. But such opportunities were not sought by the Lords. They had given up the contest upon privilege; and wisely left to the Commons, the responsibility and the odium, of constantly increasing the public burdens. Taxes and loans were multiplied; but the Lords accepted them, without question. They rarely even discussed financial measures; and when in 1763, they op1 13 & 14 Charles II. c. 10. 21 Will. and Mary, Sess. 1, c. 24. 85 & 6 Will. and Mary, c. 31. 49 & 10 Will. III. c. 25. 55 Anne, c. 13. 67 lbid. c. 7. posed the third reading of the Wines and Cider Duties Bill, it was observed that this was the first occasion, on which they had been known to divide upon a money bill.1 Lords. But while they abstained from interference with the supplies and ways and means, granted by the Com- Tax bills remons for the public service, they occasionally re- jected by the jected or postponed other bills, incidentally affecting supply and taxation: bills imposing or repealing protective duties; bills for the regulation of trade; and bills embracing other disputable matters of legislation, irrespective of taxation. Of these, the greater part were measures of legislative policy, rather than measures of revenue; and with the single exception of the Corn Bill of 1827, their fate does not appear to have excited any jealousy in the sensitive minds of the Commons. Paper Duties 1860. At length, in 1860, the Lords exercised their power, in a novel and startling form. The Commons had resolved, among other financial arrangements for the Repeal Bill, year, to increase the property tax and stamp duties, and to repeal the duties on paper. The Property Tax and Stamp Duties Bills had already received the royal assent, when the Paper Duties Repeal Bill was received by the Lords. It had encountered strong opposition in the Commons, where its third reading was agreed to, by the small majority of nine. And now the Lords determined, by a majority of eighty-nine, to postpone the second reading for six months. Having assented to the increased taxation of the annual budget, they refused the relief, by which it had been accompanied. two Houses. Never until now, had the Lords rejected a bill for imposing or repealing a tax, raised solely for the pur- Relative poses of revenue,—and involving the supplies and rights of the ways and means, for the service of the year. Never had they assumed the right of reviewing the calculations of the Commons, regarding revenue and expenditure. 1 March 30th, 1763; Parl. Hist. xv. 1316. In principle, all previous invasions of the cherished rights of the Commons, had been trifling compared with this. What was a mere amendment in a money bill, compared with its irrevocable rejection? But on the other hand, the legal right of the Lords to reject any bill whatever, could not be disputed. Even their constitutional right to "negative the whole" of a money bill, had been admitted by the Commons themselves. Nor was this strictly, and in technical form, a money bill. It neither granted any tax to the Crown, nor recited that the paper duty was repealed, in consideration of other taxes imposed. It simply repealed the existing law, under which the duty was levied. Technically, no privilege of the Commons, as previously declared, had been infringed. Yet it was contended, with great force, that to undertake the office of revising the balances of supplies and ways and means, which had never been assumed by the Lords, during two hundred years, was a breach of constitutional usage, and a violation of the first principles, upon which the privileges of the House are founded. If the letter of the law was with the Lords, its spirit was clearly with the Commons. Had the position of parties, and the temper of the times been such as to encourage a violent collision beof the Com- tween the two Houses, there had rarely been an occasion more likely to provoke it. But this embarrassment the government were anxious to avert; and many causes concurred to favor moderate counsels. A committee was therefore appointed in the Commons, to search for precedents. The search was long and intricate: the report copious and elaborate; but no opinion was given upon the grave question at issue. The lapse of six weeks had already moderated the heat and excitement of the controversy; when on the 5th July, Lord Palmerston, on the part of the government, explained the course which he counselled the House to adopt. Having stated what were the acknowledged privileges of the House, and referred to the precedents collected by the committee, he expressed his opinion that the Lords, Proceedings mons. |