Conflict, Cooperation and Institutions in International Water Management: An Economic Analysis
E. Elgar, 01 հնվ, 2007 թ. - 376 էջ
This book asks under which conditions cooperation is in the interest of the riparian countries sharing international waters, and how institutions must be designed to realize potential gains of cooperation. The author, Ines Dombrowsky, develops a conceptual framework that draws upon different economic theories, including the theory of external effects, non-cooperative game theory and transaction costs economics. She distinguishes the different types of externality problems inherent in international water management and specifies the institutional prerequisites for cooperation. She argues that the respective problems differ with respect to the need/requirement to define property rights and to establish enforcement mechanisms. The book also explores the role of issue linkage and of international organizations to foster cooperation.
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absolute territorial sovereignty actors allocation analyze aquifers argued Article benefits Chapter Chicken game Coase theorem conflict cooperative outcome coordination decision-making decisions downstream country economic analysis efficient enforcement mechanisms equitable utilization functions gains of cooperation game theory governance structures harm hierarchical direction hydropower ICPR implies incentive infrastructure interaction international law international organizations international river basin international water management international watercourse involved issue areas issue linkage joint limited territorial sovereignty management of international McCaffrey 2003a Nash equilibrium negative unidirectional externality negotiations obligations OMVS Pareto optimum parties payoffs players pollution positive externality principle Prisoner's Dilemma Prisoner's Dilemma game problem structure property rights provision question Rambo repeated game respective Rhine rights to water riparian river basin organizations Scharpf Schermers Schermers and Blokker Section sector Senegal River side-payment strategy Table A-2 TFDD theoretical transaction cost economics treaties unidirectional externality problems wastewater water management institutions water quality water resources management Williamson