Mr. COLERIDGE. I am told notice of this application has been sent to the Crown. The purchase of arms at Birmingham might be done with perfect innocence; and it was merely connecting it with other circumstances that enabled the magistrate to commit to Warwick. Mr. JUSTICE BLACKBURN. You have just spoken of this as a metropolitan offense. My impression is, it is more of an Irish offense. Very little was actually done in London. Mr. COLERIDGE. Metropolitan offense is a wrong expression. It as an imperial offense, one against the country rather than against the county of Warwick. Mr. JUSTICE BLACKBURN. The charge is of such a nature that it might be tried in many places. Mr. COLERIDGE. Yes. It is an imperial offense. The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE. And you may very well say the central criminal court is the proper place to try it. The only question for us is whether the magistrate having, in is view of the case, sent it to Warwick, should we bring it back to London? If these considerations had been presented to Sir Thomas Henry he might not have sent the case there; but its being there, shall we bring it back? Mr. COLERIDGE. I am not pressing anything untenable. I am only asking for a rule nisi. It may be that when the attorney general hears of this he will assent to it. The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE. We must consider whether the other two will have to be brought back, and therefore the application had better stand over for the present, and see what they do; and, in the mean time, perhaps you (Mr. Coleridge) will communicate with the attorney general. Application postponed. LAW AMENDMENT SOCIETY. Sir R. Phillimore, judge of the admiralty court, presided at a meeting of this society, held last evening in the Adelphi. Mr. John Westlake read a paper on "Naturalization and Expatriation, or a change of Nationality." After referring to President Johnson's allusion to the topic in his last message, and to its bearing upon the French army organization bill, he said it was admitted on all sides that the time had come when it was necessary to arrive at some clear and mutual understanding upon it. He then detailed those rights of protection and control which gave to nationality its importance, showing the difference between the laws and customs in various parts of the world as to the rights of foreigners, and pointing out that foreigners were generally held to be exempt from military service, but not from the payment of war taxes. These rights and duties were no doubt a burden which nations submitted to in order to facilitate intercourse between them. There was no reason to believe that the English parliament would hesitate to propose such alterations as might be necessary, but the particular arrangements to be recommended must be a question for much discussion even after the principle of free expatriation had been admitted. There was much difficulty in the proposal to merge nationality in domicile. The following rules might be considered for a change of nationality: First, a simple form of naturalization, to which any state might add any condition it thought necessary; secondly, a provision for securing that none but permanent residents were naturalized, making for that purpose a certain number of years' residence necessary, unless special reasons were assigned; thirdly, the renouncing of all claim by the original government over the person naturalized; and, fourthly, some provision for the return of expatriated persons to their original country. In the discussion which followed, Mr. Mozely said the question could not be settled until an international code was agreed upon, but meanwhile some advance might be made. At present the British legislature seemed to go upon no intelligible principle whatever, except that of making as many persons as possible British subjects. Mr. Vernon Harcourt said that foreigners had no rights whatever except those which the country in which they were resident chose to give them; they went there of their own will, and must be subject to the laws made there. Any government might, in its discretion, subject to enlistment anybody within its borders, those so subjected, if they disliked the law, having the option of leaving the country. The doctrine of locality of crime, in the strictest sense of the word, had no place whatever in general or international law, and any country whatever had a perfect right to say it would try every man within its borders for any crime whatsoever, whether committed there or elsewhere. England and America were the only countries where this doctrine was not held. At present if an American plotted against this country, for instance, he would be punishable for the offense in his own country, but would be perfectly safe in this country against which he had been conspiring. If an Englishman murdered a foreigner abroad he might be tried in England for doing so, but if a foreigner murdered an Englishman abroad and came to England he could not be tried. Could anything be more absurd? If we acknowledged the continental doctrine upon this subject, we should have a sounder basis to proceed upon than the American doctrine of citizenship. Mr. Chisholm Anstey said our present law was full of absurdity, and illustrated his position by narrating what took place on the coast of China. Mr. Garvie, Mr. Merriman, Mr. E. Hill, and Dr. Waddilove continued the discussion, which at length turned upon the desirableness of adjourning the debate. Sir R. Phillimore said the subject was one of extreme importance at the present time, and would have to be pressed upon the attention of not only the English and American governments, but upon the consideration of all nations. The entire question would require deliberate and ample discussion, for it was to be viewed from a great many positions, and would require a great many lights to be thrown upon it before it was satisfactorily settled. The true interpretation of international law was, that when a foreigner entered the dominion of any state he was in all respects amenable to its law. The chief difficulty arose from an inability to define when a man actually left his country. Of course, if an Englishman broke the municipal law of a foreign country, by that law he must abide; but the protection of his own government should be thrown over him so far that he should not be placed in a worse position than the citizens of the country in which he might happen to be. He (the chairman) should not like to countenance the doctrine that the moment a citizen left England the state ceased to have any care over him, or he to have any claim upon the protection of the state. All lawyers knew the difficulty there was in settling when residence became domicile, and that made him think domicile itself would not be a discreet or sufficient test of expatriation, although it might with advantage be used as an element in the matter. Any rule that was proposed must be one upon which there should be mutual agreement. He felt a difficulty in touching upon this question as effecting military service, because he was concerned in it during the American war. Very early the absolute necessity of agreeing to some clearly defined rule as to the protection of British subjects in America was forced upon their attention. It was soon agreed that it could not be demanded as a matter of right by a British subject who had by his acts incorporated himself in America either by domicile, by the purchase of land, by the establishment of manufactories, or still more by the exercise of voting, that he should be regarded as otherwise than an American citizen. It was justly regarded that if a person had settled in America at his own option and for his own convenience, he had no right to claim the rights of British citizenship when his residence there became inconvenient, especially as the chances were that he would return as soon as the cause of inconvenience was removed. A line was accordingly drawn, and it was agreed that the option should be given a man of leaving the country if he wished to avoid military service. With regard to the interesting question of the competency of a country to punish a crime committed in another country against itself, he was inclined to think that it was a monstrous thing that any technical rule of venue should prevent justice being done in this country on a criminal for an offense which was perpetrated here, but the execution of which was concocted in another country. But he was not prepared to say that if a criminal, being a foreigner, was accused of a crime against a third state, the same rule should apply. He did not see why any crime committed against a British subject abroad should not be tried here, instead of action being limited to a crime against the state. It was stretching the law of hospitality too far to afford a foreigner a refuge in the country against whose welfare he had been conspiring. The debate was adjourned. [From the London Daily News, January 15, 1868-Editorial.] It is unlucky for the calm consideration of the theory of indefeasible allegiance that the American objection to it is put forward at the very time when we have to defend our institutions against the plots of so-called American citizens. Our columns yesterday, for instance, contained at once the report of a discussion by the Society for the Improvement of the Law on the international bearings of the law of allegiance, and a notice of Mr. Coleridge having raised the point before the Court of Queen's Bench, whether Burke was not a foreigner entitled to the benefit of a mixed jury. Now it is quite certain that, whatever we may do to meet frankly the reasonable wishes of the American government, we shall not consent to any alteration in our laws which will afford a better hope of immunity for Irish Americans who return to this country for the purpose of deluging it with blood. Our first duty is to ourselves. We must make our principles and procedure so distinct as to leave no chance of evasion to those who are really guilty of crimes against the state. Yet, while we are firm upon this point, we may fairly consider what alterations could be conceded in order to facilitate the adoption of a satisfactory general rule. In this inquiry it must always be assumed that we treat only of what may be done in time of peace, for in time of war; and for a certain brief space preceding it, no abandonment of the national flag for that of the enemy can ever be permitted. But during the existence of peace we may readily enough admit that there is no good reason for insisting on maintaining our bond of authority over those who bona fide desire to renounce it in order to make a foreign land their permanent residence. It can be of no possible advantage to us to assert the doctrine that Americans to the remotest generation are still British subjects, since they never come within the reach of British power, nor ever demand British protection or privileges. It is equally useless even to assert the indelible British character of one who was actually born in Britain, when he has unquestionably renounced his claim to the benefits of that character. Even if war broke out, we should not venture to hang him as a traitor if we captured him in arms against us in the enemy's ranks. But while all must admit that the British doctrine is in theory far too extensive, and that it might properly be cut down by admitting a bona fide renunciation of citizenship, coupled with actual permanent residence abroad, to divest the emigrant of his British character, these modifications only introduce new difficulties. How are we to measure bona fides in this matter? What is to constitute a permanent abandonment of residence? Evidently we must secure both these points in some way. To neglect the one would allow a colorable abandonment of our country, only the better to wound it. To omit the other would enable people while still remaining in this country to evade the duties and burdens of its inhabitants. But what test shall we adopt to ascertain the existence of conditions so indefinable, and so subject to variety in different cases? The problem seems difficult, and it is not wonderful that a number of solutions should have been proposed both by the official organs of the states which have discussed it and by private lawyers. Yet, we confess, it seems to us one which a little common sense can sufficiently cope with. What we want to provide against is the case of a person nominally throwing off allegiance in order the more safely to perpetrate a crime. Now, the general law of this and of all countries declares that a foreigner committing a crime within it is punishable as a citizen. It is only in the case of treason that there is a difference, because it is only a citizen that can commit treason. But this is a mere rule of technical law. As such it is one for our own legislature to alter. If we abolish the statement in the indictment that the accused is a subject of the Queen, and owes allegiance to her, we should make the form similar to that of an indictment in every other case; and we should make the foreigner liable in the same way as he is for any other crime. Nor could he complain of being required to conform to the same laws as apply to all around him. We do not invite his presence; we only suffer it. Obviously, we can do so only on condition of his conforming to our laws. He cannot be allowed to murder a private person with impunity. Why should he be allowed to levy war against the Queen with impunity? Nor would the abolition of this purely technical rule in the least affect the rights of foreigners when they are entitled to be treated as such. On an invasion by the troops of a state which is at war with us, we should in strictness be entitled to try every man for murder. But we do not, yielding to the international code which declares that slaughter in public war is not murder. So we should in that case admit that the levying of war was not treason. A public war would alter the character of every act, and there is no chance of difficulty in discriminating whether a war is public between states, or only private, levied by individuals. Indeed, in the latter case we should have, as we have before now pointed out, the additional right to proceed against the foreigner as a mere pirate, as a contravener of international law as well as a breaker of municipal law. As to the period of residence necessary to consummate a change of allegiance, no greater difficulty ought to be found in agreeing upon a general rule. No state would willingly allow full nationality to be acquired, with all its attendant privileges and duties, without a reasonable period of probation. But if that period is fixed upon, it would be of reciprocal effect. On a man who had been denaturalized coming back to the land of his birth, he would have to pass through the like period of residence before he could recover the benefits of citizenship. This in many cases would render him slow to renounce it, for the occurrence in the mean time of a war between the two nations would leave him in the position of an alien enemy, without right to hold property or to sue in our courts. The practical consequence which these remarks point at would be the conclusion of a treaty by which the subjects of all countries should be allowed, on becoming naturalized citizens of another state in time of peace, to renounce citizenship in the land of their birth. They would then, on revisiting it, be free from its civil obligations; though, on the other hand, they would be liable to the civil disabilities of foreigners. But if, when within its borders, they committed a breach of its laws, they would be liable to trial by the ordinary municipal law in the same way as if they were still subjects of the state. Whatever privileges the municipal laws might accord to all foreigners would be theirs. But no other state would be entitled to demand that any exceptional privileges at all should be accorded to foreigners, since that is solely a matter for the internal regulation of each state by itself. In its application to existing circumstances the effect of the rule would be, that Burke, if a naturalized American, must have declared that he had ceased to be a subject of the United Kingdom. But if he is proved to have levied war against the sovereign of the United Kingdom, he would be liable to be hanged just as if he were still a subject. Besides this, he would be liable to be hanged if he were proved to be a foreigner who was on a fillibustering expedition. He would be entitled to a mixed jury so long as our laws allow that privilege to foreigners. But, on the other hand, he could hardly expect the sympathy or intercession in his behalf of the American government, since he would not only have committed treason and piracy against us, but would have broken the American laws to which he owes allegiance, in levying private war against a friendly state of which he had avowedly and expressly ceased to be a subject. Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams. No. 2123.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, January 20, 1868. SIR: Referring to my No. 2097 in regard to the question pending between the governments of Great Britain and Nicaragau, concerning the Musquito territory, I now inclose for your information a copy of a dispatch from the United States minister to Nicaragua, containing the correspondence between Mr. Dickinson and the minister for foreign affairs regarding the action which this government has taken in the matter. I am, sir, your obedient servant, WILLIAM H. SEWARD. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c. Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward. No. 1522.] LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: On Saturday evening, the 18th instant, I received a telegram from Mr. Eastman, the consul at Queenstown, announcing the fact that Mr. G. F. Train, a passenger in the steamer Scotia from New York, had been arrested on the tug-boat whilst going up the harbor, and was still detained, on suspicion of intentions hostile to the government. I wrote at once to Mr. Eastman, giving him instructions to learn the facts of the case, and if it should turn out as I fully expected, that there were no just grounds for his detention, to apply for his release. If, on the other hand, there was a continued detention for reasons assigned, I directed him to report them at once to me. I called at the foreign office yesterday, and spoke incidentally of this case, expressing my own confidence that whatever Mr. Train might have said in America, there was no ground for believing him disposed to do any act here that would compromise him with the authorities; hence I hoped that no further measures would be taken to detain him. My own impression was that he had had no intention to remain in Ireland at all. His lordship said that he knew nothing of the case from any source but the public journals. Mr. Train was well known here already. His first impressions rather coincided with my notions of his doings. But he should be obliged to inform himself of the grounds upon which the detention had been made before being in a position to give any official opinion on the matter. *For inclosure dispatch No. 144, December 23, 1867, from the United States minister to Nicaragua. The public journals generally contain extracts from Mr. Train's speech in Boston, taken from the Pilot, and are disposed to make merry with it. But I cannot help thinking the act of the arrest extremely injudicious; and hope that the government will see it in that light whilst there is time to correct the error. A few hours after writing the above I received a telegram from Mr. Eastman at Queenstown, announcing that Mr. Train had beeu released. Still later in the evening I got a private note from Lord Stanley to the effect that he had communicated with Lord Mayo, who had informed him that the arrest had been made by the magistrates. at Queenstown without communication with Dublin. Directions for the release of Mr. Train had been given from the latter place. I have now reason to believe that the whole affair originated with a fellow passenger in the steamer by the name of Gee, who informed the magistrates of conversations of Mr. Train on shipboard, which he did not himself hear, and failed on being called upon to substantiate. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. No. 1525.] Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward. LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, SIR: The agitation of the public mind consequent upon the late attempts at violence having pretty well subsided, I thought the time had arrived when I could communicate to Lord Stanley, with some prospect of a hearing, the substance of your dispatch, No. 2108, of the 14th of December. I did so upon my visit to the foreign office on Monday last. I recapitulated to his lordship the grounds upon which you placed the representation, as being the person charged with the duty of watching the friendly state of the relations between the two countries, and then stated the unfavorable effect produced in America by the late convictions and penalties inflicted upon those who had become American citizens, and were, therefore, an object of interest there. I likewise mentioned your opinion that it would have been a good thing to have released Messrs. Nagle, Warren, and Costello, as viewed in the light in which you are placed. His lordship listened to all I had to say very quietly, and when I had closed he only remarked that it had never been the disposition of the government to exercise any needless severity against the unprovoked attacks which had been made on the country. He felt very sure that not a trace of vindictiveness or of ill temper could be found in any of their acts. They had been obliged to use their best judgment in difficult circumstances much as we ourselves had done, and if some of the consequences were not favorable they could only regret that it should be so. He did not know that he was called to give any formal answer to your communication. I said that I could not say I expected one, as I understood your intention had been confined to a friendly expression of opinion. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, |