that the reservation of interest semi-annually was in conflict with the statute authorizing annual interest; Coler v. Santa Fe County Commissioners, 6 N. M. 132, 27 Pac. 629, holding that by implication county and township officials had statutory power to adjudicate all the preliminary matters and to recite their determination on the bonds in terms creating an estoppel; Belo v. Commissioners, 76 N. C. 495, holding that recitals were conclusive and constituted an estoppel in pais in an action by a bona fide purchaser for value; Walker v. State (Bond Debt Cases), 12 S. C. 275, holding that when a statute authorizes an issue upon conditions, a recital of issue under the authority of the statute is conclusive of compliance with conditions; dissenting opinion in Smith v. Sac Co., 11 Wall. 163, 20 L. Ed. 110, majority holding that when fraud in the origin of the bonds was shown it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove that he was an innocent holder for value.

Distinguished in Morris v. Griffith & Wedge Co., 69 Fed. 138, as inapplicable where there was no showing that the corporation officers had authority to make and issue its promissory notes; Lewis v. Bourbon County Commissioners, 12 Kan. 219, holding that there being no recitals and records showing noncompliance with the statute, the county plead no authority.

Bonds and coupons as negotiable instruments. Note, 23 Am. Rep. 16.

Coupon bonds. Note, 64 Am. Dec. 480.

Conclusiveness upon Federal courts of construction given to statute by State court subsequent to accrual of right involved. Note, 17 Ann. Cas. 1213.

Questions of State law as to which State court decisions must be followed in actions originating in, or removed to, Federal courts. Note, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 410.

5 Wall. 785-791, 18 L. Ed. 562, KELLY v. CRAWFORD.

An agreement, the validity of which is contested, may be admitted in evidence, "subject to the proof to be given hereafter."

Approved in First Unitarian Soc. v. Faulkner, 91 U. S. 418, 23 L. Ed. 284, holding that the order and times of introducing evidence belong to the Circuit Courts, with which the Supreme Court ought not to interfere.

An agreement that accountant's certificate should be final as to amount due is not a submission to arbitration, nor is accountant's report an award of an arbitrator.

Approved in Erickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 125 Mich. 391, 84 N. W. 468, following rule; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, 162 Fed. 233,

15 Ann. Cas. 498, 89 C. C. A. 205, and Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 *U. S. 198, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1084, 54 L. Ed. 999, 30 Sup. Ct. 615, both holding appraisers of value of water system being purchased by municipality could independently examine books relating to property; American Steel Co. v. German-American Fire Ins. Co., 187 Fed. 733, 109 C. C. A. 478, holding appraisement not void because appraisers appointed under insurance policy to fix loss, met without notice to insurer with officers of insured present pointing out property damaged; Toledo S. S. Co. v. Zenith Transp. Co., 184 Fed. 406, 106 C. C. A. 501, holding where arbitration agreement providing for three arbitrators provided for award by two, refusal of one to sign award did not invalidate it nor subsequent proceedings to ascertain damages by two of them; Royal Ins. Co. v. Ries, 80 Ohio St. 284, 88 N. E. 640, holding appraisement under terms of insurance policy was not subject to strict rules of arbitration and award, and was valid where appraisers having list of property and claimed loss refused to hear testimony; Willingham v. Veal, 74 Ga. 759, holding an agreement that if contracting parties could not agree on market value, it should be ascertained by parties to be appointed by the contractors, was not agreement for an arbitration; Green Street etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 64 Pa. St. 91, holding that where a railway company accepted a charter on condition of their purchasing the stock of a horsecar line, at a price to be fixed by appraisers, was not a submission to arbitration; dissenting opinion in Norton v. Gale, 95 Ill. 547, 35 Am. Rep. 180, majority holding a proviso in lease that rent be based on appraised value of premises not a submission to arbitration.

After dissolution, a partner may ratify the act of a former partner in signing firm name, and such ratification binds firm.

Approved in Williston v. Camp, 9 Mont. 97, 22 Pac. 503, holding that signature of a note by one of the firm in the presence of all, and receipt of the benefit of the proceeds, was both delegation and ratification.

5 Wall. 791-795, 18 L. Ed. 606, O'NEAL v. KIRKPATRICK,

Right of State to grant tide-lands. Note, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340.

5 Wall. 795-808, 18 L. Ed. 653, DEERY v. CRAY,

Recitals in ancient conveyance, of facts on which its power depends, when not inconsistent with any fact found, may be proved as against persons who are not parties to deed, and who claim no right under it.

Approved in Johnson v. Jarvis, 223 Fed. 758, 139 C. C. A. 286, following rule; Butterfield v. Miller, 195 Fed. 207, 209, 115 C. C. A. 152, holding ancient deed not evidence of title where authority for execution was of record and failure to produce same not accounted for; Stockley v.

Cissna, 119 Fed. 824, 56 C. C. A. 324, holding recitals in recent deed that grantors are heirs of former owner, without circumstances to support, are not evidence against stranger; Norris v. Hall, 124 Mich. 175, 82 N. W. 834, holding recitals of death in ancient documents are proof of death; Rollins v. Atlantic City R. Co., 73 N. J. L. 70, 62 Atl. 931, holding recital of pedigree in ancient deed was evidential though made by one not related to family when supported by long-continued possession consistent with fact recited; Young v. Shulenberg, 165 N. Y. 388, 59 N. E. 136, holding in absence of rebutting evidence recitals in ancient deed executed in foreign country, that grantors are heirs at law of one who died intestate and seised of land conveyed, is evidence of those facts; Wilson v. Braden, 56 W. Va. 375, 107 Am. St. Rep. 929, 49 S. E. 410, recitals of heirship and widowhood in deeds upward of thirty years old, under which possession continuously held, are admissible against adverse claimants; Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 U. S. 399, 29 L. Ed. 919, 6 Sup. Ct. 785, admitting a declaration of sole heirship in a writing sixty-one years old as proper evidence tending to prove such fact; Jackson v. Deslonde, 1 Posey, 685, holding that recitals in a deed forty years old were evidence, coupled with testimony of possession; Harman v. Stearns, 95 Va. 63, 27 S. E. 603, holding that a recital of grantor's widowhood in a deed forty-six years old necessarily implied the prior death of her husband.

Recital in deed as binding on stranger to instrument. Note, Ann.
Cas. 1915A, 98, 100.

Recital in deed as evidence of heirship. Note, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.)

94.

No one can rely on estoppel growing out of a transaction to which he was not a party or a privy, and which in no manner touches his rights; mutuality is a requisite of all estoppels.

Approved in Laughlin v. Page, 108 Me. 316, 80 Atl. 756, holding persons claiming under beneficiaries of trust not bound by recitals in deed to trustee of land purchased with proceeds of trust estate that they consented to inclusion of others as beneficiaries; Price v. Ward, 25 Nev. 213, 68 Pac. 851, holding administrator cannot sue to redeem from mortgage on intestate's lands in another State by setting off against mortgage debt waste committed by mortgage in possession after death of intestate; Merriman v. Blalack, 56 Tex. Civ. 607, 121 S. W. 558, holding where married woman's deed to husband was void, and she afterward conveyed land to another by deed reciting conveyance to husband neither she nor those claiming under later deed were estopped to deny validity of conveyance to husband, except as to those claiming under it; Thompson v. Sioux Falls Nat. Bank, 150 U. S. 244, 37 L. Ed. 1067, 14

Sup. Ct. 99, doubting if a transferee of a cashier's check, given without consideration, could plead maker was estopped from denying liability; Fitch v. Cornell, 1 Sawy. 171, Fed. Cas. 4834, holding that a judgment in another case cannot estop the plaintiff in a subsequent action, unless it also binds the defendants in the subsequent action; Stanton v. Alabama, etc. R. R. Co., 31 Fed. 588, holding that a contract by a purchaser, appointed receiver, to pay invalid certificates, issued by a prior receiver, was not estopped from pleading ultra vires; Houston v. Blythe, 60 Tex. 512, holding that recitals in a private instrument, executed between the original grantee and a stranger to the plaintiffs in error, could not aid or prejudice their rights; Rives v. Farish's Admr., 24 Gratt. 134, holding that when an estoppel is relied on to conclude a party from claiming a clear legal right, he who claims the benefit ought himself to be bound by it.

A recital in a married woman's certificate of acknowledgment, of examination "privately, apart from and out of the hearing of" her husband, shows conclusively that the examination was had out of his presence, as required by statute.

Approved in Black v. Aman, 6 Mackey (D. C.), 138, holding acknowledgment of married woman to deed showed substantial compliance with statute; Geil v. Geil, 101 Va. 775, 45 S. E. 326, upholding acknowledgment of married woman showing that writing was fully explained to her, that she was examined by officer privily and apart from her husband, and that she "declared that she had willingly executed same and does not wish to retract it"; Nippel v. Hammond, 4 Colo. 216, holding "contents and meaning of the deed were made known and fully explained," to comply with requirement that "the effect of the deed" should be explained; Hart v. Sanderson's Admrs., 18 Fla. 112, where the certificate to a mortgage, with a covenant of warranty, stated that it was executed to convey "all her estate in esse and in futuro," held sufficient to bar dower; Johnson v. Badger Mill & M. Co., 13 Nev. 353, sustaining sufficiency of a certificate of acknowledgment of a mortgage by the president and secretary of a corporation on the question of identification; Hockman v. McClanahan, 87 Va. 37, 12 S. E. 231, holding that the substantial compliance must extend to every requisite of the statute; Virginia Coal etc. Co. v. Roberson, 88 Va. 118, 13 S. E. 351, holding that where possession was taken and purchase money paid, a conveyance with defective acknowledgment constituted a contract which would be specifically enforced; Blair v. Sayre, 29 W. Va. 610, 613, 2 S. E. 100, 101, holding a certificate that "she acknowledged that she had willingly executed the same and does not wish to retract it," fatally defective.

Acknowledgment of deeds by married women. Note, 41 Am. Dec.

181.

When defects in certificates of acknowledgments are fatal and when not. Note, 108 Am. St. Rep. 569.

Necessity and sufficiency of certificate of authority to take acknowledgment. Note, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1238.

Impeachment of certificate of acknowledgment. Note, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1175.

Certificate of married woman's acknowledgment. Note, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1113.

No judgment should be reversed when alleged error works no injury to appellant; but this must be shown beyond doubt.

Approved in Todd v. United States, 221 Fed. 208, 136 C. C. A. 615, Pettine v. Territory of New Mexico, 201 Fed. 492, 119 C. C. A. 581, Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. Miller, 174 Fed. 611, 98 C. C. A. 453, Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Heidel, 161 Fed. 539, 88 C. C. A. 477, United States v. Ute Coal & Coke Co., 158 Fed. 29, 85 C. C. A. 302, Traver v. Smolik, 43 App. D. C. 153, Huston v. Johnson, 29 N. D. 556, 151 N. W. 776, Nichols v. Camden Interstate Ry. Co., 62 W. Va. 413, 59 S. E. 970, and Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 203, 15 Ann. Cas. 392, 53 L. Ed. 473, 29 Sup. Ct. 260, all reversing judgment where not affirmatively shown errors in ruling on admissibility of evidence was not prejudicial; Sprinkle v. United States, 150 Fed. 59, 82 C. C. A. 1, where defendants were jointly indicted with others, typewritten letter purported to have been dictated by one of them and signed in his name by rubber stamp was inadmissible against him; Inman Bros. v. Dudley etc. Lumber Co., 146 Fed. 452, 76 C. C. A. 659, in action for breach of contract to sell all lumber on hand and entire cut for certain year estimated at certain figure, exclusion of evidence by defendant of amount actually cut during year is prejudicial; Armour & Co. v. Russell, 144 Fed. 615, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 602, 75 C. C. A. 416, in action for personal injuries to servant, it is prejudicial to instruct that it is master's duty to furnish reasonably safe place to work, reasonably safe appliances, and to keep them in reasonably safe repair; Seattle Elec. Co. v. Hartless, 144 Fed. 381, 75 C. C. A. 317, under Bal. Code (Wash.), §§ 4828, 4838, relating to actions for wrongful death by heirs and personal representatives, in action by widow and daughter, evidence as to their physical condition is inadmissible; Bank of Havelock v. Western Union Tel. Co., 141 Fed. 526, 5 Ann. Cas. 515, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 181, 72 C. C. A. 580, where evidence is insufficient to sustain verdict for defeated party in action for sending unauthorized telegram, instruction directing verdict against him on other and erroneous ground is not

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