30

INVASION OF EGYPT.

induced him to yield. Towards the end of the year 1166, the rumours which spread over the whole country of immense preparations being made in Syria for the invasion of Egypt, gave notice both to the Franks of Palestine and to Schawer, the vizier, or rather Sultan* of Egypt, of the designs entertained by the Attabec for the subjection of that country.

The interests of Almeric and Schawer were now evidently the same; the authority of the latter was the direct object of assault, but the very existence of the Franks in Palestine could not be considered as secure for one moment, unless the projected occupation of Egypt by the forces of Noureddin were prevented from taking place. Schawer consequently summoned at once the King of Jerusalem to his aid, and Almeric called all his forces to his standard, and set out without a moment's delay. The latter reached the city of Pelusium, or Belbeis, and effected his junction with the Egyptians before Schircou could accomplish the longer march which he had to make; and the emir, proceeding by the deserts, and losing a number of men by the way, found himself suddenly in the neighbourhood of a superior adverse force. After various manoeuvres to escape from this unpleasant predicament, the Syrian emir endeavoured, by specious allurements, to bring over Schawer and the Egyptians to his own party. He made vast promises, and summoned his vizier, by his faith in Mahomet, to aid him in exterminating the Franks, engaging, at the same time, to quit Egypt as soon as this great act of Mussulman policy was accomplished. Schawer was too wise, however, to trust to so dangerous a guest, and Schircou soon heard that the vizier had shown his letter to the Christians, and put the messenger to death.

The two armies were at this time encamped on the opposite banks of the Nile, but Schircou, who was evidently inferior in number to his adversaries, retreated before them, and Almeric, passing the river, pursued him with all speed. The Syrian forces were overtaken some short way beyond Hermopolis; and a battle being inevitable, the emir ranged his forces in order, giving the command of a large body to his nephew, Saladin, with orders to make a circuit, and attack the Christians in the rear, while he himself maintained the battle in front. The time occupied by the circuit taken by * We find that the viziers of Egypt had adopted this title some time before.

BATTLE OF HERMOPOLIS.

31

Saladin afforded the King of Jerusalem an opportunity of attacking Schircou while his forces were diminished. For some time the battle was favourable to Almeric; Schircou was driven back, and on the eve of a total defeat, when the appearance of Saladin upon the field turned the fortunes of the day. Schircou rallied his battalion, Saladin charged the rear of the Christian army, and the day was still undecided when night fell and separated the combatants.* The Mahommedan writers claim a great victory for the Syrians, and adduce as a proof thereof, that the baggage of the enemy, and one of the principal leaders of Almeric's host, named Hugh of Cæsarea, fell into their hands. The Christians say that the result was doubtful, and it is certain that the whole of the allied army reassembled, and on the following morning passed calmly, and in good order, through a valley between two divisions of the Syrian army, which did not venture to renew the battle. Almeric only retreated to the town of Lamonia, or Elmonia, said to be ten miles from the field of battle, and there remained for three days; while Schircou, on the contrary, hastened rapidly to Alexandria, apparently expecting to be attacked by the way.

The Christian army followed, and endeavoured to blockade the city, having refreshed and recruited itself at Cairo; and Schircou, finding that the provisions in Alexandria and its immediate neighbourhood could not support his whole army, left his nephew, Saladin, with a thousand men in the town, and by a masterly march opened a way into Upper Egypt. The movements of Schircou produced considerable alarm in the mind of Almeric for the safety of Cairo; and although he

* It will be seen that this account of the battle is totally different from that given by Mills, and by almost all other European writers. The cause of this difference is, that I have taken my account of the battle chiefly from Ibn-aboutai, who received the description which he gives from Edrisi, who was present. This ocular testimony thus transmitted to us I conceive to be the best; but another reason for adopting it here, in preference to that of Ibn-alatir, is, that the statement of Edrisí is much more in harmony with that of William of Tyre than that of the other writer. Thus William of Tyre and Edrisi both state that Schircou was in the centre, and not on the left wing; that Schircou was on the eve of a complete defeat; that the recovery of the Syrian army was owing to the appearance of the corps commanded by Saladin, and that night fell before the battle was over. On all these points Ibn-alatir differs from both; but their concurring testimony must surely outweigh his authority, especially as we find that after the battle, if either army displayed the appearance of flying from the other, it was that of Schircou, who, says the historian of the Attabecs, won the victory.

32

PROPOSALS FOR PEACE.

had made some progress towards reducing Alexandria by famine, the King of Jerusalem determined to march in pursuit of the Syrian commander. The inhabitants of Alexandria had supported Schircou zealously, but the idea of starvation alarmed them; and just as the Christian army was about to commence its second day's march in pursuit of the emir, one of the leading men of the city presented himself before Almeric, and promised to aid in expelling the troops of Saladin.* Schawer and the King of Jerusalem instantly returned to the attack, and now employed all those means for battering the walls which were customary in that age. Saladin resisted with the greatest determination and gallantry, and for three months kept the enemy at bay; but the famine had become intense; the defences were shattered at various points; it was evident the city could not hold out much longer, and messengers from the young emir announced to his uncle, who was still in Upper Egypt, that Alexandria must speedily be surrendered if he did not march to its relief.

On receiving this intelligence, Schircou began to descend rapidly towards Alexandria, but, hopeless of making any impression upon the Christian and Egyptian army, which had lately been augmented by reinforcements from Palestine, he sent for his prisoner, Hugh of Cæsarea, and by his intervention proposed to Almeric a convention, in virtue of which Alexandria should be surrendered, an exchange of prisoners take place, and the Frankish and Syrian forces be allowed to quit Egypt, and march peaceably back to their several countries. Schircou represented, in eloquent language, the pressing necessity which there existed for Almeric's return to Palestine, and that monarch himself was well aware that his presence in his own kingdom could not be much longer dispensed with. The overtures for peace were favourably received by all parties; but Saladin demanded a complete

* William of Tyre, lib. xix. The account of Ibn-aboutai does not materially differ from that of the archbishop. He does not, indeed, mention that Almeric had commenced the siege before Schircou retired into Upper Egypt, or that any of the inhabitants of Alexandria took part with the Christians; but it is probable that even Edrisi, from whom he received his intelligence, through a companion of Saladin, did not know what passed without the walls, and in the Christian camp. For those facts I have relied on the Latin writers.

The account of what passed in the Syrian camp was given to William of Tyre by Hugh of Cæsarea himself.

RETURN OF ALMERIC TO ASCALON.

33

amnesty from Schawer in favour of the inhabitants of Alexandria, and this having been granted, peace was proclaimed, and the two armies prepared to put in execution the terms of the treaty.

Saladin seems to have been given as an honourable hostage for the good faith of the Mahommedans, and remained for some time in the Christian camp, treated with the highest distinction.† Schawer entered the town in, triumph; and it would appear that, forgetful of the amnesty which had been promised, he was about to punish such of the inhabitants of Alexandria as had espoused the part of the Syrians, but Almeric at once interposed, and forced his ally to abide by the treaty.

The King of Jerusalem would seem even to have conceived a personal regard for Saladin, for we find that he furnished him with ships to convey the sick and wounded of the young emir's army to Acre, promising them a secure passage through Palestine. At Acre, however, these invalids were seized upon by the commander in that city, and were ordered by him to be employed as slaves in a sugar-press; but Almeric was moved with much indignation when he heard it, and he instantly caused the Mussulmans to be conveyed in safety to their own country. These acts of good faith and generosity are recorded by a Syrian, although European writers of a later date, while striving with an illiberal liberality to raise the character of the Mahommedans at the expense of their fellow-Christians, have totally forgotten to mention many such acts, which throw a bright light into the scene where too many dark shadows are apparent on all sides.

Schircou and the Syrian forces returned unsuccessful from Egypt; and Almeric, with the Christian host, having succeeded in all that he had undertaken, having frustrated the two most famous generals of Noureddin, maintained Schawer in authority, and forced the enemy to evacuate the territory in dispute, re-trod his steps to Ascalon in the month of August, 1167, after the most scientific campaign which we have yet seen in the holy wars.

* Ibn-aboutai.

+ Will. Tyr.

Edrisi, who was himself one of the invalids thus conveyed back by Almeric to his own country.

34

DESIGNS UPON EGYPT.

The struggles for Egypt, however, were not yet come to an end; Almeric had faithfully performed all his engagements to Schawer, and the vizier, or sultan, as we now find him called, had agreed to pay to the Frankish monarchs of Jerusalem an annual sum of 100,000 pieces of gold. Probably at his request, also, a chosen body of Christian troops. were left under his command in Cairo, and to their charge he entrusted the gates of the city. An officer, whose functions seem to have been something similar to those of a resident consul, was appointed by the King of Jerusalem to conduct his affairs in Egypt; and the greatest harmony, it would appear, existed between the two powers at the period of Almeric's return to Ascalon.*

Both Schircou, however, and the Latin king, still fixed their eyes upon the land they had just left with feelings of ambitious cupidity, which nothing but the subjection of that country could satisfy; and we find that shortly after the return of the latter, very pressing applications were made to him from two quarters, urging him strongly to undertake at once the conquest of Egypt. Almeric had not long enjoyed an interval of repose in Palestine, when secret envoys from the emperor of the east proposed to him to unite the forces of Constantinople and Jerusalem in one great effort to overthrow the Fatimite rule on the banks of the Nile. The weakness of that country was pointed out to him, and the certainty that it must soon fall into the hands of Noureddin, if not seized upon by the Christians, was clearly demonstrated. It is proved that Almeric had so far forgotten his good faith as to agree to the designs of the emperor, and to send messengers for the arrangement of the whole plan, before Schawer had given him any cause for suspicion. Whether his treachery was discovered by the Egyptian prince, or whether the latter was but little behind the king in falsehood, I cannot tell; but rumours were speedily circulated of a frequent intercourse by couriers between Nour

* It is clear from the accounts of the Mussulman writers themselves, that the treaty between Schircou and Almeric did not by any means stipulate that the king should withdraw his forces from Egypt; and the above facts mentioned by Ibn-alatir, as well as that of its being the banner of Almeric which was first planted on the pharos of Alexandria, on the surrender of the city-an important fact in feudal times-clearly show that the success of the campaign was entirely on the side of the allied Christian and Egyptian forces.