e) f) the maintenance of rosters of experts for the purpose of mediation, concilliation or arbitration and help in the selection of appropriate persons qualified to advise in particular disputes; advising the Commission on the recommendation of panels of g) the consideration of future issues and the requirements for h) the reasonableness and proportionality of countermeasures taken as a result of treaty violations; i) oversee the harmonization of standards on animal health, plants, etc. as provided for in the schedules to Chapter Seven. : This list could continue. The types of issues which will become of concern to both governments and their citizens as a result of this agreement are potentially as extensive as the nature of the economic interpretation that it will produce. Without a permanent group of experts working together with the common goal of ensuring the effective application of the Agreement, the Commission runs the risk of being a body which will respond only to domestic political pressures on various issues as they arise. As such it will not further the implementation and operation of this Treaty; it will tend to contribute to problems rather than resolve them. Only future experience can determine the nature and scope of the Commission's operations, the Agreement itself is sketchy when it deals with this important institution. The Parties' willingness to create an infrastructure adequate to ensure the establishement of a truly binational institution will ultimately determine the effectiveness of the Commission and, in the end, that of the agreement itself. ENDNOTES * In these endnotes "P.T." refers to the Preliminary Text; Introductory 1. notes to Chapters referred to, article number references and page Speech, Frank Iaccabuci, Deputy Minister of Justice of Canada, Fifth 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. On the role of the Commission in the European Communities see Lasok & Art. 1802.4. Agreement, p. 259. Graham, W., "Government Procurement Policies, GATT, the EEC and the 239. Agreement, pp. 69-70. See, for example, the "Casis de Dijon" Case, Rewe-Zential Bundes See Burrows, F. supra note 8, Part II. See, for example, Van Duyn v. Home Office [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1, and 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. Burrows, F. supra note 8 at 231 ff. Ibid. See, Black et al. v. Law Society of Alberta, (1986), 44 Alta. L.R. (2d) 1 (F.C.C.A.); Trebilcock et al. eds., supra note 6, at 273 ff. Cohen, M. "Canada and the U.S. New Approaches to Undeadly Quarrels", 16 International Perspectives (Mar.-Apr. 1985). See Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Canada- Report, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development These observations are drawn primarily from a speech by L.H. Legault See, Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, Testimony on United States Trade Jackson, J.H., "GATT an the Tokyo Round Agreements" in Cline, ed., See Stein, E., "Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Jackson, J.H., supra note 19, at 182 refers to the notion of nullification and impairment in the GATT as "exceedingly ambiguous". An See Hudec, "GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: Horlick et al., supra note 18 at 27; USITC Report, supra note 22 at at 82 ff. 24. 25. 26. 27. Chorzow Factory Case, (1929) A/17 at p. 29; Harris, D.J., Cases & See Summary Report of the Committee on Canada-United States Relations of the Canadian and U.S. Chambers of Commerce, Scotsdale, Arizona, April 1-3, 1987, at 5. EEC Treaty, Art. 173; Lasok & Bridge, supra note 3 at 169 ff. American & Canadian Bar Associations Joint Working Group on the 28. Ibid., at 22. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. Ibid., at 26. Art. 1808. It is interesting to note the title to Art. 1808 "Referrals EEC Treaty, art. 169; Lasok & Bridge, supra note 3, at 116, 167-169. For text see 12 Bevans 319, 102 Br. & For. S. Papers 137; see also See ABA/CBA Report, supra note 27, at 9. 34. 35. 24 Int. Leg. Mat. 653 (1985) arts. 17 & 19. 38. 39. Franck, T., Messianism & Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace ABA/CBA Report, supra note 27 at 9. |