(Cheers.) According to the declaration which has been made by the General commanding the Rus sian forces, Prince Gortschakoff, the evacuation ought immediately to follow on the satisfaction obtained by Turkey from the Emperor of Russia. I will only say further, that it is an object which Her Majesty's Government consider to be essential: but with respect to the mode in which the object is to be obtained with respect to the mode in which the end is to be secured-I ask the permission of Parliament to say nothing further upon this head, but to leave the means-the end being one which is certain to be obtained to leave the means by which it is to be obtained in the executive Government. With respect to the question which has been raised as to the fleets of England and France at Besika Bay, that of course need not be made any question of difficulty, because, supposing Turkey were in danger, we ought to have the power at all times of sending our fleets to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles to be ready to assist Turkey in case of any such danger, and we ought not to consent to any arrangement by which it may be stipulated that the advance of the fleets to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles should be considered as equivalent to an actual invasion of the Turkish territories. But, of course, if the matter is settled-if peace is secured, Besika Bay is not a station which would be of any advantage either to England or France."

In conclusion he said, he thought we had now a fair prospect, without involving Europe in hostilities, or exposing the independence and integrity of Turkey, that the ob

ject in view would be secured in no very long space of time. "I will only say further, that this question of the maintenance of Turkey is one that must always require the attention-and I may say, the vigilant attention-of any person holding in his hands the foreign affairs of this country. This, however, can only be secured by a constant union between England and France-by a thorough concert and constant communication between those two great Powers."

Mr. Layard denied that he was anxious for war; but he regretted that the head of the Government had declared that his policy was essentially a policy based on peace.

Such is not the language of a Minister or a great statesman. If the honour and interests of England can only be maintained by war, let us have war. Why do we hear it said among men of all classes and opinions, that if the hon. Member for Tiverton had been Minister for Foreign Affairs, Russia would not have crossed the Pruth?-Not because the country wants war, but because peace is best preserved by a firm and dignified attitude, letting the world know that, anxious as England is for peace, she is prepared for war. Any other attitude only encourages a lawless power like Russia to make demands that sooner or later must lead to war."

The real difference between himself and the Government turned upon the point, whether or not a great principle was involved in the present question; and whether the conduct of Russia was not part of a great scheme of policy. He affirmed that it was. The firman making concessions to France was shown to M. de Titoff, and not

objected to, weeks before it was issued. Prince Menschikoff, on his arrival at Constantinople, demanded and obtained the dismissal of M. Garaschinin, the popular national Minister of Servia. In 1843, by the aid of Lord Aberdeen, Russia succeeded in forcing the Porte to annul the popular act of the Servian people, who expelled Prince Michael, the Russian tool. Since that time, Russia had checked every rising nationality. In 1848, all men of liberal and independent opinions were driven out of Moldavia and Wallachia; by the treaty of Balta Liman, Russia established her right to interfere in all the internal affairs of the Principalities; and they were to all intents and purposes Russian provinces. Protestantism had spread among the Christian subjects of Turkey, mainly through the influence of the American missionaries; but the Greek religion was a persecuting religion, and the converts were only saved -not from Turkish, but Greek persecution under the firmans obtained by Lord Cowley and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. When persecution was no longer available, Prince Menschikoff appeared at Constantinople. The note which he gave in before he departed, made a distinction between the Orthodox Eastern Church and the other rights and privileges of the clergy. The great end of Russia had been to crush the spirit of religious and political independence which had manifested itself of late among the Christian subects of the Porte; and in this she had succeeded.

In passing, Mr. Layard contended against the project for the establishment of a Greek empire at Constantinople. It was based

on a fallacy. The Greek population was small when compared with other Christian races in Turkey; and a Greek empire would lead to Russian domination in Turkey, and throw the whole of Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia, into confusion. Some persons hold that it would signify little whether Constantinople were in the hands of Russia or not; but no British statesman could coincide with such an opinion; the very moment that Constantinople passed from the hands of the Turks, British India would be in jeopardy.

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The object of Russia was to render any other Government but her own impossible in Turkey." In those designs she had entirely succeeded on this occasion. We have, in my opinion, committed two great diplomatic errors. In the first place, when Colonel Rose knew that Prince Menschikoff had proposed a secret treaty to the Porte-a fact known to many other persons at Constantinople, and that he had declared that Russia would consider any communication of the fact to either France or England as a direct act of hostility against Russia- and when we knew, not from mere rumour but from authentic reports, that Russia was accumulating great armaments on the frontiers of Turkey and at Odessa-preparing, in fact, for war-we ought not to have been satisfied with the explanations and assurances which the noble Lord has told us were given us at St. Petersburg. We ought to have insisted that Russia should give us, by an immediate disarming, or by some other step, a proof of her pacific intentions; and unless she did so, we ought to have acted accordingly. Our not having done so was an error; but that

error having been committed, the results were inevitable. The next error was in not having, at the very moment when Russia declared that she would pass the Pruth, informed her that we should consider that a casus belli; not, perhaps, that we might go to war, but that the treaties existing between Russia and the Porte, and on which those pretensions to interference with and protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte were founded, would be abrogated; and we should then have been in a position to declare to Russia that she should not again enter into any treaty engagements with Turkey without the concurrence and participation of England and France; and if we had taken that step, I for one believe that Russia would never have dared to cross the Pruth."

Mr. Layard had no doubt that Russia would now evacuate the provinces; because they were already her own. We had lost a golden opportunity of making them a barrier to Russian ambition; and we said we had gained a peaceful diplomatic victory, "I doubt that victory." France and England have been humiliated; Turkey has been in vaded; and we are endeavouring to induce her to accept those very demands which in the first instance we urged her to resist. Suppose Turkey to refuse her assent to the draught note so eagerly accepted by the Emperor of Russia, we shall then be called upon to assist Russia in compelling Turkey to accept an unjust proposal, directly sanctioning the right of Russia to interfere in behalf of twelve millions of Christian subjects of the Porte. "You say it is a question settled; but I contend it is only deferred" Cheers.)

Mr. Layard held that the results of our policy would be, that every weak State in Europe which had depended on us, would see that it was useless to struggle any longer against the encroachments of Russia.

Sir J. Pakington complained of the shortness of the notice given by Lord J. Russell of his intention to make his statement, after listening to which, he said, he felt it not to be expedient either to express any opinion as to the policy of the Government, or to follow the noble Lord into the various topics to which he had adverted. He could not, however, help deeply regretting that it was not in the power of the noble Lord to make a more satisfactory statement, and, although he rejoiced that the Government had determined to regard the evacuation of the Principalities as a sine quâ non, he lamented that that should still remain an unsettled point. making their evacuation an indispensable condition, the Government would be supported not only by that House, but by the country. All desired peace, but no longer than it could be had with a due regard to the interests and the honour of this country and the balance of power in Europe.

In

Lord Dudley Stuart attacked the policy of the Government as pusillanimous, and censured with asperity the proceedings of Russia. He contended that the integrity and independence of Turkey might have been maintained without entering into any war whatever. If the fleets of France and Great Britain had only been in Besika Bay when they ought to have been

if the crossing of the Pruth had been the signal for their entering the Black Sea-the ambitious de

signs of the autocrat would have been frustrated at once. ("Hear, hear!") There were two ways of maintaining peace. By the one they might obtain for themselves and their allies all that they had a right to demand; but the other way was tamely to submit to every insult and meekly to receive every kick that might be aimed at them. The Minister who maintained peace at that cost was not deserving of much favour; but he did honour him who, while making no unjust demands, did make himself and his country respected, and was able to obtain good terms for himself and his frends. ("Hear, hear!") If we had only had "not a minister of Austria, not a minister of Russia, but a minister of England "(cheers) none of these deplorable events would have occurred to disturb the tranquillity and to endanger the peace of the world-for, disguise the fact as they might, the peace of the world had been in danger, and was not safe then. ("Hear, hear!")

Mr. Monckton Milnes thought Lord D. Stuart had borne too hardly upon the Government. If he was inclined to find fault with the noble Lord at all, it would be that he had not informed them whether, by the present note, or whatever it was, the Turkish Government was in any degree placed in a better position than it would have been if it had not been in duced to resist the demands of Prince Menschikoff. ("Hear, hear!") He could not help think ing that the impression would be left on the minds of the Turkish Government that the English and French Governments had encouraged them to go further in resistance to Russia than they were inclined to support them in with

arms. ("Hear, hear!") Because, if the arrangement was that a Turkish ambassador was to be sent to the Emperor to ask him for permission to put a different construction upon a portion of his own note, he could not see how these negotiations could end in any way that would justify us in inducing the Turkish Government to make the immense sacrifice in armament which it had done. ("Hear, hear!") Knowing as we did the financial difficulties of Turkey, we ought not to have encouraged her to take any position in opposition to Russia, further than we were ready to sustain by force of arms. If the result was to be as he had mentioned, he quite agreed with the noble Lord that the departure of Prince Menschikoff was a most unfortunate occurrence, and no effort ought to have been spared to prevent it. (" Hear, hear!") If that were so, then-and he said it with the profoundest regret-it would have been better to have persuaded the Government of Turkey to have submitted to the demands of Russia, than to have induced her to make this tremendous drain upon her slender resources. ("Hear, hear!") The question next Session would not be, whether Her Majesty's Government had not acted with great moderation towards Russia, but whether they ought to have encouraged the Government of Turkey in a line of policy in which they were not prepared to support them. ("Hear, hear!") The Turkish question would, no doubt, undergo great complication in the course of the year; but supposing the Turkish Government had placed themselves in a position of open hostility to Russia, he (Mr. M. Milnes) did not believe that

the people of England would permit this country to go to war with Russia for the simple purpose of preventing Russian aggression upon Turkey. ("Hear, hear!") Nor did he believe for one moment that if the Turkish Government were in open opposition to Russia, the Christian people under their rule would loyally, firmly, and permanently support Turkey against Russia. There were, no doubt, cultivated men in the Turkish dominions who felt that it was for the interest of the Christians in Turkey that the Turkish rule should continue at least some time longer, but he did not believe that that conviction extended to the whole of these, at least to a certain degree, semi-barbarous populations. (Hear, hear!") Feeling, therefore, that this question was surrounded by difficulties so great and so complicated, he could not blame Her Majesty's Government for having acted in the manner they have done; but he believed it would have really strengthened their hands and confirmed their policy if they had shown a little more confidence in Parliament, especially after the Emperors of France and Russia had published their circulars in their newspapers, and appealed to the spirit of their respective people. ("Hear.")

After a short explanation and reply by Lord John Russell to Sir J. Pakington and Mr. Layard, Mr. Muntz said that if we had had a different Minister-a Minister who would have told the Emperor of Russia that the crossing of the Pruth would be a casus belliRussia would not have crossed the Pruth. But the Emperor knew that nothing would induce us to go to war, and that encouraged him in his career. The only ques

tions mooted by the Government now were simply what would be the expense, and would war be agreeable to the different tradesmen of the nation? All sense of what England once was had been entirely lost. If Oliver Cromwell had governed this country, Russia would not have invaded Turkey. What did he do with France? He interfered there without any consideration of expense; with him it was a question of right, and not of pounds, shillings, and pence. But the question with England now really was-and the feeling had been growing up year after year-one merely of pounds, shillings, and pence; sacrificing all honour, all right, and all independence, to that mercenary feeling.

Mr. Blackett said that Lord John Russell, by refusing to take the Parliament and the nation into his counsels, had immensely increased his responsibility, and must expect a more severe judgment to be passed upon him hereafter, should the result turn out unfavourable.

He pointed out, that Lord John Russell had been silent as to the occupation of the Danubian Principalities, and he understood that no mention of it was contained in the proposition which Russia was said to have accepted. He thought the evacuation of the Principalities was the most important part of the question.

Mr. Cobden said, everybody seemed to agree that the conduct of Russia had been treacherous and violent, and to rejoice that the occurrence had brought about a sincere alliance between England and France. The opinions expressed by Lord J. Russell were those of the people of England,