cent.. or $4.000, for the whole authorized stock, was declared, although $44.938.48 was the surplus or net earnings. The surplus, however, was appropriated to payment of the floating debt of the company. The two appraisers, designated by the act, made oath that they had performed their duty with fidelity, according to the best of their knowledge and belief, in their appraisement of the stock at an actual cash value of $200 per share. On their certificate being filed with the auditor general, it became subject to his scrutiny, and that of the state treasurer, under this proviso to the law: "Provided that if the auditor general and state treasurer, or either of them, is not satisfied with the appraisement and valuation so made and returned, they are hereby authorized and empowered to make a valuation thereof, based upon the facts contained in the report herein required, or upon any information in their possession, or that shall come into their possession, and to settle an account on the valuation so made by them for the taxes, penalties and interest due the commonwealth thereon." The two appraisers designated by the act, having either full knowledge, or the means of full knowledge, of all the business of the company, necessary to an approximately correct estimate of the value of the company's shares, and the officers of the commonwealth having little or none, any dissatisfaction on the part of the latter, based on a mere inspection of the report, must arise from diverse interpretations of the law. And that is all that is alleged here. The auditor general and state treasurer made an appraisement, based on the amount of net earnings in the report, and raised the appraisement of the actual cash value of the capital stock to $748,974.66, being more than 18 times the actual cash value put upon it by the chairman and treasurer of the company. This, the commonwealth argued, is the actual cash value "indicated by the net earnings or profit made" as given in the report. It will be noticed that the $44,338.48 net earnings set out in the report was not divided among the stockholders, or carried into surplus or sinking fund. The company paid its debt with it. It is perfectly plain that no inference is warranted from these facts justifying such a change from the appraised value. The auditor general assumed that the cash value was a principal sum. 6 per cent. of which would equal the net earnings, without regard to what disposition was, and ought to have been in good business management, made of the earnings. No man, as to the stock of any business corporation, can make oath that its actual cash value is a sum which, multiplied by 6, would equal its net earnings. No prudent man, in business transactions, ever does adopt such an estimate as conclusive of an actual cash value. It is one element which is properly considered in making such an estimate, but only one out of many. In purely manufacturing enterprises, which depend for continu

ance and success on a supply of material which is inexhaustible, and on skilled and other labor which may always be obtainable, such a calculation would have greater probability in favor of "actuality." But in coal mining, oil and gas production, ore mining, quarrying, lumbering, and innumerable other enterprises the actual cash value of the stock cannot, from the very nature of the business, be determined solely by the net earnings. for any one year. The net earnings for a year may equal 6 per cent. on a large principal. The very next year the thing, mine, oil or gas territory, quarry, or timber represented by the capital may be wholly exhausted, practically worthless, and the stock becomes of no value whatever. In this view, large net earnings may largely depreciate the actual value of the stock. For example, suppose the greater part of the paid-up capital stock is represented by a tract of coal land, and that large net earnings in the year reported are attributable to large production, this large production would indicate large exhaustion of the coal, and, necessarily, impairment of the capital. To arrive at the actual value, possibilities and probabilities, as well as things certain, are properly considered. The legis lature, instead of saying the actual cash value should be that sum, 6 per cent. of which would equal the net earnings, thus plainly expressing an intention of which they have left no doubt in the estimate to be made on the average price of sales, go no further than to declare that net earnings shall constitute one fact as the ground of an estimate of the actual cash value. The prominent idea or thought of the whole act, as the learned judge of the court below has so clearly shown, was to base taxation on the actual cash value, and that this should be determined from facts. not theories, in all cases except the one that this value should in no case be less than the average price at which the stock sold during the year. In thus, in this one case, fixing a minimum, it is the only theoretical estimate adopted; and this has in it a foundation of at least approximate certainty. The worth of anything is "just so much money as 'twill bring." The man who parts with his property at a price, and he who buys it, may be assumed to have that knowledge which warrants the onein not accepting less, and the other in not paying more than the actual value. The wisdom and justice, both to the taxpayer and the commonwealth, of thus basing taxation on actual value, are so manifest, so completely in accord with the common sense of justice, that it would require a very convincing demonstration that the legislature intended otherwise before we would disturb this judg

The learned attorney general has failed to so convince us, while the judgment of the court below is vindicated by the soundest reasoning, leading to conclusions that areirresistible.

In thus expressing our approval of this judg ment, we do not intend to iu any degree deny

the power of supervision and change by the' commonwealth's officers of the appraisement as returned; but the report is of a fact, not a calculation, and, if the officers are dissatisfied, the act declares they shall "make a valuation thereof, based upon the facts contained in the report herein required, or upon any information within their possession, or that shall come into their possession." Discrepancies between large net earnings, profits, dividends, or surplus and small actual cash value may suggest inquiry to the auditor general. If so, he has by law almost unlimit ed powers of investigation for ascertainment

of the truth; such as the right of examination of books, papers, and witnesses, the right to imprison in cases for disobedience of his summons, or for a refusal to answer. But here, on a mistaken theory that the actual cash value was a sum which, multiplied by 6, would produce the net earnings, the appraisement was arbitrarily changed. There is nothing in the law to justify the change on the facts in the report. It is not pretended that any information had come into their possession of fraud or false swearing. We hold with the court below, in its first conclusion of law from the facts, that: "The amount and rate per cent. of dividends made, and the amount carried to surplus and sinking fund during the tax year, do not furnish an absolute indication or measure of the actual value in cash of the capital stock of a corporation, but are to be considered, with all other relevant facts, in determining what is its actual value in cash." Therefore the judgment is affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. ALDEN COAL CO.

(No. 25.)

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county: J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by the commonwealth against the Alden Coal Company to recover a tax on defendant's capital stock. There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth. M. E. Olmsted, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This case is ruled by the decision in Com. v. Edgerton Coal Co. (opinion filed herewith) 30 Atl. 125. The judgment is affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. PROVIDENT LIFE & TRUST CO. (No. 32.) (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county: J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by the commonwealth against the Provident Lite & Trust Company to recover the tax on defendant's capital stock. There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which plaintiff appeals. Affimed.

W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth. M. E. Olmsted, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This case is ruled by Com. v. Edgerton Coal Co., 30 Atl. 125. The judg ment is affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. PHILADELPHIA CO. (No. 29.)

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin County: J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Philadelphia Company to recover the tax on Action by the commonwealth against the

defendant's capital stock. There was judgment for plaintiff, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth. M. E. Olmsted, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. As this case is ruled by Com. v. Edgerton Coal Co. (opinion filed this day) 30 Atl. 125, the judgment is affirmed, and the appeal dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. ALDEN COAL CO.

(No. 24.)

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county: J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by the commonwealth against the Alden Coal Company to recover the tax on defendant's capital stock. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth. M. Ę. Olmsted, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. The questions raised here are practically the same as those raised in Com. v. Edgerton Coal Co. (opinion filed this day) 30 Atl. 125. The judgment is affirmed, and appeal is dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. DELAWARE, L. & W. R. CO. (No. 34.)

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county; J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by the commonwealth against the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company to recover the tax upon defendant's capital stock. There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which it appeals. Affirmed.

W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth. M. E. Olmsted, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This appeal is disposed of by the decision in the case of Com. v. Edgerton Coal Co. (opinion filed this day) 30 Atl. 125. The judgment is affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. SHARON COAL CO., Limited. (No. 22.)

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS-UNIFORMITY-TITLE.

1. The act of 1831 taxing corporations does not deprive any person of the equal protec

tion of the laws (Const. U. S. Amend. 14, § 1) because it discriminates between property owned by corporations and that owned by natural persons, nor is it in violation of Const. Pa. art. 9, § 1, requiring taxation to be uniform, because it imposes a tax of five mills on capital stock of some corporations and a tax of only three mills upon the stock of other corporations.

2. The subject of the act of 1891 taxing corporations is sufficiently expressed in its title, which calls it an act to provide increased revenues, "Supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to provide revenues by taxation,'" all its provisions being germane to that subject.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county; J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by the commonwealth of Pennsylvania against the Sharon Coal Company, Limited, to recover the tax on defendant's capital stock. There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which defendant appeals. Affirmed.

M. E. Olmsted, for appellant. W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth.

PER CURIAM. The rule stated by the learned judge of the court below in Com. v. Edgerton Coal Co. (No. 27, May term, 1894, of this court) 30 Atl. 125, in which opinion has this day been filed, we think applicable to the facts in this case. 1ts application here in no way affects the judgment. The court has found as a fact that the actual cash value of the whole stock was the amount estimated by the appraisers, on the construc tion of the act of 1891, that "the amount and rate per cent. of dividends made, and the amount carried to surplus and sinking fund during the tax year, do not furnish an absolute indication or measure of the actual value in cash of the capital stock of a corporation, but are to be considered with all other relevaut facts in determining what is its actual value in cash." On that rule we affirm this judgment.

The further claim is made by appellant that the act of 1891 is unconstitutional, in that (1) it discriminates, for purposes of taxation, between property owned by appellant and property owned by natural persons and other corporations; (2) it is in conflict with section 1, art. 9, of the constitution of Pennsylvania, and section 1, Amend. 14, of the constitution of the United States, because it imposes a tax of five mills on capital stock of appellant, and on stock of other corporations only three mills, and on other property of the same class only four mills; (3) the fourth and fifth sections of the act are void, the subject thereof not being clearly expressed in the title, as required by section 3, art. 3, of the constitution of Pennsylvania. As to the first and second objections, it has been settled that the legislature can, without making the revenue statute obnoxious to the constitution, classify corporations for purposes of taxation; may sever a small class from a larger one; might subject one class to taxation, and leave others untaxed. Com. v. Brewing Co., 145 Pa. St. 85, 22 Atl. 240,

and the cases there cited. And in Com. v. Canal Co., 123 Pa. St. 596, 16 Atl. 584, it was decided that a different basis of taxa. tion might be adopted on mortgages and loans held by individuals and those held by corporations. All properties, however, in the same class, must be taxed without discrimination in the rate of tax imposed, and the rule for ascertaining the value of the property must be the same. The actual cash value of one capital stock, in the saine class, cannot be ascertained from net earnings, another from profit, another from surplus, and another from dividends; for each method will produce a different valuation, and result in inequality. But each may be taxed on the actual cash valuation from any relative evidence tending to establish the fact. As to the third objection, that two sections of the act are void because their subject is not expressed in the title, we think it cannot be sustained. The act is entitled "An act to provide increased revenues for the purpose of relieving local taxation, being supplementary to an act," etc., and then follows the enumeration of the acts of which it is a supplement. The act is a supplement to provide increased rev enues by taxation. Every section of it is germane to the subject of the original bill; and it is decided in State Line & J. R. Co.'s Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 431; Millvale Borough v. Evergreen Ry. Co., 131 Pa. St. 19, 18 Atl. 993; and in Craig v. Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42,-that if the subject of the supplementary act be germane to the subject of the original act it is a sufficient compliance with the mandate of the constitution. None of appellant's assignments of error are sustained; therefore the judgment is affirmed, and appeal dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. SHARON COAL CO.

(No. 28.)

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county; J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by the commonwealth against the Sharon Coal Company to recover the tax on defendant's capital stock. There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which plaint ff appeals. Judgment affirmed.

W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth. M. E. Olmsted, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal by the commonwealth from the same judgment affirmed in appeal of defendant (opinion filed this day), 30 Atl. 127. The assignments of error call for no further notice. The judgment is affirmed, and appeal is dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. JAMESTOWN & F. R. CO. (No. 30.)

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county; J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by the commonwealth against the Jamestown & Franklin Railroad Company to recover the tax on defendant's capital stock. There was a judgment for plaintiff, from which plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth. M. E. Olmsted, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This case is decided by the rule declared in Com. v. Sharon Coal Co. (opinion filed this day) 30 Atl. 127. The judgment is affirmed, and appeal dismissed, at costs of appellant.

COMMONWEALTH v. EDGERTON COAL CO. (No. 23.)

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) Appeal from court of common pleas, Dauphin county; J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by the commonwealth against the Edgerton Coal Company to recover the tax on defendant's capital stock. There was a judg ment for plaintiff, from which plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

W. U. Hensel, for the Commonwealth. M. E. Olmsted, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. All the questions raised on this appeal have been decided in appeal of commonwealth between the same parties, (No. 27, May term, 1894) 30 Atl. 125, and of defendant in Com. v. Sharon Coal Co. (Nos. 22, 28, May term, 1894) Id. 127, 128. The judgment is affirmed, and appeal dismissed, at costs of appellant.

ENDERS v. ENDERS et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 1, 1894.) VALIDITY OF CONTRACT-MINOR CHILD-PARENT'S

RELINQUISHMENT OF CUSTODY.

An agreement by one to pay his daughter $20,000 and her son $10,000, when he comes of age, if the daughter will permit the boy to live with and be educated by him, she to see him whenever she desires, is not against public policy.

he was desirous that he should have a better education than his mother could afford him. The subject of the boy's future was discussed between her and both grandfathers and others of the wife's family, at this visit. The grandfather Enders proposed to her, if she would permit him to take her son and educate him, the boy to make his home with him until he was of age, she to have the privilege of visiting her child when she desired, and to have him at her home whenever convenient, he would give the mother $20,000, and the boy $10,000, when he came of age. The mother consented, and thereafter the home. of the boy was with his grandfather, the mother and son visiting each other frequently. About the 25th November, 1891, soon after the boy came of age, the grandfather died, but he had not paid, nor had he made any provision by will or otherwise for payment of, the $20,000 to the mother, Annie Enders. Thereupon, she brought suit against his executors. At the trial the defendants contended: (1) That the contract, even if proven, was void, because against public policy; (2) there was no sufficient consideration to support the alleged promise. The court submitted the testimony as to whether the contract was made as averred by the plaintiff to the jury, who found for the plaintiff; at the same time reserved the questions of law raised by defendants, and afterwards entered judgment.in favor of defendants non obstante veredicto. From that judgment, plaintiff brings her appeal.

The court having decided the consideration was sufficient, the sole question here is whether the contract was against public policy, and therefore void. The learned judge of the court below was of opinion that it was, and refers to many cases holding that the parent cannot divest himself of the custody of his child by any agreement or contract; that,

Dauphin county; J. W. Simonton, Judge.

Action by Annie Enders against William J. Enders and Annie Elizabeth Enders, executors of William Enders, deceased. There was a judgment for defendants, from which plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Robert Snodgrass, for appellant. C. S. Bigler and F. M. Ott, for appellees.

DEAN, J. About the year 1868, Annie Enders, the plaintiff, was married to Emanuel Enders, son of William Enders. Two years after their marriage, a son, William J. Enders, was born to them. At that time they lived at Cornwall, Lebanon county. Two years after the birth of the son, on account of her husband's ill treatment and neglect to support her, the wife left him, and, with her child, took up her home with her father, at Berkley, in Berks county. Some months after leaving her husband, and while living with her father, on 7th November, 1872, William Enders, the father of her husband, visited her. Her boy was his only grandson, and v.30A.no,3-9

tion as a parent remains, as well as the right of custody and guardianship. It is admitted in the opinion that none of the cases cited raise the precise question on which this case, because of its peculiar facts, turns. Public policy in the administration of the law by the court is essentially different from what may be public policy in the view of the legislature. With the legislature it may be, and often is, nothing more than expediency. The public policy which dictates the enactment of a law is determined by the wisdom of the legislature. If the legislature declared by statute that it was injurious to public interests, under any circumstances, for a parent to sur render the custody of a child during minority to a grandfather, that would be the end of discussion on that question. It has declared the parent can apprentice his child; can, by certain proceedings in court, permit its adoption by another; and that it can take away, for misconduct, the right of testamentarg guardianship. But, in the absence of any statute forbidding such a contract as the jury