in emissions through engine modifications. Third, I can require use of catalysts on a substantial portion of 1975 vehicles, thereby attempting to minimize initial production problems and their potential impact on the public while requiring each manufacturer to gain production experience preliminary to use of catalysts on all conventional engines during the 1976 model year. It is my judgment that the third option best serves the total public interest and the mandate of the statute. It promotes continued momentum toward installation of control systems meeting the statutory standards, while minimizing risks incident to national introduction of a new technology. This option also offers the opportunity to gain experience with production of catalyst systems for a full range of automobiles by requiring catalysts on a portion of each model introduced by each manufacturer in the State of California. I am accordingly waiving federal preemption for California's 1975 hydrocarbon standard of .9 grams per mile (as measured on the 1975 federal test procedure), except to the extent that such California standard applies to multipurpose vehicles as later defined in this decision. I am also waiving federal preemption for continued application during the 1975 model year of California's nitrogen oxide emission standard of 2.0 grams per mile (as measured on the 1975 federal test procedure), except to the extent that such California standard applies to multipurpose vehicles. This waiver of federal preemption shall include California's assembly-line test requirement. In order to insure that catalysts are used in California, I am denying waiver of preemption for California's 1975 carbon monoxide standard and I am prescribing a more stringent federal interim standard for 1975 light duty vehicles shipped to California, other than multipurpose vehicles, limiting emissions of carbon monoxide to 9.0 grams per mile, as measured by the 1975 federal test procedure. Thus, under my decision the federal and State standards applicable to 1975 cars sold in California will be: .9 grams per mile of hydrocarbons; 9.0 grams per mile of carbon monoxide; and 2.0 grams per mile of nitrogen oxides. These standards in my judgment will require use of catalytic converters on all 1975 passenger cars shipped to California. California sales of such vehicles constitute approximately ten percent of total United States new car sales. Except to the extent that a vehicle is subject to a more stringent carbon monoxide standard applicable to vehicles shipped to California, all 1975 light duty vehicles, other than multipurpose vehicles, shall be subject to the following federal interim standards, as measured by the 1975 federal test procedure: 1.5 grams per mile hydrocarbons; 15 grams per mile carbon monoxide; 3.1 grams per mile nitrogen oxides. These standards can, in my judgment, be achieved by manufacturers generally on most models without use of catalytic devices. In my judgment these standards will not require use of catalysts on more vehicles sold outside California than manufacturers are capable of producing without the possibility of severe production difficulties. Multipurpose vehicles shipped and sold during the model year 1975 shall for the most part be subject to emission standards applicable to 1975 light trucks. The most compelling factor in my decision to require phase-in of catalysts in 1975 has been the possibility raised by the evidence that if the automobile industry attempts to install catalytic converters on its entire product line, without a scale-up period of limited mass production in which to gain experience, difficulties such as a shortage of vital parts or materials, inaccurate machining tolerances, or defects in assembly techniques will arise, and may well be severe enough to cause significant economic disruption. These problems will be more fully discussed later in this decision. I believe that the requirement to install catalytic converters on all 1975 automobiles shipped to California and on a portion of 1975 cars sold outside California will minimize adverse economic effects which could be caused by production difficulties associated with initial use of new technology, will require all manufacturers to gain experience in the mass production of catalyst-equipped cars under conditions of careful quality control, and will maintain the accelerating momentum of technological progress which has so clearly characterized catalyst development for automotive applications during the past two years. In requiring a limited introduction of catalysts in 1975 I am holding the two major United States manufacturers to their commitments to use the additional year to gain essential experience in production techniques by equipping all California models with catalytic converters. My decision will have other important effects. New 1975 cars sold in the Los Angeles basin, where automobile-related pollution is most severe, will have the highest degree of emission control that is technically achievable in 1975 on a broad range of cars. In addition, two Japanese manufacturers (Toyo Kogyo and Honda) plan to market significant numbers of automobiles powered by innovative engine systems which do not require catalytic treatment to achieve emission reductions even lower than appears to be possible with conventional engines. These companies sell a disproportionately high number of their vehicles in California. Hence, the advantages which these alternate engine systems may offer, in emission control and in other areas of performance, will have an early test in the marketplace. Where regulatory requirements for emission control challenge conventional technology to its limits, the marketplace will in my judgment provide a strong lever for causing a shift into any superior technology. The selection of California for initial introduction of catalytic converters has other advantages as well. Because of California's history of leadership in emission control, that State has in existence a legal and regulatory framework for implementing and enforcing a set of standards different from those applicable outside California. Because of its size, and because its major cities are geographically distant from other States, regulation of out-of-State traffic is less essential, and enforcement of requirements applicable to California residents is less difficult. At the same time, I believe that the national interim standards I am prescribing will obviate or minimize the need for additional transportation controls in urban areas outside of California. These interim standards, while they are achievable for the most part without catalysts, require a reduction in emissions from uncontrolled levels of over 80 percent and a reduction from 1974 levels of about 50 percent. To the extent that additional transportation controls are needed outside California, vehicles designed for California can be purchased in 1975 by fleet operators, such as taxicab companies. Although evidence was presented that failure to deny suspension would adversely affect the attainment of ambient air quality in some areas, notably New York City, this evidence was based on a continuation of the 1974 automobile emission standards. The national interim standards which I am establishing will not, in my judgment, unduly inhibit control programs in urban areas outside California. III. Discussion 1. Encouraging Progress in Development of Technology In my decision of May 12, 1972, I found that, although no manufacturer had yet succeeded in running a car that met the 1975 standards for the required 50,000 miles, promising new technology was available to the manufacturers which, in view of the time that then still remained for development and testing, made it reasonable to conclude that compliance could be achieved within the statutory deadline. May Dec. pp. 8, 13. It is clear that during the 11 months since last year's decision impressive strides of progress have been made by some companies toward development of technology capable of meeting the 1975 emission control standards at reasonable cost, even though the constraints of time appear to make it not feasible to apply those standards for 1975 model year cars. The evidence available indicates that questions previously raised as to whether use of catalysts might create safety hazards can now be largely set aside. It also appears that the cost of emission control systems will be less than previously anticipated. Finally, concerns over the fuel penalty which might result from use of catalysts have been reduced significantly. Certain data presented by General Motors provides considerable support for optimism that the industry is on the brink of success in meeting the 1975 standards. Six cars from GM's latest test fleet have completed the 50,000 mile test runs which the law requires. Three of these met the standards at the end. GM App. VI-11. Two more almost met In this Decision, the following abbreviated citations are used: Tr. The transcript of the March 1973 hearings. May Dec. My prior decision of May 12, 1972. Dec. The slip opinion issued by the Court of Appeals on C. App. The Supplemental Statement of Chrysler Corporation dated March, 1973. F. App. The Submission Upon Remand of Ford Motor Company dated March 5, 1973, The Statement of General Motors Corporation on Remand dated March 5, 1973. (Footnote continued) the standards. This fleet was built and started running almost a year ago. Given the rate of progress in this field, it is reasonable to expect that its performance would be significantly better today. As Mr. Starkman of GM testified, "We are on a very steep learning curve." Tr. 2990. Test data on durability cars run by other auto manufacturers for 50,000 miles also show a number of other examples where systems have achieved compliance with the 1975 standards or have come very close to doing so. Results for cars driven substantial mileage (for example, in the range of 20,000/ 30,000 miles) contain a sizable number of other cases where the 1975 Federal standards were being met. It must be recognized that other test cars have performed unfavorably and produced data considerably above the 1975 standards. In many of these latter cases the poor results are attributable to identifiable and correctable problems; in other cases, however, it is unclear whether such an explanation applies. It is also apparent from other data submitted on the basis of dynamometer and laboratory testing that significant improvements in catalysts have been made, making it reasonable to assume that future test results will be better than past test results. Tr. 917; 1322-24; 1356-60; 1423-25; 1496. On balance, believe that an overall review of test data supports the judgment that solutions are close at hand to overcome any remaining obstacles which might interfere with achievement of the 1975 standards by the auto manufacturers. I The applicants contend that their test results show that, if catalysts are installed on all cars in 1975, a high proportion can be expected to fail in customer use. Indeed, this expectation of catalyst failure constitutes one of the principal arguments that technology is not "available" to (footnote continued) NAS Rept. Ford Mem. C. Mem. the Report by the Committee on Motor Vehicle The Post-Hearing Memorandum of Ford Motor Company. C. Doc., Vols. I-VI - The six volumes of documents submitted by Chrysler Corporation in response to Mr. Allen's requests made on March 15 and 21, 1973, and set forth at Tr. 1143 and 2355-57. EPR Minutes - Minutes of the Emissions Policy and Review |