ity of two Judges against one, affirmed that decision, and the wife appealed. The parties were married in 1904 in the Roman Catholic Church at Richelieu by their own curé. The civil formalities were duly observed. Both parties are Roman Catholics and cousins in the fourth degree, though common ancestors married in 1781, who were their great-great-grandparents. The Judicial Committee has held that the marriage between the parties should be declared valid and subsisting. Lord Moulton, in delivering their Lordships' judgment, said that the marriage was contracted in all good faith. It was solemnized openly by a competent official and after due proclamation of the banns. It might be taken that if all the facts as to the relationship of the parties had been known the officiating priest would have required the parties to obtain a dispensation, seeing that at that date the Roman Catholic Church considered no extremely distant relationship sufficient to make a dispensation necessary, although their Lordships understood that such is no longer the case. Had he refused to solemnize the marriage without such a dispensation being obtained, he would have been within his rights, and the law would have supported him in his refusal. But nothing of the sort took place. The marriage was performed with all legal formalities, and did not come within any provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec which deals with questions of nullity. The relationship of the parties was not within the provisions of Articles 124, 125 or 126, in respect of which actions contesting marriages on the ground of relationship can alone be brought. The marriage, therefore, fell under the absolute rule laid down in Article 185: Marriage can only be dissolved by the natural death of one of the parties: while both live it is indissoluble. Ladies are now called to form members of the jury in the High Court and at the trial of criminal cases at the Assizes and Quarter Session. Considerable discussion has taken place as to the correct method of addressing mixed juries. The Judges consider that "Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury" sounds rather too much like an after dinner speech and "Members of the Jury" is the form which meets with general approval, although "Friends," "Brethren," Comrades" and "Citizens" have all been suggested. The Duke of York, who was elected a Bencher of the Inner Temple in November, 1917, dined in Hall for the first time last month on the Grand Day of the Hilary Term. King George, when Duke of York, dined in Hall in 1895. A solicitor who, in giving evidence in the Divorce Court, referred to Mr. Justice Coleridge as "Judge Coleridge" was reproved by Mr. Justice Horridge, who said that the title "Mr. Justice" is an extremely old and respected English title, and that a solicitor of all people ought to know better than to refer to one of His Majesty's Judges in this way. Yours, etc., W. E. WILKINSON. NOTABLE CASES NOTATED. Will Construction. A peculiar and interesting problem came before the Court for solution in Cunningham v. Cunningham,1 where the Marquis of Cunningham devised his estate in a series of consecutive limitations thus: To A. for life with remainder to A.'s sons in tail with remainder to B. for life with remainder to B.'s sons in tail, and with remainder to his own right heirs. By a Codicil the testator revoked the benefits given to A. under his will. At the death of testator A. had no sons. It was held that there was no intestacy as to the rents and profits of the estate pending the birth of a son to A., but that the estate of B. was accelerated and he was entitled to the rents and profits during the life of A. and so long as no son was born to A. Lord Justice Warrington in his judgment pointed out that the devise was an equitable devise and that the seisin of the legal estate was not involved. The seisin was at all times in the Trustee to whom the property had been devised upon trust for the parties stated. If it had been otherwise the case would have presented other features; because the seisin must always be vested in some one. The cases cited were D'Eyncourt v. Gregory,2 In re Wills, In re Scott.* Restraint of Trade Covenants. Here are a series of cases on this subject: 5 (1) In Bowler v. Lovegrove an important question was decided as to whether a Covenant "not to carry on the business of Auctioneers and Estate Agents" was broken by the covenantor carrying on the business of an Estate Agent alone. 137 T. L. R、 P. 420. 234 Beav. 36. * (1917), 1 Ch. 365. 3 37 T. L. R. 424. The Covenant was given by a clerk in the employment of the Plaintiff's firm who carried on the double business of Auctioneers and Estate Agents. The Covenant was for a year and there was no question of its reasonableness in that regard. The Court held that the business against which the Covenant operated was the united business of Auctioncer and Estate Agent, and that the Defendant having only commenced the one business of an Estate Agent had not violated his Covenant which being one in restraint of trade had to be strictly construed. Mr. Justice Lawrence, however, did not leave the question there, that is on this narrow and strict construction of the Covenant. He gave (what often we wish the Judges of Canada would condescend to give) an exhaustive dissertation on the law of covenants in restraint of trade. It is illuminating and should be read or a reference made to it by Lawyers concerned in framing or enforcing such covenants. He cited few cases in support of his own exposition of the subject. He did mention, however, Morris v. Saxelby, Attwood v. Lamont, and Dew v. Fitch.s (2) Davies v. Thomas' seems at first sight to give a tilt to the cases of Quinn v. Leatham,10 Giblan v. National Amalgamated Union," and Glamorgan Coal v. South Wales Miners.12 But the distinction is drawn that in the last three cases the element of coercion, or procuring a legal thing to be done by illegal means, was present, whereas in Davies v. Thomas it was, according to the finding of the Judge on the fact, totally absent. His finding on the facts does not by any means appear as clear as his statement of the law. It may be the evidence was defective. But the facts are: The plaintiff was employed by a man named Williams on 6 (1916, 1 A. C. 688. the terms that after the engagement ceased he would not for two years carry on or be employed in the business of his employer within a radius of 12 miles. The Agreement ceased regularly and plaintiff entered the same business within the radius with a man named Hopkins on practically the same terms. Both these employers were members of a Trade Association, one of whose rules was (20), "An employee leaving an employer shall, if he so desires, report the same to the Secretary, who shall advise all the members; and no other member of the association shall employ or supply him for 12 months." Under this rule the first employer Williams brought the second employer Hopkins before the Association, and the upshot was, though after considerable hesitation and objection by Hopkins, that the plaintiff was dismissed from his employment. The Judge said there was nothing behind this rule to enforce it. It had no sanction, and a member disobeying it could not even be expelled from the Association. 13 He said, however, the rule was unreasonable restraint of trade and void on authority of Mineral Water v. Booth, but it was not invalid ab initio in that it was an agreement to commit a tort, or that it was a conspiracy; and that it was not per se an offence at Common Law to make such an agreement unless the illegal means by which it would be enforced were prescribed. It seemed from the evidence that Hopkins yielded not to threats of any kind, but to persuasion of his co-members, and as he had a perfect right to terminate the employment as he did, the plaintiff had no cause of action against those who merely persuaded him to do what he did. The Judge said this made all the difference; but what it may be asked was the compelling force behind the persuading eloquence to induce Hopkins to do what no doubt he had a right to do, but what he objected to do, unless it was fear of the 13 1887, 36 Ch. D. 465. |