on the other. The Judge also referred to Cory v. France.16 He said "according to one view the consequences which may be reasonably expected to result from a particular act are material only in reference to the question whether the act is or is not a negligent act. According to the other view those consequences are the test of whether the damage resulting from the act, assuming it to be negligent, are or are not too remote to be recoverable."

The Judge also referred to Sir Frederick Pollock's Law of Torts as to this difference of view point, and pointed out that Bevan on Negligence supports the view point of Smith v. London and S. W. Rly. (supra). In two recent cases this last-named view point has been adopted, namely, In re H. M. S. London" and WeldBlundell v. Stephens.18 Following these the Court of Appeal in the case under review, held that it was "immaterial that the causing of the spark by the falling of the plank could not have been reasonably anticipated."

The Court also declined to recognize a very fine distinction, sought to be drawn by the Appellant's Counsel between "the anticipation of the extent of damage resulting from a negligent act, and the anticipation of the type of damage resulting from such an act." This Counsel admitted that it did not lie in the mouth of a person whose negligent act has caused damage to say that he could not have reasonably foreseen the extent of the damage, but he contended that the negligent person was entitled to rely on the fact that he could not reasonably have anticipated the type of damage which resulted from his negligent act.

The Court held the distinction could not be admitted.

N.B.-What we want to impress is that the true view as adopted by the Court is stated in Bevan on Negligence, Vol. I., p. 85, 3rd ed., and in Smith v. London and S. W. Railway Co., referred to above.

16 (1911), 1 K. B. p. 122.

17 30 T. L. R. 196.

18 1920 A. C. 983.

Negligence and Third Party Liability.

19

A very interesting question was decided in the case of Great Central Railway v. Bates. It arose out of an accident to a Great Central Railway Policeman, who was injured in the course of his duty. He claimed compensation against the Railway, his employer, and obtained an award of £1.15:0 per week during disablement. The Railway Company then sought to recover the money back from the Defendant, in this action as a Third party, on the ground that the accident to the Policeman occurred on the Defendant's premises, where he was in discharge of a public duty.

The fact was that Defendant had a boat-shed adjoining the dock and immediately inside sliding doors opening on the street there was a sawpit crossed by a gangway used by the workmen. The Policeman coming along the street about 6 o'clock on a November evening, saw the sliding door open, and went inside in order to place in security a bicycle which he could see on the other side of the shed. He did not see the sawpit, and fell into it, incurring serious injury.

The Court held damages could not be recovered against the Owner of the shed as a Third party.

Lord Justice Atkin ruled that the Constable had no right to enter the premises, and that he was not there in exercise of any public duty. Besides that there was no evidence of any duty owed by the owner of the premises towards any constable who might enter at any time.

The Master of the Rolls said he was not at all satisfied a Policeman had any right to enter a house simply to see that everything was secure. But if there was such a right, there was no obligation on the owner of the premises to fence or light them or to warn him of any danger he might encounter from the dark within.

N.B. This question of a Policeman's right may arise in connection with the raids for concealed liquor, now so frequent in Canada.

10 37 T. L. R. p. 948.

The Editor,

"SCOTCH EXACTNESS."

SEPTEMBER 20TH, 1921.

"Canadian Law Times,"
Toronto, Ont.

DEAR SIR. I have just come across a delightful "Scotticism" in a recent number of the House of Lords Law Reports (1921, 2 Appeal Cases, p. 12), in a judgment comprising only four lines, of Viscount Findlay, the newly appointed British Judge on the Bench of the League of Nations. It is a model of Scotch exactness of speech, which is always so surefooted and precise. The great Law Lord saith: "Lord Moulton, who sat on the hearing of this appeal, before his death had prepared a judgment arriving at the same result, etc., etc."—"Before his death," forsooth! Query: Do the Judges of the House of Lords prepare judgments "after death?" We shall have to consult Sir Oliver Lodge on that point-no doubt they would find no more delectable employment in the "meads of asphodel" than in "preparing judgments." One recalls that delightful picture drawn for us in Croake James "Curiosities of Law and Lawyers" of the old "Special Pleader" visiting a brother Pleader, who lay very sick abed at his home, and taking with him a "Bill in Chancery" which he had just drafted and lovingly revised as Counsel to display as a work of art, a choice piece of "vertu," to his dying friend.

It recalls the old worthies of the law of other days, the Old Benchers of Charles Lamb's tender portraiture, whose love for their profession was a love surpassing that of women-yea, a love even unto death. Dear old dreamers of dreams!

God rest their souls in peace!

Yours truly,

"JURIDICUS."

The

Canadian Law Times.

VOL. XLI. TORONTO, DECEMBER, 1921.

EDITORIAL.

C. L. T.'s Policy and Perspective.

No. 12

This being the last issue of 1921, it is fitting to adumbrate something with regard to the future.

In the past we have constantly kept in mind the essential requirement of a Law Magazine—that is, the discussion and elucidation of subjects of practical value to the Professional Lawyer. For the coming year that Policy will be our Lodestar.

In some instances we have expressed views sometimes at variance with accepted notions and on more than one occasion these views have ultimately received recognition and acceptance. Indeed Articles in the C. L. T. have on more than one occasion been handed up to the Court as the argument of the Counsel engaged in a case. We do not say this in any vaunting spirit. It is rather a matter on which the Profession should congratulate themselves-that they have a Magazine wherein new and complex problems may be stated and expounded; and expounded in such a way that the advocate in Court can use the arguments of the writer, and even adopt his language.

A Magazine of this type has the effect of raising the estimate of the Canadian Lawyer in other countries where it circulates. The C. L. T. has its readers in all parts of the Empire; and it is one of the few Legal Journals which penetrate the sacred arcanum of the League of Nations.

It behooves us Lawyers, therefore, in the interest of our Country to keep up the standard of the C. L. T.,

VOL. XLI. C.L.T.-48

for by its quality we are surely judged by those whom it reaches outside our borders, but with whom we individually are precluded from coming in contact.

All over the United States of America the C. L. T. circulates and some of our best contributors are legal luminaries in that Country. And when I mention the U. S. A. let me say its professional men have established some of the finest legal Magazines in the world. Articles from these Magazines have more than once been favourably discussed in the highest Courts in England-the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords and the Privy Council.

Let us make such an example an incentive, and let the Lawyers of Canada rally round the C. L. T. and reflect themselves to the world in their contributions to it.

For the coming year we intend to write a series of Articles upon various subjects which require more of an exposition than one Article can possibly yield.

There is the subject, for instance, of Trade Unions which, being at first mere protective organizations of Workmen, have generated counter organizations of the Employers; and hence to-day we have combinations of Manufacturers, Wholesalers and Retailers which control the prices of every commodity from an Automobile to an Apple. These Unions and combinations dominate the world, and have annihilated the most sacred of Man's rights-the Liberty of the individual man to do whatsoever he listeth so long as he does not violate the law.

Freedom of contract, inherent to our constitution, is no more; and the adjustment of prices by the natural principle of supply and demand is a thing of the past. We live, in truth, under a tyranny of encroaching combinations.

These Unions and combinations got a wrong projection when Allen v. Flood was decided; and from that decision we intend to discuss them along the lines of their legality. We will pass in review the cases which have followed Allen v. Flood and Quinn v.

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