prompted him to the deed. Courier's pamphlets are masterpieces of style. They have been published, together with his translations from the Greek and other works, in Paris, 1884, in 4 vols., and reprinted by Didot in 1 vol. The best edition of his translation of Longus is that of 1825.

COURLAND, or KURLAND, one of the Baltic provinces of Russia in Europe, bounded N. by the gulf of Riga and Livonia, E. by the government of Vitepsk, S. by that of Kovno, and W. by the Baltic sea; area, 10,608 sq. m.; pop. in 1851, 539,270. The face of the country is level, but interspersed with some hills, the highest of which has an elevation of 700 feet. The province contains a great many forests, especially of pine and fir, and there are said to be no less than 300 lakes and ponds, beside a large number of small streams and brooks, and several rivers. Among the larger rivers are the Düna, Aa, and Windau. The soil is not rich, but when properly tilled is productive. The principal products are wheat, rye, barley, oats, peas, beans, hemp, flax, and linseed. Clay, iron, lime, and gypsum are found, and are wrought to some extent. The manufactures are unimportant. The province is formed of the old duchies of Courland and Semigallia, united with the ancient bishopric of Pilten, and the district of Polangen, which once formed part of the duchy of Lithuania. It is divided into 5 arrondissements, each of which is subdivided into 2 captaincies. It has 2 shipping ports, Libau and Windau. Capital, Mitau. The predominant religion is Protestantism, and the ecclesiastical affairs are conducted by the consistory of Mitau. There are about 15,000 members of the Greek church and 45,000 Roman Catholics, who together possess but 19 churches, and are subject respectively to the bishops of Samogitia and Pskof. There are also many Jews, Poles, Russians, and various residents of other nations, among whom are the Krewincks, a race of Finnish descent. The nobility and the city population, and the higher classes generally, are of German descent, while the peasantry and the lower classes are chiefly of Lettish origin. Courland was ruled for a long time by sovereign dukes, as a dependency of the Polish crown. By the marriage in 1710 of Duke Frederic William with the princess Anna of Russia, the influence of that empire became predominant in Courland. It was strengthened in the following year, when after the duke's death Anna was appointed regent, under the protection of Peter the Great. After Anna's accession to the Russian throne in 1730, her uncle Ferdinand officiated as duke of Courland until his death in 1737. Subsequently the duchy was ruled by Anna's favorite, the adventurer Biron, who died in 1772, and bequeathed it to his eldest son Peter. The latter, failing to give satisfaction to the country, was obliged to cede Courland to Catharine II. in 1795. Since that time it has formed part of Russia, though retaining some ancient privileges. The civil governor of Courland is now (1859)

M. de Brevern, who resides in Mitau, while the general direction of affairs devolves upon the governor-general of the Baltic provinces, in 1859 Prince Italiski.

COURT (Lat. curia, the senate house), in the early middle ages, the feudal lord and his family, with their companions and servants-all the persons, collectively regarded, who occupied the various departments of a feudal castle. After the rise of the modern monarchies the name was given by preeminence to the family of the sovereign and their attendants, the residents in the royal palace. Pomp and obeisance had waited on the ancient Roman and oriental masters of empires, and when Charlemagne founded the empire of the West he adopted the titles and ceremonial which were in use in the palace of the emperors of Constantinople. The marriage of the emperor Otho II. with the Byzantine princess Theophania, also contributed to spread in Europe the usages of the imperial court of the Orient. The cours plenières, which followed the establishment of royal over feudal supremacy, were assemblages of all the nobility of the kingdom around the monarch. Charles V. in vain sought to introduce permanently into the German courts the severe and stately manners of the Spanish; and the Spanish reverences and bending of the knee were soon succeeded by the fashion of merely bowing the head. The French court, as organized by Francis I., became a model of politeness and taste to all Europe. Affirming that "a court without ladies is a year without spring, and a spring without roses," this monarch introduced more of elegance and freedom into society, and substituted the spirit of gallantry for that of courtesy. A distinction was made between the severe manners of the palace and the freer etiquette allowed in the field and in travelling. The French court obtained its highest prestige for wit and grace under Louis XIV. In England, the courts of Elizabeth and Queen Anne have been most illustrious for the learned and witty men that attended them, and that of Charles II. was most famous for its gayety. The court ton is any peculiarity of manner imitated from the personal habit of the sovereign. The Spanish language was spoken in the German imperial court till about the end of the 16th century, when it was succeeded by the Italian. Near the end of the 17th century the French had become the usual court language in all the countries on the continent, but about the beginning of the present century was partially succeeded by the German in most of the German courts.

The right of admittance or presentation at court belonged originally only to the nobility. It was extended also to the higher clergy, and to some distinguished persons, as great artists or scholars, whose accomplishments were regarded as giving them personal nobility. The reign of Frederic the Great and the period of the French revolution relaxed the conditions of presentation, though Napoleon in his new imperial court revived all the dignities and strict

ness of ceremonial which had existed under the old régime. The precedence of diplomatic agents and others at court is determined partly by the relative rank of states, important republics, as the United States and Switzerland, receiving the same honors as kingdoms; and partly by the degree of relationship to the sovereign, since nearly all the European dynasties are united to each other by family ties.

COURT, in law, an institution having a twofold object, viz. the conservation of public order by the suppression of violence and crime, and the adjudication of disputes on civil matters between the individuals constituting a community. The first of these is most prominent in a rude state of society; the latter, in an advanced stage of civilization. In the earlier and ruder condition, the laws have principal reference to protection from personal violence, and the judicial function is chiefly exercised in rendering speedy justice to the offenders. Another peculiar distinction is also observable in the administration of laws at the different periods above referred to. In the earlier, it is vested in the executive, which at that time is usually the sole constituent of the government, and this continues to be the characteristic of every nation whose advance beyond semi-barbarism is arrested, or whenever from a state of partial civilization it returns again to its original rude condition. Such was the primitive administration of laws in the states of Greece; the king or chief of a people was not merely a military leader, but also a judge; and this is now the case in oriental autocracies, with only the modification that where the territorial jurisdiction is large, as in Turkey or Persia, the laws are administered by deputies, but who, in like manner as the sovereign of a small state, each within his respective district, perform the functions of executive and judicial officers. A third circumstance may be observed, viz.: that in the earlier period a large discretion is exercised in judicial proceedings. The laws being few, cases will occur that are not provided for; and again, personal security being the chief object had in view, summary justice is naturally preferred to the more tardy form of proceeding which would be involved by a regard to the rules of evidence which in a more advanced stage of society are deemed essential; indeed, these rules are an after growth, and require a long experience and an intellectual habit to develop. The Roman consuls were at first executive and judicial magistrates. The progress of the people in civilization was indicated by their demand of some check upon the arbitrary judgment of the consuls in their judicial capacity, which led to the compilation of the laws of the 12 tables; a still further advance was shown in the separation of the judicial from the consular office, and the appointment of the prætor. But although the Roman mind was eminently legal, it did not during the existence of the republic attain to a clear idea of the importance of a su

pervisory power for the correction of the errors of inferior tribunals. The assemblies of the people, both the centuriata and tributa, had indeed a judicial power, but it was exercised in the hearing of cases in the first instance, and those chiefly of persons charged with capital offences. But in civil causes (judicia privata) there was not properly an appeal from the judgment of the prætor, or of the judges (or more properly juries) appointed by him. The nearest approach to it was the power exercised by the prætor in certain cases of setting aside the sentence of the judices for fraud, and so the assistance of the tribunes was sometimes invoked against the corrupt conduct of the prætor himself. Under the imperial government an appeal was allowed from all inferior judges to the emperor, which was in fact usually heard by a court composed of the chief officers of state and distinguished jurists. Even this court was not, however, strictly subject to the rules which are in modern times deemed essential to an appellate court. It not only decided cases brought before it by appeal from the final judgments of inferior tribunals, but would take original jurisdiction in many cases while they were pending before a subordinate court, and not merely made decisions (decreta) in such cases, but also gave opinions (rescripta) to magistrates or private persons upon questions proposed by them. -In the constitution of judicial tribunals under modern European governments there has been a great advance beyond the Roman in all of the particulars which we have named above as appertaining to the administration of law. The separation of the judicial from executive functions has become gradually recognized as a political principle. In England it was asserted at an early period for the protection of personal freedom against royal power, but it was imperfectly carried into effect until within the last 2 centuries, when the tenure of judicial office was made independent of the pleasure of the king. The clause of Magna Charta, Communia placita non sequentur curiam nostram, sed teneantur in aliquo loco, though seemingly intended for the mere convenience of suitors, by prescribing a certain place for the trial of their causes, instead of compelling them to travel about with their witnesses wherever the aula regis held by the king in person might be, in reality had the effect of breaking up that court, and ultimately of establishing the several courts of common pleas, king's bench, and exchequer, presided over by justices appointed for that purpose. The king's bench alone, which retained jurisdiction of criminal cases, continued for some time afterward to be migratory, whence the common form of process returnable to that court was ubicumque fuerimus; and this prevailed after the court became fixed like the others at Westminster, and its itinerancy was but a mere legal fiction. But the judges of all these courts were appointed by the king, and could be removed by him at will; and this power of removal continued until by statute 13 William III.

(1701) it was enacted that the commissions of the judges should be quamdiu se bene gesserint, instead of durante bene placito as formerly, and that they should be removable only upon an address of both houses of parliament. The chancellor alone, who presides over the department of equity, is subject to removal at the pleasure of the king, and his office is held entirely by a political tenure. There are 4 courts of original and general jurisdiction, viz.: the king's bench, common pleas, exchequer, and chancery. These may be considered the outgrowth of the common law, though according to a popular mode of expression chancery is distinguished from the other three, as if not of common law origin, but the equity administered in that court was chiefly indigenous. The ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, on the other hand, derive their mode of administering law from a foreign source, though the limit of their respective jurisdictions is prescribed by acts of parliament, or by long usage, which is supposed to be founded upon statute. The court of king's bench, in the distribution of judicial powers upon the breaking up of the ancient aula regis, retained, as we have mentioned, jurisdiction of criminal cases; but to this was added all that class of cases which, though in reality civil actions between private citizens, yet, as they involved an allegation of force (as in actions for trespass, where the act complained of was alleged to have been done vi et armis), were deemed quasi criminal. But nowithstand ing this narrow limit of its cognizance of civil cases, it remained in one sense the highest court in the realm. It has always been the representative of the king's prerogative, has exercised authority over all other common law courts so far as to restrain them within their proper jurisdiction by writ of prohibition, and has always exercised summary power, in all cases not otherwise provided for, to compel inferior courts and magistrates to do their duty. By a fiction of law it has also acquired jurisdiction over all civil cases except actions relating to real estate, and may in one form of action, viz., ejectment, even try titles to land; which fiction consists of an allegation in pleading that the defendant has been arrested upon process of that court for a trespass, whereupon the plaintiff complains against him for another and the real cause of action. The court of common pleas had originally exclusive jurisdiction of all merely civil actions not involving any criminal offence, and it still retains sole cognizance of actions relating to realty except ejectment, which, as before mentioned, may be also brought in the king's bench. The business of the court of exchequer was originally the collection of debts due to the crown, the proceeding for which was by bill, somewhat in the nature of a bill in chancery, whence this was called the equity side of the court; but jurisdiction was obtained of all personal actions by a fiction, viz., an allegation that the king's debtor hath suffered an injury whereby he is less able to pay his debt, quo minus sufficiens existit, whereupon he was allowed to implead in this

court the person charged with the wrong. This was called the common law side of the court. The old forms of process and proceeding peculiar to these courts have been recently abrogated, but the jurisdiction acquired by them remains. Substantially the same process and mode of pleading is now used in the three courts, by stat. 2 William IV., c. 39 (1832), and other acts, the provisions of all which are included in the more general revision by stat. 15 and 16 Vic., c. 76 (1852), and 17 and 18 Vic., c. 125 (1854). As to the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the court of chancery, see article CHANCERY. From all these courts an appeal lies to the house of lords. There are, however, some intermediate appeals. From each of the three courts it has been long the practice to adjourn cases of great importance, before judgment, to the court of exchequer chamber, consisting of the barons of the exchequer, the chancellor, lord treasurer, and justices of the king's bench and common pleas. There is also an appeal, in certain cases after final judgment, to the same court (in which cases on appeal the judges of the court from which the appeal is taken do not sit), and from that court an appeal lies to the house of lords; and so in all other cases which are not reviewed in the court of exchequer chamber. Cases in chancery are usually heard in the first instance before the master of the rolls or a vice-chancellor, from whom an appeal lies to the chancellor (with whom two lords justices have been recently associated for the hearing of appeals), and from them to the house of lords. A writ of error, it is said, may also issue from the king's bench to the common pleas, but it seems to have been rarely used. The trial of all common law causes in the first instance is before itinerant or circuit judges, one of whom must be a justice of one of the superior courts of Westminster, which judges are sent annually into every county of the kingdom for the trial of civil and criminal cases which are to be brought before a jury. They were first appointed in the reign of Henry II., and were then called justices in eyre (justiciarii in itinere), but are now designated as justices of assize and nisi prius. Their commission also authorizes them to try all criminal cases, which part of their duties is expressed by the old law phrases of oyer and terminer (to hear and determine), and general gaol delivery; the former relating to cases upon which an indictment is found by a grand jury at the same circuit, the latter to indictments previously found upon which there had been an arrest and imprisonment of the parties indicted. The commissions of assize and nisi prius relate to civil causes. Assize in the old English law was the name applied to the trial of issues relating to the freehold, by a species of jury called recognitors, who were allowed to decide upon their own personal knowledge without the examination of witnesses; in modern law the term designates issues in actions relating to real estate. Nisi prius is a phrase in the writ issued to the sheriff for the summoning of a jury, by which he is

commanded to bring them before the court at Westminster at a certain day in term, unless before that time the justices of assize should come into his county; and as the justices according ly come, the sheriff returns the writ at the court of assizes.-In France, the administration of justice, which originally belonged to and was exercised by the suzerains or feudal lords in person, was, by a process similar to what took place in England, vested in certain officers appointed for that purpose, who at first were considered as the mere deputies of the suzerain, but were afterward recognized as having independent official functions. One peculiarity prevailed in all the seigniories, viz., that whether the seigneur or his deputy, or the latter judicial magistrate (under the name of bailli), presided, it was necessary for the adjudication of any question to call together the principal vassals, who in fact constituted a court, although at first they were spoken of rather as advisers of the seigneur than as judges; but afterward, when the baillies held the courts, they were obliged to submit every case to the judgment of the assembled vassals, who then began to be called peers. These courts decided all questions between the vassals themselves or between vassal and seigneur, except that in the latter class of cases such questions were excluded as invloved a contest between the seigneur and the vassals generally, which questions were brought before the suzerain or superior lord of whom the seigneur held. In other cases, where the seigneur refused to decide,or interfered with the proper administration of right, an appeal was often made to the superior lord; and so also for an unjust judgment, probably, however, only in a case of flagrant violation of right. The former appeal was called en défaut de droit, the latter en faux jugement. In either case, however, the ground of the appeal was some misconduct of the seigneur or his representative, and not strictly for a review of a case fairly conducted. But instead of such appeal, the vassal who thought himself aggrieved by the judgment of his seigneur could challenge him to combat, first renouncing fealty to him. From these seigneurial courts subsequently grew up the parlements. There was at first but one, viz., the court of the king. The first Capetian Sovereigns created 4 grand bailliages to hear appeals from all judgments rendered in the courts of the seigneurs, and to judge in the first instance where there was a conflict of jurisdiction; but these tribunals were not uniformly acknowledged, and the vassals still resorted to the court of the king. In consequence of the accumulation of business, and the great expense of attending upon that court at various places, Philip the Fair, by an edict in 1302, made the sitting of the court permanent at Paris. He also established a parlement for Languedoc. The exchiquier of Normandy was fixed at Rouen permanently by Louis XII., and was entitled by Francils I. a cour de parlement. Others were afterward established, and these courts continued to be the appellate tribunals until the

revolution. Henry II. established presidences (présidiaux) in the principal cities, reserving to the parlements only the more considerable causes and inspection of the inferior courts. The parlements, which originally consisted of the peers of France, were finally composed of lawyers appointed by the king. They were abolished in 1790, and in their palce, so far as respected appellate jurisdiction, was substituted the court of cassation. This court was composed of 52 judges, who, by the charte constitutionelle of 1814, received their appointment from the king, but were not removable. Tribunals of appeal were created a few years after the establishment of the court of cassation (1802), which after the restoration were called cours royales, and under Napoleon III. cours impériales. The exact limits of the jurisdiction of the latter courts and of the court of cassation are not defined with much precision. The court of cassation, which now consists of 45 judges, 3 vice-presidents, and a president, is divided into 3 chambers, viz.: a chamber of requests, a chamber of civil, and a chamber of criminal cassation. Demands in cassation (applications for reversal of judgment) are first heard by the chamber of requests, which either rejects them or sends them to one of the other chambers to be adjudicated. The appeal to the cours impériales is directly from the tribunals of first instance, tribunaux civil d'arrondissement, which are the same that were established in 1790 under the name of tribunaux de district.—This brief review of the courts of the two countries of Europe most celebrated for their jurisprudence, will sufficiently illustrate how far they fulfil the conditions of a sound administration of justice in two particulars, viz.: freedom from executive control, and a due regard to the correction of errors by a review of the first judgment in an appellate court. There are, however, other important considerations to which we may properly advert. Judges should be independent not only of executive influence, but also of all personal responsibility to litigant parties. There is a singular feature in the French law which indicates either a low state of judicial integrity or an entire oversight of an important principle of jurisprudence. By a proceeding called prise à partie, which has been recognized from an early period, a judge is liable to be sued by the party against whom he has rendered judgment. The old rule was, that he could be made responsible only when the judgment was without excuse (doit être affectée et inexcusable); by an ordinance of Francis I. (1540) a judge was not liable except for fraud or extortion (s'il n'y a dol, fraude, ou concussion). Still he was subject to a suit for damages, and several old writers commented strongly upon the peril to society in subjecting judges to such a liability, especially for judgments in criminal proceedings. But notwithstanding these remonstrances, the proceeding has always been and still is allowed. Merlin mentions a number of cases in which the

judge would be held responsible, among which are: 1, arresting a person without proper complaint, except in case of flagrant crime (hors le cas de flagrant délit); 2, arrest without proof, or for an offence which was not punishable by imprisonment; 3, where the judge has exceeded his power by taking cognizance of a matter without having jurisdiction; 4, evoking a case from an inferior tribunal under pretext of an appeal, and then not disposing of it. The provisions of the code of civil procedure lack precision. The cases of prise à partie are: 1, for fraud or extortion, in the language of the ordinance of Francis I.; 2, where it is expressly prescribed by law; 3, where the law has declared judges liable for damages; 4, if the judge has denied justice. (Code de procédure, § 505.) The English law, on the contrary, affords an ample protection to judges. The rule is, that no private suit will lie against judges of a court of general jurisdiction, either for error of judgment or even for misconduct in their judicial functions; and the same protection is extended to judges of courts of inferior jurisdiction when acting within the limit of their authority. For official corruption, or other criminal conduct, a judge may be impeached and removed from office, and is also liable to be proceeded against by indictment; but no other redress is allowed to a suitor who may have sustained injury by such misconduct. If, however, a judge having a limited jurisdiction should exceed it, that is to say, should undertake to act in a matter not within his jurisdiction, then he becomes liable to a suit for damages, even if it was a mere mistake of judgment. Thus the court of Marshalsea, which had jurisdiction only of cases in which one of the parties was of the king's household, or trespasses committed within the verge of the court, having given judgment for a debt of which they had no cognizance and imprisoned the debtor, the judges and even the ministerial officers were all held liable to damages, the proceeding being coram non judice (case of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke's Rep. 68); but in the same case it was said that where a court has jurisdiction of a cause and proceeds erroneously, an action will not lie against the party who sues or against the officer or minister of the court. A single exception may possibly exist in respect to the immunity given to judges of courts of general jurisdiction, viz.: where they act extra-judicially, as in the case mentioned by Hawkins: “If a judge will so far forget the honor and dignity of his post as to turn solicitor in a cause in which he is to judge, and privately and extrajudicially tamper with witnesses or labor jurymen, he hath no reason to complain if he be dealt with according to the capacity to which he so basely degrades himself." The rule, however, as above stated, has been sustained by the most eminent English judges. (See Groenvelt v8. Burwell, 1 Salk. 896; Miller vs. Seare, 2 Bla. Rep. 1141; and Mostyn vs. Fabrigas, Cowp. 161.) In the case last cited, a governor of Minorca was sued in England for a false imprison

ment alleged to have been committed by him while governor. Lord Mansfield said, if it had been done judicially it would have been a complete bar to the action, but as governor he had no such exemption, and he mentioned several cases of naval officers in the British service against whom actions had been brought and damages recovered for acts done by them officially in foreign parts. There was an interesting discussion of this subject in the courts of the state of New York in the case of Yates vs. Lansing, which was an action against the chancellor, and the English doctrine was fully considered and sustained. (5 Johnson's Rep. 282; 9 id. 375.) The same exemption from private suit on account of judicial acts which is given to judges is also extended to jurors, who, by the English and American law, are judges of facts.Another important requisite for the proper administration of law is certainty in the rules of decision. A discretionary power has been shown by common experience to be unsafe, however specious the idea may be of determining each case upon its own equity. A general rule, known beforehand and rigidly adhered to, is preferable to an oscillating and precarious judgment, although cases of individual hardship will occur in the application of such rules. There will, however, be cases not foreseen or provided for; in respect to these, shall the judges exercise a discretionary power, or should there be a judicatory to take special cognizance of them, or lastly, should legislative action be invoked? The Roman prætors intermingled equitable relief with their judicial decisions. In the English judicial system the court of chancery has had an exclusive but still limited authority to give relief in certain cases upon principles of equity differing from the strict rules of law. Yet even in the administration of equity that court soon became bound by its own precedents, from which it was not at liberty to depart, and the chancery law of England is at this day as well settled as the law administered in the other courts. Bacon proposed in his aphorisms De Justitia Universali, that there should be what he calls prætorian courts, having power as well of relieving from the rigor of the law as of supplying the defects of law, that is, prescribing the rule in cases not otherwise provided for (De Aug., lib. 8, c. iii., aph. 31). The English courts all decide according to precedents, or if no former decision can be found, then by analogy to what has been decided in similar cases, or upon some general principle which has been recognized; and in cases entirely new have sometimes sought aid from the Roman law. There is one class of cases, however, in which positive law alone is acted upon, and that is in respect to crimes and their punishment. Crimes must be defined by law, which may be either by statute or by ancient prescription, but courts have no power to declare new crimes; and so in regard to punishment, courts can enforce no other penalty than what has been previously fixed by law. The parlements of France were