resolutions of the League. Instead of amelioration of the condition after a period of 2 months, the Chinese find Japan successfully completing the destruction of all Chinese authority in Manchuria. They have seen an utter and shameless defiance by Japan of every effort made by the League, and it would seem that actually Japan has timed its every advance in a way so as to indicate to China and the world the low esteem in which it holds the League of Nations and world opinion. Great restraint, it seems to me, has been and is being exercised by the Chinese in the face of such provocation as they have had, and most emphatically do I feel that the powers owe it to themselves to take measures in all seriousness to prevent not only the complete destruction of confidence in the intentions and support behind the League Covenant, the Washington treaties, and the Anti-War Pact, but also the complete destruction of Chinese Government. (7) The Chinese are in desperation. Japanese activities, unrestrained by the rest of the world, are fanning among the younger Chinese generations hatreds which will some day produce very dangerous fruit. Whatever Japan's grievances may have been against China before September 18, there is nothing I know of done by China since then which would justify the program Japan has insisted upon following. JOHNSON 393.1154 (M) Andersen, Meyer & Company/2: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Johnson) WASHINGTON, November 25, 1931—3 p. m. 437. Your 862, November 3, 3 p. m. 1. The Consul General at Mukden should continue to bring to the attention of the Japanese Consul General the American interests in the Antung Electric Light Plant and the loss being suffered by the American interests as a result of the closing of the plant. 2. This matter is being taken up informally with the Japanese Ambassador here. STIMSON 793.94/2895: Telegram The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State PARIS, November 25, 1931-4 p. m. [Received November 25-1:05 p. m.] 799. From Ambassador Dawes: [Paraphrase.] The so-called Chinese counterproposal has just been sent by Sze to Briand. It must, of course, be assumed that Sze was instructed by his Government to do this following receipt through both Johnson and myself of the statement of the United States attitude. You will observe that references to the United States are eliminated in this counterproposal and also that Briand has not yet been asked by Sze to present the document to the League Council. The text of the counterproposal reads as follows: [End paraphrase.] "Article 1. Immediate cessation of all military activity in any way tending to aggravate the situation. Article 2. Withdrawal of Japanese forces within the railway areas; such withdrawal to begin at once, proceed progressively and be completed within 2 weeks. Article 3. China to assume full responsibility for the security of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in Manchuria. In this connection China is ready to cooperate in any reasonable measures looking to the establishment of additional guarantees of security by means of neutral aid or otherwise. Article 4. The details of evacuation and the taking over of territory, as well as the measures to safeguard security of Japanese life and property in Manchuria, to be subject of discussion and agreement between China and Japan in the presence of neutrals representing the Council. Article 5. The creation by the League of a neutral commission to supervise the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territories and to study and report upon the situation in Manchuria for the information of the Council and of the conference hereinafter mentioned in paragraph 7. Article 6. The mutual reaffirmance by both China and Japan of the principle of respect for international treaties, especially the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Paris Pact for the Renunciation of War, and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty. Article 7. The convocation of a conference of all interested powers to discuss and settle all questions between China and Japan relating to Manchuria on the basis of the principles embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Paris Pact for the Renunciation of War and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, with a view to safeguarding peace in the Far East and promoting the economic development of Manchuria through international cooperation." [Dawes] SHAW 793.94/2863: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Nanking (Peck) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, November 25, 1931-4 p. m. 120. For Minister Johnson: Your November 24, midnight. Since the objective "in order to avoid any clash" is stated by Dr. Koo, it is my feeling that, "as a temporary measure pending a general statement [settlement?] of the Manchuria question", the withdrawal by the Chinese Government on its own initiative of its troops to Shanhaikwan would be well advised. Undoubtedly the situation is very delicate, and so long as Chinese forces remain at Chinchow, it is possible there may be a clash and an ensuing conflict to aggravate the situation and to result probably in further loss of life and the compulsory withdrawal of Chinese troops. It would, I feel, be a sound preventive step for the Chinese Government at once to withdraw these forces, and I offer this only as a friendly suggestion, not as formal advice, solely made in reply to the question Dr. Koo put to me. As to the question of guarantees, time is lacking to commence an attempt to complete negotiations which might be needed. The question of the occupation by Japan of South Manchuria will have to be dealt with upon its merits and in its entirety, upon the basis of both facts and law, meaning treaty obligations. The problems thus presented are of solicitous interest to the whole world which is struggling to solve the question. As yet nothing can be guaranteed except the continuation of every possible effort for the prevention of war and the achievement of a solution by peaceful means. You should, by exercising your utmost tact and discretion, take this up immediately with Dr. Koo, informally and orally. STIMSON 793.94/2828: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Nanking (Peck) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, November 25, 1931-5 p. m. 121. For Minister Johnson: My 119, November 23, 6 p. m. To inform you as to how this matter was presented to the Japanese Government, I have asked Ambassador Forbes to repeat expeditiously to you my two telegrams dated November 23 to him and his reply dated November 24,99 In your discretion you may inform Dr. Koo orally as to the facts. STIMSON For Department's telegrams No. 240 and No. 241 of November 23, and the Ambassador's reply, telegram No. 234, November 24, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, pp. 48-50. 587122-46-VOL. III- -43 793.94/2901 : Telegram The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State PARIS, November 25, 1931-8 p. m. [Received November 25-4: 10 p. m.] 803. From Ambassador Dawes: Dr. Sze has just handed me the following statement which he has sent to Drummond for immediate transmission to the Council: "Positive information of the utmost urgency just received from my Government indicates that notwithstanding Japanese assurances to the contrary the Japanese Army is converging on Chinchow. A serious conflict therefore impends between the Japanese and Chinese forces which China earnestly wishes to avoid and it would seem that it can be prevented only if without any delay the Council interposes some decisive action. My Government accordingly asks the Council at once to take all necessary steps for the establishment of a neutral zone between the present stations of the Chinese and Japanese forces; such zone to be occupied by British, French, Italian and other neutral detachments under Council authority. In such circumstances China could and would if requested by the Council in the interest of peace withdraw her forces within the Great Wall. Please bring this communication to the immediate attention of the Council." [Dawes] SHAW 793.94/2900: Telegram The Chargé in France (Shaw) to the Secretary of State PARIS, November 25, 1931-10 p. m. [Received 11:30 p. m.1] 804. From Ambassador Dawes: Following is Sweetser's report. "The twelve members of the Council meeting at 5 o'clock today in entire privacy at Drummond's suggestion in order to avoid any premature publicity, took note of information received as to the views of the United States and decided to issue a résumé of the draft resolution as it now stands. The Council members also considered a statement from Sze. Meeting shortly after in ordinary private session, Briand drew attention to a communication from the Japanese speaking of a Chinese concentration at Chinchow and asking that the troops be withdrawn. This was in the form of a request and not a demand but it seemed to Briand a little strong to ask that Chinese troops withdraw from Chinese territory. Cecil then stated that Sze had told him that they could not withdraw unless neutral troops took their place. Briand 'Telegram in two sections. said that a note had been received to that effect asking that a neutral zone be established under control of foreign troops in which case they would withdraw behind the Great Wall. Already he noted a number of foreign observers were on the spot. Evidently Koo was preoccupied to avoid armed contact and was taking only defensive measures. Cecil thought that special action should be taken by all the Governments including the United States if it were possible. The seizure of a great town like Chinchow would be a deliberate insult at this moment when the Council was meeting to elaborate plans for a settlement. Briand then proposed two things: first, that he as President send a new appeal [to] both parties in special relation to Chinchow; and second, that the individual Governments intervene in the same sense and also send observers if possible. Accordingly an identic cable was sent this evening by Briand and [sic] to both Governments in the name of the Council pointing out that the Council's efforts for peace would be vain if new incidents occurred and drawing special attention to the situation around Chinchow. Already certain Governments had sent observers there; the responsibility however rested with the two Governments to prevent further loss of life. The Council members then took up again the draft resolution to which some slight verbal changes were suggested to make it still clearer that the commission while not in[ter]fering with actual military movements was nevertheless fully entitled to report upon the military side of the situation as well as the other sides. A draft statement to the press summarizing the resolution as it now stands was then presented. Briand pointed out that it would be better to give a summary on good authority than to give the full text as thereby the Council members would not be bound to actual phraseology. Madariaga however once again expressed the disquietude felt by himself and certainly shared by several other members of the Council lest the publication of any such statement might appear to commit the Council members and thus in case China refused put them in the position of voting against her. This would reverse the situation in that previously Japan had been alone but in this contingency China might be isolated. Both Briand and Cecil spoke against this interpretation. The former stressed the fact that the Council was still working under article 11 and that necessarily it must make the effort to secure unanimity. The case was very exceptional, given a Japanese-controlled railway on Chinese soil. No one not even the Chinese had suggested any other article than 11; the commission would be of great value to China; it would even provide a kind of internationalization for Manchuria. Cecil thought the Council members must get on to a result. They had previously approved a draft resolution, given it to the parties 48 hours ago, and ought to inform the public of its general lines. World opinion was somewhat mystified by conflicting reports; the Council must shortly have another public meeting. Briand also mentioned for the first time some kind of general statement to accompany the draft resolution. It was not quite clear what he meant; Cecil however urged that the first thing was to publish the communiqué tonight reserving until later any additional |