admit of a delay until the legislature of the United States can be consulted.

ARTICLE XIV.

The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

ARTICLE XV.

Any person charged with treason, felony, or high misdemeanor in any State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any other State, shall, on demand of the executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence.

ARTICLE XVI.

Full faith shall be given in each State, to the acts of the legislatures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.

ARTICLE XVII.

New States lawfully constituted and established within the limits of the United States, may be admitted, by the legislature, into this government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the members present in each house shall be necessary. If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the present States, the consent of the legislatures of such States shall be necessary to the admission. If the admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting.

ARTICLE XVIII.

The United States shall guarantee to each State a republican form of government; and shall protect each State against foreign invasions, and, on the application of its legislature, against domestic violence.

ARTICLE XIX.

On the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment to this Constitution, the legisla ture of the United States shall call a convention for that purpose.

ARTICLE XX.

The members of the legislatures, and the executive and judicial officers of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath to support this Constitution.

ARTICLE XXI.

The ratification of the conventions of cient for organizing this Constitution.

ARTICLE XXII.

States shall be suffi

This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a convention chosen in each State, under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such convention.

ARTICLE XXIII.

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Convention, that each assenting couvention should notify its assent and ratification to the United States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and ratification of the conventions of States, should appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; and after such publication, the legislatures of the several States should elect members of the Senate and direct the election of members of the House of Representatives; and that the members of the legislature should meet at the time and place, assigned by Congress, and should as soon as may be after their meeting, choose the President of the United States and proceed to execute this Constitution.

This report was considered and debated in the Convention from the 6th of August until the 9th of September, during which it received a great variety of modifications and alterations.

On the 9th of September it was referred as amended, to a committee of style and revision, consisting of Messrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Hamilton of New York, Morris of Pennsylvania, Madison of Virginia, and King of Massachusetts.

This committee reported on the 14th September, and after a great variety of motions to amend, of which the record is very imperfect, their draft was adopted, with but slight modifications.

EXTRACTS FROM THE DEBATE

IN THE FEDERAL Convention, ON THE RESPECTIVE PLANS OF MR. RANDOLPH AND MR. PATTERson.

The first resolution of each plan having been read, Mr. LANSING of New York, said:- "The plan of Mr. Patterson sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it.

"The plan of Mr. Randolph, in short, absorbs all power, except what may be exercised in the little local matters of the States, which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He grounded his preference of Mr. Patterson's plan, chiefly on two objections to that of Mr. Randolph, — first, want of power in the Convention to discuss and propose it; secondly, the improbability of its being adopted.

"He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained to amendments of a Federal nature, and having for their basis the confederacy in being. The acts of Congress, the tenor of the acts of the States, the commissions produced by the several deputations, all proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the confederacy marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary and improper to go further."

Mr. PATTERSON said, he preferred his own plan, "because it accorded, — first, with the powers of the Convention; secondly, with the sentiments of the people. If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume them ourselves. . . . If we argue the matter on the supposition, that no confederacy, at present, exists, it cannot be denied, that all the States stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All, therefore, must concur, before any can be bound. If a proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we

argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it, we shall find an equal sovereignty to be the basis of it. He read the fifth article of the Confederation, giving each State a vote; and the thirteenth, declaring that no alteration shall be made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done must be unanimously undone."

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"If the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the representatives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from the people; and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. Do the people at large complain of Congress? No. What they wish is that Congress may have more power. If the power now proposed be not enough, the people hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers, Congress will act with more energy and wisdom than the proposed national legislature; being few in number and more secreted and refined by the mode of election. The plan of Mr. Randolph will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia and Delaware two representatives each in the popular branch, the aggregate number of that branch will be one hundred and eighty. Add to it half as many for the other branch, and you have two hundred and seventy members, coming once at least a year from the most distant as well as the most central parts of the republic. In the present deranged state of our finances, can so expensive a system be seriously thought of?"

Mr. PINCKNEY. "The whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give New Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples and concur in the national system. He thought the convention authorized to go any length in recommending, which they found necessary to remedy the evils which produced this convention."

He

Mr. RANDOLPH "was not scrupulous with regard to power. When the salvation of the republic was at stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what we found necessary. painted in strong colors the imbecility of the existing confederacy, and the danger of delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the sense of our constituents, as denoted by their acts relating to the convention and the objects of their delib