he will enable them to know their own strength; and, at the same time, to acquire the command of a powerful instrument which nature has put into their hands, for the most valuable purposes. For when the habit of investigation is once formed, and the energies of the mind are placed under the control of well-regulated attention, the student becomes his own best teacher, and the impor tant work of education goes on of its own accord, without either pain or effort.

In these outlines, I have arranged the subjects of the first or introductory part of mental philosophy in the following order.

1st. The elements of the science of mind, or, an analysis of the powers of the mind, particularly of those by which knowledge is acquired, followed by an illustration of their several modes of operation, derived from the origin of language, and the principles of general grammar.

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2d. The elements of intellectual culture, applied to each respective faculty, and to their mutual co-operation or processes action: illustrated by the history of logic, ancient and modern. 3d. An analysis of the powers of taste; or, as they are sometimes called, of the internal or reflex senses, of novelty, beauty, sublimity, &c.

4th. An explanation of the means by which these powers or sus ceptibilities are cultivated; illustrated by the history of the fine arts, and the principles of composition in the department of belles

lettres.

5th. The powers of communication by speech and writing; and the means of cultivating these powers, illustrated by the history of

the arts of rhetoric and criticism.

These subjects may be supposed to occupy a third or a fourth part of the under-graduate course, and are very properly made to precede the more profound inquiries which belong to ethics and physics. There has, no doubt, been considerable difference of opinion among the learned, as to the nature of the studies which ought immediately to succeed the classics, in the order of academ ical tuition. Some recommend geometry and natural philosophy, as more suitable to the physical connections of things, where facts lay hold of the mind, before reason can deduce principles or ge neralise phenomena. In certain universities, accordingly, the students pass from the ancient languages to some one of the sciences which respect matter, and enter not upon the philosophy of mind, logic, ethics, &c. till toward the close of the under-graduate

course.

For reasons already stated, I am satisfied that it is more advantageous to begin the philosophical course with the studies which respect the operations of mind. In all the branches of human know

ledge, mind is either the subject or the instrument of research. In metaphysics, ethics, politics, theology, and taste, no progress can be made without a previous analysis of the intellectual and moral faculties; the anatomy of the mind must be studied, before the mental powers can be thoroughly known or successfully exercised; and no one will so profitably employ himself in the examination of the material world, as he who has been accustomed to turn his mind inward upon the course of its own operations, to mark their origin, their connection, and their results.

It is of less consequence, no doubt, to vary a little the order, in which the subjects of study are introduced, than to leave out the most important of them altogether: and it does, I humbly confess, appear to me, that, in the English universities, there is too great a portion of the under-graduate course exclusively devoted to the pursuit of classical literature.

But it is not only the matter of study which engages the attention of him who takes a survey of the present state of university education; the methods also which are adopted in the several seminaries of the kingdom, and which present not less variety than the subjects to which they are directed, claim his serious consideration, and naturally suggest some thoughts on the means of their improvement.

Every one knows that the method of teaching philosophy which is pursued in the Scottish colleges, differs considerably from that which has been long acted upon in the universities of England. In the former, a series of written lectures, composed or compiled by the professors, are annually delivered from their respective chairs; whereas, in the latter, the business of education is carried on almost entirely by means of private reading, and a species of colloquial examinations. In the prosecution of this last method, the college tutor, instead of lecturing, peruses certain authors along with his pupils, explaining particular passages as he goes along, and conversing with them on the doctrines or facts to which their attention has been directed.

Each plan, no doubt, has its peculiar advantages; but it appears to be easily practicable to combine the best parts of each, without sacrificing anything essential in either. Could this not be effected, I have no hesitation in preferring the tutorial system, limited and restricted as it must be, as infinitely more useful than a mere course of lectures, unaccompanied with examinations and exerciThe leading improvement, then, which I should venture to recommend, is the introduction into the English colleges of lectures, properly so called, to be incorporated, to a certain extent, with their present method of teaching by means of reading and conversation. This addition to their system, so far from obstruct

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ing or superseding any of their accustomed processes of intellectual culture, would, I am convinced, both render them more efficacious, and, at the same time, more agreeable to the student. Indeed, the comparatively small number of pupils, and the full command of their time and arrangements, which is placed in the hands of the college tutor, are circumstances eminently favorable to a successful application of the method of teaching I have endeavored to unfold in the foregoing pages.

The greatest obstacle which we have to encounter, in this part of the island, in following out the details of our plan, by daily examinations, and themes, arises from our very numerous classes, consisting in some instances of nearly two hundred students. In a college, therefore, where not more than thirty or forty generally attend the lectures on mental philosophy and ethics, we have the best reason to conclude that the beneficial effects of this system, would be realised to their fullest extent; that each of the young men would be examined every day on the subjects discussed in the lecture, and that essays would be regularly prescribed on the principal topics thus previously illustrated and brought home to their comprehension. The age, too, of the pupils who enter the English universities, presents another facility for adopting, in such schools, the lecture system, as a means of philosophical instruction. The mind of a youth of seventeen or eighteen is sufficiently mature to follow out a train of reasoning, and to perceive the connection of a discourse; whereas, in Scotland, there are always a number of students in the philosophy classes, who are not qualified, either in respect of age or of previous acquirements, for entering upon such pursuits. In every point of view, then, the method of teaching by lecture, examination, and the performance of essays, is fully more suitable to the circumstances of the English and Irish universities, than to those of Scotland; and seems calculated, of course, to produce still greater advantages in the former, than have ever yet been actually realised in the latter.

But, I am aware, it may still be proposed as a preliminary question, whether the method of teaching, in present use, does not answer all the purposes of education, as well as that which is here recommended, whether a careful perusal of select authors, and a subsequent conversation upon them, between the tutor and his pupils, are not employments as likely to improve the minds of youth, as a formal lecture pronounced in their hearing, even when it is made the ground-work of examination, and converted into materials for exercises in composition.

To decide this point, it is necessary to come to an understanding as to what are, or ought to be, the main purposes of education; and I should imagine, there can be no difficulty in admitting that

these are comprehended, first, in the communication of knowledge; and, secondly, in the cultivation of the mental powers, without a reference to any specific acquirement, in literature or science.

With regard to the communication of knowlege, there can be no doubt that, as far as regards classical learning, mathematics, and the higher parts of arithmetic, the only rational method of conveying instruction is to peruse, with the pupil, the best works in these several departments. No man ever thought of teaching a boy to understand Homer, Euclid, or La Place, by means of lec

But we are now speaking of philosophical education, as it relates to the science of mind; of morals, and of human life; the principles of reasoning and of taste; the distinction of good and evil, the doctrines of justice, of law, and of government; and, certainly, in this wide field, where opinions have so long remained unsettled, and where no authority is permitted to give a final decision, a very different mode of instruction ought to be pursued. It is here, in short, that the lecture system ought to be introduced, as supplementary to that of individual reading.

For instance, it is only necessary to observe that no one writer contains all that the student ought to know, and that every writer comprehends more than it is either requisite or expedient should be laid before him. Our greatest authors, it is well known, wrote, not for beginners, nor with the view of giving a didactic system, but for the learned world at large, and commonly, too, with the intention either of attacking or supporting some particular hypothesis. It is impossible, therefore, to find, in any single work, the elementary statements, combined with those general views on which a philosophical education should be constructed and thus it necessarily becomes the office of a teacher to read, to select, and to arrange, for the use of his pupils; and, from the stores of knowledge with which his professional studies must be supposed to have furnished him, to bring forward what shall appear best suited to their previous attainments, as well as to the particular object of his course. In drawing up his lectures in such circumstances, the professor will frequently see it expedient to confine himself to the outlines of subjects, which may be treated by the original author in great detail: he will give, at some length, the history of opinion on the more important questions which present themselves for discussion: he will call the attention of his pupils to the various stages in the progress of the human mind, from its first attempt at generalisation to the accomplishment of a connected system: and, in particular, he will point out the numerous sources of error, whether arising from the nature of certain inquiries, or from the imperfection of human reason, which have at various times materially retarded the advancement of science. Indeed, in many sub

jects of study, such as divinity, law, ethics, and politics, the history of opinion constitutes the sum and substance of our knowledge. Our inquiries after the statement of a few first principles, are directed to little more than the succession of truth and error, to the varying forms which they may have assumed, and to the circumstances which have paved the way for their alternate reception. It must then be abundantly evident, that the perusal of no one work, in these departments, nor, indeed, of all the works, at any one period, would be sufficient for the purposes of instruction.

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If, indeed, we shall be allowed to suppose, that the object of the tutor and his pupil is confined to the very limited attainment of knowing what were the opinions of an individual author; of Aristotle, for example, of Bacon, of Locke, or of Reid, on any particular point of philosophy, the plan of education at present pursued is unquestionably the best that could be imagined to gratify their ambition; for, they have only to turn up the chapter and section of the particular work, to examine the argument, and to note down the conclusion. But if, on the other hand, their views extend to the more exalted object of inquiring what are now received as general opinions, on the various subjects handled so successfully by Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, and Reid, in their respective works— what were the notions which prevailed as to the object of philoso phy, and the principles of human knowledge, in the long interval between the first and last of these distinguished writers-what were the discoveries or modes of thinking which led to the several changes of doctrine on these points, as we find them recorded in the history of science, and upon what particular grounds each succeeding theory was ultimately maintained or rejected, it is manifest that all the reading which the pupil, directed by his tutor, could possibly overtake, during the whole time allotted for college residence, would not enable him to accomplish this end. In short, the reading system of instruction can only be recommended when the teacher wishes to convey to his students the views of some individual philosopher; and, as such a limited undertaking is altogether inconsistent with the present state of science, it follows that, in order to realise the first mentioned purpose of academical education, namely, the communication of knowledge, the tutor ought to prepare, from his own stores of information, lectures for the use of his pupils; containing at once an outline which they should endeavor to fill up, and a guide to the best source of materials.

a course of

Let us apply these general observations to the actual practice of the schools where the reading plan of teaching philosophy is adopted. The books usually read in the colleges alluded to, as an introduction to the philosophy of mind, are, I believe, Aristotle's