or the models, on which our instructers form us. The books to be sure have been written over and over again, in order to keep pace with, and incorporate the improvements and discoveries in the different sciences, of which they treat. This is well, and as it should be. But the essential principle, on which they are written, is the same through all changes. This is wrong, and what should be corrected. Improvements in arrangement, and in the manner of expressing the principles of the sciences, have, no doubt, been frequently made. Indeed, the books have brobably been carried to as great perfection, as they can be carried, without some more essential change in the principles on which they have been written. They are very well executed, upon a very bad plan. The reason to be assigned for such slow progress in the improvement of school books, in particular, is a mistaken notion of the purpose of a school book; and the fact, that there have seldom been brought to the task of elementary instruction, talents capable of comprehending, at once, the principles of a science, in their relation and dependence upon each other; and still less capable of analysing the powers of the young mind, to which the science is to be adapted. The books for elementary instruction, have been written or compiled, with a view to set forth the principles of the science of which it treats, in a manner the most philosophical to those who make the books, but with little or no reference to the young minds, which are to encounter them. The object of the education, which can be given in the schools of this country, or even the colleges, is not so much to give knowledge, as to develope the powers of the mind, and strengthen them for the acquirement of knowledge, at some future period. Every thing, therefore, even philosophical accuracy, if it is necessary, must be sacrificed to the single object of adaptation to the mind. It is of little consequence, what the study is, which the child or youth is put upon, if it be so managed, as to bring forward all the powers of the mind, in their proper and natural order. And when the mind has acquired some strength by discipline, and a just balance among all its faculties, its attention may be then turned towards the acquirement of useful knowledge, with a good hope of success. But impatient parents have estimated instructers, by their ability to give a smattering of learning in some branch of knowledge, rather than their ability to watch over and detect all wrong associations; and to preserve the balance essential to a well disciplined mind, by encouraging or repressing different faculties as the particular case may require. Perfection of education consists more in the harmony and just proportion of all the powers of the mind, than in the overgrown strength of any one. When the plan of a school book, or the ar

rangement of studies generally, is such as to exercise but few or one of the powers, this takes the lead. It monopolises an undue share of energy, and becomes overgrown at the expense of some, or all of the other powers. The features of the mind become distorted, and unless the deformity is corrected by the judicious instructer, the effect will become permanent, and extend to the whole char

acter.

The inductive method applied to the Languages and Geography. IF Socrates was said to have brought philosophy from heaven, Bacon may as truly be said to have infused it into men. The generations, that have lived between that prodigy of human intellect and ourselves, have acknowledged their obligations to him, and no doubt profited much by his instructions. But, it is apprehended, his philosophy is not yet brought down to our comprehension, and carried thoroughly and effectually into all our intellectual exertions. It is said, he felt that he belonged to a later age, than that, in which he lived; and in anticipation of his increasing fame, 'bequeathed his name to posterity, after some generations shall be passed.** Perhaps this generation is the intended heir; and it is high time, they had put in their claim to enjoy the inheritance.

There are no means, by which we may derive more advantage from his philosophy, and consequently render more honor to his name, than by applying it to the subject of education, or the science of instruction. The applicability of his philosophy to this subject, has been, long since, acknowledged by high authority. And the distance between the acknowledgement of the principle, and the application of it, has not been greater, than was to be expected; especially, when we consider, that the application depended upon judgements warped by all the prejudices or 'Idols' of the mind, formed under the reign of a different philosophy.

Mr. Stewart, sketching a system of logic, observes: Another very important branch of a rational system of logic, ought to be, to lay down the rules of investigation, which it is proper to follow in the different sciences.' And when, farther on, he tells us how to lay down such rules of investigation, he says: Such is the incapacity of most people for abstract reasoning, that I am inclined to think, even if the rules of inquiry were delivered in a perfectly complete, and unexceptionable form, it might still be expedient to teach them to a majority of students, rather by examples, than in the form of general principles.† How far Mr. Stewart was able to over

* Stewart's Dissertation on the History of Philosophy. Part i. P. 94. + Philosophy of the Human Mind. Introd. Part 2d. Sec. 2d.

come the 'Idols' of his own mind, and keep himself consistent with the principle above laid down, his book must decide.

There is a wide difference between the rules of inquiry, by which we are to proceed to the study of a science, and the principles of that science, after we have already begun to make acquisitions in it. But if the former should be taught by examples, the reasons are much stronger, why the latter should.

It would be much easier to understand by a maxim, in what direction the science lies; than it would be to understand by the same means, all the particulars or facts of that science, when the inquirer has arrived upon the ground. The mind does not perceive a general truth, till it has perceived the particular truths, from which it has been derived. If any thing more than our own experience were necessary to settle this point, passages might be selected from various authors, to add the weight of their authority. But it is not the custom to question this position; and it is quite as little the custom to pay any attention to it. It is to this point, attention is now invited; in the hope it may have, not only a speculative belief, but a practical influence upon our principles and systems of instruction.

But this is dealing too much in generals; or falling precisely into the error to be controverted. To be consistent, a particular example must be taken, to illustrate what is meant by inductive instruction. I must even be so consistent, as not to give a definition. For unless our experience upon the particular subject has been altogether similar, there would be great danger of being misunderstood, or not understood at all; till an example explained the meaning, and then a definition would be unnecessary. After a few examples of the application of the principle, it will be easy for any one to make a correct definition for himself.

In selecting the example of languages, I shall probably meet more objections, and encounter more skeptics, than in any other example, which could be taken. But principles are always best tested by extreme cases. And there is no necessity for availing myself of the advantage of the happiest application I could select. In our most approved schools, the method of teaching languages has been, to put into the hand of the pupil a grammar of the language to be taught; and require him to learn, as it is improperly called, the general principles of the language. This is done commonly at the expense of from three to six or twelve months' time, and a thorough disgust to the whole subject. This disgust very naturally arises from being kept so long, on what he does not in the least understand.* At the end of this time, if the teacher has

*To counteract in some degree, this baneful effect, artificial stimulants are applied. And these are increased to so intense a degree, as to produce a perfect phrensy in the pupil, to seem to have learned all, that could be expected from him.

been inflexible in his purpose, and the pupil not unreasonably stupid, he will have committed to memory his grammar from end to end, including all rules and all exceptions; to which he probably attaches equal importance. He may have fixed perfectly in his memory, all the subtle refinements of all the philosophers, who have spent their lives in studying the principles and anamolies of the language; but he has made but a small approximation to a knowledge of it. This is studying the philosophy of the language before the pupil is acquainted with the facts of it.

This system of teaching proceeds upon the supposition, that the language was invented and formed by the rules of grammar. Nothing is more false. A grammar can never be written till a good knowledge of the language is attained; and then, contrary to what the pupil supposes, the grammar is made to suit the language. Now why invert this natural method in teaching language to young learners? Must not the facts be learned, before they can be classed under general principles? What are the rules and principles, which the pupil has learned at so dear a rate? They are no more than the verbal generalisation of facts. How have they themselves been formed? By the experience of those whose attention has been directed to the observation of the facts. They are abstract principles, the truth of which can neither be perceived, understood, nor believed, till some single instance, within the comprehension of the principle or rule, presents itself to the learner. And then he will perceive the fact in the particular case, long before he discovers its identity with the rule, if he is ever so fortunate as to discover it.

In learning the peculiarities of a language, which is but imperfectly known, the philosopher does not (although he might to much better advantage than a young learner) go to the grammar of that language; he selects the best authors and makes a careful analysis of their sentences; and thus discovers, what constructions are common with other languages, and what are peculiar to the one to be learned. At the end of his researches, he forms into general principles, the result of his experience. The rule, therefore, is obtained by a patient induction of particular instances, and is put in words, not to teach us anything, but to classify what has already been learned, and put it in a form convenient to be referred to, as occasion requires. As we assort our papers by examination of

Under the strong excitement of hope or fear, the young learner will spare no pains to accomplish his task. But it must be remembered, that under the influence of these motives, the object is only to convince the instructer the task is accomplished. And oftentimes the craftiness of the pupil will invent some more expeditious method for this purpose, than really to possess himself of the knowledge he is expected to gain. These short cuts to the approbation of the instructer, it is feared, are not always consistent with that ingenuousness which it is so desirable to cultivate in the youthful heart.

each particular one, and put together the letters of correspondence, the promissory notes, and the deeds of conveyance; and then put on each collection a label, with the title of the class, as a convenience for reference only, not because that alters the nature of the papers on which it is put.

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The analogy pursued illustrates my meaning farther. He, who has committed to his memory all the principles of a language, before he has had experience of the particular cases, from which those principles have been derived, will be no wiser in respect to his language, than he, who should collect the labels of his papers, and take this for a knowledge of their nature. The abstract principles of a language give no more adequate idea of the particulars, from which they have been formed, than the labels give of the nature and obligation of a note, or a deed, before those papers have been separately and individually examined.

The facts of a language must be first learned, and they always are first learned, all the arrangements to the contrary notwithstanding. The rules in the learner's memory are perfectly useless, till he has learned the particulars or facts of the language; because he cannot till then understand them. And when the pupil is learning the language by experience, he will make rules for his own convenience, precisely as a philosopher does; and always make them as general as his experience will allow. As he makes farther progress, and becomes acquainted with more of the minutiae of the language, he will extend the comprehension of his rules, till they become as general as the nature of the subject admits. Then the exceptions will be noticed and classed under the rules, to which they are exceptions.

Is not this natural and philosophical; and if so, why do we pursue a method diametrically opposite to both? What then is the business of the instructer; and must every pupil learn the language under all the disadvantages, which we should encounter in attempting to learn a dead language, without grammar or instructer? The business of the instructer is, to lay before his pupil those facts which are easiest perceived. Such are the meaning of the words, and the construction of the simplest sentences. And as a knowlledge of the words is attained, and the formation of the sentences understood, a principle of limited comprehension is established in the mind of the pupil, and sentences of more difficult construction are put in his way.

The duty of the instructer is more arduous; because he must know by observation, precisely how fast his pupil generalises, in order to arrange the difficulties he is to encounter. The duty of the learner is easier, and his success more certain; because he knows, if his instructer is not ignorant or careless, that he is com