or causing to be seized any free person with | der a certain act of Congress passed on the intent to reduce him to slavery; depositions not to be admitted as evidence; witnesses testifying falsely, liable to $5,000 fine and five years imprisonment. RHODE ISLAND. This State by her legislation forbids the carrying away of any person by force out of the State; forbids any judge, justice, magistrate, or court from officially aiding in the arrest of a fugitive slave under the fugitive slave law of 1793 or 1850; forbids any sheriff or other officer from arresting or detaining and person claimed as a fugitive slave; provides a penalty of $500, or imprisonment not exceeding six months, for violating the act; denies the use of her jails to the United States for the detention of fugitive slaves. NEW YORK. The State of New York has passed no laws having relation to the United States fugitive slave act of 1850. Though pressed frequently upon the Legislature, they have always failed of adoption. The old and obsolete act of 1840, entitled "An act to extend the right of trial by jury," extends the trial by jury to the cases of persons arrested as fugitive slaves; but in the fourth edition of the laws of the State, as prepared and published by Hon. HIRAM DENIO, at present Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals, may be found appended to the chapter containing this law the following note: "An Act to Extend the Right of Trial by Jury, passed May 6th, 1840.-The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Prigg vs. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters' R. 539, establishes the doctrine that all State laws calculated to interfere with the third subdivision of section 2, article 4, of the Constitution of the United States are unconstitutional. Since that decision the fugitive slave law (Laws of Congress, 1850, chap. 60) has been passe passed, containing provisions repugnant to the whole of this act. It is therefore of no force; but, as it never has been repealed, it is here inserted." 12th day of February, 1793." During the last session of her Legislature the Commissioners appointed to revise and amend the Penal Laws of Pennsylvania (John C. Knox, Edward King, and David Webster) made a report to the Legislature that they had completed their labors, and the result was presented in the shape of a bill entitled "An act to consolidate, revise and amend the Penal Laws of this Commonwealth." That report, on the thirty-first day of March, 1860, was enacted into a law, and by the ninety-fifth section it is enacted as follows: "No Judge of any of the Courts of this Commonwealth, nor any Alderman or Justice of the Peace of said Commonwealth, shall have jurisdiction or take cognizance of the case of any fugitive from labor from any of the United States or Territories under any act of Congress, nor shall any such Judge, Alderman, or Justice of the Peace of this Commonwealth issue or grant any certificate or warrant of removal of any such fugitive from labor, under any act of Congress; and if any Alderman or Justice of the Peace of this Commonwealth shall take cognizance or jurisdiction of the case of any such fugitive, or shall grant or issue any certificate or warrant of removal, as aforesaid, then, and in either case, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office, and shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced to pay, at the discretion of the Court, any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, the one-half to the party prosecuting for the same, and the other half to the use of this Commonwealth." The theory of this law, it will be seen, is founded strictly on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Prigg case, and does not interfere with the functions of the Commissioner appointed under the United States law. MICHIGAN.* The law of this State requires State's attorneys to act as counsel for fugitive slaves; secures to persons arrested as fugi tive slaves the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and trial by jury; denies use of State jails for detention of alleged fugitives; requires that identity of fugitive slaves shall be proved by two credible witnesses, or by legal evidence equivalent thereto, and provides a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, and imprisonment in State prison for five years, for forcibly seizing, or causing to be seized, any free person, with intent to have such person held in slavery. WISCONSIN. The law of this State enjoins on the district attorneys the duty of acting as counsel for alleged fugitive slaves; secures to such persons the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus; provides for appeal to be taken to next stated term of the Circuit Court; secures trial by jury; enjoins a penalty of one thousand dollars and imprisonment of not more than five nor less than one year on all who "falsely and maliciously represent any free person to be a slave"; identity of alleged fugitive slave to be proved by two credible witnesses; no deposition to be received in evidence. It is also provided that " No judgment recovered against any person or persons for any neglect or refusal to obey, or any violations of, the act of Congress commonly termed the 'Fugitive Slave Act,' approved September eighteenth, one thousand eight hundred and fifty, or any of the provisions thereof, shall be a lien on any real estate within this State, nor shall any such judgment be enforcable by sale or execution of any real or personal property within this State; but all such sales shall be absolutely void; and in case of seizure or sale of any personal property, by virtue of any execution issued on such judgment, the defendant in said execution may maintain an action in replevin, or other action to secure possession thereof, in the manner provided by law for such actions, on affidavit filed as required by law, and a further statement therein that said execution issued in a judgment rendered under the provisions of the act of Congress aforesaid; and the provisions of this section shall also apply to judgments heretofore rendered." OHIO, INDIANA, ILLINOIS, MINNE. SOTA, CALIFORNIA AND OREGON. We cannot find that these States have any laws in force on the subject. Notes. In VERMONT Legislature, Nov., 1860, a majority of the Committee of House of Representatives reported in favor of the repeal of the above law, but their proposition was rejected by a vote of two to one. In MAINE, a repealing bill passed the Senate-yeas 17, yeas 10, and failed in the House. In MASSACHUSETTS, a modifying bill was passed. For detail, see under "Massachusetts." In RHODE ISLAND, a repealing bill passed the Senate-yeas 21, nays 9; the Houseyeas 49, nays 18. In MICHIGAN, a repealing bill was indefinitely postponed in the House-yeas 43, nays 24. In PENNSYLVANIA, a repealing bill was introduced into the House, but was not reached, in the course of business, when the firing on Sumter opened the war. A majority of each House was understood to be in favor of it. This law was first passed in 1847, after the Prigg decision; and one section prohibiting the use of State jails was repealed in 1852. U. S. Senator Simmons of Rhode Island, in one of his speeches, made these remarks: "Complaint had been made of personal liberty bills. Now, the Massachusetts personal liberty bill was passed by a Democratic House, a Democratic Senate, and signed by a Democratic Governor, a man who was afterwards nominated by Mr. Polk for the very best office in New England, and was unanimously confirmed by a Democratic United States Senate. Further than this, the very first time the attention of the Massachusetts Legislature was called to the propriety of a repeal to this law was by a Republican Governor, Governor Banks. Now, on the other hand, South Carolina had repealed a law imprisoning British colored sailors, but retained the one imprisoning those coming from States inhabited by her own brethren." 1 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THE SECESSION MOVEMENT. Meeting and Proceedings of Congress. THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS-SECOND SESSION. Congress met on the first Monday of December, 1860, and was composed of the following persons : SENATE. JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE of Kentucky, Vice President. MAINE-H. Hamlin,* W. P. Fessenden. NEW HAMPSHIRE-John P. Hale, Daniel Clark. VERMONT Solomon Foot, J. Collamer. Sumner. RHODE ISLAND-James F. Simmons, H. PENNSYLVANIA-S. Cameron, Wm. Bigler. Mason. VIRGINIA-R. M. T. Hunter, James M. SOUTH CAROLINA-James Chesnut, Jas. NORTH CAROLINA-Thomas Bragg, T. L. Clingman. H. Hammond.† ALABAMA-B. Fitzpatrick, C. C. Clay, Jr. son. tian. NEW HAMPSHIRE-Gilman Marston, M. W. Tappan, T. M. Edwards. VERMONT-E. P. Walton, J. S. Morrill. H. E. Royce. MASSACHUSETTS-Thos. D. Eliot, James RHODE ISLAND-C. Robinson, W. D. Bray- NEW YORK-Luther C. Carter, James Humphrey, Daniel E. Sickles, W. B. Ma- B. Pottle, Alfred Wells, Wm. Irvine, Alfred KENTUCKY-L. W. Powell, J. J. Critten- Elbridge G. Spaulding, Reuben E. Fenton. den. MISSOURI Jas. S. Green, Trusten Polk. tle. Gwin. * Resigned January 17th, 1861, and succeeded by Hon. Lot M. Morrill. † Did not attend. 48 JERSEY - T. Nixon, John L. N. Stratton, Garnett B. Adrain, Jetur R. Riggs, Wm. Pennington (Speaker.) PENNSYLVANIA - Thos. B. Florence, E. Joy Morris, John P. Verree, Wm. Millward, John Wood, John Hickman, Henry C. Longnecker, Jacob K. McKenty, Thaddeus Stevens, John W. Killinger, James H. Campbell, George W. Scranton, William H. Dimmick, Galusha A. Grow, James T. Hale, Benjamin F.Junkin, Edward McPherson, Samuel S. Blair, John Covode, William Montgomery, James K. Moorhead, Robert McKnight, William Stewart, Chapin Hall, Elijah Bab bitt. † Resigned and succeeded January 2d, 1861, by Hon. Stephen Coburn. MARYLAND-Jas. A. Stewart, J. M. Har-1 ris, H. W. Davis, J. M. Kunkel, G. W. Hughes. WISCONSIN-John F. Potter, C. C. Washburn, C. H. Larrabee. MINNESOTA-Cyrus Aldrich, Wm. Windom. VIRGINIA-John S. Millson, Muscoe R. H. SOUTH CAROLINA-John McQueen, Wm. NORTH CAROLINA-W.N.H. Smith, Thos. Ruffin, W. Winslow, L. O'B. Branch, John A. Gilmer, Jas. M. Leach, Burton Craige, Z. B. Vance. GEORGIA-Peter E. Love, M. J. Crawford, Thos. Hardeman, Jr., L. J. Gartrell, J. W. H. Underwood, James Jackson, Joshua Hill, John J. Jones. ALABAMA-Jas. L. Pugh, David Clopton, Sydenh. Moore, Geo. S. Houston, W. R. W. Cobb, J. b, J. A. Stallworth, J. L. M. Curry. MISSISSIPPI-L. Q. C. Lamar, Reuben Davis, William Barksdale, O. R. Singleton, John J. McRae. LOUISIANA-John E. Bouligny, Miles Taylor, T. G. Davidson, John M. Landrum. OHIO-G. H. Pendleton, John A. Gurley, C. L. Vallandigham, William Allen, James M. Ashley, Wm. Howard, Thomas Corwin, Benj. Stanton, John Carey, C. A. Trimble, Chas. D. Martin, Saml. S. Cox, John Sherman, H. G. Blake, William Helmick, C. B. Tompkins, T. C. Theaker, S. Edgerton, Edward Wade, John Hutchins, John A. Bingham. KENTUCKY-Henry C. Burnett, Green Adams, S. O. Peyton, F. M. Bristow, W. C. Anderson, Robert Mallory, Wm. E. Simms, L. T. Moore, John Y. Brown, J. W. Steven son. TENNESSEE-T. A. R. Nelson, Horace Maynard, R. B. Brabson, William B. Stokes, Robert Hatton, James H. Thomas, John V. Wright, James M. Quarles, Emerson Etheridge, Wm. T. Avery. INDIANA-Wm. E. Niblack, Wm. H. English, Wm. M'Kee Dunn, Wm. S. Holman, David Kilgore, Albert G. Porter, John G. Davis, James Wilson, Schuyler Colfax, Chas. Case, John U. Pettit. ILLINOIS-E. B. Washburne, J. F. Farnsworth, Owen Lovejoy, Wm. Kellogg, I. N. Morris, John A. McClernand, James C. Robinson, P. B. Fouke, John A. Logan. ARKANSAS-Thomas C. Hindman, Albert Rust. MISSOURI J. R. Barrett, T. L. Anderson, KANSAS-Martin F. Conway, (sworn Jan. President Buchanan's Last Annual It was delivered on Tuesday, December 4th, 1860. Mr. Buchanan alluded to the distracted condition of the country, and appealed to the American people. He declared that the election of any one of our fellow-citizens to the office of President does not, of itself, afford just cause for dissolving the Union; and that, to justify a revolutionary resistance the Federal Government must be guilty of "a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise" of powers not granted by the Constitution which, he alleged, and pro ceeded to prove, was not at all the case. He denied that "secession" could be justified as a Constitutional remedy, and asserted that the "principle is wholly inconsistent with the history, as well as the character, of the Federal Constitution;" and claimed that such a proposition was not advanced until many years after the origin of the Federal Government, and that then it was met and refuted by the conclusive arguments of General Jackson. He held that this Government is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty over the special subjects to which its authority extends, and then discussed, in the following language, what he denominated THE POWER TO COERCE A STATE. The question, fairly stated, is: Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the power to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw or has actually withdrawn from the Confederacy? If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to declare and to make war against a State. After much serious reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power has been delegated to Congress nor to any other department of the Federal Government. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the Constitution, that this is not among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress; and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not "necessary and proper for carrying into execution" any one of these powers. So far from this power having been delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by the Convention which framed the Constitution. It appears, from the proceedings of that body, that on the 31st May, 1787, the clause "authorizing an exertion of the force of would look more like a declaration of war States were authorized to resort on such than an infliction of punishment, and would occasions, he concludes by saying, "that the probably be considered by the party attacked | Legislatures of the States might have made as a dissolution of all previous compacts by a direct representation to Congress with s which it might be bound." Upon his mo-view to obtain a rescinding of the two offend tion the clause was unanimously postponed, ing acts, or they might have represented to and was never, I believe, again presented. their respective Senators in Congress their the whole against a delinquent State" came up for consideration. Mr. Madison opposed it in a brief but powerful speech, from which I shall extract but a single sentence. He observed: "The use of force against a State Virginia Legislature against the "alica and sedition acts," as "palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution." In pointing out the peaceful and constitutional remedies, and he referred to none other to which the Soon afterwards, on the 8th June, 1787, when incidentally adverting to the subject, he said: "Any Government for the United States, formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress," evidently meaning the then existing Congress of the old Confederation. Without descending to particulars, it may be safely asserted that the power to make war against a State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution. Suppose such a war should result in the conquest of a State, how are we to govern it afterwards? Shall we hold it as a province and govern it by despotic power? In the nature of things we could not, by physical force, control the will of the people, and compel them to elect Senators and Representatives to Congress, and to perform all the other duties depending upon their own volition, and required from the free citizens of a free State as a constituent member of the Confederacy. But, if we possessed this power, would it be wise to exercise it under existing circumstances? The object would doubtless be to preserve the Union. War would not only present the most effectual means of destroying it, but would banish all hope of its peaceable reconstruction. Besides, in the fraternal conflict a vast amount of blood and treasure would be expended, rendering future reconciliation between the States impossible. In the meantime who can foretell what would be the sufferings and privations of the people during its existence? war. The fact is, that our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil If it cannot live in the affections of the people, it must one day perish. Congress possesses many means of preserving it by conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force. In this connexion, I shall merely call attention to a few sentences in Mr. Madison's justly celebrated report, in 1799, to the Legislature of Virginia. In this he ably and conclusively defended the resolutions of the preceding Legislature against the strictures of several other State Legislatures. These were mainly founded upon the protest of the wish that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to the Constitu tion, or two-thirds of themselves, if such had been their option, might, by an application to Congress, have obtained a Convention for the same object." This is the very course which I earnestly recommend in order to obtain an "explanatory amendment" of the Constitution on the subject of slavery. This might originate with Congress or the State Legislatures, as may be deemed most advisable to attain the object. The explanatory amendment might be confined to the final settlement of the true construction of the Constitution on three special points: 1. An express recognition of the right of property in slaves in the States where it now exists or may hereafter exist. 2. The duty of protecting this right in all the common Territories throughout their territorial existence, and until they shall be admitted as States into the Union, with or without slavery, as their constitutions may prescribe. 3. A like recognition of the right of the master to have his slave, who has escaped from one State to another, restored and "delivered up" to him, and of the validity of the fugitive-slave law enacted for this purpose, together with a declaration that all State laws impairing or defeating this right are violations of the Constitution, and are consequently null and void. It may be objected that this construction of the Constitution has already been settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, and what more ought to be required? The answer is, that a very large proportion of the people of the United States still contest the correctness of this decision, and never will cease from agitation and admit its binding force until established by the people of the several States in their sovereign character. Such an explanatory amendment would, it is believed, forever terminate the existing dissensions and restore peace and harmony among the States. It ought not to be doubted that such an appeal to the arbitrament established by the Constitution itself would be received with favor by all the States of the Confederacy. In any event, it ought to be tried in a spirit of conciliation before any of these States shall separate themselves from the Union. |