all was right. The President saw him depart in the fulness of this confidence, and yet before he reached the army, the proposition to supersede him was already there. Yes, the very army into which he was to breathe the inspiration of hope-which he was to train and prepare for the deadly conflicts that awaited them—was informed, in advance, that the President had no confidence in their commander-in-chief.

General Scott reached the Rio Grande about the first of January. Early in the month it became evident that some of the principal arrangements for the attack on Vera Cruz were not likely to be carried out by the government. The bill for raising the ten additional regiments was lost sight of by the administration, in the desire to carry their favorite project of placing a political partisan at the head of the army; and this bill, which ought to have been passed in the first week of the session, was not finally disposed of till a day or two before the adjournment.

What was the condition of things in Mexico at this critical period?

Santa Anna, with a force of twenty-two thousand men, was at San Luis Potosi, a fortified city containing sixty thousand inhabitants, and about equally distant from Monterey, Vera Cruz, and Mexico.

General Taylor was in the vicinity of Monterey, in the command of a force of about eighteen thousand men, occupying the long line from Saltillo to Camargo, and thence to the mouth of the Rio Grande, where General Scott had just arrived with a small force, for the purpose of attacking Vera Cruz as soon as possible. He well knew that the vomito makes its appearance there in the early spring, and that delay would be fatal. The transports,

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stores, and munitions, were beginning to arrive. What was to be done? Was the expedition against Vera Cruz to be abandoned, or was General Scott to go forward and do the best he could under circumstances so discouraging? He adopted the latter alternative. He reviewed all the disposable forces within his command, and carefully weighed chances and probabilities. He forwarded to General Taylor a full plan of his proposed operations. By the capture and assassination of Lieutenant Ritchie, the bearer of these despatches, the plans were fully disclosed to Santa Anna, and he became apprized that Vera Cruz was to be the main point of attack. At Vera Cruz, and its immediate vicinity, there were six or seven thousand men, and a much larger number could be collected from the adjoining country on a short notice. Would Santa Anna break up his camp at San Luis Potosi, and march on Vera Cruz-fill the city and castle with his best troops, and oppose the landing of General Scott with a selected army of forty thousand men? Or, was he likely to abandon the town and castle to their fate, thus leaving open the road to Mexico, and march with his whole. force against General Taylor, over a desert of one hundred and fifty miles, with a certainty of having to encounter his enemy either in the defiles of the mountains or from behind the impregnable battlements of Monterey?

Under such circumstances it became the duty of General Scott so to divide the forces of the Rio Grande as would be most likely to meet any contingency that might arise. He collected the regular infantry-for these might be necessary to carry with the bayonet the fortified city and castle of Vera Cruz. He left within the limits of General Taylor's command, about ten thousand volun

teers and several companies of the best artillery of the regular army. These General Taylor might have concentrated at Monterey, and General Scott suggested to him, in his instructions, to do so, if it became necessary. With this comparatively small force, General Taylor not only maintained all the posts within his command, but with the one half of it achieved the memorable victory of Buena Vista.

General Scott assigned twelve thousand men to the expedition against Vera Cruz, and had Santa Anna concentrated his forces at that point, the disparity of numbers would have been much greater than at Buena Vista. These remarks are not made for the purpose of comparing the skill, or the conduct, or the claims to public gratitude of the two distinguished generals who have so well fulfilled every trust reposed in them by their country; but simply to show that in the disposition of the forces made by General Scott, he did not take a larger portion for his own command than the interests of the service imperatively demanded.

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CHAPTER VIII.

General Taylor's Movements.-Taylor's Position.-Santa Anna's Advance.-Importance of the event.-Battle of Buena Vista.-Retreat of the Mexicans.-Taylor's Official Account.-Santa Anna's Report.

In pursuance of orders from the War Department, General Taylor, in the month of November, ordered the divisions of Generals Twiggs, Quitman, and Pillow from Monterey to Victoria, for the purpose of joining at Tampico the expedition against Vera Cruz. In the latter part of December, General Patterson's division left Matamoras for the same destination, by the route through Victoria; while General Worth's division proceeded from Saltillo to Comargo, thence to Matamoras, and joined General Scott at the Brazos.

At Victoria, on the 30th of December, 1846, General Taylor received information of Scott's departure for Mexico. Santa Anna, in the mean time, was at San Luis Potosi, with an army of twenty-two thousand men.

In the latter part of January, 1847, General Taylor left Victoria and established his headquarters at Monterey, and early in February his whole force at this point, including the volunteers who had recently joined him, amounted to between six and seven thousand men.

Soon after reaching Monterey, he received intelligence

that a party of dragoons under Colonel May had been surprised at Encarnacion, in the early part of February, and that Cassius M. Clay and Majors Borland and Gaines were taken prisoners by General Minon, at the head of fifteen hundred men. These circumstances induced General Taylor to believe that Santa Anna intended advancing with his whole army, and he determined to proceed at once to Saltillo and give him battle.

Leaving a force of fifteen hundred men, he departed from Monterey on the 31st of January, and reached Saltillo on the 2d of February. Having, in the mean time, been reinforced by five hundred men, his effective force was about five thousand. On the 4th of February he advanced to Agua Nueva, a strong position on the road leading from Saltillo to San Luis. Here he remained until the 21st, when he received intelligence that Santa Anna was advancing with his whole army. Having carefully examined the strong mountain-passes, he decided that Buena Vista, a strong mountain-pass eleven miles nearer Saltillo, was the most favorable point to make a stand against a force so overwhelming. He therefore fell back to that place; and having formed his army in order of battle, calmly awaited the approach of the enemy.

The position of the American army at this moment was most critical. The regular troops had been withdrawn, with the exception of four companies of artillery, and even these had been filled up by new levies. The volunteers, of which the army was mainly composed, had received some instruction in the regular duties of the camp, but had not attained that perfection in discipline which gives confidence in military operations.