(Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Jan. cent. per annum, section 2 (page 839), forbid

ding any person with intent to evade section 1 from accepting a note for a greater amount than that actually loaned, section 4, which provides that any person violating any of the provisions of sections 1 and 2 shall be punished by imprisonment or fine, or both, and section 5, which provides that no action shall be brought on any loan prohibited by the act, are not unconstitutional, as violating Const. U. S. Amend. 14, pro§viding that no state can deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

every presumption is in favor of the proper [ cused Doris Griffith, one containing six counts, exercise by the court of the power to impose it. charging three violations of said section 1, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3304; Dec. Dig. § 1214.*] 6. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1214*)-AMOUNT OF FINE -OBJECT-LATITUDE GIVEN LEGISLATURE. Where the amount of a fine which the Legislature may properly impose depends largely upon the object to be accomplished, the wid; est latitude is to be given to the discretion and judgment of the Legislature in determining the amount necessary to accomplish that object.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3304; Dec. Dig. § 1214.*] 7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 48*) - WHEN COURT WILL INTERFERE.

It is only in case of a plain conflict between a provision of the Constitution and an enactment of the Legislature that the courts will interfere.

and three violations of said section 2, and the other containing two counts charging a violation of said section 1 and a violation of said section 2. The jury found the accused guilty on all the counts of each information, and the court sentenced her to pay a fine of $1,000 on each count of the first named information, and to imprisonment in jail for 30 days on each of the two counts of the second information. In the reasons of appeal it is alleged that the act upon which the information is based is rendered void by the provisions of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, and of section 10, art. 1, Const. U. S., and of section 13, art. 1, Const. Conn. We held in State v. Hurlburt, 82 Conn. 232,

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48.*] 8. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1214*)-STATUTES PRO-72 Atl. 1079, that the provisions of the four

HIBITING USURY-EXCESSIVE FINES.

Pub. Acts 1907, p. 839, c. 238, § 4, which provides that any person accepting more than 15 per cent. per annum or who takes a note for a greater amount than that actually loaned. shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months or fined not more than $1,000, or both, is not unconstitutional as being in violation of Const. art. 1, § 13, forbidding excessive

fines.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3305; Dec. Dig. § 1214.*] 9. CRIMINAL Law (§ 1086*)-APPEAL-PRINTED APPEAL RECORD.

Where an appeal was taken in a criminal prosecution, where two defendants were tried together, the printed appeal record should have contained copies of the information and record of judgment in both cases.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2746; Dec. Dig. § 1086.*] Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County: Lucien F. Burpee, Judge.

Doris Griffith, alias Doris Griffin, and Elizabeth Trimble were convicted of charging usurious interest on loans and for unlawfully accepting notes for a greater amount than that actually loaned, and they appeal.

teenth amendment of the federal Constitution did not affect the validity of this act. The provision of section 10 of article 1 of the federal Constitution that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts applies only to legal obligations; to contracts imposing obligations which are capable, in legal contemplation, of being impaired; to contracts conferring rights which are recognized in courts of justice. It does not give validity to contracts which are properly prohibited by statute. Trustees of the Bishops' Fund v. Rider, 13 Conn. 93, 94. The contract, the enforcement of which is forbidden by section 5 of the act in question, is one which might be properly prohibited by the Legislature. Statutes prohibiting usurious contracts are for the prevention of extortion and unjust oppression by unscrupulous persons who are ready to take undue advantage of the necessities of others. From an early date such statutes have existed in nearly every state in the Union. 29 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 454. Legislatures exercise a legitimate power in enacting laws regulating the rate of interest to be taken on loans. Chapman v. State, 5 Or. 432. Section 13, art. 1, of the Constitution of Connecticut, provides that excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed. The fines imposed in the present cases did not exceed those prescribed by statute. The accused was the agent of one Tolman, who was engaged in the business of money lending in more than 60 places in the United States and Canada, and two of whose agents, as the accused knew, had been convicted of conducting business in this same office in Hartford in violation of the act in question. Although the fine imposed seems very large, yet the circumstances of the commission of the offenses, perhaps not fully set forth in the finding may have been such as to justify it. Assuming that the Legislature had the power to prescribe such fine, every presumption is in favor of the proper exercise by the There were two informations against the ac- court of the power to impose it. The amount

Affirmed.

Benedict M. Holden. and Bernard F. Gaffney, for appellants. Hugh M. Alcorn, State's Atty., for the State.

HALL, J. Section 1, c. 238, p. 838, Pub. Acts 1907, forbids any person or the agent of any person, with certain named exceptions, from directly or indirectly loaning money at a greater rate of interest than 15 per cent. per annum. Section 2 (page 839), forbids any person, with intent to evade section 1, from accepting a note for a greater amount than that actually loaned. Section 4 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of sections 1 or 2 shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months or fined not more than $1,000, or both. Section 5 provides that no action shall be brought on any loan prohibited by the act.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4562-4566; Dec. Dig. § 1173.*1 6. NEW TRIAL (§ 8*) - CO-PARTIES

TRIAL AS TO SOME.

CO-PARTIES - NEW

Where a verdict is rendered against several for a joint tort, the court may deal with it verdicts returned against each in separate acin its further proceedings, as it might with tions, and it may set aside the verdict as to some and not as to others without departing from the verdict in the rendition of a judgment on it against the latter.

of the fine which the Legislature may prop-versed as against one or more and sustained as erly impose depends largely upon the object against the others. designed to be accomplished by the imposition of the fine, and the widest latitude is to be given to the discretion and judgment of the Legislature in determining the amount of the fine necessary to accomplish that object. Southern Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 59, 22 S. E. 809, 41 L. R. A. 436; Blydenburgh v. Miles, 39 Conn. 484-497. It is only in case of a plain conflict between a provision of the Constitution and an enactment of the Legislature that the courts will interfere. State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 Atl. 80, 36 L. R. A. 623, 61 Am. St. Rep. 30. We say in this case, as we said in Blydenburgh v. Miles, supra: "In looking at this record we are unable to say that the penalty is so disproportioned to the offense as to justify us in holding the law to be void."

The question of fact, which was clearly decisive of these cases, namely, whether the accused in good faith purchased the notes described in the informations, or whether the so-called purchase was a mere expedient to cover an actual loan, and to evade the provisions of the statute (Belden v. Lamb, 17 Conn. 441, 452), was fairly submitted to the jury.

The printed appeal record in these cases should have contained copies of the information and record of judgment in both cases. There is no error. The other Judges con

cur.

SPARROW v. BROMAGE et al. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. Jan. 19, 1910.)

1. TORTS (§ 22*)-LIABILITY,

Two or more persons who unite in a tort are jointly and severally liable for the act of each and all of the joint participants.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Torts, Cent. Dig. 29; Dec. Dig. § 22.*]

2. CONTRIBUTION (§ 5*)-JOINT WRONGDOERS. There is no apportionment of responsibility and no right of contribution or indemnity between persons uniting in a tort.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contribution, Cent. Dig. §§ 6-9; Dec. Dig. § 5.*]

3. PARTIES (§ 27*)-TORTS.

Where two or more persons unite in a tort, one may be sued severally, or any, or all together may be sued.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Parties, Cent. Dig. 35; Dec. Dig. § 27.*]

4. JUDGMENT (§§ 235, 239*) - LIABILITY-AC

TIONS.

Where more than one joint wrongdoer is sued, a verdict or judgment may be rendered for or against any or all.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 414, 417; Dec. Dig. §§ 235, 239.*] 5. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1173*)-REVERSALONE OR MORE CO-PARTIES.

A judgment against more than one of two or more wrongdoers, uniting in a tort, is in effect several as well as joint, and may be re

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. Dig. § 11; Dec. Dig. § 8.*] 7. NEW TRIAL (§ 8*)-Co-PARTIES-NEW TRIAL AS TO SOME.

Where a verdict for false imprisonment was rendered against the chief of police of a town and a patrolman under him, the court might set aside the verdict as to the patrolman, and render judgment thereon against the chief of police, because, if the patrolman performed any act, he performed it under the authority of the chief of police, so that the latter was liable therefor, and, if the patrolman did not participate in the imprisonment, the chief of police was alone responsible.

Cent. Dig. § 11; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see New Trial,
8. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 344*)-TIME TO AP-

PEAL-EXTENSION OF TIME.

The time for taking an appeal is extended by the court filing after the rendition of judgfinding in order that specified questions not apment its finding pursuant to a request for a parent on the record may be reviewed, and an appeal within the time limited after the extension may not be abated on the ground that no reason of appeal is dependent on such finding. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. § 344.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Lucien F. Burpee, Judge.

Action for false imprisonment by James C. Sparrow against Edward Bromage and one Moore. From a judgment for plaintiff against defendant Edward Bromage, after setting aside the verdict for plaintiff as to defendant Moore, defendant Edward Bromage appeals.

Affirmed.

William M. Maltbie and William H. Leete, for appellant Bromage. William J. Reilley and Edward L. Steele, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J. The plaintiff in his complaint charges the two defendants, of whom Bromage was the chief of police of the town of Enfield, and Moore a patrolman under him, with having unlawfully imprisoned him, and seeks damages from them therefor. A verdict of $800 was returned against both defendants. They thereupon filed a motion for a new trial upon the grounds that the ver dict was excessive and against the evidence. The motion was granted as to Moore, and the verdict against him set aside. denied as to Bromage, and judgment entered against him for the amount of verdict. Bromage appeals, alleging that the court exceeded its power in taking this action. The sole

question presented relates to this contention, | allowed to escape from the consequences of which is based upon the propositions that the court in rendering judgment departed from the verdict, and that the appellant was injured by the course pursued, since it can not be said that any judgment, or at least one for so large an amount, would have been rendered against him as a sole defendant.

the finding of the jury upon the ground that a case had not been made out against them. It is difficult to imagine how this could well be. If a situation did present itself where there might be danger of such harm resulting, it could be only where a failure to satisfactorily establish a claimed joint action by Where two or more persons unite in an act tort-feasors was a factor in it. In such case, which constitutes a wrong to another, in- where harm of the kind suggested might be tending at the time to commit it, or in doing reasonably anticipated if a verdict was perit under circumstances which fairly charge mitted to stand against only a part of the them with intending the consequences which defendants unsuccessful before the jury, it is follow, they incur a joint and several liability to be presumed that the court would exercise for the acts of each and all of the joint par- its authority to prevent the injustice, and ticipants. Cooley on Torts, 224; Sheldon v. order a new trial as to all thus threatened Kibbe, 3 Conn. 214, 216, 8 Am. Dec. 176; with injury. See Washington Gaslight Co. v. Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447, 453, 83 Am. Lansden, 172 U. S. 534, 556, 19 Sup. Ct. 296, Dec. 154; Chapin v. Babcock, 67 Conn. 255, 43 L. Ed. 543. But such a situation is by 256, 34 Atl. 1039; New Haven Trust Co. v. no possibility present in this case. Whether Doherty, 74 Conn. 353, 357, 50 Atl. 887. the facts as claimed to have been established There is no apportionment of responsibility, by the plaintiff or by the defendant be acand no right of contribution or indemnity cepted, it is beyond question that, if the debetween them. Cooley on Torts, 226; Bailey fendant Moore performed any act of detenv. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455, 457; Whitaker v. tion within the purview of the complaint, he Tatem, 48 Conn. 520, 521. One may be sued performed it under the authority of Bromage, severally, or any or all together. Sheldon v. his superior, and in direct co-operation with Kibbe, 3 Conn. 214, 216, S Am. Dec. 176. the latter. They were inevitably joint actors Where more than one is sued, a verdict or in so far as Moore acted at all in the perjudgment may be rendered for or against any petration of the wrong of which the plaintiff or all. Wyeman v. Deady, 79 Conn. 414, 417, complains. Such being the case, no harm 65 Atl. 129, 118 Am. St. Rep. 152. Where could possibly accrue to the appellant by the judgment is rendered against more than one, action of the court. If Moore did not parit is in legal effect several as well as joint. ticipate in the plaintiff's arrest and detention, The liability continues to be a several one. there was nothing for the appellant to be Brockett v. Fair Haven & W. Ry. Co., 73 charged with on Moore's account. If he did Conn. 428, 431, 47 Atl. 763; Chapin v. Bab-participate, then the appellant would be rightcock, 67 Conn. 255, 256, 34 Atl. 1039. The fully held responsible for the consequences judgment may be reversed as against one or of his co-actor's acts, and he can be no more more and sustained as against others. ford v. Grant, Kirby, 114.

Wil-injured by Moore's escape, whether right or wrong, from a judgment than he would have been had Moore not been joined in the action. In this view of the matter, the following cases are not only suggestive, but distinctly pertinent: Wilford v. Grant, Kirby, 114; Harris v. Rosenberg, 43 Conn. 227, 231.

These well-settled principles as to the nature of the liability of joint tort-feasors, and the legal effect accorded to legal processes to enforce that liability, lead logically and naturally to the conclusion that, when a verdict is returned against several, the court The plaintiff filed a plea in abatement in may deal with it in its further proceedings this court which upon demurrer was held inas it might with verdicts returned against sufficient. The judgment was rendered in each in separate actions. And so it has been July. In due time a request for a finding in held, although authority to the contrary may order that certain specified questions not apbe found. 1 Black on Judgments, § 207; Hay-parent upon the record might be reviewed den v. Woods, 16 Neb. 306, 20 N. W. 345. was made. The court filed its finding on OcCases involving contract obligations, or concerning independent acts of negligence, of which several have been cited in support of the defendant's proposition, are obviously not in point. To so deal with the verdict and set it aside as to some, and not as to others, is not to depart from it in the rendition of a judgment upon it against those others. Such a judgment pursues it in its legal aspect as a several verdict against each.

But it is said that possible harm might result to those against whom a judgment is thus rendered, for the reason that they might be held charged with responsibility for the

tober 22d. The time for taking an appeal was thereupon extended, and the appeal taken within the time limited. The reasons of appeal passed over all questions dependent upon the finding for their presentation, and were limited to those above discussed. The claim made in support of the plea was that the defendant deprived himself of his right of appeal at the time when it was taken when he incorporated in it no reason of appeal dependent upon the finding for its consideration. We held that no such result attended his final election of errors to be assigned, and that, in any event, the extension

fendant a right to appeal within the time limited, whatever the scope of that appeal might be. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Illy, 79 Conn. 526, 528, 65 Atl. 965. There is no error. The other Judges con- were to pass by the bill of sale; the bill of curred. sale referring particularly to the schedule attached.