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See Cemeteries.

GRAVEYARDS.

GREEK LETTER FRATERNITIES. Liability of property of to taxation, see Taxation, § 243.

GROSS EARNINGS.

Contract of street railroad to pay gross earnings tax for location franchise, see Street Railroads, § 24.

GUARANTY.

See Principal and Surety.

II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION. § 27. A guaranty will be construed most strongly against the guarantor.-Newcomb v. Kloeblen (N. J.) 511.

§ 38. A guaranty held to be a continuing one.-Newcomb v. Kloeblen (N. J.) 511.

III. DISCHARGE OF GUARANTOR.

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HABEAS CORPUS.

II. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, AND RELIEF.

$85. The presumption is that the best interests of an illegitimate child require it to be in the custody of its mother.-Ex parte Byron (Vt.) 488.

§ 113. Whether a child's interests require its custody to be given to a particular person is a question of fact, and, the judgment below being pro forma, the Supreme Court is limited to the facts found in the record.-Ex parte Byron (Vt.). 488.

§ 113. In habeas corpus for the custody of a child, the exclusion of evidence offered to show that the mother was unstable and changeable held harmless.-Ex parte Byron (Vt.) 488.

67. A guarantor of indebtedness incurred by his son cannot escape liability for fail- See Domicile. ure to notify him of his son's default in paying his bills.-Newcomb v. Kloeblen (N. J.) 511.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

See Parent and Child.

Matters relating to infants and their property irrespective of guardianship, see Infants.

III. CUSTODY AND CARE OF WARD'S PERSON AND ESTATE.

Custody and control of child, see Parent and Child, § 2.

V. ACTIONS.

§ 118. A suit for the benefit of a ward must be brought by the guardian in the name of the ward.-Taylor v. Superior Court (R. I.) 482.

§ 127. Where a suit was erroneously brought by a ward in his own name, the court had no jurisdiction to permit an amendment, so that it should appear that the action was brought in the name of the ward by the guardian.Taylor v. Superior Court (R. I.) 482.

VI. ACCOUNTING AND SETTLEMENT. § 157. In a guardian's accounting, testimony was admissible to show how the property got into a run-down condition, and to show that it was in litigation a number of years before the guardian was appointed, during which time it had deteriorated.-Ballou v. Ballou (R. I.) 1089. § 157. In a guardian's accounting, where it was claimed that the guardian should have accounted for alleged profits for taking stone from a wall on the ward's farm to a crusher located thereon, and having it crushed, certain evidence held not relevant to show that the guardian made a profit.-Ballou v. Ballou (R. I.) 1089.

§ 158. In a guardian's accounting, testimony of a conversation between plaintiff and the deceased ward, offered to show the ward's mental condition, held properly excluded; its relevancy not having been shown.-Ballou v. Ballou (R. I.) 1089.

GUARDS.

HABITATION.

HARMLESS ERROR.

In civil actions, see Appeal and Error, §§ 10261068; New Trial, § 41.

In criminal prosecutions, see Criminal Law, §§ 1168-1170; Homicide, § 340.

HEALTH.

Regulation of practice of medicine, see Physicians and Surgeons.

I. BOARDS OF HEALTH AND SANITARY OFFICERS.

Consent to establishment of cemetery, see Cemeteries, § 9.

§ 19. A person aggrieved by a finding of the state board of health concerning water pollution under section 1 of the supplement to the state sewerage commission act of May 7, 1907 (P. L. p. 360), may appeal to the Court of Chancery by bill of complaint.-City of Salem v. Board of Health of State of New Jersey (N. J. Ch.) 696.

II. REGULATIONS AND OFFENSES. Regulation of practice of medicine, see Physicians and Surgeons.

§ 32. Under a city ordinance adopted by a board of health, held, that it was the duty of a plumber to sign a plan for proposed plumbing, and see that it was filed with the board of health and approved before proceeding with the work.-Board of Health of Asbury Park v. IIayes (N. J. Sup.) 339.

§ 43. A judgment of conviction for violation of a city ordinance adopted by the board of health is sufficient where following the statutory form.-Board of Health of Asbury Park v. Hayes (N. J. Sup.) 339.

HEARING.

In contempt proceedings, see Contempt, § 61. In equity, see Equity, & 377.

In probate proceedings and actions relating to wills or probate, see Wills, § 316.

Duty of master to guard dangerous machinery, On motion or application for dismissal or nonsee Master and Servant, § 105.

suit, see Trial, § 165.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE.

See Evidence, §§ 314, 317.

HEIRS.

See Descent and Distribution.
Designation in will, see Wills, § 506.

HIGH SCHOOLS.

See Schools and School Districts, § 159.

HIGHWAYS.

See Bridges; Navigable Waters, §§ 1, 9. Adverse possession as against public, see Adverse Possession. § 8.

Crossing by railroads, see Railroads, §§ 305-
350.

Eminent domain, measure and amount of com-
pensation for appropriation of highway for
public use, see Eminent Domain, § 127.
Rights in and use of highways by street rail-
roads, see Street Railroads, § 24.
Streets in cities, see Municipal Corporations, $$
671-706.

I. ESTABLISHMENT, ALTERATION,

AND DISCONTINUANCE.

(C) Alteration, Vacation, or Abandon-
ment.

Restraining taking of property until determina-
tion of title thereto, see Injunction, § 136.
(D) Title to Fee and Rights of Abutting
Owners.

§ 80. Circumstances under which title to the fee of a highway is presumed to be in the abutting proprietors stated.-Seery v. City of Waterbury (Conn.) 908.

V. REGULATION AND USE FOR

TRAVEL.

Bridges, see Bridges, § 46.

(B) Use of Highway and Law of the
Road.

Collisions of street cars with animals or ve-
hicles, see Street Railroads, § 90.
Licenses for operation of automobiles, see Li-
censes, §§ 1, 7.

Right of way over street railroad tracks, see
Street Railroads, § 85.

Use of street as highway, see Municipal Corpo-
rations, $$ 705, 706.

§ 166. P. L. 1908. p. 615, § 4, requiring a nonresident automobile owner to constitute the Secretary of State his agent for service of process, held not unconstitutional.-Cleary v. Johnston (N. J. Sup.) 538.

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§ 7. "Murder" defined.-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 11. Malice is an essential element of murder, and must be proved, like any other material element of the charge.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

§ 13. "Murder" defined.-State v. Lee (Del. Gen. Sess.) 4.

§ 22. "Murder of the first degree" defined.State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

§ 23. "Murder of the second degree" defined. -State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

$ 23. Where a killing was committed under the influence of a wicked and depraved heart, or with cruel and wicked indifference to human life, the law will imply malice, and make the killing murder of the second degree.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

III. MANSLAUGHTER.

§ 31. "Manslaughter" defined.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8; Same v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 43. Degree of provocation necessary to reduce crime to manslaughter stated.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

killing of human being without malice, on sud$45. "Manslaughter" held to be unlawful den provocation.-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 74. The reckless driving of an automobile resulting in death of a pedestrian is manslaughter.-State v. Campbell (Conn.) 927.

is manslaughter, whether deceased's failure to § 74. Homicide caused by culpable negligence use due care contributed to the accident or not.

§ 172. A person with an automobile and a-State v. Campbell (Conn.) 927. person with a team must each exercise his rights

with due regard to the corresponding rights of IV. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL. the other.-Gurney v. Piel (Me.) 1131.

§ 184. In an action against a driver of an automobile for injuries from a collision on a highway, evidence held to support a judgment for plaintiff.-Gurney v. Piel (Me.) 1131.

(C) Injuries from Defects or Obstructions.
Accidents at railroad crossings, see Railroads,
§§ 305-350.

In bridges, see Bridges, § 46.
In streets, see Municipal Corporations, §§ 762-

821.

$84. The crime of assault with intent to murder embraces an assault, and also an intent to kill.-State v. Lee (Del. Gen. Sess.) 4.

$84. Assault with intent to murder embraces the act of assault and the intended consequences thereof.-State v. Gam (Del. Gen. Sess.) 7.

$ 84. The offense of "assault with intent to murder" defined.-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

tent to kill, the facts must be such that accused § 89. In order to convict of assault with inwould have been guilty of murder had prosecutor died.-State v. Lee (Del. Gen. Sess.) 4.

§ 215. Findings, in an action for injuries from defects in a highway, held inconsistent.Nichols v. Town of Manchester (Conn.) 935.

§ 89. The degree of murder of which accused would have been guilty, had prosecutor died,

held not material in a prosecution for assault with intent to kill.-State v. Lee (Del. Gen. Sess.) 4.

VII. EVIDENCE.

§ 89. To justify the conviction of one for
assault with intent to murder the jury must find
that if prosecutor had died from the effects of
the assault, accused would have been guilty of-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.
murder in the first or second degree.-State v.
Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

(A) Presumptions and Burden of Proof. al for assault with intent to murder may be in§ 145. The intent to commit murder on a triferred from proof of the use of a deadly weapon.

§ 96. One in imminent danger of injury from an assault may repel the same with force not unreasonably disproportionate to the requirements of the occasion.-State v. Lee (Del. Gen. Sess.) 4.

§ 96. One in imminent danger of being killed or receiving great bodily harm may use a deadly weapon in self-defense.-State v. Lee (Del. Gen. Sess.) 4.

$96. On an issue of self-defense in a prosecution for assault to kill, the jury may consider the violence of the assault, the character of weapon employed, prosecutor's advantage of youth and strength, and his reputation for quarrelsomeness and violence.-State v. Lee (Del. Gen. Sess.) 4.

V. EXCUSABLE OR JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE.

§ 110. The right of self-defense against attack held not to justify killing because of slight assault.-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 113. One withdrawing from a combat commenced by himself held entitled to use force necessary to repel the attack on him by assailant and protect himself.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

§ 116. To justify one in killing another, it is not sufficient that he at the time believed himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm; but the circumstances must have been such in the judgment of the jury as to justify a reasonable man in such belief, and, further, that there was no reasonable way of escaping from such danger, except by slaying assailant. -State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

§ 116. A killing held a justifiable act of selfdefense.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

§ 116. The jury, in determining whether accused, charged with assault with intent to murder, acted in self-defense, held required to consider the facts, and determine whether the circumstances justified a reasonable man in the belief that the life of accused was in danger.State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 116. The right of self-defense, as based on apparent danger, stated.-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 118. One attacked by another held required to retreat, where that can be done with safety. -State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

§ 118. Duty to retreat when assaulted stated. -State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 119. A slight assault will not excuse or justify the killing of the assailant with a deadly weapon, and in repelling an assault no more force may be used than is necessary for the purpose, and where the person assailed uses in his defense greater force than is necessary he becomes the aggressor.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

$119. The right of self-defense against at tack held to be limited to the extent required to repel it.-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.)

1112.

$145. A statement in an instruction that the intention to take life may be presumed from the use of a deadly weapon held a sound statement of the law.-State v. Maioni (N. J.) 526.

§ 146. Where a killing was done with a deadly weapon, malice is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary; and accused has the burden of showing the contrary.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

§ 146. "Deadly weapon," within the rule that, where a killing was done with a deadly weapon, malice is presumed, defined.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8.

$146. Malice held to be implied from every deliberate, cruel act against another person, placing on accused the burden of disproof, in the absence of excuse, justification, or mitigation.-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 146. Acts from which malice may be implied stated.-State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

§ 151. The burden of establishing self-defense rests on accused.-State v. Miele (Del. O. & T.) 8; State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

(B) Admissibility in General. Demonstrative evidence, see Criminal Law, § 404. Opinion evidence. see Criminal Law, § 448. Res gestæ, see Criminal Law, § 364.

of Calabria, of whom deceased was one, held § 166. Evidence of prejudice against natives admissible to show motive.-Commonwealth v. Latampa (Pa.) 736.

$ 170. In a murder trial. the carved initials on a barn door held admissible to identify accused with the crime.-State v. Kent (Vt.) 389. § 171. In a prosecution for negligent homicide, the deceased's conduct is material only as it bears on the question of defendant's negligence.-State v. Campbell (Conn.) 927.

(C) Dying Declarations. $203. Declarations of murdered man held admissible as dying declarations.- Commonwealth v. Latampa (Pa.) 736.

(E) Weight and Sufficiency. $257. Intent to kill may be proved directly, or by circumstances, as by the use of a deadly weapon, etc.-State v. Lee (Del. Gen. Sess.) 4.

al for assault with intent to murder may be $257. The intent to commit murder on a trishown by direct or circumstantial evidence.State v. Moore (Del. Gen. Sess.) 1112.

VIII. TRIAL. (C) Instructions. Comments on evidence, see Criminal Law, § 7552.

§ 294. In a prosecution for murder, held that there was no error in charging that defendant's insanity could not be used to reduce his crime reasonable at all, he was responsible in the same to murder in the second degree, and that, if degree as a sane man, and if not, he was entitled to an acquittal in both degrees.-State v. Maioni (N. J.) 526.

X. APPEAL AND ERROR. $340. Error, if any, in an instruction in a murder case, relating to a presumption of in

VI. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. Conviction of offense included in that charged, see Indictment and Information, § 189.

tent from the use of a deadly weapon, held to be harmless, as relating to a matter which the jury were not called on to consider.-State v. Maioni (N. J.) 526.

HOSTILE POSSESSION.

Of occupant of real estate holding adversely, see Adverse Possession, §§ 58-85.

HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE. Injury avoidable notwithstanding contributory negligence, see Street Railroads, § 103.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Curtesy; Divorce; Dower.
Right of inheritance of survivor, see Descent
and Distribution, §§ 55, 57.

I. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
LIABILITIES.

§ 23. Certain contract on the part of a married woman held not on her husband's behalf within Pub. St. 1901, c. 176, § 2.-McConnell v. McConnell (N. H.) 875.

III. CONVEYANCES, CONTRACTS, AND
OTHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

§ 48. A married woman cannot make a valid conveyance of her separate real estate by a deed to her husband, which she alone signs, seals and acknowledges, and which he accepts and puts on record.-Wicker v. Durr (Pa.) 64.

§ 492. When a husband builds a store on premises owned by him and his wife as co-tenants, the presumption of a gift to her does not arise as matter of law.-Brady v. Brady (Conn.) 684.

492. Where a wife acquired good title to a horse by gift from her husband, one to whom she sold it held to also acquire good title notwithstanding the exception in P. S. 3040.Walston v. Allen (Vt.) 225.

§ 494. Evidence held to show that money coming to the possession of a husband from his wife's separate estate was not a gift.-Elmer v. Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (N. J. Ch.)

668.

§ 105. In an action against a hsuband and wife for false warranty in the sale of land, certain evidence held not admissible against the wife.-Rowley v. Shepardson (Vt.) 1002.

V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE.

(D) Conveyances and Contracts to Convey.

$193. Neither Act April 11, 1848 (P. L. 536), nor Act June 8, 1893 (P. L. 344), change the provisions of Act Feb. 24, 1770 (1 Smith's the conveyance of a wife's real estate.-Wicker Laws, p. 307), requiring a husband to join in v. Durr (Pa.) 64.

VI. ACTIONS.

Notice as condition precedent to action for injuries to wife, see Negligence, § 104.

VIII. SEPARATION AND SEPARATE

MAINTENANCE.

Alimony in actions for divorce, see Divorce, § 269.

§ 283. Under Gen. St. 1902, § 2499, as amended by Acts 1907, p. 599, c. 22, a proffer of support by the husband held not such support as the statute contemplates.-Belden v. Belden (Conn.) 896.

$288. Under Act May 17, 1907 (P. L. p. 482, § 26), the only justifiable cause for abandoning a wife and refusing to provide for her is an offense on her part entitling the husband to divorce.-Bradbury v. Bradbury (N. J. Ch.)

150.

§ 296. In a bill for separate maintenance, that the wife has been guilty of conduct entitling the husband to a divorce must be pleaded and proven.-Bradbury v. Bradbury (N. J. Ch.) 150.

$298. The support contemplated by Gen. St. 1902. § 2499, as amended by Acts 1907, p. 599, c. 22, held one which is reasonably proper under all the circumstances.-Belden v. Belden (Conn.) 896.

$2982. Under Gen. St. 1902, § 2499, as amended by Acts 1907, p. 599, c. 22, the trial court held justified in attempting to discover from defendant his intention regarding his offer to support his wife, and to warrant a finding that defendant had been and was failing to sup§ 494. Where the principal of a wife's sep-port his wife within the meaning of the statarate estate comes to the possession of her husband and is used by him, the presumption of law is against a gift.-Elmer v. Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. (N. J. Ch.) 668.

IV. DISABILITIES AND PRIVILEGES
OF COVERTURE.

(A) In General.

ute.-Belden v. Belden (Conn.) 896.

X. ENTICING AND ALIENATING.
Arrest of defendant, see Arrest, § 29.
Self-serving declarations as evidence, see Evi-
dence, § 271.

$333. In an action for alienation of the affections of plaintiff's husband certain evi§ 62. A married woman would not be es- dence held properly admitted.-Hoxie v. Walktopped by anything in a contract which sheer (N. H.) 183. has no power to make.-Sherwin v. Sternberg (N. J.) 510.

(E) Torts.

HYPOTHECATION.

$105. Where a farm sold by a husband and See Chattel Mortgages; Pledges.

wife was not the wife's separate estate, her responsibility for false representations, made in respect thereof by the husband, is to be meas

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.

ured by the common law, and not by P. S. 3037. In examination of expert witnesses, see Evi

enlarging the powers of married women.-Rowley v. Shepardson (Vt.) 1002.

§ 105. Misrepresentations of a husband in selling land not the wife's separate property held not to render the wife liable at common law, though she gave him full authority to sell the land, as the tort was based upon her contract.-Rowley v. Shepardson (Vt.) 1002.

dence, § 553.

IDENTITY.

Of accused, evidence of in criminal prosecutions, see Homicide, § 170.

Of issues or subject-matter of action as affecting conclusiveness of judgment, see Judgment, $$ 713, 743.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Amer. Digs. 1907 to date & Indexes see same topic & section (§) NUMBĒR

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Arrest in civil cases, see Arrest. §§ 28-33.

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Punishment for crime, see Criminal Law, INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

1214.

IMPROVEMENTS.

Liens, see Mechanics' Liens.

Public improvements. see Highways; Municipal Corporations, §§ 269-402.

INADEQUACY OF PRICE.

As evidence of fraud, see Fraud. $55.

Defects as ground for arrest of judgment, see Criminal Law, § 970.

For particular offenses.

See False Pretenses, § 38.

Violations of election laws, see Elections, § $28.

Violations of liquor laws, see Intoxicating Liquors, § 206.

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