65. A tenant cannot question his landlord's title, but as to him the person with whom he contracts is his landlord.-Halsey v. Sauer (N. J. Sup.) 508. IV. TERMS FOR YEARS. Right of tenant for years to sue for treble damages for trespass, see Trespass, § 19. (C) Extensions, Renewals, and Options to Purchase or Sell. $86. Leases construed and held to constitute a demise in præsenti to take effect in futuro at the option of the lessee.-Briggs v. Chase (Me.) 796. $86. A lease construed, and held not to require a written notice to renew, but that the acts of lessee constituted a sufficient renewal for the whole term.-Briggs v. Chase (Me.) 796. (A) Rights and Liabilities. $ 190. A landlord after eviction held not entitled to claim that eviction proceedings were invalid, and attempt to collect the rent for a future period.-Woelfle v. King (N. J. Sup.) 268. § 195. A landlord suing for rent of premises vacated by the tenant held not bound to relet, but entitled to treat the tenant as still occupying under the lease, and look to him for the entire rent.-Boardman Realty Co. v. Carlin (Conn.) 682. IX. RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY OF Estate created by conveyance by lessor, after § 277. Failure of lessor to make remaindermen in leasehold parties to ejectment to forfeit lease, held not to affect lessor's title after reentry under judgment.-Link v. MacNabb (Md.) § 86. Where an optional term in a lease was to extend "not exceeding ten years," a written notice by the tenant was not necessary to estab-825. lish his election to continue.-Briggs v. Chase (Me.) 796. $86. Notice held not necessary to establish an election to continue a tenancy under a lease containing an option to renew.-Briggs v. Chase (Me.) 796. § 86. A stipulation in a lease for renewal is a part of the consideration.-Briggs v. Chase (Me.) 796. (D) Termination. § 296. Where a "mortgagee takes a lease from the owner and enters into possession under it, he may on default be ousted by proceedings before a justice.-Mallissee v. Keown (Pa.) 1128. § 297. No previous demand for rent is required by Act March 3, 1903 (P. L. p. 26), before proceeding to dispossess a tenant in default.-Halsey v. Sauer (N. J. Sup.) 508. § 303. Affidavit in proceedings to dispossess a tenant held to sufficiently show that he was in default.-Halsey v. Sauer (N. J. Sup.) 508. § 311. In proceedings to dispossess a ten $ 109. What constitutes dissolution of the relation of landlord and tenant determined. Home Coupon Exchange Co. v. Goldfarb (N.ant, under Act March 3, 1903 (P. L. p. 29) § 5, J. Sup.) 143. V. TENANCIES FROM YEAR TO Operation of tenancy created without writing VII. PREMISES AND ENJOYMENT (B) Possession, Enjoyment, and Use. § 139. An action of trover against a tenant for conversion of hay on the premises held not to lie.-Olin v. Martell (Vt.) 1060. § 139. Under a lease for cash rental, the lessee is the owner of the crops.-Olin v. Martell (Vt.) 1060. (C) Incumbrances, Taxes, and Assess ments. the justice must enter judgment for possession before a writ for possession can issue; and, for want of it, the proceedings will be set aside.Halsey v. Sauer (N. J. Sup.) 508. LASCIVIOUS COHABITATION OR § 148. In an action by the landlord on a covenant by the tenant to pay the taxes, that the amount assessed against the premises was the same as the reduction in the assessment See Prostitution. against other land of the landlord would not be an inference that an apportionment of the taxes rather than an assessment had been made.--Mary A. Riddle Co. v. New Auditorium Pier Co. (N. J.) 507. (E) Injuries from Dangerous or Defective Condition. Construction of pleading in action for injuries from collapse of building, see Pleading, § 34. Limitations, see Limitation of Actions, § 32. VIII. RENT AND ADVANCES. Under mining lease, see Mines and Minerals, § 70. LAST CLEAR CHANCE. Injury avoidable notwithstanding contributory negligence, see Street Railroads, § 103. LATENT DEFECTS. In machinery, appliances, and places for work as affecting assumption of risk by servant, see Master and Servant, § 219. LATERAL SUPPORT. See Adjoining Landowners, § 4. See Landlord and Tenant. § III. JUSTIFICATION AND MITIGA TION. § 54. The truthfulness of a libel is a complete defense to a civil action. Merrey v. Guardian Printing & Publishing Co. (N. J. Sup.) 464. $55. Where libelous charges set out in a declaration are distinct. defendant may justify as to some and plead otherwise as to others.- 1 Merrey v. Guardian Printing & Publishing Co. (N. J. Sup.) 464. IV. ACTIONS. (A) Right of Action and Defenses. Liability of corporation for libel by officer, see Corporations, § 423. (B) Parties, Preliminary Proceedings, and Pleading. $94. A plea to a declaration in libel is bad admitting the publication.-Fenkart v. Bihler (N. J. Sup.) 129. Of mines and mineral lands, see Mines and on demurrer, if it justify the language without Minerals, §§ 56-81. LEX LOCI. $ 100. The truthfulness of a libel, to be available, must be pleaded fully and be strictly proved.-Merrey v. Guardian Printing & Publishing Co. (N. J. Sup.) 464. $ 100. Under the plea of general issue, the truth of alleged libelous matter may be proved, but to the extent only of rebutting the presumption of malice.-Merrey v. Guardian Printing & Publishing Co. (N. J. Sup.) 464. (E) Trial, Judgment, and Review. § 123. Whether a libel was published of plaintiff, or whether by the person mentioned in the libel plaintiff was intended, is a question of fact for the jury.-Merrey v. Guardian Printing & Publishing Co. (N. J. Sup.) 464. § 123. Certain questions held for the jury, in an action for libel upon a public officer.-Merrey v. Guardian Printing & Publishing Co. (N. J. Sup.) 464. LIBRARIES. Operation of statute of perpetuities on gifts in aid of, see Perpetuities, § 8. LICENSES. I. FOR OCCUPATIONS AND PRIVILEGES. See Theaters and Shows, § 3. Revocation without notice as denial of due process of law, see Constitutional Law, § 318. Right of owner of unlicensed automobile to recover for injuries from defects in streets, see Municipal Corporations, § 801. Sale of intoxicating liquors, see Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 58-86, 150, 206, 234. 1. Evidence held not to show that the fees for registration of automobiles and licensing of drivers imposed by P. L. 1908, p. 615, § 4, are extortionate for regulative purposes under the police power and are imposed as a tax for the purpose of revenue.-Cleary v. Johnston (N. J. Sup.) 538. Conflicting jurisdiction of courts, see Courts, $biles and licensing drivers under P. L. 1908, p. § 1. The fees for registration of automo 486. Construction of bill or note, see Bills and Notes, § 268. LIBEL AND SLANDER. II. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS, AND MALICE THEREIN. $48. Libel held not maintainable for certain criticism of public officer.-Merrey v. Guardian Printing & Publishing Co. (N. J. Sup.) 464. rather than a charge imposed under the police 615, § 4, held not a tax for revenue purposes, power.-Cleary v. Johnston (N. J. Sup.) 538. § 1. P. L. 1908, p. 621, § 8. held not to show that the fees imposed for registration of automobiles and licensing of drivers are not for regulative purposes under the police power, but as a tax for revenue purposes.-Cleary v. Johnston (N. J. Sup.) 538. § 7. P. L. 1908, p. 615, § 4, imposing certain fees for registration of automobiles and licensing drivers, held not unconstitutional even | if it be regarded as imposing a tax for revenue rather than a regulative charge under the police power.-Cleary v. Johnston (N. J. Sup.) 538. II. IN RESPECT OF REAL PROPERTY. For use of railroad right of way, see Railroads, $ 73. Injuries to licensees on or about railroads, see § 43. An agreement to allow persons owning personal property to remove it from the land of another, is a license.-Ely v. Cavanaugh (Conn.) 1122. § 48. No formality is necessary to create a license to persons owning personal property to remove it from the land of another.-Ely v. Cavanaugh (Conn.) 1122. $53. A license, coupled with an interest in chattels, passes by an assignment of the interest.-Ely v. Cavanaugh (Conn.) 1122. $58. A license whereby plaintiffs were authorized to remove certain personalty from the premises of the owner held coupled with an interest, so that it could not be terminated before reasonable time had been given to remove the property.-Ely v. Cavanaugh (Conn.) 1122. LIENS. Effect of proceedings in bankruptcy, see Bankruptcy. $$ 192, 194. On property sold as defect in title of vendor defeating contract of sale, see Vendor and Purchaser, § 134. Liens acquired by particular remedies or proceedings. See Attachment, §§ 165, 176; Garnishment, § 106. Particular classes of licns. See Mechanics' Liens; Mortgages, § 151; Pledges. For labor and materials on public improvements, see Municipal Corporations, § 373. Of servant for wages, see Master and Servant, $82. I. STATUTES OF LIMITATION. (B) Limitations Applicable to Particular Actions. § 31. An action for malpractice must be brought within two years, the period allowed by Court and Practice Act 1905, § 248, as to actions for personal injuries, which are excepted from sections 249 and 250, as to actions of trespass, case, and debt on contract.-Griffin v. Woodhead (R. I.) 417. § 32. An action by a tenant against his landlord for injuries to his stock of merchandise from negligence held barred in one year, under Gen. St. 1902, § 1119, as amended by Law's 1903, p. 114, c. 149, rather than in six years under section 1111.-Miner, Read & Garrette v. McNamara (Conn.) 933. П. COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION. (A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense. $ 46. In the absence of an express contract by one to pay at his death for services rendered him, a recovery for services held limited to those performed within six years previous to his death. Appeal of Hull (Conn.) 925. § 49. Limitations held not to begin to run against a cause of action for services rendered under an agreement to pay by will, until the person's death, without making a will.-Appeal of Hull (Conn.) 925. (E) Absence, Nonresidence, and Concealment of Person or Property. 87. The statute of limitations is not suspended during plaintiff's non residence.-Griffin v. Woodhead (R. I.) 417. (F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and Concealment of Cause of Action. $ 100. Knowledge of trustees, appointed to hold property upon the termination of a prior trust, of the fraudulent concealment of the former trustee of trust property, is imputed to the beneficiaries, so as to bar an action within the statutory time, under Acts 1868, p. 646, c. 357: Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 57, § 14. -Reeder v. Lanahan (Md.) 575. 102. The statute of limitations is not applicable to an equitable interest in a fund held in trust by a building association for distribution among the holders of shares in a matured series.-Campbell v. Perth Amboy Mut. Loan, Homestead & Building Ass'n (N. J. Ch.) 144. (H) Commencement of Action or Other Proceeding. $130. Under Court and Practice Act 1905, p. 74, c. 13, § 256, an action may be brought within one year after plaintiff was nonsuited in Duty of city as to lighting street, see Municipal his original action, although the time within Corporations, § 797. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. See Adverse Possession. Contract limiting time to sue carrier for loss of or injury to goods, see Carriers, § 180. Laches, see Equity, §§ 72, 84. Particular actions or proceedings. Appeal or other proceedings for review, see Appeal and Error, § 344. By or against executors or administrators, see Executors and Administrators, § 437. which an original action may be commenced has expired.-Pesce v. Mondare (R. I.) 913. III. ACKNOWLEDGMENT, NEW § 160. A mere indorsement on a note held not proof of payment, preventing the running of the statute.-Crahan v. Town of Chittenden (Vt.) 86. V. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL, AND REVIEW. Recovery of mortgaged premises, see Mortgages, On trial before referee, see Reference, § 58. $143. To enforce lien for materials furnished in making public improvement, see Municipal Corporations, § 373. To establish and enforce trust, see Trusts, 365. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. Of carrier in respect to goods, see Carriers, §§ 155-163, 180, 405. LIQUIDATION. In general, see Assignments for Benefit of Creditors; Bankruptcy; Insolvency. Of corporations in general, see Corporations, §§ 542-566, 617, 622. Of partnerships, see Partnership, §§ 247–257. LIQUOR SELLING. See Intoxicating Liquors. LIS PENDENS. Proceedings to enforce lien for materials furnished in making public improvement, see Municipal Corporations, § 373. LIVE STOCK. Carriage of, see Carriers, § 209. LOAN COMPANIES. See Building and Loan Associations. LOANS. Interest on, see Interest. Validity of statutes regulating interest, as de- LOCAL LAWS. See Statutes, §§ 85-95. LOGS AND LOGGING. Logs belonging to manufacturing company as stock in trade for purposes of taxation, see Taxation, $ 350. § 4. A contract held not a mere revocable license to cut timber, but a sale of the timber as it stood, to be removed within the time prescribed.-Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. 4. Whether a sealed contract for the sale of standing timber is a revocable or irrevocable one depends on the intention of the parties.Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. 5. Conveyance of standing trees held to work a severance from the freehold and convert them into separate property.-Fairbanks v. Stowe (Vt.) 1006. $ 14. The word "and" in Priv. & Sp. Laws 1899, p. 92, c. 64. § 3. amended by Priv. & Sp. Laws 1905, p. 233, c. 205, held used in the sense of "or" so as to authorize the collection of toll both on logs passing over dams, and also on those passing over a part of the stream improved to facilitate the driving of logs.-Wilson Stream Dam Co. v. Boston Excelsior Co. (Me.) 115. $14. Evidence held insufficient to support a recovery under Priv. & Sp. Laws 1899, p. 92, c. 64. $3, amended by Priv. & Sp. Laws 1905, p. 233, c. 205, authorizing the dam company incorporated by that act to collect toll on logs driven over its dams and improvements.-Wilson Stream Dam Co. v. Boston Excelsior Co. (Me.) 115. 14. Evidence, in an action by a dam company authorized to collect a toll for the passage of logs over its dams and improvements, held not to satisfactorily show that any "improvements" had been made in that part of the stream over which the logs were driven.-Wilson Stream Dam Co. v. Boston Excelsior Co. (Me.) 115. LOSS. Of goods by carrier, see Carriers, §§ 117, 123. LUMBER. Requirements of statute of frauds, see Frands, See Logs and Logging. 3. The words "to cut," in a sealed contract for the sale of standing timber, construed. -Brown v. Bishop, (Me.) 724. § 3. All timber which it was not reasonably possible for defendant to cut during the current winter, as stipulated in a logging contract, he was entitled to cut the following winter.-Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. § 3. "Possible," defined.-Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. § 3. A contract for the sale of timber held to vest in the purchaser the personal legal title defeasible as to so much of the timber as should not be cut within the time specified.Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. 3. A sealed contract for the sale of standing timber is to be considered in accordance MACHINERY. Dangerous machinery, liability of master for injuries to servant, see Master and Servant, §§ 101-125, 235. MAGISTRATES. See Justices of the Peace. MAINTENANCE. Separate maintenance of wife, see Husband and MALICE. Element of offenses. with the intention of the parties as disclosed See Criminal Law, § 24; Homicide, §§ 11, 13, by its language, mode of execution, etc., unless some established rule will be violated.-Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. § 3. Title to standing timber does not pass by an oral or unsealed contract.-Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. § 3. Growing timber, though separated, so long as it remains uncut can only be conveyed in accordance with the rules for conveyance of real estate.-Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. § 3. In an action of trespass for cutting trees held improper to exclude evidence of parol sale to defendant for the reason assigned.-Fairbanks V. Stowe (Vt.) 1006. § 4. A license to enter land to remove standing timber could not be revoked while the contract was in force.-Brown v. Bishop (Me.) 724. 146. MALPRACTICE. By physician or surgeon, see Physicians and MANDAMUS. II. SUBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF (B) Acts and Proceedings of Public Offi- III. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, ❘ II. SERVICES AND COMPENSATION. AND RELIEF. § 164. Motion to quash return to alternative writ denied where it did not appear that the allegations of the return were false or frivolous or designed to delay the remedy sought.-Byron v. City of Bayonne (N. J. Sup.) 459. (B) Wages and Other Remuneration. Relief association or department as mutual benefit insurance association, control of funds, see Insurance, §§ 698, 722, 793. $73. A servant employed by the week held not entitled to recover for time lost on ac$ 180. Peremptory writ granted in first in-count of sickness.-Orpin v. Westmacott Gas stance, where both parties have been heard, Furnace Co. (R. I.) 481. and there is no dispute as to the facts.-American La France Fire Engine Co. v. Seymour (N. J. Sup.) 439. See Mandamus. MANDATE. To lower court on decision on appeal or other proceeding for review, see Appeal and Error, § 1201. MANDATORY PROVISIONS. Of statutes, see Statutes, § 227. MAPS. As documentary evidence, see Evidence, § 379. MARITAL RIGHTS. See Husband and Wife. MARK. Distinguishing marks on election ballots, see MARKET VALUE. As basis for taxation, see Taxation, § 348. Of property, relevancy of evidence, see Evi- MARRIAGE. See Divorce; Husband and Wife. MARRIED WOMEN. See Husband and Wife. MASTER AND SERVANT. Constitutional guaranties of rights in general, see Constitutional Law, § 82. Employés of municipal corporations, see Municipal Corporations, §§ 218, 219. Implied liabilities for services rendered not in performance of duties of employment, see Work and Labor. Restraining combinations of employés, see Injunction, § 101. Trade unions, see Trade Unions. I. THE RELATION. (A) Creation and Existence. Employment of agents, see Principal and Agent, $$ 20-24. (B) Statutory Regulation. Laws, p. 214, c. 147; Rev. Code 1852, amended in 1893, p. 817, c. 110), gave a lien to an employé on a chose in action belonging to the employer, such as a claim for services, no means is provided for its enforcement against that species of property.-In re Morace (Del. Super.) 375. § 82. Even if Act Feb. 25, 1879 (16 Del. III. MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR IN JURIES TO SERVANT. Statutory actions for death, see Death, §§ 77103. (A) Nature and Extent in General. Release after accrual of liability, see Release, $$ 53, 56, 58, 59. Subject and title of statute relating to employment of children, see Statutes, § 114. § 90. A master must exercise reasonable care to provide a servant a reasonably safe place in which to work.-Vaillancourt v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada (Vt.) 99. $95. The employment of a child under 14 in violation of Act May 2, 1905 (P. L. 352) § 2, requires a finding of negligence, notwithstanding the employer may have been advised that the child, having been employed before the passage of the act, was not within its terms.Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Mach. Co. (Pa.) 215. $95. The employment of a child under 14, in violation of Act May 2, 1905 (P. L. 352) $ 2. held to afford opportunity for injury; and, if the child's act was of a character common to youthful indiscretion, the injury would be referred to the original wrong. Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Mach. Co. (Pa.) 215. (B) Tools, Machinery, Appliances, and Places for Work. §§ 101, 102. A master is not bound to furnish his servant a safe place in which to work, but only to exercise reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place to work.-State v. Flanigan (Md.) 818. §§ 101, 102. The duty of a master to exercise reasonable care to provide a servant a reasonably safe place in which to work cannot be delegated to an employé.-Vaillancourt v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada (Vt.) 99. § 104. It is because a child under 14 is likely to be imprudent and negligent that his employment is forbidden by Act May 2, 1905 (P. L. 352) $ 2.-Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Mach. Co. (Pa.) 215. $105. Under Act May 2, 1905 (P. L. 352), requiring machinery of every description to be guarded, a master is responsible for failure to guard the same, though it is customary not to guard the machinery in question.-Jones v. American Caramel Co. (Pa.) 613. $107. The obligation of a master to exercise care as to the safety of the work place does not Subject and title of statute, see Statutes, § 114. extend to temporary perils arising in the course (C) Termination and Discharge. Termination of agency, see Principal and Agent. § 37. of the work which are a part of the work.Robichaud v. Mendell (N. H.) 1049. § 107. The running board on a machine on which employés operating the machine stand is For cases in Dec. Dig. & Amer. Digs. 1907 to date & Indexes see same topic & section (§) NUMBER |