476), the argument of the appellant being that, if the act of 1893 has any validity, it must mean that parties whose interests have not been properly foreclosed, or who have have been given to him of such sale by the | (P. L. p. 350; Gen. St. 1895, p. 3388, §§ 474purchaser, redeem said lands in the manner provided in said act. If such owner is a nonresident, the notice may be served by publishing the same in a newspaper printed and circulated in the city, and depositing not received notice, shall be entitled to come a copy of such notice within 20 days after its first publication, inclosed in a wrapper, postpaid, directed to the owner at his last known post-office address, if it can be ascertained, the inquiry for which shall be made upon the lands purchased, if they are occupied, and wherever else in the city the same may be likely to be ascertained, and also by an examination of the record of the deed on account of which such notice is given, "provided, however, that if any estate in any of the said lands shall be held by any heir or devisee of a decedent whose estate appears of record in the county such heir, devisee *** shall be entitled to redeem, and to have notice aforesaid before the purchaser shall be entitled to the possession of the lands." Section 5 of a supplement to the act, approved April 8, 1892 (P. L. p. 431; Gen. St. 1895, p. 3387, § 469), provides that where notice is given by publication pursuant to the provisions of the act and its supplements to the person who, by record in said county where the land sold lies, is, or appears to be, the owner or to have an interest therein, and the time for redemption has not yet elapsed, and the purchaser or his agent, or his assignee or his agent, does not know of his own knowledge, and cannot ascertain by inquiry made on said lands whether such person is alive or deceased, and cannot ascertain his address by inquiry made on said lands, such person shall be conclusively presumed to be alive, and a notice published as required and mailed to the address if given by the deed, or other recorded instrument shall, after the time limited for redemption, bar and foreclose from all equity of redemption the title and interest in said lands, not only such person, if he shall have been alive at the time of publication together with all persons claiming under him, but shall also be conclusive against the heirs, devisees, and personal representatives of such person or persons if at the time of such publication such person shall in fact have been dead. As it is admitted in this case that the notice was mailed to one who, by the record of the deed in the county where the lands were situate, appeared at the time of the sale to be the owner of the lands, and that all of the other requirements of the act were complied with, the heirs and devisees of Abell are by the terms of the act and its supplements as effectively bound by the notice as he would have been if alive. But it is urged that the act of 1892 just referred to was repealed by a supplement to the "Martin Act" approved March 16, 1893 in and redeem. The difficulty with the first part of this proposition is that the interest of the heirs of Abell was properly foreclosed, and the objection to, the second proposition is that the heirs of Abell did receive all the notice which the law provided for, but the act of 1893 does not apply to this case. What the act provides for is that where a person who is entitled thereto has not had the notice which the law requires he should have, because of inadvertence, or for some other reason, the purchaser may subsequently correct such error by giving the notice which the law requires, and upon proof thereof, and that no redemption has been tendered or made, the officer whose duty it is to make a deed under the act shall execute a supplemental deed without requiring a resale of the lands. Whether section 2 of the supplement of April 8, 1892 (Gen. St. 1895, p. 3387, § 466) was repealed by the supplement of 1893 it is not necessary to determine, because the question of limitation does not in my judgment arise under the circumstances of this case. The city bought the property at a tax sale, and it is assumed from the stipulation that all the notices and other requirements of the act relating to redemption were complied with, and the only question is whether the notice to Abell, he being dead at the time of the sale, foreclosed the right of redemption of his heirs or devisees. I think the statute is very clear on this subject, and that the deed which the purchaser procured from the devisees of the heir of Abell was unnecessary because whatever interest they might have had was barred by the notice to redeem given to the person who was the owner of record, and it therefore follows that there was no breach of the covenant in the deed from the defendants to the plaintiff. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. ECKERSLY et al. v. ABBOTT. (Supreme Court of New Jersey. Oct. 25, 1909.) 1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 59*)—PLACE OF SALE "NEW PLACE." An inn or tavern, in which the occupants have for many years carried on the business of ly for that purpose, does not become a "new retailing liquors under a license granted annualplace," under the act of April 13, 1906 (P. L. p. 199), merely because an applicant was refused a license, when the occupant applied at the first opportunity for a license to keep an inn or tavern in that place, and it was granted. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 59; Dec. Dig. § 59.*] 2. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (§ 59*)-PLACE OF | ling, because the length of time a place reSALE "NEW PLACE." In order to make it a new place under the law, there must be some proof showing that there was a real and substantial abandonment of the business. The refusal of a court to license a particular applicant is not sufficient. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 59; Dec. Dig. § 59.*] (Syllabus by the Court.) Certiorari by the State, on the relation of James Eckersly and others, to review the action of the Ocean County Court of Common Pleas granting Robert A. Abbott a license to keep an inn and tavern. Writ dismissed. Argued June term, 1909, before REED, BERGEN, and VOORHEES, JJ. mains unlicensed would be evidence of an intention to abandon the business, but under the law in this state, when the license is refused, no application can be made until after an application was made as soon as an opthe expiration of one year, and in this case portunity was afforded. We therefore are of opinion that this license was not granted to a new place within the meaning of the act, and that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed, with costs. KUNZ, Overseer of the Poor, v. DECH. S. A. Atkinson and Peter Backes, for pros-(Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 8, 1909.) ecutors. John T. Van Cleef, John H. Backes, and Eckard P. Budd, for defendant. BERGEN, J. This writ was allowed to test the legality of the action of the court of common pleas of the county of Ocean in granting to the defendant a license to keep an inn and tavern. The prosecutor claims that the action of the court was illegal because it was the granting of a new license within 200 feet of a church, which, under P. L. 1906, p. 199, the court has no power to grant. It appears from the record that the different occupants of the house or hotel had been licensed continuously for a great many years previous to 1908, but that at the April term of that year the occupant was, for some reason, refused a license. Nevertheless he continued to reside in the building, and there was no proof of any fact from which it can be inferred that the occupant had indicated any intention of abandoning the business, provided he could obtain a license, and at the first opportunity he did make an application for a license which was granted, and is now the subject of this review. The conclusion which we have reached is that it was not the legislative intent to prevent the renewal or continuance of a license to sell liquor at a place in existence at the time the law went into effect, unless there is a real and substantial abandonment of the business, and that, therefore, there must be something more than the mere refusal of the court to continue or renew a license to bring the place within the legislative definition of "new place." If it appeared that after opportunity to renew an application, which had been denied, the applicant had neglected his opportunity to obtain a license, or done anything to indicate an abandonment of the business, then we think it may lose its place in the class which the law evidently intended to protect. Matter of Kessler, 163 N. Y. 205, 57 N. E. 402; People ex rel. Sandman v. Brush, 179 N. Y. 93, 71 N. E. 731. The argument that, if a year is not sufficient, 20 years would not be, is not control DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION (§ 142*)—WILLS (§ 847*)-DISTRICT COURT-JURISDICTION. District courts have no jurisdiction of suits against heirs and devisees for the debts of the decedent. Distribution, Cent. Dig. § 502; Dec. Dig. § [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Descent and 142;* Wills, Cent. Dig. 2159; Dec. Dig. S 847.*] (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from District Court of Orange. Action by Gustav Kunz, Overseer of the Poor, against Elizabeth Dech. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed. Argued June term, 1909, before SWAYZE, TRENCHARD, and MINTURN, JJ. Joseph K. Field, for appellant. William A. Lord, for respondent. SWAYZE, J. This action was brought in the district court against a devisee upon the bond of the testator. The only question is whether such an action can be maintained in the district court. The jurisdiction of the court is not necessarily excluded because title to land is involved. The restriction upon district courts in this respect, contained in section 30 of the act of 1898 (P. L. 1898, p. 564) has been removed by later legislation (P. L. 1902, p. 368; P. L. 1908, p. 384). Cranston v. Beck, 70 N. J. Law, 145, 56 Atl. 121. The question of the constitutionality of the legislation was mooted in that case. If there be doubt in this respect, we need not consider it, as we think the judgment must be reversed upon another ground. The act for the relief of creditors against heirs and devisees (Gen. St. 1895, p. 1679) requires special pleading by the heir or devisee if he desires to avoid the effect of a general judgment against him. Muldoon v. Moore, 55 N. J. Law, 410, 26 Atl. 892, 21 L. R. A. 89. Upon proper pleading the judgment is special, and the execution can only command the sheriff, or other officer, that of the lands whereof the testator was seised on the day when the real estate became liable, or at any time afterwards, or at the time of his death, as the case may require, he cause to be made the debt, damages and costs mentioned in the writ. Executions Act, § 1; Gen. St. 1895, p. 1414. tion of district courts is Koch v. Vanderhoof, 49 N. J. Law, 619, 9 Atl. 771, where it was held that those courts had no jurisdiction of a suit for a penalty of $200, although they had jurisdiction of "every suit of a civil nature at law," and actions for penalties were conceded to be civil actions. The district court was without jurisdiction, and the judgment must be reversed, with costs. The district court act contains no provision which authorizes the filing of a special plea such as the heirs and devisees act permits, and it seems inconsistent with the practice of oral pleading, if pleading it may be called, in that court. If this difficulty could be surmounted, a more serious one would remain. Upon proper pleading by the heir or devisee the judgment and execution are against the lands descended or devised only. BOARD OF RAILROAD COM'RS v. UNITThis is quite inconsistent with the scheme of the district court act, which requires that the judgment be docketed in order to make it ED NEW JERSEY R. & CANAL CO. et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 15, 1909.) a lien upon lands. An execution out of the district court can only reach the goods and chattels. P. L. 1898, p. 620, § 178. The im- 1. possibility of carrying out the provisions of the heirs and devisees act by the machinery and procedure of the district courts is a sufficient reason for holding that the district court was without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the general language of section 30 in its amended form. In Princeton v. Mount, 29 N. J. Law, 299, it was held that an action against a municipal corporation could not be brought in the court for the trial of small causes, because the provision for service of a summons upon a municipal corporation was inconsistent with the provision for service in the small cause act. For a similar reason EQUITY (§ 230*) - DEMURRER-SPECIFICA TION OF GROUNDS. The specification of grounds of demurrer as prescribed by chancery rule 209 is in effect a statement in advance of the points of law intended to be argued thereunder. Dig. 506; Dec. Dig. § 230.*] 2. EQUITY (8 264*)--MOTION TO STRIKE AS SIGNED CAUSES OF DEMURRER. A motion to strike out assigned causes of demurrer is unwarranted. Dig. § 536; Dec. Dig. § 264.*] (Syllabus by the Court.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Information by Robert H. McCarter, Attorney General, on relation of the Board of Railroad Commissioners against the United New Jersey Railroad & Canal Company and others. From an order striking out causes of a demurrer to the information (71 Atl. 291), the company appeals. Reversed. Alan H. Strong, for appellants. Nelson B. Gaskill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent. it was held that a scire facias in attachment proceedings could not issue out of the small cause court against a foreign corporation (D., L. & W. R. R. v. Ditton, 36 N. J. Law, 361), or against a municipal corporation (Jersey City v. Horton, 38 N. J. Law, 88, 92). Up: on the authority of these cases, it was held that district courts had no jurisdiction of suits against municipal corporations (Townsend v. School Trustees, 41 N. J. Law, 312), and for the same reason justices' courts were without jurisdiction (School Trustees v. Stocker, 42 N. J. Law, 115). In Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Carty, 53 N. J. Law, 336, 21 Atl. 851, Mr. Justice Van Syckel said: "The omission in the justice's court act to provide expressly for service on foreign corporations as is done in the eighty-eighth section of the corporations act for the higher courts, is significant of the legislative intent to withhold from justices of the peace jurisdiction over them." These are but instances where general language in one portion of the statutes is narrowed in its interpretation by the necessary construction of other portions. As Chief Justice Kinsey said: "In the construction of the acts of the Legislature it has ever been held a sound and wholesome rule that when divers laws are made relating to one subject, the whole must be considered as constituting one system, and mutually connected with each other." An illustration of the application of this rule to the jurisdic DILL, J. The Attorney General filed an information, on the relation of the Board of Railroad Commissioners, to compel the defendant company to abandon an existing crossing over its tracks at Irving street in the city of Rahway, and to substitute some other method of crossing, to be determined by the court. The defendants filed a demurrer to the information, and, under the chancery rule 209, specified five causes for the demurrer. The Attorney General then moved to strike out the demurrer, and also to strike out each of the several causes. The Vice Chancellor refused to strike out the demurrer. He also refused to strike out the first cause, but ordered that the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes be stricken out. From this order the defendant company appeals. If we were to decide this case upon the question argued before us, namely, the validity of the causes of demurrer stricken out by the order appealed from, we should ar rive at a conclusion at variance with that of the learned Vice Chancellor below; but there is another and prior question involved, and that is as to the practice adopted by the court below, in striking out assigned grounds of demurrer. The practice of requiring the statement of grounds for demurrer appears to have arisen as early as 1585 (St. 27 Eliz. c. 5). In 1654 the Court of King's Bench formulated in an order the substantial provisions of that statute, and later (1705) it was made more specific by St. 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16. In 1833, by Reg. Gen. Hil. Term, 4 William IV, the practice of specifying causes or grounds was extended to every demurrer, and, what is to the point here, the party filing it was required to state in the margin thereof the matters of law intended to be argued thereunder. This order of 1833 was embodied in the common-law procedure act of 1852, which in turn was followed by the judicature act of 1875, and order 28, rule 2, of that act is the source of our chancery rule 209. of the argument upon the trial by eliminating in advance the discussion upon certain points of law. This the court may not do. A demurrer is wholly good or wholly bad, and it is not necessary that all of the causes of demurrer specified should hold good. If any of the assigned grounds are valid, the demurrer should be sustained. To sanction motions to strike out, either wholly or in part, assigned grounds of demurrer would prolong litigation indefinitely. Such practice should not be allowed. For this reason, therefore, the order appealed from should be reversed. MCCARTER, Atty. Gen., v. MCKELVEY et al. (Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 8, 1909.) Laws 1907, pp. 79, 89, 114, cc. 45, 46, 62, which are made applicable to cities containing from 100,000 to 200,000 inhabitants, and aumembers who are, in effect, vested with all imthorize the mayor to appoint boards of four ously exercised by any board of aldermen or common council, do not violate Const. art. 4, § cial law regulating the internal affairs of cities 7, par. 11, prohibiting any private, local, or speor appointing local officers to regulate municipal affairs; the Constitution not prohibiting the Legislature from classifying cities according to population for regulating their internal affairs when population has a reasonable relation to the subject-matter of the statute, and the classification by population is reasonably adopted to the purpose of the act in question. As was said by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet in 1889: "The new orders in chancery of England contain a clause identical in pur-portant governmental powers and duties previpose with our rule. Rule 2 of order 28 requires that a demurrer shall state the specific ground on which it is founded; our rule requires that the particular ground shall be stated; so that it is manifest from their language that the scope and design of both are the same." Essex Paper Co. v. Greacen, 45 N. J. Eq. 504, at page 505, 19 Atl. at page 466. Chancery rule 209 requires the grounds of demurrer to be specified, and these grounds, one or more, are in effect mere announcements in advance of the questions of law intended to be argued. The origin of this requirement is found in Reg. Gen. Hil. Term, 4 William IV, where the party authorizing the mayors of cities of a certain Laws 1907, pp. 79, 89, 114, cc. 45, 46, 62, filing the demurrer was required to state in size to appoint boards of four members, no more the margin thereof the points of law intended than two of whom shall be of the same political to be argued thereunder. The reason for re- party, and vesting them with certain governquiring a statement of the points of law up-ifications upon the right to hold office, or promental powers, do not impose any political qualon which the demurrant relies is apparent. hibit members of any party from holding such The adverse party is thus advised at what office, but simply limit the representation of point his pleading will be attacked, and the any party, and are constitutional, even if the spirit of the Constitution prohibits the imposing court, in passing upon the demurrer, is aided of political qualifications upon the right to hold by specific reference to the grounds in sup- office. port thereof. Essex Paper Co. v. Greacen, 45 N. J. Eq. 506, 19 Atl. 466, supra. There is, however, nothing in the statute, in the rules of the court, or in the history of the law, and there is no precedent to be found, which would warrant the striking out of the causes specified. The demurrer may be stricken out if it is sham or frivolous, but not the causes. A motion to strike out one or more assigned causes of demurrer, viz., the statement of the points of law intended to be argued in support of the demurrer, is asking the court, in advance of the regular trial of the issues of law, to hear the case in piecemeal, and to limit the scope [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 102; Dec. Dig. § 93.*] 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 176*)-RIGHT TO HOLD OFFICE-POLITICAL QUALIFICATIONS-VALIDITY OF STATUTE. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 427-440; Dec. Dig. § 176.*] Quo warranto proceedings by Robert H. McCarter, Attorney General, against Charles D. McKelvey and others; against William A. Hopson and others; and against William Berdan and others. On demurrer to the in formations. Judgment for defendants. R. V. Lindabury, for informant. William B. Gourley and John W. Griggs, for demurrants. GUMMERE, C. J. These suits were in- to the matters with which they deal; that stituted by the Attorney General for the cities having a population between 100,000 purpose of testing the right of the several and 200,000 have no characteristics which defendants therein to exercise the liberties, privileges, and franchises of members of the board of fire and police commissioners, the board of finance, and the board of public works of the city of Paterson, under appointment by the mayor of that city, made pursuant to the terms of three acts of the Legislature of this state, passed in the year 1907, and constituting chapters 45, 46, and 62 (pages 79, 89, 114) of the laws of that year. The information asserts that these several acts are unconstitutional and void, and that the offices held thereunder are unlawfully held. The demurrers challenge the soundness of this assertion. The framework of each of these acts is the same; each is made applicable to cities having a population of not less than 100,000, nor more than 200.000, inhabitants; each act gives the mayor power to appoint boards consisting of four resident members, not more than two of whom shall be members of the same political party; under each of these acts the boards created thereby are substituted for, and vested with, the powers and duties previously exercised by any board, committee, or governing body having control or management of the matters treated of in the various acts. In each act there is a repealer of all inconsistent acts. Taken together, they clothe these three boards which they create with all the important governmental powers, and im pose upon them all the important governmental duties which, prior to their enactment, were exercised and performed by the boards of aldermen, or common council, in the cities affected by the Legislature. The first contention made on behalf of the Attorney General, in support of the informations, is that each of these statutes violates the provision of article 4, § 7, par. 11 of the Constitution of our state, which prohibits the Legislature from passing any private, local, or special law regulating the internal affairs of cities and counties; appointing local offices or commissions to regulate municipal affairs. It has been settled by a long line of decisions by our courts that this constitutional provision does not prohibit the Legislature from classifying cities for the purpose of passing acts regulating their internal affairs. It has further been conclusively determined by our courts that the classification of cities upon the basis of population, for the purpose of legislation regulating their internal affairs, does not violate the constitutional provision referred to when population bears a reasonable relation to the subject-matter of the legislation. It is conceded on behalf of the Attorney General that the power of the Legislature, to the extent indicated, cannot be successfully challenged. The ground upon which he attacks the statute under review is that popu so distinguish them from those having a larger or smaller population as to render the statutory provisions which are under consideration fit and appropriate to them alone, and unfit and inappropriate to municipalities having a greater or less number of inhabitants; that for this reason the classification is illusive and unsubstantial, and consequently makes the law special, although it sounds in general terms. This contention is identical with that raised in this court by counsel in the case of Owens v. Furey, 55 N. J. Law, 1, 25 Atl. 934, in which the constitutionality of an act passed in 1892, creating a board of public works, and other offices, in cities having a population of not less than 50,000, nor more than 100,000 inhabitants, was under consideration. The scope of that act was practically the same as that of chapter 62 of the Laws of 1907 (now under scrutiny), and it conferred largely the same powers upon the board which it created. The conclusion reached in that case was that the classification by population was substantial, not illusory, and that such legislation was general, not special. In the case of Varney v. Kramer, 62 N. J. Law, 486, 41 Atl. 711, the constitutionality of an act similar in its purport was attacked, because, by its terms, it was applicable only to cities having a population of not less than 55,000, nor more than 100,000 inhabitants; the contention there also being that the classification by population was illusory and unsubstantial. This court there considered the decision of Owens v. Furey as controlling, and affirmed the constitutionality of the statute on that decision. The same course should be pursued in the present case. The doctrine of Owens v. Furey has never been overruled by the Court of Errors. On the contrary, it would seem to have been approved (obiter) in the case of Wanser v. Hoos, 60 N. J. Law, 534, 38 Atl. 449, 64 Am. St. Rep. 600. Until that decision is overruled by the court of last resort it should be accepted as settling the question that legislation of the character under review is general, not special. The Attorney General further insists that the statutes under review are unconstitutional "in that they prescribe political qualifications for the holding of public office." No specific provision in the Constitution, which prohibits such prescription, is referred to by counsel, and none such can be found. His argument is apparently based upon the theory that the imposing of political qualifications upon the right to hold public office violates the spirit of the Constitution. Assuming that this proposition is sound, are these statutes in conflict with it? We think not. They do not require that any of the officers named therein shall have any political qualification whatever. In fact the mat |