In view of the fact that the appellants have no standing to object to the register's action in granting letters of administration, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions attempted to be raised by this appeal. The decree of the court below is affirmed. adopted as children by the decedent. (2) They claimed that decedent had made a will in their favor, which was lost, or at least had promised to make such a will. (3) They claimed that there was a resulting trust in the real estate of the decedent in favor of her husband, Robert L. Smith, and that, therefore, the said real estate had descended to them as his heirs at law. The orphans' court heard testimony upon these conten tions, and found that none of them were sustained by the evidence produced. petition was dismissed and the refusal of 1. WILLS (8 587*)-RESIDUARY CLAUSE-EFthe register to revoke the letters of administration was sustained. The petitioners have taken this appeal. The The assignments of error are all bad in form, and the final decree of the court below dismissing the exceptions is not assigned for error. Waiving the insufficiency of the specifications of error, the appellants, upon their own showing, had no standing to main tain their petition to revoke the letters of administration. If their claim to be adopted children of decedent were sustained, it would confer upon them no right to administer the estate, or to select an administrator, or to object to an appointment made by the register of wills. In McCully's App., 10 Wkly. Notes Cas. 80, this court held that an adopted child does not acquire by reason of his adoption the right to administer upon the estate of the adopting parent. In a recent case-Burnett's Estate, 219 Pa. 599, 69 Atl. 74 -the rule of the earlier cases was recognized, and it was held that: "An adopted child, under the laws of Pennsylvania, cannot inherit from collateral kindred of the adopting parents." The act of May 19, 1887 (P. L. 125), which so far as the rights acquired by an adopted child are concerned merely reenacts the provisions of the act of May 4, 1855 (P. L. 430) does not affect the rule of McCully's Appeal. If it had been shown that a will which the law would regard as the last will of the decedent had been lost, and due proof of its execution and contents had been made, such will might be admitted to probate and the letters of administration would then necessarily be revoked. But no such proof was made. Nor was there any evidence of a contract to make a will. The loose expressions of decedent as to how she intended to dispose of her property did not constitute either a will or a contract. Nor was any consideration alleged for such a contract. If there was a resulting trust in the real estate, that fact can be established in an appropriate proceeding. But the fact, if established, could not bear in any way upon the right to letters of administration upon the personal estate of the decedent. If the letters should be revoked, it would not affect in the slightest degree the rights of any person having an interest in the real estate. In re FULLER'S ESTATE. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 11, 1909.) FECT. A residuary clause passes the whole estate, preventing any part of it from coming under the intestate laws. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 1279; Dec. Dig. § 587.*] 2. WILLS (§ 500*)-CONSTRUCTION-RESIDUARY ESTATE. Testator devised certain land to his son, with remainder to his children or issue, with provision that, on his death without issue, the property should pass to the heirs of the testator. Held, that the heirs were to be determined from the death of the testator and included the devisee for life, whose interest passed under his will. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Dec. Dig. § 506.*] 3. WILLS (8 587*)-CONSTRUCTION-DEVISE OF RESIDUARY ESTATE. Testator gave his son a life estate in land, with a provision that, if he die without issue living, the devise should become a part of the residuary estate, and should be sold, and that the son should receive one-third of the proceeds. Held that, where the son survived the entitled to have the land devised for life to the father, on his death his representatives were son included in the residuary estate, and to claim one-third thereof. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Dec. Dig. § 587.*] Appeal from Orphans' Court, Fayette County. In the matter of the estate of Smith Fuller. From a decree dismissing exceptions to adjudication, Elizabeth M. Fuller appeals. Affirmed. Argued before MITCHELL, C. J., and FELL, BROWN, POTTER, and ELKIN, JJ. Sterling, Higbee & Matthews, Smith & Brownfield, and Robinson & McKean, for appellant. S. Ray Shelby and William E. Crow. for appellee. POTTER, J. In the will of Dr. Smith Fuller. he provided as follows: "5th. I give and devise to my son William B. Fuller the dwell. ing house and lot of ground where he now resides, also the vacant lot of ground adjoining thereto and occupied by him situate on South Gallatin Avenue. Also the dwelling house and lot of ground now occupied by my son John M. Fuller, situate on the south side of Fayette street, together with the one-half of the lot of ground on which my office now stands on Fayette street, to have and to hold during his natural life. If he should die leaving surviving him lawful issue, then at his death I direct the same shall go to such issue in equal proportions; but if he should die without lawful issue living the said devise shall revert and become part of my residuary estate and be sold by my executors and the proceeds distributed as hereinafter provided." And in the seventh clause he said: "The rest and residue of my estate, personal and real, I give, bequeath and devise to my executors, and direct them to sell the same at public or private sale, and execute deeds therefor. The real estate to be sold within three years from my death. I direct that the money arising from the sale of my personal property and real estate directed to be sold, shall be distributed as follows: to Harriet R. Anderson four twentyfourths (4-24); Elizabeth M. Fuller four twenty-fourths (4-24); John M. Fuller four twenty-fourths (424); Frank M. Fuller four twenty-fourths (4-24); and William B. Fuller eight twenty-fourths (8-24)." The testator died March 14, 1892, and his son, William B. Fuller, died June 28, 1895, leaving a widow, but no issue. By his will he devised and bequeathed all his property to his wife absolutely. The real estate of the decedent in pursuance of the direction in the will was sold by his executors, including the properties which had been devised to William B. Fuller for, life, and, upon distribution of the fund arising from such sales, Louisa Fuller, the widow of William B. Fuller, claimed eight twentyfourths or one-third of the balance in the hands of the executors. This claim was disputed by the other devisees, so far as the properties in which William B. Fuller had a life estate were concerned, but the auditing judge sustained the claim, and awarded to the claimant one-third of the entire balance for distribution. Exceptions to the adjudication were dismissed and the accountant directed to pay out according to the schedule of distribution contained in the adjudication. Elizabeth M. Fuller, one of the residuary legatees and also an heir at law to the testator, appealed from the decree, and assigns for error the dismissal of the exceptions to the opinion of the auditing judge and the entry of the final decree. Counsel for appellant contend that the gift of eight twenty-fourths of testator's residuary estate to William B. Fuller did not include the property in which he was given a life estate, and that, upon the death of William B. Fuller, the proceeds of the sale of such property would go to those entitled to take from testator under the intestate law. This construction would cause intestacy, which is always to be avoided if possible by any fair interpretation of the will. The intention of the residuary clause is to pass the whole estate, and prevent any part of it from coming under the intestate laws. When the language of a residuary clause is ambiguous, the courts lean towards a broad, rather than a narrow, construction, in order to avoid intestacy. This principle applied to the present case requires a construction of the residuary clause, which will include within it the property in which William B. Fuller had a life estate. This is in harmony with the express direction of the testator in clause 5, in which he says that the property in question shall in case of the failure of issue become part of his residuary estate, and be disposed of by his executors as such. William B. Fuller was made one of the residuary legatees, and the estate to him was in terms a life estate, with remainder to his unborn issue if he should leave any, and, in default of issue, the remainder vested in the legatees named, of which he was one. The principle here involved is the same as that in Riehle's Appeal, 54 Pa. 97, and in Buzby's Appeal, 61 Pa. 111, in which it was held that where a devise for life was made to one, with remainder to the devisee's children or issue, and it was provided that, upon the death of the devisee without leaving issue the property should pass to the heirs of the testator, the heirs were to be ascertained as of the date of testator's death and included the devisee for life, whose share of the remainder passed under his will. The assignments of error are overruled. and the decree of the court below is affirmed. SULLIVAN v. UNION R. CO. (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Dec. 22, 1909.) perior court, we do not feel justified in overruling the decision granting a new trial. The plaintiff's exception is therefore overruled, and the case is remitted to the su APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 1005*)-REVIEW-QUES- perior court for a new trial. TION OF FACT-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. The Supreme Court will give great weight to the decision of the presiding justice, sustaining the verdict as supported by the evidence, or setting it aside as against the evidence; but the decision is not conclusive. DOUGHERTY v. TOWN COUNCIL OF [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3860-3876, 3948-3954; Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Darius Baker, Judge. 1909.) Dec. 20, INTOXICATING LIQUORS (8 65*) - LICENSE- FICIENCY. Pub. Laws 1908, p. 206, c. 1583, § 1, requires Gen. Laws, c. 102, § 2, as amended by the city council, before granting a liquor liAction by George Sullivan against the Un-cense, to give notice by advertisement of the ion Railroad Company. There was an order name of the applicant and the particular logranting a new trial after verdict for plain- notice of application for a license stated the cation for which the license is requested. The tiff, and he brings exceptions. Overruled, location to be "in D's Block, Main street, Wyand cause remanded for new trial. oming," giving the applicant's name. D's Block was a well-known building, and the only one in the village known by that name, and the buildings were not numbered. Held, that the notice of the location was sufficient. See 69 Atl. 923. John W. Hogan, for plaintiff. Joseph C. Sweeney and Alonzo R. Williams, for defend ant. nied and dismissed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 65; Dec. Dig. § 65.*] Petition for certiorari by Patrick W. PER CURIAM. Two juries have found for the plaintiff, and the judges who presid-Town of Richmond and others. Petition deDougherty against the Town Council of the ed at the trials have each expressed their dissatisfaction with the result. The first judge, however, did not feel at liberty to disturb the verdict, which we afterwards set aside as being against the evidence. The second judge has granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the strong preponderance of the evidence, and evidently feels that the trial has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. John W. Sweeney, for petitioner. Benjamin W. Grim, for respondents. F. Deady, in Dawley's Block, Main street, Wyoming." The petitioner claims that this notice is not sufficiently specific as to the particular location for which the license was requested. PER CURIAM. This is a petition for a writ of certiorari. Owen F. Deady filed an application for a retail liquor license in the town of Richmond. The notice by advertisement of the pendency of this application statIt appears from the transcript of the tes-ed the location of the place to be "Owen timony that witnesses who were not called at the previous trial testified at the last trial in favor of the plaintiff. It also appears that the testimony of certain of the defendant's witnesses given at the previous trial differs from the testimony of the same witnesses given at the last trial. The plaintiff is warranted in urging that the evidence presented upon this record is more favorable to him than that upon which this court granted a new trial after the former verdict for the plaintiff. However, the justice who presided at the trial, who saw and heard the witnesses, has granted the defendant's motion for a new trial. We have said, in Wilcox v. R. I. Co., 29 R. I. 292, 70 Atl. 913, that great weight should be given by this court to the decision of the justice presiding, when he sustains the verdict of the jury. No less force should be allowed to his finding that a verdict is unwarranted and unjust. The determination of a justice of the superior court upon such a matter is not conclusive upon this court; but it has much persuasive force. After a careful consideration of the testimony and the decision of the justice of the su*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes Section 2, c. 102 of the General Laws as amended by section 1, c. 1583, p. 206, of the Public Laws, passed at the January session, 1908, provides (among other things) that, before granting a license to any person, the council "shall give notice by advertisement for at least two weeks * * of the name of the applicant for said license, and the particular location for which the license is requested. * * *" In Dexter v. Town Council of Cumberland, 17 R. I. 222, 21 Atl. 347, the notice simply stated, "Robert Tripp, High street, Valley Falls," and the court held that the notice was insufficient, saying: "When the statute requires the particular location to be given, in order that owners of land within 200 feet of it may file objections, it evidently contemplates something more exact and definite than the notice in this case." It appeared at the hearing that Dawley's Block is a well-known building, formerly a [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Powers, Cent. Dig. § 32; Dec. Dig. § 16.*] tavern, and the only building so designated [ terpreted in accordance with the law of the in that village, and that buildings therein donor's domicile. are not numbered. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the notice in the case at bar is sufficient for that purpose. Petition denied and dismissed. PEZZUCCO v. GAUTIERI. (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Dec. 20, 1909.) NEW TRIAL (§ 168*)-GROUNDS. A petition, under Court and Practice Act 1905, 82, 472, 473, for new trial, where the person aggrieved by a judgment has failed from accident, mistake, or unforeseen cause to prosecute his appeal, etc., and where justice requires a revision of the case, will be denied, where the mistake relied on is one of law, and where it does not appear that justice requires a revision of the case. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see New Trial, Dec. Dig. § 168.*] Action by Antonio Pezzucco against John G. C. Gautieri. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant files a petition for new trial, under Court and Practice Act 1905, §§ 2, 472, 473. Dismissed. 3. EVIDENCE (§ 81*)-PRESUMPTIONS-LAW OF FOREIGN COUNTRY. The law of a foreign country governing the disposition of property under a power will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to be the same as the law of this country. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 102; Dec. Dig. § 81.*] 4. POWERS (§ 36*)-EXECUTION OF POWERVALIDITY-STATUTORY PROVISIONS. Civ. Code France, § 893, forbids any one to dispose of his property "gratuitously except by a donation inter vivos or by a will under the terms hereinafter established." Section 913 provides that donations either by instrument inter vivos or will cannot exceed one-third of the property if the donator leaves two children. Held, that these sections do not limit the right of a person to dispose of all of his property under a power by the terms of which he was given that privilege. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Powers, Cent. Dig. § 137; Dec. Dig. § 36.*] 5. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION (§ 45*)-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DISTRIBUTION-EFFECT OF WILL. Where property is held in trust for the benefit of a named beneficiary, who is given power to dispose of the property by will, and she bequeaths the property to her husband, the re Edward M. Sullivan, for plaintiff. John turn of the trustees of the property to the or G. C. Gautieri, pro se. PER CURIAM. There is no merit in the petition. The mistake, if any, is one of law, rather than of fact. It does not appear that justice requires a revision of the case. The petition is therefore denied and dis missed. GALARD, Prince de Bearn et Chalais, v. (Court of Appeals of Maryland. Dec. 3, 1909.) Defendant conveyed property to be held in trust during the lifetime of his daughter, with power to her to dispose of the trust estate by will, and the daughter bequeathed to her husband "the totality of all my property, personal and real, that I may leave at my decease, without exception. Consequently I institute him as my universal legatee" and executor. Code 1904, art. 93, § 323, provides that every devise of all real and personal property belonging to the testator shall include "all property over which he has a general power of appointment unless the contrary intention shall appear." Held, that the husband was entitled at the wife's death to all the property held under the trust deed, and that he took title directly from the donor of the power as though both the power and the will constituted one instrument. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. 1292; Dec. Dig. § 589.*] 2. POWERS (§ 16*)-CONSTRUCTION-INTENT OF DONOR-WHAT LAW GOVERNS. The intent of the donor in a power governs in its construction, and, where the domicile of the donor and the location of the property involved are the same, the power should be in phans' court as part of the wife's estate, and the attempted distribution thereof by that court as do not confer any title to the property upon the a part of such estate, are contrary to iaw and persons to whom distribution was made, and such persons will be treated as having received the property subject to the trust and will be bound to refund to the person entitled to the property, unless such person has deprived himself of his right to equitable relief. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Descent and Distribution, Cent. Dig. § 123; Dec. Dig. § 45.*] 6. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 271*) -LIABILITIES OF ESTATE-PROPERTY LIA BLE. A father deeded property to trustees to be held by them during the lifetime of his daughter, and the interest and increase to be applied to her use, and gave her the privilege of disposing of the body of the property by will. Held, that such property cannot be subjected to the payment of the daughter's debts at her death. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators, Cent. Dig. § 1044; Dec. Dig. § 271.*] 7. TAXATION (§ 878*)-COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAXES-EXECUTION OF POWER. Such property is not subject to an inheritance tax under Code 1904, art. 81, § 117 et seq., imposing a collateral inheritance tax on property passing to collateral relations from persons dying seised thereof or transferred by will or other instrument intended to take effect in possession after the death of the grantor, devisor, etc., and therefore the return of the property to the orphans' court by the trustees was not authorized by such claims upon it. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 1701; Dec. Dig. § 878.*] 8. TRUSTS (§ 156*)-POWER OF EXECUTOR TO ADMINISTER TRUST PROPERTY. Where property is conveyed to trustees with directions to use the interest and increase thereof for the benefit of a beneficiary named and to transfer the property to a person appointed by the beneficiary, the appointment of an executor by the beneficiary does not authorize him to administer the trust property. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. §§ 201, 202; Dec. Dig. § 156.*] 9. EQUITY ( 44*)-JURISDICTION-ORPHANS' COURT AND COURTS OF EQUITY. trust who has been injured by any transaction between himself and the trustee. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 403; Dec. Dig. § 283.*] 15. TRUSTS (§ 372*)-ENFORCEMENT OF TRUST -ACTIONS EVIDENCE. Evidence, in an action by a cestui que trust against the trustees, held sufficient to show that the disposition of the trust fund which was authorized by the cestui que trust [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Equity, Cent. en advice with reference to his rights, and that was due to ignorance of the law and to mistakDig. § 141; Dec. Dig. § 44.*] Courts of equity, and not the orphans' court, have jurisdiction over trusts and their construction and administration. 10. TRUSTS (§ 285*)-UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT BY TRUSTEE-LIABILITY. Where trustees, acting under wrong legal advice, make unauthorized payments of portions of the trust funds in their hands, they are liable for the loss resulting from such payments, although they acted in good faith and in accordance with what they supposed to be the wishes of the person who was to receive the trust property. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Dec. Dig. § 285.*] 11. TRUSTS (§§ 61, 131*) - TERMINATIONSTATUTE OF USES. Where an estate is given to trustees to pay the income to a person for life and at his death to hold the same for the use of other named persons, the trust ceases upon the death of the life tenant, and, where the property consists of realty, the statute of uses executes the use and vests legal title in the party to whom the estate was limited at the expiration of the life estate. A similar result occurs when the estate consists of personalty unless there be an apparent intention to the contrary, although, strictly speaking, the statute of uses is not applicable to personal property; but, where the trust deed provides that the life tenant may "dispose of the capital of the fund hereby created in such manner and to and amongst such person or persons and in such amounts and upon such limitation" as she might by will direct, the trust does not expire at the death of the life tenant. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. he is entitled to recover the portion of the trust fund paid by the trustees under his direction to other persons. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. § 602; Dec. Dig. § 372.*] Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; George M. Sharp, Judge. Bearn et Chalais, against Ross R. Winans Action by Louis E. J. H. Galard, Prince de and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and PEARCE, BURKE, and SCHMUCKER, JJ. Maurice Leon and Redmond C. Stewart, for appellant. John E. Semmes and Bernard Carter, for appellees. SCHMUCKER, J. The appeal in this case was taken from a decree of circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore city dismissing a bill filed by the appellant. The purpose of the bill was to procure the construction of a deed of trust and of a will executing a power of appointment conferred upon the testatrix by the deed; and also to have certain proceedings of the orphans' court of Baltimore city declared void and the releases given in pursuance thereof canceled and set aside. The deed of trust was made in favor of Dig. §§ 84, 175, 1752; Dec. Dig. §§ 61, 131.*] the appellant's wife for her life by her fath12. PAYMENT (§ 84*)-RIGHT TO RECOVER-er, on the eve of her marriage, and it gave MISTAKE OF LAW. Money paid with actual knowledge of all the facts in the case under a mistaken conception of the law cannot be recovered back in an action at law; nor will equity afford relief in the absence of special circumstances entitling the party to equitable aid. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Payment, Cent. Dig. §§ 267-271; Dec. Dig. § 84.*] 13. CONTRACTS (§ 93*) - VALIDITY - GROUND FOR CANCELLATION-MISTAKE OF LAW. Contracts resting upon a proper consideration, fairly made, with a full knowledge of the facts, under a mistake or ignorance of the law, will not be set aside in equity, in the absence of special grounds of equitable relief. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 418; Dec. Dig. § 93.*] 14. TRUSTS (§ 283*)-EXECUTION OF TRUST TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE TRUST. Agreements or contracts between a trustee and cestui que trust are looked upon with suspicion by the court, and in order that a release, confirmation, waiver, or acquiescence may have any effect the cestui que trust must have full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case, and must know the law and what his rights are, and how they would be dealt with by the court, and equity will in general relieve the cestui que to her an unrestrained power of testamentary appointment of the corpus of the trust estate. By her will, made after her marriage, she gave her entire estate absolutely to her husband. After her death the orphans' court undertook to administer upon the property which had passed under the deed and the appointment, consisting of railroad bonds, as if it had been her own property, and distributed it one-third to the appellant as her surviving husband, and the remaining twothirds to her two surviving children, for whom he was made guardian. The bonds were delivered to the appellant, one-third in his own right, and the residue as guardian for his children, and he executed releases therefor to the administrators of his wife's estate and the trustees under the deed of trust. Within two and a half months after receiving the bonds and executing the releases, the appellant filed his bill in the present case, insisting that upon his wife's death the entire corpus of the trust estate became his individual property in his own right unhis individual property in his own right under the operation of the deed of trust, by |