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Representatives, attend the funeral of Major General
Brown, on Wednesday next at twelve o'clock."

Mr. HAMILTON, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, said that he rose for the purpose of moving the concurrence of the House in the resolutions transmitted by the Senate; for he was assured that, whilst those who heard him felt the deepest sympathy in the distresses of the bereaved family of the late General BROWN, and the loss which the country at large had sustained, that they entertained the most unfading recollection of the valuable services of this distinguished officer, to whom emphatically belonged the distinction during the late war of having been the first to deprive the British bayonet of its reputed invincibility. The grave of such a man well deserves the tribute of a nation's honors, as well as its grief: I, therefore, move you, not only that the resolutions be concurred in, but that a committee of three be appointed on the part of this House to meet such committee as the Senate may appoint, to make the necessary arrangements for the attendance of both Houses at the funeral of the late Major General BROWN.

The House unanimously agreed to the motion of Mr. HAMILTON, and the committee consisted of Messrs. HAMILTON, VAN RENSSELAER, and WARD.

INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT.

On motion of Mr. McDUFFIE, the House proceeded to the consideration of the bill making appropriations for Internal Improvements.

Mr. HALL, of N. C. moved to strike out the first section of the bill.

[H. OF R.

execution and management? He did not mean, however, to go into these matters. At some time, they must be forced on the attention of the People, in their proper character. For that time, he was willing to wait. When annual appropriations should succeed annual appropria tions, to remove sawyers from the Mississippi, or sand banks from the Ohio, immediately to be replaced, the People would open their eyes to the abuse, and be led, in that way, to inquire into the validity of the power. It was in this view that, for himself and his State, he was willing to forbear discussion. It was in the mirror of experience that the frightful enormity of this power was to be disclosed.

It was his fortune to be present at what had been called the great discussion of this question, in 1824. Every person present, then, must recollect, with him, what had occurred. Our forebodings were met, incessantly, by the declaration, that only the definite and limited class of national objects were claimed. And how has this pledge been observed? How has it not been violated? He repeated, the violation had been gross, open, wanton, shameless In this very bill, appropriation had been made for two creeks in Ohio. This clause for surveys, too? In the bill of 1824, it had been specially inserted "to designate objects of national importance." How had this pledge, too, been observed? What proportion of these surveys had pretension to this character? Yet, we went on making appropriation after appropriation, to this object, not for use certainly, unless it were to the use of patronage. But this theory, too, Mr. A. said, must have an end. When survey had been some time longer piled on survey, to no good purpose, the People would open their eyes here, too. For this period, also, he was willing to wait; confiding that the best of counsellors, experience, by instructing us that the exercise of this power was inconsistent with the economy and purity of the Government, would lead us farther to see that it was unwarranted by any just interpretation of its authority.

Mr. ARCHER, of Virginia, rose, and said, he had no intention, more than the gentleman from North CaroFina, to discuss the question of the power of Internal Improvement. He concurred, however, that the bill ought not to pass without notice. The quarters of country from which the gentleman from. North Carolina and himself came, indulged an extraordinary sensibility to this question, and this bill extended to a greater number of objects than had been embraced by any bill before. It Mr MINER addressed the House. The solemn prowas agreed that discussion, at this time, would be tests against the exercise of this power ought to be met. unavailing. Principles, stronger than any conviction, If Congress did not possess the power, to exercise it was would obstruct a fair audience at this moment. For one, usurpation. Whenever the constitutional objection was however, he wished it to be known, that he did not de- made, it should be answered. Not only here was the spair. On the contrary, he thought he saw in the depth power of the General Government denied, to make roads of the gloom which involved the question, the outbreak and canals, but several State Legislatures had recently of the light which was to redeem it; he thought he saw, put forth elaborate arguments, to show that the power did distinctly, the cause of the prevalence of mistake on this not exist in respect to this and some other subjects. Resubject, in the abstract cast which had been given to the sistance was spoken of; a dissolution of the Union broaddiscussion. The imputation which had been cast on his ly hinted at. Mr. M. thought at such a crisis, and unown State, and its representation, in this respect, was der such circumstances, we should not only see our way just. But this power, in a practical view, was the most clear, but we are bound to set forth the principles of conimportant which had ever been assumed under this Go-struction which governed us; to state the grounds on vernment. The Government, from its nature, was oblig. which we acted. A letter was just laid on our tables ed to be prodigal. It was at a great distance, and other from the Governor of Georgia, covering resolutions of the legislative bodies intervened to intercept reponsibility. Legislature of that State, "on the subject of the powers Its proper objects of expense were large, in a great de- of the General Government for the purpose of encourag gree indefinite, and not easily subjected to accurate cal- ing domestic manufactures, and effecting a system of inculation. Its very means of raising money, in an indirect ternal improvement." Mr. M. begged leave to read an mode, not challenging the notice of the People, facilitat- extract: "The committee are fully sensible that every ed extravagance. There was but one effectual restraint degree of moderation is due to the question on which they -it was in the limitation on the objects to which its ex- have founded the present serious complaint; but they penditures might be applied. It would be prodigal on owe it to truth and sincerity to say, that it is their decidits appropriate objects, but the number of those was ed opinion an increase of tariff duties ought to be resistconfined. The practical effect of the power of Internal ed by all legal and constitutional means, so as to avert the Improvement, was to take away this bridle from its extra- crying injustice of such an unconstitutional measure. vagance. There was no end to the expenses, on this They are constrained, too, to say that this State ought to single object. Where was the limit, in time or money, oppose, in every possible shape, the exercise of the pow in reference to the works of Internal Improvement, er, on the part of the General Government, to encour which this country presented? If there were a limit, be- age domestic manufactures, or to promote internal im fore the list had been gone through, the renewal of ex-provement." penditure must commence from their decay. Where was [While reading the above extract, Mr. McDUFFIE calthe limit, too, to the jobs, abuses, and corruption, in the led to order.]

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Mr. MINER said, he did not intend to discuss the tariff question his purpose was to show the serious opposition made to the course we were pursuing, not only here, but elsewhere. These protests and arguments were spread before the People. They were calculated to have an effect-he thought an injurious effect. The friends of internal improvement owed it to themselves and their cause, to put the matter on its true grounds to set forth again, and again, whenever the constitutional power should be seriously denied, the principles on which they sustained it. It was not sufficient to say, "we know we are on proper ground, and we will advance." The People were entitled to know the reasons for our construction of the Constitution that they might compare them with the arguments of those who denied the right. To justify the present argument on a bill which no one doubted would pass, Mr. M. thought it fair to advert to the proceedings of the Georgia Legislature. It had been his intention to read an extract from the message of Governor Giles to the Virginia Assembly, but if it was unpleasant to any gentle man, he would not do so, but proceed directly to the argument.

[FEB. 25, 1828.

12, says, "let this, therefore, be the characteristic line of the division. Internal legislation, or the management of those concerns, which are entirely local, shall belong to the States, and that those which have a foreign aspect, and in which they have a national concern to the Confederacy." Such were the opinions of a most distinguished Virginia statesman. Mr. Jay, one of the wisest and best men this nation has ever produced, in an address to the People of New York, urging them to adopt the Consti tution, says, "the Convention concurred in opinion with the People, that a National Government competent to every national object, was indispensably necessary." Mr. Madison, in one of the numbers of the Federalist, says, "from a comprehensive and fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the Government acted. They were to form a National Government adequate to the exigencies of Government and the Union."

Before I proceed, Mr. Speaker, to quote other authori ties, permit me to ask-Is it not very reasonable to suppose that some discretionary powers would be vested in the General Government? A Constitution was forming My first purpose, said Mr. M. will be to inquire what for a vast People, and for future ages-was it possible to principles should govern us in construing the Constitu- foresee all the exigencies that might arise Must not tion. And it will be my object to make this impression something be left to patriotic wisdom, to sound and enupon the House: that the powers of the General Govern-lightened discretion? Have not the State Governments ment are equal to the exigencies of the Union; that Con- almost unlimited discretion? And what security have the gress possesses some discretionary power to promote the People from the encroachments of the State Legislatures general welfare; that the line of demarcation between that they have not from the encroachments of the Genethe powers of the State and General Governments is this: ral Government? It seems to be a common error to look Affairs entirely local belong to the States: all those which on the State Governments as parental, and having a comhave a foreign aspect and a national concern, belong to mon interest with the People, while this is often regardCongress. And the inference which I shall draw from ed as a foreign Government, or one not identified with the these positions is, that a system of internal improvements, interests of the People. This does not appear to me to be by roads and canals, to connect the whole Union toge. a correct view. The Constitution, in its preamble, has ther, is a national concern, not entirely local, and there-set forth the objects for which it was framed. "To form fore, within the legitimate power of the General Govern ment. To this contest I come not in the confidence of my own power, but I appear before you sustained by the strength of strong men, and supported by the wisdom of the wise. I know no fairer mode of determining the true meaning of the Constitution, in doubtful cases, than to go back to the time of its adoption to inquire how it was then understood; to ascertain what were the evils suffered; what was the remedy meant to be applied; what were the sentiments of those who wrote and spoke in favor of its adoption. To this contemporaneous exposition I confidently appeal.

The Constitution grew out of a recommendation of commissioners, who met at Annapolis, in 1786. Those commissioners recommended that a Convention be held at Philadelphia, "to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union." This was the express purpose for which the Convention was called to frame a new system; and, in construing the Constitution, this fundamental principle, it seems to me, should be constantly present to our minds. Mr. Monroe, in a tract on a Federal Constitution, page

* NOTE.-Extract from the Message of Governor Giles.

"Executive Department, February 8, 1828. tures of South Carolina and Georgia, I now do myself the honor of lay SIR: In compliance with the resolutions of the respective Legislaing before the General Assembly the proceedings of the Legislatures of each of those States, upon the subject of the 1 ariff, Internal Improve ment, and the American Colonization Society."

"In fact, in the worst state of things, that the oppressed sections of country afford abundant means to the local authorities to secure to themselves, in their intercourse with the world, all the salutary independence of nations, to protect themselves, without the least hazard: against physical force from every quarter; whilst through the same means, their wealth and prosperity might be augmented to an amount beyond any estimate which has yet been made in the contemplation of that view of the subject." Constitutional opposition is not here spoken of, but a direct dissolu

tion of the Union,

a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare"-are among those objects and would seem to imply the existence of some discretionary power to effect them. In the 8th section, art. 1, the powers of Congress are declared: "Congress shall have power"to do what? "To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare, of the United States." The preamble to the Constitution had already been recited; the general welfare is there spoken of. Here, when we come to a strict enumeration of the pow ers of Congress, the "general welfare" is again introduced. These words must have some meaning, or they are mere verbiage; useless, worse than useless; and, if they have any meaning, it must be either that power is given, or an end set forth to be effected, which, of course, carries the power to effect that end. It would be unjust to the great and good men who framed the constitution, to suppose they used words in any part of that instrument without the most careful consideration. Writers on public law were familiar to them. General powers were given. To explain the meaning of many passages in the Constitution, we must have recourse to writters on public law. What is the meaning of the ha beas corpus? What are letters of marque and reprisal? define these we must have recourse to the common law, What are the rights of trial by jury? To understand and and writters on the law of nations. Now. Sir, I beg leave to refer you to Vattel, book 1, chap. 9, where he speaks of the duties of Governments, in "the case of the public ways of communication." He says: "One of the principal things that ought to employ the attention of the Government, with respect to the welfare of the public in general, and of trade, in particular, must then relate to the highways, canals, &c. in which nothing ought to be neglected to render them safe and commodious." Again:

FEB. 25, 1828.]

Internal Improvements.

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and abused." Thus am I fortified in the opinions, advanced, by those of the pride and ornament of Virginia, whose caution and prudence no man will question. The words" public happiness' are used; they are synony mous with "general welfare ;" and whether these words vary the conclusion. Mr. Hamilion, in the Federalist, No. 23, has this paragraph: "The means ought to be proportioned to the end. The person from whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to pos sess the means by which it is to be attained." Again, Mr. Hamilton says: "The powers are not too extensive for the objects of Federal Administration; or, in other words, for the management of our national interests." In the Convention of Massachusetts, which adopted the Federal Constitution, there are some sentiments expressed, which appear to me worthy of being noticed in this argu ment.

"Mr. Choate said, that this clause gave power to Congress to levy duties, excises, imposts, &c. considering the trust delegated to Congress, that they are to "provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare," &c. If this is to be the object of their delegation, whe. ther they shall not be vested with powers to prosecute it. And this can be no other than an unlimited power of taxation, if that defence requires it. Mr. C. contended that it was the power of the People concentrated to a point: that, as all power is lodged in them, this power [of taxation] ought to be supreme."

Mr. Bowdoin, (p. 113.)"If we consider the objects of the power, they are numerous and important; and, as human foresight cannot extend to many of them-and all of them are in the womb of futurity-the quantum of the power cannot be estimated. Less than the whole, as relates to Federal purposes, may, through its insufficiency, occasion a dissolution of the Union."

"The whole nation ought, doubtless, to contribute to such useful undertaking." Here, then, the public and general welfare, is spoken of-almost the exact expression made use of in the Constitution-spoken of, too, in reference to roads and canals. Is not the inference, to an unprejudiced mind, fair and strong, that this very sub-are a power granted or an end to be effected, does not ject, this identical quotation, was in the view of the Convention when they introduced these words' But this power, we are told, is liable to abuse. What power is not? A prevailing error in reasoning is, to show what infinite and deplorable injuries may follow the abuse of power, and hence to infer that the power, even for salutary ends, does not exist. This is the root and ground work-the grand pervading error of the school that denies any discretionary power to the General Government, and would narrow the construction of the Constitution as rigidly as a penal statute. All delegated power may be abused. Yet it is indispensable that power should be delegated. There is no security to Government or People -to life, liberty, or property-except by delegating to Government ample power for defence and protection. Unlimited power over the purse and the sword has been vested in the General Government. Every gentleman who has carefully looked into the subject must have been struck with the course of argument urged by those who opposed the adoption of the Constitution. Every possible and most flagrant abuse of the power proposed to be granted was conjured up and set forth in fearful array, as leading to the certain destruction of public liberty and the utter prostration of private right. Standing armies were to be spread over the land! The last dollar was to be forced from the pocket of the farmer! The militia of one State were to be sent to the extreme point of the Union. These have all proved imaginary evils. What motive has Congress to abuse its power? The security of the People, it should be repeated and reiterated, depends upon their own intelligence and virtue-in paying Again-"In short, the commercial and political hapan enlightened regard to the elective franchise-in send-piness, the liberty and prosperity, the peace, safety, and ing here pure and faithful delegates-in holding their Representatives to a strict account for their conduct. This is the source of security; and not in withholding power, for useful ends, because it may be abused. Republican Governments are founded in the confidence that man is capable of self-government; that there is a sense of justice-a disposition to do right—a sentiment of patriotism and honor in the human breast-that man is to be trusted. That jealousy which presumes every man will violate his trust and abuse his power, is a sentiment of despotism, on which the legitimates of Europe justify their restraining the People from self-government with a hand of iron. These sentiments are sustained by those of the wisest and best men. In a report to the old Continental Congress, 1782, by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Fitzsimmons, those sound, general principles, are set forth,which are as strictly applicable to the present as to the former Government."The truth is, the security intended to the general liberty, in the Confederation, consists in frequent election, and in the rotation of the Members of Congress, by which there is a constant and an effectual check upon them. This is the security which the People in every State enjoy against the usurpations of their internal Governments, and it is the true source of security in a Representative Republic. The Government, so constituted, ought to have the means necessary to answer the end of its institution. By weakening its hands too much, it may be rendered incapable of providing for the interior harmony, or the exterior defence of the State" Again, "There is a happy mean between too much confidence and excessive jealousy, in which the health and prosperity of a State consist."

Mr. Madison, in the Federalist, page 252, says: "In every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied

general welfare, both internal and external, of each and all the States, depend on this power, which, as it must be applied to a vast variety of objects, and to cases and exigencies beyond the ken of human prescience, must be very great, and which cannot be limited without endangering the public safety."

"The public good, in which private is necessarily involved, might be hurt by too particular an enumeration." And this remark is a very satisfactory answer to the objection (in the Georgia report) that a distinct proposi tion was made in the National Convention, to provide for the creation of "a Secretary of Domestic Affairs, whose duty it should be to attend, among other things, to the opening of roads and navigation, and facilitating communication through the United States." &c. It was not thought necessary. The important subject was already provided for in the general powers of the Government, and it was thought the public good "might be hurt by too particular an enumeration."

Mr. Bowdoin again, (p. 162.) speaking of the Confe deration: "The People, feeling the inconvenience of a system of Government, that, instead of relieving, increases their perplexities; instead of regulating trade upon proper principles; instead of improving the natural advantages of our own country, and opening new sources of wealth-our lands have sunk in their valueour trade has languished—our trade has been daily reducing, and our resources are almost annihilated."

Here the positions I have laid down seem fully sustained. These considerations are urged at the moment the Convention is to adopt or reject the Constitution, and are urged as motives for its adoption. Mr. Bowdoin seems to have had in contemplation a system of Internal Improvement. He speaks of "improving the natural advantages of our country"-" opening new sources of

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wealth"-as things which the weak Confederation had not done, and could not do, and presses for the adoption of the Constitution, that these desirable objects may be effected. Sir, this is almost demonstration, that a system of Internal Improvement was then contemplated, and was considered one of the ends to be accomplished by the new Government. It is proper here to remark, that Massachusetts proposed an amendment to the Constitution, "that it is explicitly declared, that all powers, not expressly delegated by the aforesaid Constitution, are reserved to the several States, to be by them exercised." This proposed amendment was not adopted.

[FEB. 25, 1828.

In war,

it, by irresistible necessity, the power of facilitating the
means of transportation and rapid movements.
celerity of movement is as much power as number or
arms. Napoleen gained his battles, and Frederick the
Great, before him, by the rapid concentration of force
upon a particular point. All nations, having the power
of war, have exercised the right to make military roads.
The Romans had their Appian and Flamminian ways, to
send forth her legions rapidly to the seat of hostilities.
The military road through Scotland, the road of Napo-
leon over the Alps, must be familiar to the recollection
of every gentleman who hears me. And can it be con-

I am happy to be able to fortify myself in these conceived, sir, that this Government had the power to add clusions, that there is some discretionary power in this an Empire to the Republic, and that it has not the right Government to promote the "general welfare," by the to make a road to that Empire? That we have no auauthority of an eminent Southern writer. In an address thority to open a way to send troops thither for its deto the freemen of South Carolina, earnestly and eloquent- fence? Such a conclusion would strike an unprejudiced ly pleading for the adoption of the Constitution, is this mind as extraordinary indeed! During the late war, it sentence the address is ascribed to Dr. Ramsay "You is well known, that the carriage of cannon and provi will observe, that their future power is confined to pro- sions frequently cost three times their value, owing to vide for the common defence and general welfare of the the defective modes of conveyance, by the time they ar United States.' If they apply money to any other pur-rived at the point of destination. The loss of lives, priposes, they exceed their powers. The People of the vate property, and public treasure, arising from delay, United States, who pay, are to be the judges how far which a proper system of roads and canals might have their money is properly applied. It would be tedious to obviated, is beyond the reach of calculation. I have go over all the powers of Congress; but it would be easy spoken of a canal through New Jersey as public in its to show, that they all may be referred to this single prin- aspect, although local, or within the limits of a State, in ciple, that the general concerns of the Union ought to position. The Delaware and Chesapeake Canal seems be managed by the General Government.' What is this also clearly to be of public concern. The country, but to say-the general welfare and common defence through which it actually passes, is less interested in the are entrusted to you, as ends to be accomplished; the work than Pennsylvania, and the country South. Sup power of collecting money, and of raising armies, is given pose Delaware should have chosen not to consent that without limit, for these purposes. It is impossible to the canal should be made-suppose the opinion existed point out all the objects to which your power may be ex- that her citizens would be more benefitted by the transtended. They must necessarily be left, in some degree,portation of produce and passengers, across the peningeneral and undefined. But this general principle is to be your guide in exercising this discretion: whatever is entirely local, belongs to the States; whatever is foreign, or general in its aspect and tendency, belongs to Congress."

plished. It is almost impossible to speak plainly of the ill conduct of the States, without seeming to be disrespectful, which I would not be guilty of.

sula, in wagons and stages-is the doctrine maintained, that the great public interest must forever give way and be retarded by considerations so sectional, and of interests so limited? Will it be said, "Delaware would not refuse" I agree to the position. Delaware is governHaving, as I conceive, clearly established the just prin- ed by liberal and just principles now, and would not reciple of construction, the question presents itself: Is a fuse. But in considering the power intended to be vestsystem of internal improvements matter of general con- ed in the General Government, we cannot shut our eyes cern? Is it a proper object of national regard? It may to what had been the conduct of States under the Conbe observed, that objects are frequently national in their federation. Their selfishness and misconduct were too aspect, although local in position; light-houses are ad- gross, and too sensibly felt by the whole People, to permitted to be matter of general interest, although erected mit them to leave individual States power to thwart the within the limits of particular States, and occupying a General Government, or arrest its course, when the ge confined space. It may be the same with roads and ca-neral interest demanded that an object should be accomnals. A canal might be of great national concernment, though wholly located in one State. Such might be a canal through New Jersey, a necessary link in a great chain of canals, to perfect an inland navigation from The old articles of Confederation did not carry us South to North. In peace or war, for commerce and de- through the war-the war carried through the Confedefence, the means of rapid transportation are indispensa- ration. After external pressure ceased, all obligations to ble. The power of regulating, exclusively, external obey the requisitions of Congress seemed also to cease. and internal commerce, would seem to carry with it the Jealousy, selfishness, distrust, appear to have been almost means of facilitating the transportation of foreign and do- universal. The States were like a high mettled team of mestic produce, which is the very life of commerce. Allill-broken horses. When one sprang forward, the rest commercial nations have considered the power important to commerce, and have exercised it. Vattel, in treating of commerce, book 2d, ch. 2, says: "Every nation ought, therefore, not only to countenance trade, as far as it reasonably can, but even to protect and favor it. The care of the public roads—the safety of travellers-the establishment of posts,” &c. “all contribute to this end." What gave life to the commerce of Holland, in the days of her glory? What has more contributed to advance the commerce of Great Britain than canals? The right to make internal improvements, would, therefore, seem naturally to flow from the duty of regulating external and internal commerce. But the duty of the common defence, the power of making war, carries with

flew back-no two pulled together. The public creditors were not only left without the principal sum due them, but even the interest was unprovided for. Public confi dence and public credit had sunk to the grave-dead and buried. We had become a by-word and a reproach among ourselves and abroad. One State had one set of commercial regulations, another a different; a third, a code of commercial law for herself. An eminent public writer of the day remarked, "we may, indeed, with propriety, be said to have reached almost the last stage of national humiliation." The patriot was dismayed-the best hearts, whose fortitude had never been shaken dur ing the darkest days of the conflict, began to despair. It is painful to advert, even at this distant day, to that

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state of things; but it is necessary to my argument to show that every motive existed then to clothe the Gene ral Government with all power necessary for the general good, leaving nothing of a common or general concern to the jealousy, self-interest, or local prejudice of the States. It may, also, be salutary to recall those events, occasionally for it may serve to moderate jealousies when they arise-to restrain passion, and induce moderation, by seeing to what a fearful crisis the cherishing local and sectional interests had, at that day, reduced States, patriotic as any that now exist, but misconceiving their true course of interest and duty. Perhaps nothing can give a more clear idea of the impression made by the almost fatal course pursued by some of the States, at that time, than by a quotation from the writings of an eminent patriot and statesman-from Virginia, too, sir, and first in the ranks of the great men of that State, always distinguished for noble spirits-foremost in the cause of liberty in the cabinet or field. In a book entitled "Tracts on the American Constitution," is a paper, ascribed, by the pen of Mr. Jefferson, as I understand, to Mr. Monroe. Bear with me while I read you an extract:

"Two species of remedy only present themselves to my mind; and these contemplate either a complete annihilation of the State Governments, or a partial one, or considerable reduction of their powers. A complete annihilation, and an organization of a General Government over the whole, would unquestionably remove all the objections which have been stated above, and apply to it as a Federal Government; and I will be free to own, that, if it were in reality a practicable thing, there is no object which my mind ever contemplated the attainment of which would give it such high gratification. To collect the citizens of America, who have fought and bled together, by whose joint and common efforts, they have been raised to the comparatively happy and exalted theatre on which they now stand; to lay aside all those jarring interests, or discordant principles, which State Legislatures, if they do not create, certainly foment and increase; arrange them under one Government, and make them one People, is an idea not only elevated and sublime, but equally benevolent and humane." Again, Mr. Monroe says: "I should concider the abolition of the State Legislatures, as a most fortunate event for America." A moment's reflection will show, that the errors of passion, prejudice, or selfishness, on the part of the State Governments, must have been excessive, beyond endurance or apology, to force such sentiments from a leading Virginia statesman. We never have gone to that length in Pennsylvania. We would preserve the State Governments, sustain them in their legitimate authority, as the best safeguards of liberty, as organized and vigi. lant sentinels of the People's rights; still thinking that they may learn a lesson of moderation, from the historical recollections of the past.

But we have wandered from the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. This work is necessary for the public interest. This point admits, I presume, of no question. Shall I be told" Delaware might not only be willing it should be made, but choose to make it?" I ask, in reply, would she consent to enter on a work of such expense and magnitude, without knowing that Maryland would make a canal of corresponding dimensions, to extend the communication to the Chesapeake? Would she hazard so much, without some agreement on the part of Maryland, as to the rate of tolls with which her citizens might be burthened? The answer is too natural not to be prompt-she certainly would not. It would be the height of imprudence to do so. But States have no right to make any agreement together. Such is not my dictum, it is the language of the Constitution. In art. 1, sec. 10, it is written: "No State shall, without VOL. IV.-102

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the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State," &c. I confess to you Mr. Speaker, this would seem to me to settle the question. A general system of internal improvements, for National objects, could not be expected from the States, from the diversity of local interests; and would be impossible, without some agreement among them, which they have no power to make. In looking over the Journal of one of the earliest sessions of Congress, among the memorials was one, asking of Congress power to make an agreement in respect to the location of a canal. This view of the subject is greatly strengthened by the consideration, that a general system of roads and canals must cost an immense sum of money. Intended for the benefit of the nation, who but the nation ought to incur the expense? To this General Government have the People assigned the rich and productive sources of revenue. All imposts go into the National Treasury, and the power of internal taxation is without limits, excepting as it is limited by a sound and wise discretion. Who possesses the rich fund of wealth exist. ing in the public lands? All this belongs to the National Government. The conclusion would seem obvious and irresistible, that great public works, for National purposes, should be accomplished by the power that holds the National purse. Why should Delaware make a canal for Pennsylvania? Why should that portion of Pennsylva nia on the Susquehannah and the West, be dependent on Maryland for leave to carry their produce, which has descended the river, to their own emporium of commerce? Why should New York, and Pennsylvania, and all East and South, be, of necessity, dependent on New Jersey, for an interior communication between the Delaware and Hudson-tributaries forever-liable to onerous tolls-subject to have their trade interrupted at the pleasure of a government in which they are not represented? And why should the General Government be necessarily dependent upon the will of any State, for the right to pass with troops or munitions of war, while to pass might be necessary, and delay ruinous? In high party times, that spirit may exist which has existed. The general welfare ought not to depend on the whim, caprice, interest, or party feelings, of any State or party. No one has more confidence in the justice and patriotism of New Jersey, than I have. I speak generally, and only refer to that State from her local position. I deduce, therefore, the power of making roads and canals for National purposes, from those of regulating commerce, making war, and possession, on the part of the National Government, of the rich sources of revenue necessary to their accomplishment.

Mr. Speaker, I think I have made out a strong case. But there is one more very important proposition which I wish to establish. It is this: that, to ensure the adoption of a grand system of Internal Improvement, was one of the leading motives and objects of forming the Constitution, and especially of Virginia in adopting it. I am aware that this is taking bold ground. If able to make it good, 1 shall not have addressed you in vain. As a prelimina ry to the strong and direct points of authority on which I rely, permit me to quote from the Federalist two extracts, going to show the view that was then entertained of the objects of State expenditure, and of National expenditure. I quote from No. 34. "To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of the question, it will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that will require a Federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which will require a State provision. We shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited, and that the latter are circumscribed with in very mod erate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are nt to confine our views to the present

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