H. or R.] Office of Major General. {May 14, 1828. Mr. VANCE moved to strike out the second section | Ohio, [Mr. VANCE.] He would have contented himself of the bill, which was in the following words: "Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That all officers serving by commission from the authority of any State, shall, on all detachments, court martial, or other duty, wherein they may be employed in conjunction with the regular forces of the United States, take rank next after all officers of the like grade, either by brevet commission or otherwise, in said regular forces: notwithstanding the commissions of such militia, or State officers, may be older than the commissions of the officers of the regular forces of the United States." In support of his motion, Mr. V. said, that he considered this bill as going further than any bill had ever gone before. He sent to the table a letter from the Department of War, which he desired to have read. He then stated, that one of the greatest difficulties a commanding General had to encounter, was to preserve a state of har monious feeling among his troops. He did not, therefore, wish to place it in the power of unqualified individuals to fill that responsible station. Mr. DWIGHT hoped this motion would prevail. The effect of the amendment is to make a distinction between the officers of the army and the militia, so that they shall not come in conflict with each other. He referred to the equality of rank between General Jackson and General Brown, and asked the House to reflect on what might have been the effect upon these distinguished men, if they had been placed under the command of a militia officer. Mr. BARNEY was opposed to the bill in all its features. He considered the rank of Major General as indispensable to the efficient organization of an army composed of several brigades. As well might the presiding officer of the co-ordinate branch of the Legislature, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives be dispensed with, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States. What would be its practical operation? The moment it becomes necessary to call into service a portion of the militia of the respective States, the first Major General drafted for the occasion, and who may have received a commission for the special purpose, takes the command of your whole forces, and thus the elements of military science acquired by your officers in early youth at West Point, and matured by a whole life devoted to its development, ceases to advantage the Re. public: for it is of no consequence how the commission is obtained, whether by election, as in some of the States, by regular promotion as in others, or by selection from the ranks, as has sometimes happened in moments of political excitement, to gratify an influential partisan; the defence of the Nation is thus committed to the guidance of a militia officer, who cannot, by any rational calculation, have acquired experience to qualify him for this responsible station. As a gross act of injustice to those distinguished men, possessing this brevet rank, it is all important that this bill should not become a law. In my judgment, their grade, whether obtained by gallant conduct in the field, or by ten years' faithful service, has become a vested right, which Congress cannot, without a violation of their plighted faith, deprive them of. It is true, that, by an arbitrary exercise of sovereign power, they may be thus razeed; but is it consistent with the duty we owe to ourselves, and to a grateful Nation, who, with one loud acclaim, have sanctioned, by their approbation, the laws enacted during the late war, conferring this honora ry reward for the gallantry that nerved their arm in battle, and the patience which, in peace, condemns them to linger ten long years without promotion? In every as pect which the proposition assumed, Mr. B. expressed his decided hostility to it. Mr. BUCHANAN said, he should not have said a word upon this bill, had not his attention been drawn to the second section of it, by the motion of the gentleman from with a silent vote in favor of its passage. But, said Mr. B. I belong to the Militia myself-I have a fellow-feeling for them, and I never shall consent to degrade them; for after all, they are the great bulwark of our defence. The second section of this bill will produce that effect. A Captain in the regular Army, after he has continued in the service for ten years, is breveted a Major, and in ten years more he becomes a Colonel by brevet. The mere lapse of twenty years transforms a Captain into a Colonel by brevet, and gives him this honorary rank; although he may still remain but a Captain in the line, and be entitled to command but a single company. Brevet rank is therefore acquired, in our army, without any extraordinary merit. Under this section, such a Captain would be entitled to rank a Colonel of Volunteers or Militia who had led his regiment into the field, and to assume the command. I ask, will not any law, which would operate is this manner, tend to destroy the spirit of the Militia, and to degrade them both in their own eyes and those of the Nation? The past history of this country proves that they do not deserve such treatment at our hands. During the last war, the Militia purchased glory both for them selves and for their country, upon the field of battle; and our most brilliant victories were those achieved under the command of men, who had been Militia Generals, and who were transferred to the same rank, in the regular Army. It has been objected, against the passage of this bill, by the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. DRAYTON,] that if the office of Major General should be abolished, a Militia Major General would then command an officer of the highest rank in our Army, should regular troops and militia be called into service together. Even if we should admit this construction of the law to be correct, the inconvenience which that gentlemen apprehends, would never occur in point of fact. The army is now on a peace establishment. When war shall threaten us, it must immediately be reorganized. We must then call into existence a new head to the Army, and confer upon him a rank which will entitle him to command a Major General of Militia. It is scarcely possible, therefore, that the case supposed by the gentleman can ever exist. If this bill should pass, it will afford the President of the United States an opportunity of placing at the head of the Army, in the event o: war, an able and an efficient man, and relieve the country from the danger of having that station pre-occupied by a superannuated officer. In the mean time, no inconvenience can be experienced. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Army; and it is his duty to decide the question of rank, which has so long existed, between the two Brigadier Generals. The one or the other of them will then be the chief officer of the Army. But it was not my intention to discuss the main question; I rose merely to defend the Militia, and I shall proceed no further. Mr. SMYTH made a few observations in reply; and asked if it would be considered a degradation that Gen. Scott should take command of any of the Major Generals who have probably seats on this floor. He was about to proceed in some general observations on the bill, when he was reminded by the Chair that the question was on the amendment-and he sat down. Mr. VANCE said, that officers who had received brevet rank as the reward of distinguished services, were placed on a different footing with those who obtained brevet rank in consequence of a certain term of service. He stated, that as the militia have no brevet rank, a Lieutenant of the Army, having brevet rank, might go and take a Colonel's regiment from him. After a few words from Mr. DRAYTON, Mr. WEEMS said that, even under the articles of war, which he read in part, (applicable) and which ap peared so very explicit as not to admit of a misconstruction, yet a very unpleasant occurrence had been witnessed by him during the late war, which he would describe as concisely as possible, in hope that it would, without further debate, satisfy every member of the policy, it not absolute necessity, of striking out the section. Whilst the enemy were at anchor directly off, and within almost cannon shot of Annapolis; whilst the Governor of Maryland was commanding, by the advice and direction of his Council, as Major General, a very large militia force, then garrisoned at Annapolis, Col. Peake and Col. Carbery, with their corps, arrived sent as the Major General (Governor) naturally suppos. ed, to co-operate with the militia under his command; but, to the astonishment of all, they peremptorily refused to be commanded by him. They were invited, and did calmly discuss the subject in his [Mr. W's] presence, with the Governor. The articles of war he had just read were referred to. In reply, Major Hamilton said (for he acted as spokesman) that they were most positively forbid by the Secretary of War (then General Armstrong) suffering themselves to be commanded by an officer holding his commission from a State, however high his rank; and, in answer to a question put by the Governor, "would you, or do I understand, gentlemen, that you are ordered so to construe those articles as to contend that an ensign, the lowest commissioned officer, holding his commission under the United States, coming here with a dozen men, to co-operate with the militia of Maryland, twelve hundred strong, would have a right to rank over and command this garrison, and all the officers in it, from the Governor, acting as Major-General, down?" Mr. Hamilton answered affirmatively. Upon which the Governor replied, it was unnecessary further to argue; their own good sense would satisfy them that he could never consent to what would be so degrading to the character of the State, and still more disgusting to the officers under his command, (placing himself out of the question) and, therefore, it would be necesasry for them at once to withdraw from his garrison, which they did that evening, and pitched their tents without the lines of the garrison, as designated to them, and so continued, without an exchange of countersign, until Col. Ridge ly, (one of the Governor's aids) returned from this city, where the Governor sent him express, with a communication to the Secretary of War, informing him of what had taken place, and apprising him of what would be the situation of the disagreeing parties should the enemy attempt to land. The Secretary refused to answer the communication; indeed sent, as I understood, or rather said to Col. Ridgely, he had no answer to send to the Governor, but solicited Colonel Ridgely to be the bearer of a letter back to Col. Carbery, in answer to the one that Col. R. had consented politely to convey from him to the Secretary; and it was not until this answer was received by Carbery that an exchange of countersign took place so that, from forty-eight to seventy two hours, such was the situation of the two parts of what ought to have been an united whole force, that, had the enemy made even a show of landing, the bayonets of the U. States troops, and of the militia of Maryland, would have been found in serious conflict. Mr. W. said he did not rise to make a speech, but to state a fact, which went, as he conceived, to demonstrate the absolute necessity for striking out the second section, as moved. The amendment was then agreed to. And the question then occurring on engrossing the bill for a third reading Mr. McDUFFIE said, he rose to say a word or two in opposition to this bill, and he would take leave to say, at the commencement, that, so far as he was capable of forming a judgment on this matter, this was one of the [H. of R. most unwise measures that could possibly be submitted to a deliberative assembly. I take it for granted, said he, that it is the object of this bill to accomplish one of these two objects: either to improve the organization of the Army, or to effect a retrenchment of the expenses of the Military Establishment. Now, sir, I presume no military man will undertake to say, that it will improve the organization of the Army, to deprive it of a military head. I say no military man, sir, because I amaware that the gentleman from Pennsylvania-who, like myself, is not a military man-has made a grand discovery on the subject of organizing a peace establishment, which may prove to be one of the greatest improvements in the art of modern warfare. The plan of the gentleman is to have no Major General or Commanderin-Chief in time of peace, lest he should become superannuated before the occurrence of a war. By keeping the chief command of the Army vacant in time of peace, the gentleman says the President will have it in his power to place a young and vigorous man at the head of the Army in the event of a war. My only surprise in this matter is, sir, that the gentleman has not extended his principle a little further. The same reason will certainly apply with equal force to the Brigadiers, the Colonels, the Captains; and, in a word, to the whole rank and file of the Army. It would be certainly desirable to get rid of superannuated soldiers, and have those that are young and vigorous. Indeed, I think the principle of the gentleman applies with greater force to the subordinate officers, who rise by seniority, than it does to the office of Com mander in Chief, in relation to which the Executive has an unlimited discretion. Thus, sir, we should make short work of re-organizing the Army. We should get rid of it altogether. There would be at least something like retrenchment in this. But this proposition to dispense with the Commander in Chief, has nothing to recommend it, either on the score of improving the organization of the Army, or of curtailing its expenses. In the former regard, it is absolute disorganization, as far as it goes. In the latter it is the very worst possible retrenchment conceivable. There is no part of the Army, where you might not save an equal sum of money with less injury to the public service. Cut off the legs or the arms, but I pray you spare the head. We were informed by my friend and colleague, the Chairman of the Military Committee, the other day, that the proposed change would save annually not more than two or three thousand dollars. Now, sir, if the object is to save this sum, cut off some three or four Colonels, some six or eight Captains, or some twenty or thirty common soldiers. These would be curtailments to be sure; but they would not materially injure the public service: for they would not destroy or impair the organization of the Army. Upon the whole, sir, I regard this bill as being positively injurious on the score of organization; and wholly unworthy of consideration, on the score of retrenchment and economy. Mr. RAMSEY then offered the following amendment; which was negatived: "Be it further enacted, That, as soon as the two com. missioned Brigadier Generals shall resign, die, or be dis missed from the military service of the United States, no appointment shall be made to supply such vacancy." Mr. SMYTH, of Va. said, that he could not assent to the opinion of the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. MCDUFFIE] that the abolition of the office of General-inChief would be injurious to the organization of the Army. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States. If the President and Secretary of War perform their duties as regards the Army, there can be no occasion for a Commanding General residing at the Seat of Government. There ought to be no other Commander-in-Chief than the President, either in war or peace. H. OF R.] Office of Major General. [MAY 14, 1828. The Commanding General stationed at the Seat of Go-another, as circumstances may require, and will subscribe vernment can have no duties assigned to him, but such the orders "By the President," instead of "By the Comas properly belong to the President, the Secretary of manding General." There can be no occasion for an or. War, the Adjutant General, or an Inspector General. der to pass through grades of Generals before it arrives Does experience prove that any such General-in-Chief at the post where it is to be carried into execution. is necessary? The Romans had no Commander-in-Chief except the Dictator, or the Emperor. Neither during the Republic, nor during the reign of their most unmilitary Emperors, was there a Commander-in-Chief at the Seat of Government. The French, during the war of the Revolution, had no Commander-in-Chief at the Seat of Government, when Bonaparte was in Italy, and Moreau in Germany. We had no General-in-Chief residing at the Seat of Government in 1814 and 15, when Jack son and Brown were achieving the triumphs of the late war. We had no General-in-Chief from 1815 until 1821. This proves that the office is not necessary, neither in peace nor in war. The country was divided into two divisions, and a Major General commanded the troops in each division, receiving his orders from the War Department. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. McDUFFIE] has said that we will save only 3,000 dollars by abolishing the office of Major General. How does he prove this? The document laid on our table shows that the pay and allowances to this officer, and the extra-allowances to his aids, may amount to about 11,700 dollars per annum. He supposes that the senior Brigadier General will be ordered to the Seat of Government, to per. form those services which were rendered by General Brown; that a Colonel will be ordered to fill the place of that Brigadier General, and command a division, and so on. I will not suppose it. We cannot interfere with the President's authority to command the army; but if the office of General in Chief shall be abolished by law, I presume the President will understand that it is not expected he will continue it in fact. I presume that he will adopt thear rangement which existed from 1815 until 1821. As to the military advice which the Secretary of War requires, he has near him Gen. Macomb, the Chief Engineer, whose utility would not be increased by his ele vation to the office of Major General. And the advice of the Chief of the Engineers is, in the present state of our military preparations, precisely the military advice which will be most important to the Secretary of War and the President. I will refer the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. MCDUFFIE] to the plan of Mr. Calhoun, for the reduction of the army. In his report on that subject, made in December, 1820, he said: "It is believed that the true principle of organization is, that every distinct branch of the staff should terminate in a chief, to be stationed, at least in peace, near the Seat of Government, and to be made responsible for its condition. It is thus the government may at all times obtain correct knowledge of the condition of the army, in each particular, and be enabled Mr. BUCHANAN said, he felt himself bound to reply to introduce method, order, and economy, in its disburse- to some of the remarks of the gentleman from South Caments." It is at present, with slight exceptions, thus rolina, [Mr. McDUFFIE.] That gentleman has been pleasorganized, &c. His plan was to retain two Major Gene-ed to say that I had made a grand discovery when I found rals, four Aids-de-Camp, four Brigadier Generals, four out that the army of the United States ought to be left Aids de Camp, &c. It thus appears not to have been without a head in time of peace. He has also endeavor. the opinion of Mr. Calhoun, that a General-in-Chief, ed to prove that the principles which I advocated would residing at the Seat of Government, was essential to the result in abolishing all the offices in the army. Indeed, proper organization of the army. It was the Staff De- from the tenor of his observations, it might be supposed partment, as the Quarter-master's Department, the Pay- that I had expressed a desire to destroy the whole milimaster's Department, the Purchasing Department, the tary establishment of the country-horse, foot, and draSubsistence Department, the Medical Department, that goons. he believed should terminate in a chief, to be stationed at the Seat of Government. Where shall we find precedents to recommend this organization of the army, which requires a Cabinet Commander in Chief residing at the Seat of Government? Is it in the example of the Duke of York, who held the command of the British army, and all its patronage? Or is it the example of the Duke of Wellington, who is Prime Minister, commander of 110,000 men, and the real sovereign of Great Britain? Sir, I have some reason for being of opinion that the Executive, during the late war, wanted no such office as that of General in Chief. It is safest that the command of the army should be divided among the Generals, and that it should have no head except the President, who is also the civil head of the government. I hope, if we ever shall find a Cæsar in the army, we shall also find a Pompey. It has been urged that there is a Navy Board to assist the Secretary of the Navy in the performance of his duties, and that, therefore, there should be a General in Chief. It may be a question whether the law establishing the Navy Board has not too much eircumscribed the powers of the Secretary of the Navy; but the essential aid which is rendered to the Secretary of the Navy by the Navy Commissioners, is rendered to the Secretary of War by the heads of the army departments, as the Quartermaster General, the Commissary General, the Surgeon General, and by the Commander of Engineers, and the Commander of Ordnance—all stationed at the Seat of Government. The Adjutant General, under the direction of the Secretary, will order troops from one division to That gentleman has not only done me injustice in the manner he has stated the proposition which I advocated, but he has drawn the most unnatural and the most illogi. cal inferences from my argument. It is well known that, up to the rank of Colonel, the officers have a right to be regularly promoted. Beyond that rank, no such right exists. At that point regular promotions, according to seniority, cease. Within this limit, I trust I should be one of the last men in this House who would attempt to interfere. I shall ever hold all existing rights of the officers sacred. But what is the case above the rank of Colonel? It has been the uniform practice of this government to leave the discretion of the President unfettered, and to allow him to select general officers from the mass of the American people. Why has this practice prevailed? Is it not to enable the President to select such men to fill the high offices of the army as may be best able to serve their country? Our present army is emphatically a peace establishment. Its present organization never was intended for a state of war. I wish, therefore to leave every avenue open, which I can do with a proper regard to the existing state of things, for the purpose of enabling the President, in the day of danger, to fill the high offices of the army with efficient commanders. And yet the gentleman from S. Carolina has contended that my argument, which was specially confined to the office of Major General, would equally apply to officers of every grade, and lead to the destruction of the whole army. H. or R. The useful, to appoint a successor to continue this office?— No one, I mean, who duly considers the relations of peace in which we stand with the nations of the earth, and the happy exemption we enjoy, in our situation, from the liability of being placed in a condition of hos tilities, requiring much military force by land. crisis is peculiarly auspicious to the inquiry. The of fice is vacant. Its abolition will not be attended with that painful act of indignity and deprivation-a dismissal of any one from public service. It is a field of leThe case of General Brown will strikingly illustrate gislation, which we are at liberty to enter, without be. the truth of the proposition for which I contended. He ing under the necessity of quieting any occupant's title, was a great military man. Nature had made him a com- or of exercising that legal violence, which we have been mander. He commenced his career in the militia, and eloquently importuned to practice towards the aborigi then was appointed a General in the service of the Unit-nal inheritors of the Western domain. I hail it as a cired States. During the last war, he not only distinguish. cumstance propitious to the best results, that this subed himself, but he distinguished his country. But I would ject is so free from the embarrassments of personal conask the gentleman from South Carolina, whether General siderations. Brown, for years before his death, would have been It is contended, by those opposed to this reduction, fit to take the command of the army, and go into active that the office of General in Chief is essential, as the service? Time and disease had laid their heavy hands supreme military head of the army, for the purpose of upon him, and had rendered him wholly unable to take efficient command, and complete organization. It is the field against an enemy. In considering this subject, also contended, that, if the office might be dispensed we should never forget that the present army is emphati-with now, it is, nevertheless, necessary to retain it for cally upon a peace establishment; and that, by abolishing the purpose of having, in the event of war, an officer the office of Major General, when danger shall threaten, of professional skill and experienced in the chief comand when it becomes necessary to organize our military establishment for a state of war, the field of competition Sir, I propose to take a view of the organization of for the highest office in it will be left entirely open. The our army, and the powers of the different departments President may then select the most capable man in the of command, in order to shew that this office is not country for that arduous station, whether he be found in what its name implies to our vague and uninformed nothe militia, the regular army, or among the private cititions of it-the supreme head of our peace establishzens of our country. It is certain he ought to be on efficient man, capable of rendering his country service, and not a superannuated officer. In order to accomplish this purpose, however, I would not disturb any man living. I would not think of abolish ing the office, either of Scott or of Gaines, even if they were less worthy of their country's gratitude, although I do not believe both to be necessary. But when either of them shall die or shall resign, Congress ought, in my opinion. to act upon the same principle, and leave but a single Brigadier General at the head of the army. I have thought it necessary to say thus much, to redeem myself from the remarks of the gentleman from South Carolina. I thought it due to myself, considering the respectable source from which they came, not to suffer them to go before the public unanswered. I should think the saving of money to the Treasury an inconsiderable object, though it ought to be altogether disregarded, provided the services of a Major General were required by the army, I shall not reply to the other observations of the gentleman. That task has already been performed by the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. SMYTH,] in a much better manner than it could have been accomplished by me. Mr. HOBBIE said, it was under a strong sense of the magnitude of the subject, and a painful consciousness of his inability to do it justice in the discussion, that he took the floor. But the duty, which arises from my situation here, [said Mr. H.] requires me to maintain that opinion, which, as an humble member of the committee that was charged with the deliberation of the subject, I have adopted, and which has been so ably assailed by argument on this floor, and by the letter from the War Department, Sir, we have not sought this question. It has been presented to us by an event beyond our control, and the considerations inseparably connected with it. In my judgment, no one can contemplate the juncture of affairs in our military command, occasioned by the death of General Brown, without feeling the inquiry press upon his reflections-can it be necessary can it be mand. ment; that it is, in truth, an useless station. We have a regular force of 6186 strong-544 of which are commis. sioned officers-constituting about the 11th part of the whole. This force is distributed among 39 or 40 posts, at no one of which is there an assemblage large enough to constitute a full Brigadier's command. These posts are arranged, and the army divided into two general commands, which are designated as Geographical Departments, and placed under the two Brigadiers, Scott and Gaines-to whom (laying out of view, for the present, the General in Chief) the Secretary of War is the common head, the supreme source of authority. The Secretary of War bears the same relation of command to the two Geographical Departments, which the General bears to the several regiments within his department, which the Colonel holds towards the seve ral companies of his regiment, and which the Captain maintains towards the several files that compose his company. This succinct view of the lineal command of the whole army, and of its divisions and sub-divisions, shows that (independent of the office of Major General) there is provided in the person of the Secretary of War the same common head for the whole, that its several parts possess in their respective chiefs. Does not this exhibit, in those respects, a complete organization? But it is said, that the Secretary of War is not the authority suitable for, and adequate to the control and superintendence of, the government and well-being of the army; and that, therefore, it is necessary to place between him and the army, this office of General in Chief, for the purpose of regulating, in the language of the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. HAMILTON,] "its details, the distribution of its parts, its discipline, and improvements." With the view of shewing that this estimate of the Secretary of War is a mistaken one, permit me to turn your attention to the nature and scope of his functions. By the Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. In the distribution of the powers of the Executive through the several Departments of the Cabinet, his military at H. or R.] Office of Major General. [MAY 14, 1828. tributes are placed in the hands of the Secretary of War. order of the Secretary of War. I conceive, sir, that the The act creating the Department of War, declares, Secretary is as well qualified to perform that class of duthat its Secretary "shall perform and execute such ties under this head, which now belongs to the Generalduties as shall, from time to time, be enjoined on, or en-in-Chief, as those which devolve upon himself. What is trusted to him by the President of the United States, requisite to enable him to do so? A knowledge of the agreeably to the Constitution, relative to military commis- country-its resources for supply-its avenues of com. sions, or to the land forces, or warlike stores of the Uni- munication-its defences-its proximity to points of hosted States, or to such other matters respecting military tility-its climate-the character of the troops-their affairs, as the President of the United States shall as adaptation to the region in which they are to be stationed, sign," &c. Does not this furnish a range of powers am- on the score of health, habits, efficiency-and the fitness ple enough to embrace "the details, distribution, disci- of the corps for the peculiar service of the station. And pline, and improvements of the army," or any thing that all the necessary facts and considerations, on these tocan fall within the supervision of supreme authority over pics, are furnished to the Department periodically, and a peace establishment? Why, sir, the law has created especially if required, in the inspection returns of the and placed in immediate subserviency and responsibility Department and Inspector Generals, and in the returns to him, a corps of staff officers, called the administrative and remarks of the Quarter Master and Surgeon Gener. departments of the army, for the purpose of enabling the als and the Engineers. Assuredly, the Secretary of War Secretary of War to discharge that very class of duties must be supposed, though destitute of tacticial skill and which the advocates of this office deny him the posses- experience in the field, abundantly competent, under all sion of. There is one, an Adjutant General, who is at this advice and instruction, under the consummate skill, the head of the Bureau of official correspondence. 2. A science, and experience of his staff, to determine the Quartermaster General, with the Commissariats, for the station of 6000 men, on the American soil, in a time of purpose of administering all the supplies of clothing, sub-peace. Why,sir, it is on the same sources and means of insistence, quarters, transportation—in fine, all the facilities formation that the General-in-Chief himself is to depend, in the progress and conveniences in the location of troops. in the performance of the same duty. I will add, that, 3. A Paymaster General, whose duties are too obvious- when the posts become fixed, (as they are at present) ly explaieed by the title, without requiring a further de- the General-in-Chief has but little or nothing to do with finition. 4, A Surgeon General, having charge of what- the arrangement of troops, as the distribution of the reever pertains to the conservation of the health of the ar-cruits devolves upon the Adjutant General who, under my. 5. A chief of ordnance, for the construction, procurement, distribution, and preservation, of all ordnance and ordnance stores. 6. A chief of Engineers, to conduct all works and operations requiring scientific knowledge and skill, and to superintend the institutions established by the munificence of our Government, for instruction in military science and art. And in describing these administrative departments by their respective chiefs, I mean to include, in the same chain of dependence on the Secretary of War, their numerous subordinates. It is also important to add, that this control over them by the Secretary is exclusive-that the law keeps them aloof from the authority of the General in Chief. I am confident that this general aspect of our military organization is insufficient to shew that the Secretary of War has abundant power in the contemplation of law, by his own act, and through the agency of his staff, to administer to all the wants, interests, and concerns of the army, in a time of peace-from the construction and equipment of fortifications-from the inculcation of the love and practice of the most scientific abstrusities of the military art, to the supplying of the humblest private with the just weight and measure of his daily ration to the Secretary's sign manual on a staff subaltern's furlough, or a sutler's license. Now, sir, let us look at the office of General-in-Chief, let us examine his duties; and I venture to affirm that they will be found, in a time of peace, so slight in number and importance, that they may be easily transferred to other departments of command, without marring the symmetry of our military system, or disturbing the harmo. ny of its operations, which the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. M'DUFFIE] so much deprecates. 1. In the distribution or arrangement of troops to stations. The issuing of orders for this purpose devolves on the General-in-Chief. But there are these exceptions the President is to designate the limits of the geographical or department commands. The assent of the Secretary of War is necessary to enable the General-in Chief to fix the customary Head Quarters of the Depart ment Generals. Troops are not to garrison a fort until its completion and inspection, but by order of the Secretary of War; and the assignment of subaltern officers to ordnance, or subsistence service is only to be made by advice with the superintendent of recruits, arranges all those enlisted at a principal depot to the various regi mental and other commands. 2d. The inspection of troops. This is done.-1. By the Department Generals once in two years. 2. By the Inspector Generals, as the General-in-Chief shall direct. 3. And extra inspections shall be taken by the Department Generals, whenever the Secretary of War, or the General-in-Chief, shall order. The power of the General-in-Chief, under this head, is to control the Inspector Generals, as to time, &c. and co-ordinately with the Secretary of War, order special department inspections.— I presume that the Inspector Generals have reduced their duties to a system; they are at least susceptible of it. In that case the power of the Major General to direct him is purely nominal, and of course it will not be denied, can be changed into the hands of the Secretary of War, without increasing materially the labors of the latter, or lessening, in the slightest degree, the amount of professional ability employed. Surely the Inspector General can examine with as much fidelity and skill, and point out defects with as much truth and precision, when placed like the Quarter Master General in immediate dependence on the Secretary of War, as when standing in the inferior relation of an attaché to the General-in-Chief. As to special inspections by the department Generals, under the order of the General in-Chief or Secretary of War, they are seldom, if ever resorted to. A partnership in a prerogative, whose exercise is barely problematical, is an inadequate inducement, surely, for retaining this of fice. Why not leave it exclusively where it is placed co-ordinately, in the hands of the Secretary of War? 3d. Recruiting troops The General-in-Chief designates the recruiting grounds. He appoints the recruiting officers, and the superintendent, to whom those of ficers are to report and be responsible; and his express order is requisite for the purpose of enlisting any one prohibited by the general regulations of the army, as drunkards, persons diseased, and foreigners. According to the authority on which 1 principally rely, the army regulations, there seems to be allotted to this humble branch of the service more of the acts of the General-inChief, than to any other of the peace establishment. And no one will deny that it stands less in need of the high |