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all around, and owing it professedly to none. In like manner, where the people attend personally to their government affairs, the sovereignty is kept together in a mass; there is no partition of it, because no agency-corps to be invested with a part.

Now this great feature of our system must be thoroughly attended to in all its bearings. We suppose there are advantages in it. May there not be disadvantages in it? Few things are good without abatement or mixture. May there not be evil tendencies and hazards as peculiar to republican polity as are some of its undoubted advantages?

Observe the state of facts resulting from the very frame of such a polity. It clothes public men with half the sovereignty of the nation (so to speak) on one hand; while on the other, the electors, as such, hold the remaining half; neither party to the division having the whole power, but each a moiety only.

And imagine the consequence. Is it likely that a man intrusted with a limited political authority (the most tempting of earthly things) will not instinctively yearn for more?-will not endeavor to enlarge his stock as opportunity offers? His principles may restrain him if he be an honest man. His character may also help to hold him back. But the tendency of his corrupt nature will and must be to grasp grasp grasp. The thing is inevitable. Try it on the side of the officer. He has power, but the modicum is not sufficient. It leaves him still a deputy, a servant. There is a controlling power behind him. Can he be satisfied with the subordination, that cries fie! continually to his "pride of place?"

For a time, it is probable, the electors will keep an eye upon his movements, provided they are of a grade to do so intelligently. But long vigils lead to weariness and slumber. And if the people find that all is seemingly well for the time being; that to-day is as yesterday, and the flow of things unbroken; they will be likely to relax their vigilance, and suffer their minds to be insensibly drawn off into channels of private interests, to the neglect of their political duties. Then comes the day of ambitious enterprise for the functionary. Will he let it pass without improvement?

Office is indeed a name for duty, and implies a trust. But it is power too, and money, and distinction; and this under limits that are sure to whet the appetite for an increase of these dainties. And when the office-holder feels himself secure, and can have everything his own way, what are we to expect? What does history, observation, philosophy, warrant us in expecting? Men's integrity fails when hard-pressed by opportunity. Indeed their very judgment is apt to play truant under that temptation, and they often do wrong without conscious guilt. A tale which the teller of it knows to be false, will yet lull his own mind into credence by continual and applauded repetition. Long possession of land by another than the true owner will ripen, under the sun of selfishness, into a claim of property. Scarcely can a free servant grow old in his master's house, (the windows being closed against inspection from without,) but he is in danger of being turned into a slave-and then a chattel. Might begets right (that is, a conviction or presumption of right) in almost every one's conception. A man on horseback is a more considerable man in his own eyes than he was before he mounted; and he is capable of a rudeness towards foot-travellers that he would not venture upon as one of them. Even a pedestrian, with a stick in his hand, carries his head higher, and is less cautious whom he jostles, than if supported by his legs alone. Such is human frailty. And when we see it thus displayed in private life, and by persons not intentionally wicked or brutal, it is fearful to think of its possible developments in other circumstances, where easy principles are planted in the hotbeds of political forcing-houses, and left to all the excitements of the sun and soil, unpruned, untrained, unwatched, from year to year.

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In short, let public men alone, and trust and duty, as connected with their stations, will soon turn to "airy nothings in the minds of many; while power, sole survivor of the family of official ideas, will grow big and burly, as if it had eaten up the others, which indeed is likely to be true without a very violent metaphor.

But then it may be said short terms and frequent elections give us a remedy for all this. Do they indeed? And can they

be certainly relied on for the purpose? | one for settlement in the first instance. Will they extinguish the thirst of half- Whether the fathers or we have acted upon power for the whole? Will they root out it with the greater wisdom, is not the presthe self-aggrandizing instinct of a place- ent question. That it was a delicate and trying point to them in their circumstances, may be well affirmed. Indeed, the whole subject of the administrative sovereignty was full of difficulties.

man's nature.

True, they are good and necessary things, and calculated to have very important conservative effects, provided the precise medium could be found between terms of office too long and too short; between elections too frequent, and too few and far between? Has such a medium been arrived at? When-where--if at all? The fathers thought one thing, their descendants think another; who is right? The probable aggregate of all sorts of official terms now is less than half its original magnitude; though some of the States maintained their position nearly as at first in this respect.

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On the other hand, the electoral sovereignty itself was not an easy matter to dispose of. There, too, was power, under the provoking stimulus of felt incompleteness. Add to this, it was power in retirement; shut out from the bustle and display of public life-another disquieting circumstance. And though the reins of empire would in fact be held by the electors, their supremacy could have no visible triumphs, nor make the kind of figure to put the vainglorious passions of men at ease. Was there no danger of discontent on this score? And might not the goadings of such motives push the electors to an over

were to be instrumental in advancing to public stations? Was it not to be apprehended they might gradually trench upon the authority or liberty of these agents, and so plunge the commonwealth, sooner or later, into a modified democracy; subjecting not only men, but measures, to immediate popular dictation?

Let us take the general case as it stands. Are the enticements of power neutralized by the necessity public men are now very generally under, of going back yearly to the polls to get their commissions renew-reaching policy as regards the agents they ed? It would be nearer the truth to say, that this necessity only changes the direction of men's efforts in pursuit of their political objects, while the objects themselves remain as they were, with attractions not sufficiently diminished to let go one votary in twenty of the captivated throng. The office-holder, now unable to give up his idol, and compelled at such short intervals to go back to the people for leave to retain it, becomes a general suitor at their doors, spends his time in saying pleasant things to them; calls them whatever names he thinks they love to hear, be it democrats, be it gods upon earth. In a word, he plays the demagogue. This is his line of action, his modus operandi for securing the very ends of his ambition; especially in those parts of the country where the electoral will is forever grinding, and the true sentiment of respect and veneration for the dignity of office, consequently, at a low ebb; so that instead of correcting entirely what is evil in the tendencies of the agency system, the expedidient of over-frequent elections, while doing some good, doubtless in the way intended, has incidentally contributed to stir up a prodigious amount of cajolery and misguidance in the prevailing treatment of the popular mind.

At any rate, the point was a delicate

And then imagine the influence of a race of demagogues-men in office, wishing to keep their places, and men out of office striving to get in-imagine their influence brought to bear upon feeling already excited and misdirected in the public mind. What temptation on the part of candidates to sell or pawn the freedom of their future conduct in office for the patronage that has office to bestow. Will these mercenaries shrink from such a trade? Will the people shrink from putting the seeming gains of it into their pockets? It will indeed be losses and not gains in the end; no doubt of that; but will they see it so beforehand? or seeing, will they have the magnanimity, the good sense, the wisdom, to forego a present gratification for the sake of a greater good at some distance of time?

Assuredly, the case for which the fathers had to legislate, was of a nature to put all their prudence in requisition. The framing of democracies, and aristocracies,

and monarchies, would have been child's play in comparison with their task.

See what they had to do.

In the first place, there was wanting a vast agency mechanism for ends of ordinary government.

And things must be so managed as to bring into the service of the country a variety of personal qualities and talents, There must be men for making laws, men for seeing laws executed, men for judging in detail of common justice between party and party, men for all sorts of ministerial labor in aid of the more prominent functions of political life. In some of these walks of duty, great abilities were necessary, in some, professional skill; a measure of undoubted character for principles, in all. How was the selection to be made. That was one point of difficulty. To some extent, the people might be supposed. competent to choose their own agents. This was eminently true in reference to the legislative and chief executive functions; involving services, which though of vast importance, were not of a kind to call for much technical knowledge or specific preparation, so that the leading business of the government, and that upon which all else depended more or less, might be safely organized in the way the general liberty required, namely, by votes sufficiently numerous to express the popular sentiment of the country. Had it not been so, the republican scheme must have altogether failed as impracticable. But legislation was no mystery of art, and the people could not well be mistaken in the kind of evidence by which the fitness of a legislative agent should be indicated. High standing for integrity, good sense and acquirements, with some experience in affairs, was all they wanted. So also, the executive function (apart from its judicial subdivision) could be judged of in a general way by everybody. And these are the parts of the system where it was especially momentous that the people should be as closely and sensibly present as possible. But in descending from hence to other branches of the public service, such as the courts, particular bureaus, &c., the case became harder for the common mind to manage. It was not enough that candidates for such places were well reported of. There was to be a special adaptation of the men

VOL. III. NO. V. NEW SERIES.

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to the offices, a fitness of artificial skill, concerning which the multitude were scarce capable of forming an intelligent opinion. It would, therefore, be safer as to stations of that sort, to entrust the appointing power with persons of eminence in the government, who from their position might be expected to exert it more cautiously and discreetly than the people could. And fortunately, there was nothing in the economy of the public liberty that was likely to take harm from such an arrangement.

Still, beyond the question how far it was best to organize the public service by popular vote, how far by substituted agencies, (no inconsiderable question by itself,) ulterior matters were to be attended to. There was danger of bad men's coming into office through ignorance or incaution on the people's part, or by the arts of deceivers; and there was danger of men's becoming bad under the perverting influence of office, after their elevation to it. How were evils like these to be guarded against?

One expedient was that of dividing public power into several parts, called jurisdictions, and setting these in counterpoise against each other. Hence the wellknown legislative, executive, and judicial departments of government, each under separate charge, and fenced, as far as practicable, against encroachment from the rest. The early constitutious lay great stress upon this.

Another expedient was the territorial division of the country into states, counties, and townships; or rather the making use of these divisions (they existed already) to distribute the dispatch of public business over a wide surface, and so to prevent a plethory of the central system, and keep down the fever of the head by drawing off as much as possible of the elements of active power into the extremities.

Other securities of a personal nature were added to these; such as age, residence, property, religion, and the like; required partly in candidates for office, partly in electors, more or less in both. Nor does it need much knowledge of human history to determine that all the guards and cautions which the case admitted of, were not likely to be more than enough.

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But, in the second place, the sovereignty | to such peculiarities?-to each and every of the polls was also to be looked after. And here the first inquiry would naturally be directed to the proper vesting of this all-important power. Who should have it? From whom should it be withheld? For observe, it belonged of right to nobody, save as the constitution should give it, being a mere functionary power, to be held, not for the special emolument of individuals, but in trust for the commonwealth. Who, then, in matter of safety and prudence, should have it, and who not?

Women and children were of course out of the question. It is incompatible with female delicacy to join the scramble of an electoral contest. And as for children, they could not understand the thing at all; their votes would be no better than a lottery. So that two-thirds, three-fifths of the entire community, are thus set aside

at once.

Would it do to clothe fresh-landed aliens with a suffrage of this kind? How much better than children could they understand the use of it? Or what stake have they in the country that could be supposed to give them a proper sense of concern in the consequences

?

Finally, are there not native citizens in abundance to whom such a franchise cannot be prudently confided ?-men without virtue, without intelligence, without property, without patriotic attachment, without anything to bind them to the country, or fit them for a voice in its affairs?

It is difficult, you will say, to apply tests. It is, indeed. But it is harder still to preserve free institutions without them. Our antipathy to tests is apt to become morbid. In some forms they are odious things, but in some they are necessary. So, at least, the fathers thought; nor has their judgment in the matter fallen yet into quite universal disrepute.

I conclude, in the third place, with one suggestion more.

The fathers had to suit their measures to the social and civil elements of the land they were providing for.

What were those elements? Different classes of men, distinguished from each other, not in rank or privilege, but in education, refinement property, habits, and pursuits. Was there not something due

of them in particular? Would it do to frame the government with a view to the rich only, or the educated and refined ? Would it do to frame it in utter neglect of these portions of the general mass of citizens, as if their existence were unknown. Government is moral power in the hands of a few over the many. The balance of physical force is with the governed. Supposing, then, the people to be free, the political system must in prudence be so fashioned as to please them, lest their physical force should not be quiet under it. And how, as a whole, are they to be pleased and satisfied, unless their prominent diversities of character, business, and condition, are all taken into view, and made something of in the economy of the constitution?

Let us illustrate in the article of wealth or property. Some men are very rich, some poor, and some in middle circumstances. Would it be wise to take no note of this in framing a government for all? Would it be safe? Suppose numbers disregarded, and wealth made a test of admissibility to every kind of office whatsoever; is it likely the poor and middle orders of society would be satisfied? Or if property were disregarded, on the other hand, and not only the right of suffrage, but office too, in all its grades and forms, thrown indiscriminately to the multitude, would this be satisfactory to the more opulent classes? There might, in one case or the other, be no sudden outbreak of impatience, but there would certainly be a leaven of discontent in the body politic, calculated to put it in a ferment by and by.

All this should be avoided; and with reasonable care it may be. What is easier than to make some offices accessible to all ranks, and confine others to men of good estates? Or, if you wish a property qualification to be general and uniform, let it be adjusted to the notion of a medium between rich and poor.

As regards the franchise, there is no convenient alternative but to try for such a medium. For, since the men who have nothing are always more numerous than the rich, and often compose a majority of the whole people; if you make the suffrage universal, you annihilate the influence

of property; while, on the other hand, if | you give the poorer classes no vote, you annihilate the influence of numbers. Now, you should do neither of these things. Take the world as it is. Let those who pay the taxes, and bear the chief burdens of the state, have an influence directly proportioned to their usefulness and merit as citizens. This is just, and you cannot otherwise make them feel that they are rightly dealt with. It is therefore politic too. Yet do not hurry off to the other extreme, and stifle utterly the voice of mere numbers. Men who have nothing, are yet men; and not a few of them are citizens of high desert. Their poverty may be owing to other causes than sloth, intemperance, or dissipation. It is not always the lot of industry or enterprise, or both together, to make large acquisitions. In a free country, the voice of the poor man, as well as of the rich, must have its share of political weight. There will otherwise be a feeling of injury here also. How, then, are you to manage? As to office, there may be something like an apportionment, by opening the doors of certain employments to the property classes only, while others are made accessible to all; but in the matter of the franchise, where one uniform rule may be desirable, I see no better way than to mediate between the very rich and the very poor, by giving the right of suffrage to the inter

vening portion of society, which approaches both extremes, and is capable of feeling for the interests of both, so as to vote impartially, and with probable satisfaction to the whole community.

At any rate, the founders of our government seem to have acted upon a policy of this kind. We do not enter practically into such refinements now-a-days. We are too busy, and prefer a more dashing style of politics. Constitution-making is become a humdrum business. "Nature's journeymen" can do it, and with cigars in their mouths. It was not so at first. A republican state was then regarded as a piece of moral clock-work; a complicated mechanism, full of parts requiring the most careful and precise adjustment. And there were three great topics of interest combined in the general subject. First, government proper; secondly, the vesting and qualification of the franchise of election; thirdly, (not apart from the others, but in close connection with them,) the accommodation of the political to the civil and social system, for ends of justice and of popular peace. These topics claimed and received attention, each on its own account, and with an anxious regard to its own occasions. The result was an economy of peculiar and very decided character, which I propose to examine with some care.

THE SHADOW.

A MOON ascending, full and small,
A lone and snowy road;

And, here and there, a wild-wood tall,
With branches bare and broad.

A lone, dark figure moving by-
Its shadow goes before;
The figure and the shadow fly
As on a silver floor.

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