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bor management over the whole railway system, and thus upon the whole district served by it. It is assumed that, when the income from the harbor business does not meet expenses incurred in the harbor, the railway company, by increasing the traffic carried as a result of this terminal property, can afford to meet a temporary total deficiency, since the acquirement of a valuable trade will more than pay for the trouble of getting it in the long run.
Thus we see in the three forms the common tendency of the general public to increase its authority. The independent private dock company is disappearing, or, in other words, the aspect of the dock as an important instrument of National Economy is being everywhere emphasized instead of its importance from the point of view of Private Economy. The important inference to be drawn from this fact is that the efficiency of any form of control is being tested by its ability to meet the national needs of commerce.
Public control by the State offers uniformity of administration and the aid of great capital and credit. But the test of this form of control rests upon its owner to concentrate this support. France and Germany present two different results under this type of control. In France with its sixty-nine harbors there has been such strong rivalry for the state support that the central government has been unable to concentrate the nation's efforts sufficiently to make any one port representative of the country. In Germany, on the other hand, Hamburg is a result of a governmental policy which is capable of being focused upon one or two ports. But that this policy has been successful in Germany under the peculiar political relations which the State of Hamburg holds to the Empire, and the physical location in regard to the industrial centers, is no guarantee that it would succeed under conditions which would involve the competition of the ports of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Antwerp under one government. Any transportation policy which would divert trade from the Rhine and the Scheldt would be bitterly opposed. In fact, the relation of Hamburg to her Hinterland would be very different, and the advantage that Germany gets to-day from having one port developed on a gigantic scale over a country with numerous ports suitable only for small vessels would have to be gained, probably, under a very different policy.
The second form of public control is that provided by the Municipality. The advantage put forward under this method is the impartial treatment of the interests of the port city, the lessened interest costs on capital through a pledging of the local taxes, and a broad and comprehensive policy of administration. But unless the city like the state can succeed in bringing the industries, the real estate owners, and others into effective coöperation, the port must lag for want of proper support. To such an extent has this been true in Great Britain, that the municipal forin has nearly disappeared. To meet the conditions peculiar to Great Britain, the quasi-public corporation in the form of the “ Trust has been necessarily devised. The “ Trust " has been applied to the larger ports with great success. It brings to the ownership of the harbor and docks efficient management and a capital and credit strength sufficient for economical financing operations. In these respects the ownership of harbors and docks by railways does not differ from the Public Trust. But in the important feature of the general public's interest and convenience, the Trust shows a representative character not found in the railway management. Yet the Trust is not wholly free from the influence of large special interests which are represented upon their boards. As a rule, the shipping companies are the predominating influence, and since the dock and harbor are primarily concerned with the shipping, this is not strange. Yet there would be much gained, not only by the port, but more especially by the industrial community tributary to it, if the railway company had a larger share and more influential voice in the management of ports controlled by a trust. Beside the strong personal interest that the shipowners have in the superior efficiency of their port, the railway companies are practically well fitted to be efficient and successful dock managers. They are in a position to know the workings of their own system and those of their rivals. They are familiar with the traffic situation throughout the width and breadth of the land. They know the physical condition of the country, the location of railway properties, the position of the various industrial and manufacturing centers. They are informed as to the business prospects of every section, Such knowledge admirably fits a railway company to advise open dock management and to provide conveniences for goods which are shipped through the docks. Of course, in those ports controlled solely by the railway company all this experience and much more of advantage is brought. And when a port, which has been in the hands of a collection of local tradesmen or merchants with narrow and limited views of commercial and constructional improvements, is compared with other ports, or perhaps with the same port after a railway company has taken them over, one is inclined to favor the railway management. Yet is there a wholesome fear of putting the ports into the hands of the railway systems, which at best will manage its properties from the point of view of the money profits to the shareholder. The public, so far, has felt that its chief protection from the effects of monopoly has rested in the keeping of the terminal facilities free from the control of any one special interest centered there. Let one great steamship line control a port's dock system, and all of its rivals will soon cease to visit that port. Put the complete management into the hands of the shipowners in general, without some way to maintain the rights of the small owner, and the latter will soon be forced out of the port under the cloak of “providing accommodation according to its trade importance.” Permit one railway system to monopolize the advantages of the terminal privileges and all competition by rail, by canal, and by coasting vessels will disappear. Allow any special interest, even so broadly characterized as the term “shippers ” may imply, to have sole control and the burdens will surely be shifted to the shipowner and other unrepresented lines of business. And while the "shippers' ” advantage would lie in having the port open to the forces of competition among the lines of traffic, nevertheless the tendency will be always to tax the ship instead of the goods, to say nothing of the internal difficulties that would arise in the equitable assignment of "accommodation" among the various shippers. Give the city corporation itself the sole administration of the port and it will be found that this does not free the management from the influence of special interests, and those, too, which are inimical to the business of the city as a port; and if on the other hand the controlling majority be those interested in low dues and rates upon goods and shipping the deficits arising from the management will be thrown upon the payers of taxes in the city.
To reduce these grave faults in the management the administration should be intrusted to as broad a representation of the interests centered at the port as possible. In this respect, Liverpool
has come closest to the ideal method. Yet even here, while the import interests are well represented, the export businesses have no voice. This could be supplied in a large measure by admitting the railway companies to a participation in the port and dock affairs. The consumer would be especially represented, though indirectly. How this is so is at first perhaps not evident, but if the attempts of the home producers to force the railways to favor home products in preference to the imports in the matter of rates be considered, and how the “import rates” offered by the railway companies have to a degree (from the consumers' point of view) made the bad effects of a protective tariff less noticeable, perhaps no more need be said to show that the railway companies' interests lie at the service of the consumer. An added word of explanation may make this perfectly clear. The effect of a protective tariff is not necessarily limited to duties levied by the national government. High dock dues upon goods and vessels have the same effect. In fact, the dock dues might be so arranged as to nullify the force of “the most favored nation clause" in a foreign country's commercial treaty. Every rise of dues, therefore, whether for national or private purposes must be met by the railway companies in the protected country by lowered rates upon their lines if they would induce the foreign trade to come to its rails. As a rule the producers not located at the port would be represented likewise by the railway management. Goods that are meant for export have their prices generally fixed in the world's markets. The price of wheat fixed in the Liverpool market is perhaps the best example. Here again, if the railway company is to induce these products to move to a foreign market, they must carry them at rates low enough to allow the goods to compete in that market. Dock dues and charges are frequently so high that they exceed the profits made by the manufacturer and the carrier combined. According to the report of the New York Commerce Commission (1902), the cargo for export has often to be lightered from New Jersey to Brooklyn at a cost of 60 cents per ton. Here it is warehoused and afterwards lightered again at a similar cost to the steamer's berth at the New York piers. It is estimated that this cost of lighterage—the charges incurred in the transfer of cargo from the rails to the ship—is equal in the case of flour to the profits of the farmer, the miller, the shipper, and the retailer. Every additional expense which tends to keep the export product from competing in the foreign market, and hence keeping it from moving is a direct loss to the railway. Low carriage rates are often the result. Of course, the port city which looks upon such differentials in favor of export goods as a discrimination in favor of the hinterland would hardly feel that they were represented in the port management by the railways; but such local producers and consumers could easily be provided for through their municipal and trade organizations. But they should not be given the controlling voice in the port administration. A port is not a local perquisite by means of whose monopoly the fortunate city may squeeze its taxes for local municipal affairs, or the lucky producer situated on the dock quays may thrive regardless of the great country behind it which furnishes the body of the nation and which may justly consider the port a part of that body and a necessary part through which it is fed.
This conception of the national importance and character of the port and its facilities is in harmony with the growth of the idea regarding trade and industry in general. The former idea which thought of the local enterprise as the unit, and which in the harbor had this conception represented in the private ownership and management of its dock system, has changed or is changing to a broader conception of industry and trade, having for its unit the nation. The importance of having the management of the dock system in harmony with this changing conception is difficult to be overestimated. Not all countries need to adopt the Liverpool method, especially in those lands where the port with all its adjuncts—the railways and the canals—are under the control of the state. Here the question turns rather upon the efficiency of management as compared with the “ Public Trust," than upon the broader conception of the port's relation to the country as a whole and to other industries in particular.
The very enumeration of the technical difficulties which are involved in the bringing of a port up to date shows the extensive financial and business operations comprised in these harbor enterprises. To manage any business of this extent would require a business talent of the highest order; but when the peculiar relations of a port are considered, the question of management becomes doubly complex; and since all betterments and progress depend upon the policy of its management, the character of the