SIR,

HAVING been informed that in your fourth Volume of "The History of Jacobinifm," p. 523 and following, you have taken notice of a book which I wrote in 1797, entitled "Elements of Critical Philofophy," (London, Longman and Rees,) I have read, not without aftonishment, the mifreprefentation you` have given of Kant's principles, and the inferences you have drawn from fragments of a mutilated tranflation.

On Wednelday latt, when I paid you a vifit with my learned countryman Mr. Nitich, we requested you to explain to us, how you could be to grofsly milled, as to reprefent the fyftem of the VENE. RABLE KANT as dangerous to the moral, religious, and political Conftitution of Europe. But as you have gone a ftep farther, and branded the difciples of Kant as a fpecies of Jacobins, we had an additional motive to demand your proofs of fo invidious an affertion. We have in plain and familiar terms explained to you the nature and tendency of Kant's fyftem; difclaimed its connection with WEISHAUPT'S, or any other philofophical theory; and protefte against the authenticity of your quota. tions from the Spectateur du Nord :" it will therefore be an act of justice you owe to us and the public, to acknow ledge that you have been mifled by a falfe translation; and that, confequently, your

66

inferences are deduced from falfe premises.

There are fevere demands; but they are such as every honest man has a right to make in fimilar circumftances. It was not our wish to draw from you infincere conceffions, or fuch as your confcience might not approve; but it will appear, from the proofs annexed to this letter,

1. That your quotations are taken piecemeal from a mutilated French tranflation.

2. That Kant is fo far from oppofing the belief in Revelation, Immortality, and the existence of a Deity, that he endeavours to prove the fubjective conviction of these truths by the moft cogent and conclufive arguments; while he ftrongly reprobates the prevailing method of reafoning, by which fubjective proofs are confounded with objective, fo that the ideas of pure, or what you may call abftract reafoning, are continually croffed and intermingled with the perceptions of fenfe.

Such are the grounds upon which I demand your unconditional difavowal of the mitchievous tendency you have afcribed to the principles of Kant: for even admitting that the Critical System is liable to mireprefentation, in common with all other philofophic theories, nay, that it has actually been made inftrumental in the propagation of falfe doctrines, while it has confufed the heads of the weak, and efpecially the fanatic, does

it

it thence follow, that the Syftem itself deferves the cenfure and condemnation of thole who do not understand it? There would be an end to all reafoning, if man were not permitted to exercife that a culty, in order to diltinguifh one fpecies of knowledge from another; and if this diftinction were imputed to motives that had a tendency to fubvert cftablished governments and religions. Farther, as you have candidly admitted, before Mr. Nitich and myself, that, you have not saken your quotations fiem the original writings of Profeffor Kant, but from a French tranflation, and as you have con

led that you are unacquainted with the fundamental principles and Ipirit of Critical Philofophy, we trust you will not give us an evative anfwer.

Another point I cannot pafs over in flence: Why did you not make your quotations from my own work, or that of Mr. Nitfch? What apology can you effer for having quoted an anonymous periodical work, in preference to others which are fanctioned by the names of their authors, whom you point out as promoters of dangerous principles, and yet will not do them the juice to lay Their own words and opinions before the public Latily, with refpect to the im putation you have fuggefted, that I have per bats purpofely fupprefled the account of Kant's "Plan of a General Hicry in Copropulitical View," I have already afford you, and am willing to prove, that I have never had an opportunity of reading that Ellay, though the original was published as late as the year 1784; goriequently, in this cafe alio, your Imagination or fufpicion has led you farther than reaton could warrant. For I Eope, in the lequel, to give fuch conucing proofs of your mistake from this very Lay, as will perfectly fatisfy the Benders of your volumés, as well as the Fublic mind, which is always open to conviction. At the fame time I cannot mit to mention, that it was yelterday nly when I had the good fortune to obtain the Elay alluded to, by the favour of Dr. Metz, a phyfician of Würzburg, now refident in London, who accommodated me with "Immanuel Kant's Mifdellaneous Writings," where this paper is contained, in the 2d Volume, p. 661 and following.

I remain, Sir, with due efteem,
Your's, &c.

A. F. M. WILLICH.

Lexden, Jan. 3, 1800.

FROOFS.

1. That it was unjust to afcribe imi moral motives to Profeffor Kant; to confound his Syftem with cibers; and to im pute a mischievous tendency to bis zuritings.

The following declaration was given by Kant to the late King of Pruflia,

FREDERIC WILLIAM II. who had been informed by his depraved and fanatical minifter, MR. WOELLNER, now dif miffed, that the Philofopher of Koenigsburg had, in his work entitled " Religion within the Boundaries of pure Reason," 8vo. 1792, attempted to vilify the prin cipal and fundamental doctrines of the The King's

Bible and Christianity. letter was prefented to Kant on the 12th of October, 1794; to which an immediate anfwer was returned.

"That this book cannot contain a depreciation of Chriftianity, as it does not enquire into its principles; being devoted only to the investigation of Natural Religion. This mistake could arife only in confequence of the quotation of feveral paffages from the Bible, which have been made with a view to corroborate certain, purely rational, doétrines of Religion. But the late MICHAELIS, who adopted a fimilar method in his Moral Philofophy, has explained himself to this effect, that by juch a process of reafoning it was neither intended to introduce any thing maintained in the Bible into Philofophy; nor to deduce any philofophical maxims from the Bible: but his intention was to judge, illuftrate, and confirm rational principles by a true or fuppofed coincidence with other writers, whether they be poets or orators.' So far the authority of Michaelis.

"That I," continues Kant, "have

evinced my veneration for the Chriftian doctrines of the Bible, will, befides what I have done on other occations, he manifeft from the opinion I have given in the work before mentioned; where I have prailed the Bible as the best means of establishing and preferving in all future ages, (unabfebliche Zeiten.) a religious fyftem in a country, whofe inhabitants afpire to the true improvement of the mind. Hence I have feverely cenfured the mischievous and arrogant attempt to raife doubts and objections against those theoretical doctrines of Sacred Writ, which are involved in myftery; whether this be practifed in fchools, from the pulpit, or in popular writings: bus

the

the Learned Faculties ought not to be deprived of that privilege. This cenfure, however, is not the greateft proof I have given of my veneration for Chriftianity. The uniform coincidence of this doctrine with the purest moral and rational belief which I have exhibited in that work, is the best and mofi permanent panegyric that could be bestowed upon it; because it was from this coincidence, and not by hiftorical erudition, that Chriftianity, though it had frequently degenerated, has always been reitored to its purity; and it is upon the fame principle alone, that in fimilar revolutions, which doubt Jefs will occur in future, Christianity will again be restored.

"That I have, on all occafions, recommended to the profeffors of religion a peculiar degree of confcientious fincerity, fo that they fhould neither pretend to believe, for intrude upon their pupils, any articles of faith but those of which they are themfelves fully convinced. This internal judge I have always reprefented to myself as prefent (zur feite febend) when I was engaged in my writings, not only with a view to guard me against every error which might tend to corrupt the mind, but alfo to prevent me from ufing any expreffion which might be confidered as opprobrious. Sup. ported by fuch motives, I can fafely tranimit to your Majefty the declaration respecting my philofophical doctrines demanded from me, and given with perfelt fincerity of confcience: for in my Teventy-first year of age (1794) the idea naturally ariles, that in a bort time I fhall probably be obliged to give an ac. count of all thefe tranfactions to the JUDGE of the world, whofe omniscience beholds our hearts, and all the fprings of action.

"IMMANUEL KANT." No more, it is to be hoped, will be required on this subject.

2. That the Abbé Barruel is a Cafuift rather than a Logician, and confequently unqualified to write upon philofopbic Jubjects.

To prove this affertion, it will be neceffary to fhew that the Abbé did not understand the nature and tendency of the Critical Philofophy; that he has quoted paffages, and made propofitions which have no connection with each other; and that he has entirely omitted the oppofite illuftrations, while he has endeavoured to put a falfe conftruction upon Profeffor

VOL. XXXVII. JAN. 1800.

Kant's principles, with an avowed defign to thew an affinity between the Critical Syftem and that of Weishaupt, or other Illuminati; an affinity which does not exift. On the other hand, it is well known to thofe who are at all acquainted with the ftate of philofophy in Germany, that there is an effential difference between their respective principles, and that the objections started by Weishaupt against the fundamental tenets of Kant, are fuch as will ever prevent an union between thefe Philofophers. It will, however, be more to the prefent purpose, to give a fpecimen of the Abbé Barruel's mifrepresentation of Kant's opinions. As our antagonist has not thought proper to communicate his fragments even in the fame order which the Profeffor obferves in the Effay in queftion, we shall here recapitulate Kant's words, and refute the Abbé by oppofing them to his abfurd propofitions contained in page 523 and following of the "Hiftory of Jacobinifm," tranflated into English under the eyes of the author, and fold by the publisher of the original work.

"I. It is melancholy to be obliged to feek, in the hopes of another world, for the end and destiny of the human species." -BARRUEL.

This paffage is fo entirely repugnant to Kant's principles, and involves a propofition fo abfurd in itself, that it mult either have been warped from an antithefis (or one of the antinomies expofed by the Critical Philofophers) into a thefis, or altogether perverted in its meaning by the French Tranflator and Commentator in the "Spectateur du Nord,” from which it has proteffedly been extracted. There is no fuch impious af fertion to be found in the work of Kant before alluded to; nor is it probable that this acute writer would advance a principle inconfiftent with his philofophic fyftem.

"II. It is not of man conducted by reafon as it is of brutes led by inftinct. The former has each for his end the developement of all his faculties, while in the latter, the end is accomplished in each individual brute. Among men, on the contrary, the end is for the fpecies, and not for the individual; for the life of man is too fhort to attain the perfection and complete developement of his faculties. In the class of man all the individuals pafs and perify; the fpecies alone furvives, and is alone immortal." BARRUEL.

F

T.

To fhew the obvious misreprefentation in this paffage, which is composed of fragments from feveral diftinct propofitions of the Effay, we fhall give the reader a faithful tranflation of Kant's words, from the original, as literally as is confiftent with the idiom of the English language:

་་

"Man being the only rational creature on earth, thofe natural difpofitions or talents, which incite him to the ufe of his reafon, fhould be completely developed in the genus only, not in the indi ́vidual."- KANT. Propofition Second, p. 66.-Nature has ordained that every gradation of improvement beyond the mechanical arrangement of his animal existence, fhall be altogether effected by man hinfelt (i. c. by his moral powers); and that he shall partake of no other happiness or perfection, than what he has procured himself, not inftinctively, but by his own reafon.-After having explained that man is a moral agent, neither led by instinct, nor endued with innate knowledge; that Nature appears to have been very parfimonious in her original difpenfation of endowments; that we prepare a fabric of convenience and happinels for others, without enjoying the fruits of our progreflive exertions; and that, though it appear enigmatical why generations fhould labour and live in mitery, as it were, to fulfil the intentions of Nature, by advancing one step farther, and laying the foundation for the profperity of their fucceffors, yet this gradual progrefs is necessary, if we admit the following propofition:"A genus of animals is faid to be endowed with reafon; and, as a class of reasonable beings who all die individually, though the genus never dies, they fhould nevertheless attain the complete developement of their talents (anlagen)." KANT. Propus. Third, pages 667-669.

It is evident, from the author's own words, that the question here is not of the mortality or immortality of the foul; and that the French commentators have entirely mifunderstood the drift of the argument.

III. With refpect to man again, the end of the fpecies cannot be accomplished, that is to fay, his faculties can only be entirely developed, in the most perfect ftate of fociety.

IV. That perfect state of fociety would be a general confederacy of the earth, fo united together, that diffentions, jealoules, ambition, or wars, would ever be heard of."-BARRUELL

"The greatest problem for the buman race, and to the jolution of which man is compelled by Nature, relates to the infliturion of a civil fociety, which should adminifter univerfal justice. The higheft intention of Nature, namely, the developement of all her difpofitions in mankind, can be accomplished only in that ftate of fociety, where the greatest degree of liberty prevails; and which, though it admits a thorough independence (antagonism) among its members, ftill appoints and maintains the most exa& limits of this liberty, fo that it may be confiftent with that of others. As Natúre farther wills, that man in fociety fhould realize this as well as all other purposes of his deftiny, it follows that a cciety in which liberty fubjected to external laws is established and combined with the greatest poffible degree of an irrefiftible power, or a perfect and just civil confiitution, is the greatest taik Nature has impofed upon the human race; because the can attain her other purposes with our fpecies only by the folution and practical application of that problem."KANT. Propos. Fifth, pages 671 & 672.

"V. Thousands and thousands of years may elapfe before this happy period of perpetual peace may come; but, whatever may be the idea conceived of the free exercife of our will, it is neverthelefs certain, that the apparent result of that volition, the actions of man are, as well as the other facts of Nature, determined by general laws."-BARRUEL.

Whatever idea we may form of the liberty of the will in a metaphyfical fenfe, yet the phenomena of it in actions of man, as well as every other natural event, are determined by general laws of Nature. Hiftory, which records thefe phenomena, however deeply their caufes may be concealed, till affords us a profpect by which we may difcover them in a regular feries, if we take an enlarged view of the fanciful difplay of the human will. Thus, the actions which appear confufed and controlled by no rule in the individual, we shall recognize in the whole species as a continual, though flow, evolution of their original talent or difpofition. For inftance, marriages, births, and deaths, being much influenced by the free will of man, appear to be fubject to no rule, according to which their number could be previously determined by calculation: and yet the annual lifts of them in populous countries evince that, as well as the inconftant weather, they take place according to fixed natural laws. The

changes

changes of the atmosphere cannot be previously determined in fingle cafes; but, upon the whole, they do not fail to preferve vegetation, the current of rivers, and other inftitutions of Nature, in an uniform, uninterrupted courfe. Individuals, and even whole nations, are little aware, that while they, each according to his own mind, and frequently in oppofition to each other, purfue their peculiar aim, they imperceptibly co-operate with, and are, without their knowledge, guided by the intentions of Nature. And let us even fuppofe that mankind were made acquainted with her purposes, they would be little concerned in that enquiry.

"As men in their exertions do not at merely from instinct, like animals, and yet, upon the whole, do not proceed upon a fettled plan concerted by rational citizens of the world, it appears to be impoffible to form a fyftematic hiftory of their tranfactions, fuch a one for inftance, ́s might be composed of the bee, or the aver. The obferver cannot reprefs a certain degree of indignation, when he fes the actions and omiffions of man rerefented upon the great theatre of the world; when he finds occafionally apparent wifdom in individual cafes, but on taking a more general view of things, perceives that the whole is interwoven with folly, puerile vanity, nay even puerile malignity, and a defire of deAtruction. At length he is at a lofs what idea he muft form of that fpecies which is fo conceited of its prerogatives. There is no explanation left to the philofopher; and as he cannot prefuppofe in man, and bis general actions, any rational and peculiar defign, he endeavours to discover a purpose of Nature in the inconsistent courfe of human affairs; and thence, if poffible, to frame a history according to a fixed natural plan, though the creatures who are the objects of this research, proceed without a determinate rule. Let us try whether we can discover a guide to fuch an historical picture; and truft that Nature will endow a man with talents adequate to the completion of the piece. Thus the produced a KEPLER, who, contrary to expectation, reduced the eccentric courfe of the planets to fixed laws; and a NEWTON, who explained thefe laws from a general and natural caufe."-Vide KANT's Idea of an Univerfal History, in a Colmopolitical Piezo: Introduction, pages 663—665.— (Extracted from the fecond Volume of his "Mifcellaneous Works:" genuine edition; alle, Renger, 1799.

CONCLUSION.

Without commenting upon the incongruity of the quotations made by the Abbé Barruel; an incongruity which the intelligent and unprejudiced reader will eafily detect; I hall only add the following declaration :

It appears to me, as I have verbally ftated to the Abbé, that he has acted on this occafion from confcientious motives rather than from rational conviction. Had he defended the great caule of Christianity and Social Order with arguments clearly deduced, and proved- that the fpirit and tendency of the Critical Philofophers eventually militates against established religions and governments, I should have filently borne his reproaches, nay even made with him a common caufe. But convinced that he is mistaken, and finding that he has contributed to prejudice the world against my venerable teacher, for whom neither time nor diftance can diminith my respect, I have ventured, nay I thought it my duty, to refute affertions equally virulent and undeferved. For my own part, I shall only add, that I have uniformly, during the prefent political and religious conteft, oblerved a refpectful filence; a conduct becoming the pupils of Kant, and the inhabitants of a country where we enjoy every degree of rational liberty. Nor would I have undertaken the publication of the Elements of Critical Philofophy, had I not been repeatedly urged by my literary friends in Edinburgh, to perform that arduous task. Among thefe I have the fatisfaction to recal to my memory men of the first talents and refpectability; men now employed in the intruction of youth at that learned College. And whatever my opinions were at the time when I compofed this work, I folemnly difclaim every perfonal inference that might be drawn from a book, in which the general principles of another author are avowedly fubmitted to the examination of the learned-not with a view to diffeminate them in political circles, or to propagate them in popular pamphlets, but to exhibit the truth or fallacy of thofe principles to competent judges. I trust I have faid enough to conciliate the opinion of those who might have been prejudiced against the philofophic fyftem of a man who, for more than half a century, has ranked high in the estimation of Europe; whofe irreproachable manners are adinired by all who have the happirefs to know him; and whofe whole life is one feries of virtuous actions. Jan.10.

A. F. M. WILLICK,